Analysis: China wary of Japan after Abe’s big election win | Asian Correspondent

Analysis: China wary of Japan after Abe’s big election win | Asian Correspondent
Michele Penna, Jul 25, 2013

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe triumphed in the election for the upper house earlier this week, with the Liberal Democrats obtaining 65 of the 121 seats up for grabs. Together with their smallerA Buddhist partner, they can now muster a majority in Parliament, which counts 242 seats. The Liberal Democratic Party must be rejoicing. But what does China – up to now rather at odds with the Japan’s new administration – think of it?

The Global Times, a traditionally nationalistic outlet, does not have much optimism to share. “Abe’s toughness against China will be further fuelled… It’s hard to ease the Sino-Japan relationship at large,” reads an article published on June 23. The paper dismisses Mr Abe’s declaration that the bilateral relationship between Beijing and Tokyo is one of the most important diplomatic connections to both sides as a cliché and foresees that China “shouldn’t expect any détente in the bilateral relationship during his term.”

Others, too, highlighted that a stronger administration in Japan could mean a tougher position on the international stage, much to the dismay of the Chinese government. China Daily wrote that “Abe is moving toward security policy changes that mark a big shift in a country that has prided itself on pacifist ideals even as it built up a military bigger than Britain’s. Among those changes are an expected reinterpretation of the constitution… Another is a review of defense policies that includes a consideration of acquiring the capability to attack enemy bases when an attack is imminent and no other options exist, and creation of a Marines division to protect remote islands such as those at the core of a heated territorial row with China.”

Opinions on Weibo, the Chinese Twitter, were not as many as one might expect, but those who took the time to comment were clear-cut in their thoughts. “War maniac! He should get a lesson!” wrote one. “The dog is about to come out and bite!” warned another. Taking a more balanced position, a netizen gave experts some food for thought in the debate on Asian nationalism: “the path Japan has taken looks more and more like that of Germany in 1931, what will happen next will be the legitimization of the army and its expansion. They will engage in provocations and move to oversea areas. The U.S. is like Chamberlain, supporting Japan in order to deal with China and nevertheless will become a victim. We must be aware of this trend.”

(READ MORE: New China coast guard ships seen in disputed area)

Mr Abe, the grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, prime minister of Japan from 1957 to 1960 and former member of the Tojo Cabinet during the Second World War, is outspoken about his plans to revive Japan’s role in international affairs. He does not shy away from nationalism: in the past, he said he was looking forward to replacing the 1995 apology offered by Tokyo to Second World War’s victims and government members have criticized the way in which history is taught in Japanese schools for a lack of patriotism.

Last Wednesday, in a show of patriotism right before the election, Mr Abe visited a vessel on Ishigaki, an island close to the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku group. He reportedly told the crew that “Japan faces a grim security environment because Chinese vessels are frequently sailing to areas close to our waters, and there are consistent provocations targeted at us… I will continue to take charge and defend our territory, territorial waters and territorial airspace.”

The most controversial move envisaged by Japan’s new leader is the modification of Japan’s pacifist Constitution, which everybody believes would cause anger among Beijing authorities. In June, the Prime Minister told the public he would raise the issue after the election. The chief target seems to be Article 9, according to which “Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes,” vowing that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” To be sure, Japan has an army, and a sophisticated one, too, but Tokyo cannot use it like other nations do.

While constitutional changes could be a major issue in the future, a short term irritant could be a visit to the notorious Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese leaders convicted as war criminals are honored along thousands soldiers who died in the Second World War. As the anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the conflict on August 15 nears, eyes are fixed on the Prime Minister.

Burma: Trouble Brewing for China | asia sentinel

Burma: Trouble Brewing for China | asia sentinel
Bertil Lintner, YaleGlobal , 07 November 2012

Government tolerates freedom of expression, and the Burmese target Chinese investments
Following the Burmese government’s suspension of a controversial joint-venture hydroelectric dam project with China in the far north of the country, another flashpoint has emerged in relations between the two countries – a massive copper mine at Latpadaung, a mountain near Monywa northwest of Mandalay in Upper Burma.

