The Great Game Over Burma | The Irrawaddy

The Great Game Over Burma | The Irrawaddy
 AUNG ZAW / The Irrawaddy, June 10, 2015

China’s President Xi Jinping, right, and Burmese President Thein Sein attend an official welcoming ceremony as Thein Sein arrives for the Boao Forum, in Sanya, Hainan province, on April 5, 2013. (Photo: Reuters)Burma’s opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi began a five-day visit to China on Wednesday, the first time the National League for Democracy chairwoman has made an official trip to Burma’s northern neighbor.

In this April 11, 2013 story, The Irrawaddy looks at the changing dynamics of Burma’s relationship with China, and the wider world.

The recent political opening in Burma surprised many neighboring countries, including China. The government’s reforms have no doubt received welcome applause, but for Burma’s traditional friends and foes, they have also created room for new competition in the country. The rules of the game have changed quickly in Burma, and the world is watching to see how international relations, particularly with China, shift in turn.

Since Burma regained independence from the British in 1948, leaders and diplomats at the Foreign Affairs Ministry have devoted most of their time, energy and resources to improving ties with China. We have seen rocky relations as well as honeymoon periods between both countries.

In the past, China had openly supported Burma’s banned Communist Party. At points, the East Asian superpower even dispatched troops to the northern territory of Kachin State—forcing Burma to set rounds of border demarcation meetings in the 1950s and 1960s. Burma also saw anti-China riots in 1967, as Beijing stirred up disturbances by encouraging Chinese agents to support Communist cells in the country during the Cultural Revolution period.

Although both countries signed a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression based on five principles of peaceful coexistence, China has sometimes breached these core principles to test the so-called paukphaw relationship, while Burma has avoided antagonizing its northern neighbor.

Though many Burmese political observers dislike Gen. Ne Win, who came to power through a coup in 1962 and ruled Burma with an iron fist until his regime was ousted in 1988, some give him credit for playing a “neutral” foreign policy during the Cold War, which they say saved Burma from becoming the puppet of any giant power in the region or the West. For the Chinese Communist Party, Burma served as a buffer zone to deter proxies of the West along with India and the Soviet Union.

Certainly, however, in the back of their minds, Burma’s leaders have always feared China. Burma’s late Prime Minister U Nu, who held numerous meetings with Chinese leaders to settle several disputes, once publicly expressed this fear in a statement after the Chinese Communist Party assumed power in 1949. “Our tiny nation cannot have the effrontery to quarrel with any power,” he said. “And least among these, could Burma afford to quarrel with new China?”

But the situation is changing now. Last weekend, Burma’s President Thein Sein visited China, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. During his three-day visit for the Boao Forum, a summit of government and business leaders, Thein Sein played relatively safe but firmly stressed that Burma would practice an independent and active foreign policy while still adhering to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. He said Burma would focus more on developing ties with other countries in the Southeast Asian region. He also urged China to invest responsibly in Burma and to earn the trust of local Burmese people.

As Burma’s leaders continue to forge closer relations with the West and other Southeast Asian nations, the Chinese, like everyone else, are preparing to adapt.

Recently, the outgoing Chinese ambassador publicly met democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyidaw. Chinese diplomats have acknowledged previous meetings between them. To handle Burma going forward, China has appointed a veteran diplomat in Asian affairs, Yang Houlan, who served in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. His appointment is reminiscent of the past. In 1963, a year after Ne Win took power, China appointed Geng Biao as vice foreign minister to Burma. Geng Biao was a senior diplomat who had served missions in Europe soon after the formation of the People’s Republic of China.

In the face of rising Western influence, it is likely that China will employ “soft power” to win back the hearts and minds of the Burmese people. During a previous visit, Thein Sein confessed a fondness for Chinese television dramas. “Since childhood, I’ve been watching Chinese television,” the president told China Radio International.