The Myitsone hydroelectric project, being built to supply power to China, was cancelled in the face of strong local resistance. This time, local residents are protesting against a Chinese company. Wanbao Mining, a joint venture with the Burmese military’s main commercial enterprise, Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, or UMEH. Wanbao has been accused of destroying cultivated fields, polluting nearby water sources and desecrating Buddhist shrines. No less than 3,150 hectares of land from 26 surrounding villages were confiscated for the project.

The public outcry could also force China to rethink its often insensitive – some would say aggressive – policies towards smaller countries in the region.

UMEH’s involvement is merely as a recipient of fees from Wanbao, a subsidiary of the North Industries Corporation, or Norinco, China’s main weapons manufacturer which is also involved in other business activities.

When the agreement between Norinco and the government of Burma was signed 10 June 2010, the Chinese company said on its website that Monywa is “abundant in copper mine resources with excellent mineral quality, which is of great significance to strengthening the strategic reserve of copper resources in our country, and to enhancing the influence of our country in Myanmar (Burma).”

That influence is now on the wane as Burma tries hard to distance itself from China - which for more than two decades has exerted considerable economic, political and even military influence over this Southeast Asian country - while improving political relations with the United States, the European Union and Japan. But after last year’s suspension of the US$3.6 billion joint venture Myitsone dam project in the northern Kachin State, which shocked the Chinese, Burma must tread carefully in dealing with Wanbao Mining. For the country’s new leaders, it is a dilemma: They cannot crack down on the movement in Monywa without risking its still tenuous relationship with the West. But a continuing struggle could impact relations with Burma’s powerful northern neighbor.

The campaign against the Chinese company is led by two unlikely local heroes: Thwe Thwe Win, 29, and Aye Net, 34. Neither of the two young women has more than the compulsory five-year primary education behind her, and more than a year ago, both were selling vegetables in the local market in Monywa.

“The Chinese company came and bulldozed our fields and the Chinese officials made rude gestures at us when we came to complain,” says Thwe Thwe Win in an interview in Monywa.

The police did nothing, except arrest the two women and some of their comrades. That ignited a mass movement, at a time when freedom of expression is becoming tolerated in Burma after decades of iron-fisted military rule and when anti-Chinese sentiment is rising across the country. Student and labor activists from the old capital Rangoon and elsewhere traveled to Monywa to show support. On 26 October, more than 1,000 local miners, Buddhist monks and members of the general public defied an order by local authorities restricting access to the mine and marched past roadblocks to make merit at a pagoda inside the mining area.

The two women vow not to give up until the project is scrapped and the Chinese company leaves Monywa.

Elsewhere in Burma, people are also complaining about how China treats their country. For more than 20 years, Chinese companies have stripped large swathes of the north of trees, denuding ecologically crucial watershed areas. Chinese merchants have also flooded Burma with cheap consumer goods and fake medicines, explains a local businessman in Rangoon. “China does produce goods of good quality, but only for export to the West,” he said. “Here, they sell only junk. This is an almost racial attitude towards us.”

Even within the ruling military, anti-Chinese feelings run high. Already in 2004, a document was compiled by Lieutenant Colonel Aung Kyaw Hla, a researcher at Burma’s Defence Services Academy located in Pyin Oo Lwin, an old hill station in the highlands northeast of Mandalay.

The 346-page top-secret, thesis, titled “A Study of Myanmar [Burma]-U.S. Relations,” outlines in Burmese the policies now being implemented to improve relations with Washington and lessen dependence on Beijing. The establishment of a more acceptable regime than the old junta after the November 2010 election has made it easier for the Burmese military to launch new policies and have those taken seriously by the international community.

The thesis bluntly states that having China as a diplomatic ally and economic patron has created a “national emergency” that threatens the country’s independence. Aung Kyaw Hla, probably a committee of army strategists rather than a single person, goes on to argue that although human rights are a concern in the West, the US would be willing to modify its policy to suit “strategic interests.” Although the author does not specify those interests, the thesis makes it clear that includes common ground with the US vis-à-vis China. The author cites Vietnam and Indonesia under former dictator Suharto as examples of US foreign-policy flexibility in weighing strategic interests against democratization.

If bilateral relations with the US were improved, the master plan suggests, Burma would also gain access to badly needed funds from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other global financial institutions. The country would then emerge from “regionalism,” where it currently depends on the goodwill and trade of immediate neighbors, including China, and “enter a new era of globalization.”

At the same time, China is clearly taking the new signals from Burma seriously. In February and March this year, the Beijing-based, Chinese-language weekly Economic Observer ran a series of articles about the suspension of the Myitsone dam trying to analyze what went wrong with China’s relations with Burma. “How could something like this happen?” columnist Qin Hui asked. The 14 October Global Times, a daily tabloid published under the auspices of The People’s Daily newspaper, said in a commentary that Chinese companies need to “attach more importance to grassroots voices” in carrying out investment projects such as the Monywa copper mine. According to Burmese journalists, reporters from The Global Times are calling them with questions about pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, which never happened before.

It’s too early to say whether Myitsone, and now Monywa, will become a turning point in China’s relations with Southeast Asia, paving the way for a more tactful relationship with countries such as Burma. But popular struggles against two Chinese megaprojects here have no doubt been wake-up calls for the leaders in Beijing. Even smaller countries – and a movement led by two former vegetable vendors in a town in the Burmese outback – are now brave enough to challenge the region’s most powerful economic and political player.

(Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist based in Thailand and the author of several works on Asia. He can be reached at lintner@asiapacificms.com. This is published with permission from the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization.)

The US and the Future: Middle East to Asia | Asia Sentinel

The US and the Future: Middle East to Asia | Asia Sentinel 

Khanh Vu Duc , 07 September 2012

 

What will the next US President do, whoever he is?

Whether under President George W. Bush or Barack Obama, America’s strategy in the Middle East has been fairly consistent. Although President Obama succeeded in drawing down and withdrawing troops from Iraq, the continuing campaign in Afghanistan remains more or less the same, punctuated only by talks of withdrawal dates. If anything, Obama has reinforced America’s resolve in neutralizing terrorist leaders through the increased use of drone strikes.

However, the unilateralism so readily displayed by Bush has softened, in part perhaps by a nation subdued after the costly Iraq debacle, as well as a stagnant domestic economy. With the death of Osama bin Laden and disruption of terrorist networks, the Middle East, while still important, is slowly being supplanted by Asia.

But there is no war to be fought in Asia. To be sure, terrorism and piracy are regional US concerns, but the focus has shifted towards a more economic-oriented objective. Hampered by the recession, the US is looking towards Asia as a path towards recovery.

Turning to Asia-Pacific

Whether it is President Obama or President Romney next year, both men will not shy away from promoting an American presence in the Asia-Pacific.

Front and center is China, whose economic practices, such as currency manipulation, including issues pertaining to intellectual copyright, have been a constant source of irritation for the US. Moreover, Chinese activities in the South China Sea (claiming the entirety of the sea as Chinese) have raised alarms among its neighbors.

The US’s return will therefore serve two purposes: one, to confront China on its activities on and off the market, directly or indirectly; and, two, to improve ties between the two countries. The latter, however, may prove difficult. Most recently, China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi issued a not-so-subtle warning to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to steer clear of issues pertaining to Chinese sovereignty, specifically the South China Sea.

Not yet recovered from the economic recession, the US finds itself vulnerable. The vast fortunes spent in Iraq and Afghanistan have made for a war-weary American public, which has translated to a less confrontational (but not less aggressive, e.g. increased drone strikes) American foreign policy. Libya perhaps best exemplified this new and fairly relative internationalist, multi-lateral US demeanor.

Where the battle lines were drawn clearly in Libya, the same cannot be said about the Asia-Pacific. Competing claims over territory do not simply pit China against country “x” but also fellow American allies such as Japan and Korea over the Takeshima/Dokdo islets. Resolutions to these territorial disputes will therefore require more carrot and less stick, diplomatic finesse over military might.

The US, perhaps in anticipating the difficulties and complexities of these territorial disputes, has yet to openly come down on one side or the other, although it has maintained an interest in them. Its desire to see a multilateral resolution serves as a sore point for China, which has sought to resolve matters through bilateral negotiations, but emboldened other claimant states such as the Philippines and Vietnam.

Whether the US is truly above the fray can be argued otherwise; however, its actions thus far have demonstrated a country that is comfortable keeping its distance. Rather, the US has worked to establish and strengthen its position in the region. Joint naval exercises with allies and non-traditional partners (Vietnam) are becoming increasingly common. Instead of tackling matters head-on, American policy in the region, it seems, is to build a coalition of like-minded nations and to find strength through numbers. While American unilateralism has not faded, the American public’s appetite for unilateralism has surely been sated.

Looking at Vietnam

Vietnam, for example, a potential regional partner for the United States, proves just how difficult this outreach might be. In espousing peace, prosperity, and democracy, the US will find some countries in the area that do not place much importance on these values. Vietnam, with its record of human rights abuses and lack of democracy, will prove especially challenging, for said reason and more.

Vietnam has the undesirable situation of being China’s neighbor. This is a fact made worse than it sounds given the history between these two countries. Ultimately, size matters, and Vietnam is constantly living in the shadow of its much larger neighbor to the north.

Hanoi can neither come out against China nor can it fall in line with Beijing without upsetting the Vietnamese people, many of whom regard China with distrust. The US administration should therefore be wary of cornering the government in its dealings and pushing the country into the hands of China. Ultimatums along the lines of “take it or leave it” will achieve little, if nothing, in the long run. Having already proved its contempt for the rights and dignity of its citizens, the Vietnamese government, although desiring American weapons technology, could and would just as well purchase its armaments from other suppliers.

The Vietnamese government’s natural inclination to resist may prove to be the primary obstacle to democratic reform rather than whatever concerns voiced by China. One need only look at the slow democratization process occurring in Burma, which has thus far been free of direct Chinese interference. Presently, there appears to be little love lost between the Communists of Vietnam and China. Shared ideologies are second to financial interests. Whether Vietnam is a democracy or a Communist single-party state, China’s outlook on Vietnam will hardly change.

Undoubtedly, any US-proposed effort to reform Vietnam will be met with some suspicion by the Vietnamese people; however, if one to is to draw conclusions from events occurring within the country, it seems Vietnam is ready for democracy. If the US wishes to strengthen ties with Vietnam, progress can only come about after political reform.

The Communist Party has become fractious as intra-party rivals threaten to destabilize the government. In a multi-party state, none of this would be particularly shocking given policy and ideological differences; however, where the Communist Party’s power in Vietnam is absolute, a political coup d’état could be disastrous for a country where a sense of progress, stability, and continuity is paramount.

The institutions of old are weakening, and as fears of China’s assertiveness continue to mount, the United States can offer itself as an alternative to balance China’s rise. Although the US has made it its goal to engage China and help the latter grow to become a partner on the world stage, this should not prevent countries like Vietnam from seeking American assistance.

Rather than stamp its feet and loudly announce its arrival, the US should cultivate relationships with regional countries, so as to better its standing in the region. Efforts to promote democracy and protect human rights, such as in Vietnam, would go far to establish goodwill with the people. Rather than strong arming the government of these countries into agreement, a softer touch is required. Rather than appealing to authoritarian regimes, it may be necessary for the US to appeal to the people of these states.

(Khanh Vu Duc is a Vietnamese Canadian lawyer in Ottawa who researches on international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel.)
 

China's Navy Goes Global | Asia Sentinel

China's Navy Goes Global | Asia Sentinel
 Jens Kastner, 21 August 2012

And develops a cruise missile to supplement its seagoing arsenal
China is developing a ship-based cruise missile that has the capability to attack targets thousands of kilometers inland, snapshots published by a military enthusiast web site suggest. For the first time, that would give the People's Liberation Army Navy a weapon comparable to the US's hugely successful Tomahawk missile.

It is the newest chapter in Beijing's quest to be taken seriously as a global military power. While China has had land-based cruise missiles for perhaps a decade, the emergence of the new ship-launched ones, which are designed to carry out long-distance precision attacks against targets on land at the lowest risk to its own forces, is an indication of how far the Chinese has come since Mao Zedong was in charge.

Under Mao, China's navy was concentrated on coastal defense and for the possible invasion of Taiwan. It wasn't until Chinese military planners in the late 1990s realized that their rising country could quickly be brought to its knees by an enemy seeking to choke off the economy's supply of oil and other raw materials on the high seas.

Currently 74 destroyers and frigates as well as 63 submarines make up the Chinese blue-water navy. The new missiles, which in theory could be launched from either platform, are expected to do their share in beefing up the force. What ship-launched land-attack cruise missiles can achieve has been impressively demonstrated by the US Navy and its allies in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1995 Bosnian War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 campaign against Libya, among others.

According to James R. Holmes, an associate professor at the US Naval War College, it's clear that the Chinese Tomahawk isn't meant for contingencies in East and Southeast Asia. Against China's opponents there, they are hardly needed.

“China's inventory of land-based ballistic missiles already gives Beijing an enormous asset to Chinese diplomacy vis-a-vis countries within the missile envelope strikingly depicted in the Pentagon's annual reports on Chinese military power,” Holmes told Asia Sentinel. But, he said, outside the range of the Second Artillery, the unit controlling the PLA's arsenal of land-based nuclear and conventional missiles, the picture is different.

“There a land-attack cruise missile grants the PLA Navy an option to project power from the sea, much as the US Navy has enjoyed since the Tomahawk debuted in the 1980s,” Holmes said. “This is part of China's coming-out party as a blue-water sea power.”

In order to evolve from a Mao-inspired naval force that kept its home ports pretty much in view to one that ensures free passage for Chinese merchant fleets tens of thousands of kilometers away, Beijing not only needs continuing breakthroughs in the acquisition of weapon systems but must also send the navy to practice. Farewell ceremonies in China's naval bases have been becoming more and more familiar to the Chinese blue-water fleets ever since 2008, when China became a participating member in the international anti-piracy patrols off Somalia, having marked the first time Chinese warships operated outside their own territorial waters.

Illustrating the Somalia mission's importance to the navy’s coming-of-age are the numbers when added up: Since operations began, in stints that last about four months, Beijing has dispatched 11 naval escort task forces that usually consist of one or two destroyers or frigates and one supply ship. If deployment continues at this pace, each destroyer and frigate will have had its turn in about five years.

Because the task forces come with well over 600 sailors plus a few dozen special operations personnel, thousands of Chinese military men and women who rotate through the anti-pirate patrol operations are provided with the opportunity to get somewhere near to what could cautiously be described as real combat stations.

Chances to sail elsewhere for the odd operation and also to carry out friendly calls to far-away ports have been deriving from the Somalia mission: In 2010, Chinese warships visited Egypt, Italy and Greece. Last year, a missile frigate was diverted from the Somali coast to waters off Libya. In what amounted to the navy’s first-ever operation in the Mediterranean, it protected the evacuation of Chinese civilians amid the raging civil war. some 12,000 km from its home port.

In mid-August, also for the first time in history, the PLA navy paid a friendly visit to Israel and later made its maiden entry into the Black Sea, sailing with a destroyer and a frigate that are part of the 11th Chinese naval escort task force, to Bulgaria. The Chinese naval hospital ship Peace Ark has also been cruising Asian, African and Caribbean waters in the meantime, treating tens of thousands of afflicted people as part of a goodwill mission.

Although Chinese soldiers and sailors have fired hardly any shots during their stints off the African coast, let alone on excursions into the Mediterranean, the missions are hugely valuable because according to the PLA calculus, this hands-on experience would be badly needed if in future conflicts an enemy were to block the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz or the Malacca Straits.

Professor Holmes says a Chinese “Tomahawk” fits neatly into the equation. He finds that although such a system is of concrete use mainly for powers like the US, which unlike China do not maintain an inventory of conventional, land-based ballistic missiles that can devastate most potential opponents, in China's case, it's a very plausible choice, if only to provide Beijing's foreign policy with powerful argumentative ammunition.

“Demonstrated capability confers diplomatic influence,” he said. “This adds luster to the PLA Navy's reputation outside East Asia and to China's reputation more broadly.”

China to join ASEAN sea talks | The Phnom Penh Post

China to join ASEAN sea talks | The Phnom Penh Post
Shane Worrell and Cheang Sokha, 10 July 2012

China may not be in ASEAN, but it’s looking more and more like an honorary member – at least where the South China Sea is concerned.

ASEAN foreign ministers yesterday took a significant step towards involving the burgeoning superpower in South China Sea discussions, adopting key elements of a Code of Conduct on behaviour in the disputed waters.

Kao Kim Hourn, secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said ASEAN was now ready to meet with China over the long-awaited document that would be for “11 parties, not just ASEAN”.

“At the first meeting [on Sunday], they [senior officials] agreed that to work on the Code of Conduct ... ASEAN will meet with China to discuss the code of conduct from now on,” he said. “It is ASEAN and China.”

Senior officials, including some from China, would be involved in the final wording of the CoC, he said.

China, Taiwan and ASEAN members the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam and Malaysia have all made claims on the resource-rich waters that have become a powder keg under the ASEAN chairmanship of China’s close ally Cambodia.

Anxieties about the CoC have intensified this year as activities in the waters increased.

In 2002, ASEAN members and China agreed on a Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC), but it was never fully implemented.

Yesterday’s announcement came just hours after Prime Minister Hun Sen officially launched this week’s ASEAN meetings, which included yesterday’s 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, in front of hundreds at the Peace Palace in Phnom Penh.

During his opening address, the Prime Minister said ASEAN “should give emphasis to the implementation of the DoC, including the eventual conclusion of [a CoC]”.

ASEAN secretary-general Surin Pitsuwan acknowledged yesterday there had been “rising interest” since the ASEAN regional forum in Hanoi in 2010.

“I think this has something to do with the heightened attention to the issue and the realisation and awareness that the region must be able to show the international community that it is manageable and we are trying to manage it in the best possible way,” Pitsuwan said.

The Chinese Embassy in Phnom Penh released a statement underscoring its commitment to implementing the DoC, adding that it had been engaged in “informal discussion” on how to “jointly formulate a code of conduct in the South China Sea”.

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To contact the reporters on this story: Shane Worrell at shane.worrell@phnompenhpost.com
Cheang Sokha at sokha.cheang@phnompenhpost.com

China boosts role in regional security bloc | The Straits Times

China boosts role in regional security bloc |  The Straits Times
Kor Kian Beng, The Straits Times, June 08, 2012

The Chinese have a saying, si hai zhi nei jie xiong di, which translates literally as "within the four seas, all men are brothers".

But when ties with maritime friends are less than chummy, one alternative is to move closer to continental friends.

Observers say China's leading role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a regional security bloc that also comprises Russia and four Central Asian states, has taken on added significance in the light of recent developments.

The South China Sea dispute, most recently over the Scarborough Shoal, has heightened tensions between China and Southeast Asian claimants, particularly the Philippines.

The United States' so-called 'pivot' to Asia will see more American warships deployed to the region by 2020, and closer defence cooperation between Washington and its Asian allies and partners, such as South Korea to the east of China and the Philippines to the south.

Given the strained relations, Beijing might find merit in bolstering ties with the other members of the SCO, according to analysts.

This could explain China's decision to extend massive loans and pledge its commitment to developing the four Central Asian members - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

On day two of the SCO annual summit in Beijing yesterday, President Hu Jintao said China would offer US$10 billion in loans to group members, although he did not elaborate on how the funds would be used.

The latest pledge mirrored an earlier US$10 billion loan offer, made at the June 2009 summit, to help the Central Asian states tackle the global financial crisis.

While it is not known how much money from the 2009 offer has been disbursed, China has said on previous occasions that it would "continue providing member states with concessional loans".

At a press conference yesterday, Vice-Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping did not respond directly when asked by The Straits Times whether the South China Sea row had led Beijing to place greater emphasis on the SCO this year.

However, in what appears to be a veiled swipe at the US role in Afghanistan, among others, he said all SCO members had noted and objected to the rise of "interventionism" by certain countries in the domestic affairs of others.

"You can't say that just because you dislike a country's system, you can then think of ways to overturn its government," he added.

Russia is the only other global heavyweight in the SCO, which was formed on June 15, 2001 in Shanghai to foster collaboration in areas such as military cooperation, intelligence-sharing and counter-terrorism.

Being the economic juggernaut of the region, China is well-poised to increase its influence over the group's poorer Central Asian members.

Notably, the SCO is the only international grouping with no US participation.

The group thus provides an ideal stage for China to boost its international stature and advocate its preferred world order, which could attract states weary of a West-centric power structure.

Beijing's growing focus on the SCO might also make its maritime neighbours think twice about standing up against China or throwing their support behind the US.

While the SCO appears to be an excellent vehicle for China to make more friends, there are obstacles that could trip it up, according to foreign policy expert Yang Cheng from the East China Normal University.

For one thing, China must avoid giving the impression that its involvement is motivated by self- interest, he said.
It must act as "a service provider", which he described as a role that rallies members to a common vision, institutionalises the group's procedures and reaches out to outsiders, including even the US.

"Western countries are already present in Central Asia. It is impossible to remove or ignore them," Dr Yang said.
"By reaching out to the West, it could quash criticism that the SCO is anti-West. It might even attract more countries to the group."

China gives Cambodia 19 millions military aid before meet

China gives Cambodia 19 millions military aid before meet
Vong Sokheng, 29 May 2012

China granted Cambodia about $19 million in defence aid yesterday as part of a military agreement signed between the two countries.

The pledged funds came less than 24 hours before Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie is scheduled to speak at the ASEAN Defence Ministers meeting, ostensibly to explain the country’s stance on the disputed South China Sea.

ASEAN members the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, along with China and Taiwan, claim portions of the resource-rich body of water, and it has been a flashpoint of conflict for years.

In recent weeks, the temperature has heated back up, with China and the Philippines sending boats to a disputed reef that both countries claim.

“It is good that is he is going to explain China’s stance directly to ASEAN defence ministers,” Cambodian Minister of Defence Tea Banh said in explaining Cambodia’s decision to invite China’s top-ranking defence official to speak.

Calls to the embassies of Vietnam, the Philippines and China seeking further clarification about today’s meeting were not returned yesterday.

Last week, representatives from ASEAN countries polished a draft of a Code of Conduct governing relations in the South China Sea.

The final version is due to arrive in China over the summer.

The military agreement was signed after a closed-door bilateral discussion between Tea Banh and China’s Guanglie.

Guanglie came to Cambodia on Sunday for a four-day official visit. He is also scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Hun Sen.

Tea Banh said that China will continue to support members of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces who train in the country.

“Chinese assistance is greatly contributing to building Cambodian army’s capacity in national defence, and the military co-operation between China and Cambodia has really improved,” Tea Banh said.

He also reaffirmed Cambodia’s stance to support the “One-China” policy, in which China claims sovereignty over Taiwan.

China will not use force in Spratlys, says new envoy

China will not use force in Spratlys, says new envoy
Jerry E. Esplanada, Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 16th, 2012 

China does not intend to invade or use its military might to interfere in the affairs of any of its neighbors, including the Philippines and four other countries claiming ownership of the Spratlys in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea), Beijing’s new ambassador to Manila said Thursday.

“We have no ambition or ability to pose a threat to other countries … What we want to do is to protect China’s interests, protect its borders and sovereignty. That’s all,” Ambassador Ma Keqing told a news conference held Thursday at her residence in Dasmariñas Village, Makati City.

Asked about the US plan to increase its military presence in the region, Ma said “China has responded very calmly” to the issue.

“The Asia-Pacific is wide enough to accommodate (both) the US and China,” she said.

Ma, who assumed her post only two months ago, noted the 11.2-percent increase in China’s military budget this year might have “aroused suspicions” among other countries about its real intentions. She emphasized that China’s military policy was “purely defensive in nature.”

She pointed out that the growth in China’s military budget had been “very minimal” for a long time. “We increased the growth just to compensate for the previous years of neglecting the military budget,” she said.

Ma said the bulk of military expenditures had been used “for logistics, for improvement of the officers’ well-being, to increase wages and so on. It was only in the last few years we used the increase in budget to purchase  hardware for the military.”

The military budget was “only 1.3 percent of the total (government) budget,” she stressed, pointing out that it was much lower than that of the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, India and Brazil.

“So with such a military budget, I believe the Chinese Army will not pose any threat to other countries,” she said.

Alarm bells

Early this month, Beijing announced that its defense budget would increase to 670.27 billion yuan (about $106.41 billion) this year. The amount marks a slowdown from 2011 when its budget rose by 12.7 percent but still set off alarm bells across Asia and the United States.

In January, Washington disclosed a defense strategy focused on countering China’s rising power.

In her first news conference in the country, Ma expressed hopes the Philippines and China could “finally find a way to start the negotiations” on the joint development of areas in the West Philippine Sea.

“As Chinese, we are patient. But with patience and wisdom and goodwill, we can finally find a way,” she said. “Our thinking is that pending the final resolution of (the Spratlys dispute), we should shelve and put aside our differences and have a joint cooperation (agreement).”
“The resources are there to tap,” Ma said, adding that economic development “is our priority” for China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei, which are claiming ownership over the Spratlys.

Joint development

“But since it’s in the disputed islands, no one can take action unilaterally. So the proper way to do that, or the starting point is to shelve differences and disputes and have joint cooperation,” she said.

Earlier, Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario told the Philippine Daily Inquirer that the joint development of areas in the West Philippine Sea that “are clearly ours is not a viable option” to the country’s problem with China. But he said the Philippines “is open to considering joint development in the disputed areas.”

Del Rosario said he “reiterated our position that we are open to inviting China to the Recto Bank (Reed Bank) as an investor to be governed by our laws” during a recent meeting with Wang Yingfan and Wang Chunqui, two former Chinese ambassadors to the Philippines who were here on a goodwill visit.

The Recto Bank is an “integral part of the Philippines and, as such, cannot be jointly developed,” he said.

During the news conference yesterday, Ma said China “is not against the rules-based interpretation of the dispute.”

“We also endorse international norms that we should abide by. But one cannot side only with few clauses of the (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or Unclos) and neglect other clauses,” she said.

Other treaties

“There are more international norms than (Unclos). Even according to this treaty, we can find some arguments to support China’s stance. There’s a little bit of misunderstanding that China does not abide by international rules and only to historical facts. Unclos is just one treaty. There are other treaties,” she said.

Del Rosario has repeatedly asserted that a rules-based approach is the “only legitimate and viable way to address disputes in the West Philippine Sea.” The Philippines has been pushing for the availment of the dispute settlement mechanisms under Unclos.

No longer Cold War

She expressed hopes the United States “will take a constructive and positive role to make this region more peaceful and stable.”

“We believe and hope that there is a possibility for China and the US to have cooperation in this region rather than confrontation, I like to believe that based on this argument this is not anymore Cold War. We are living in a new world. We are living in a global village, and we are so interdependent,” she said.

At the same time, she expressed optimism that “all countries in this region can develop their economies and improve the well-being of their people.”

“China has its own interests. Being an Asian country, it’s only natural. We hope our interests will be respected by others, including the US, the Philippines and other countries. At the same time, we respect the interests of other countries. In that way, we can have mutual trust and enhanced cooperation. At the end of the day, economic development will determine the development of a nation,” she added.