On the political front, Yang Houlan’s appointment as ambassador and China’s involvement in ceasefire talks between Kachin rebels and the Burmese government are signs that Beijing is serious about settling Burma’s lingering ethnic conflicts, which have threatened border stability as well as Chinese gas pipelines and a railway project in the country. Kachin military leader Gen. Gun Maw, who is now involved in ceasefire dialogues with the Burmese government, told The Irrawaddy that Kachin leaders asked international observers including the United States, the United Kingdom and the United Nations to observe the peace talks, but that the Chinese did not want any outsiders (i.e. Westerners) getting involved. Instead, China invited the Burmese government and Kachin leaders to hold a series of meetings on Chinese soil.

A stable and prosperous Burma will no doubt benefit everyone. However, Burma’s improved relations with the West, and particularly with the United States, will complicate relations with China. The more Burma improves ties with the West, the more Western influence in the country is expected to rise.

Burma has seen growing anti-China sentiment at home. Most ordinary people in the country were repulsed by Beijing’s support for the previous brutal regime, and many continue to protest against China’s extraction of natural resources with little regard for the environment and local populations. Some critics say China has only given its support to exploit Burma’s natural resources and gain strategic access to the Indian Ocean.

China is Burma’s largest investor, channeling between US$14 billion and $20 billion into the country since 1988. Energy-hungry China has poured money into hydropower projects in the country’s ethnic regions, and its three major oil corporations have a strong foothold. Many Burmese worry that Chinese investments and aid programs are like a Trojan horse. However, given the government’s suspension of the China-funded Myitsone dam project and public protests over the controversial Letpadaung copper mine, it seems likely that civil society groups will target many more Chinese-backed projects in the future and that these investments will become political time bombs.

The fact is that Burma no longer needs to hide behind China. Nevertheless, pundits argue that Beijing will not let go easily. When former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Burma for the first time in November 2011, Chinese leaders played it coy. The Global Times newspaper, a mouthpiece for the Chinese government, wrote during Clinton’s visit that China did not resist Burma’s attempts to improve relations with the West but would not accept “seeing its interests stomped on.” The message was clear: China would not tolerate Burma becoming an ally of the United States.

In October 2011, Burma announced its decision to suspend construction of the Myitsone dam in Kachin State, a project that had provoked strong public opposition. China was bewildered by the announcement, which came just five months after Thein Sein’s first official visit to Beijing, where he signed nine cooperation agreements including a $765 million credit package and a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.

But the question remained, would Burma turn against China? The answer is simple: no. Burma doesn’t yet have that luxury.

It will be interesting to watch how Burma handles the delicate balancing act between China and the rest of the world, maintaining its old alliance while proving it is not a satellite state. Burma’s generals are well versed in the art of pitting international powers against one another. But if Burma falters at the game this time, the country’s leaders will no doubt face accusations of playing with fire.

Just before her trip to Burma in 2011, Clinton, who announced the US policy of a pivot toward Asia, received a counterbalancing message from Naypyidaw: Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, commander in chief of Burma’s armed forces, flew to China to meet with then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. The military chief signed a defense cooperation agreement, and the two sides talked of enhancing their comprehensive strategic partnership.

At home, Thein Sein told Clinton that Burma would continue its relationship with China while strengthening ties with other countries. He pointedly called Beijing a strong, geopolitically important partner that had encouraged Burma to improve relations with the West. Ironically, China secretly hosted a rare meeting between Burma and US officials in Beijing just four years earlier, in 2007.

In September 2012, before making his first official visit to the United States, Thein Sein traveled to China. Ne Win, the former dictator, likewise received Chinese leaders in Rangoon before making trips to the West, and they urged him not to make political commitments to the United States.

Washington is also being careful not to upset China. During his historic visit to Burma in November last year, President Barack Obama said in a speech that the United States welcomed China’s peaceful rise. And when asked whether US policies in Burma centered on relations with China, US Ambassador Derek Mitchell told The Irrawaddy that his country’s increasing engagement was “about Burma.”

“It’s always been about Burma,” he said. “There’s a misunderstanding in China, and even among some commentators, that everything we do in Asia is about containing China or encircling China, but that’s simply not the case. Our policy toward Burma has been about Burma for 20 years, 25 years, before China was so-called rising or re-emerging. Our policy toward Burma is evolving because Burma itself is evolving.”

Burma and the United States both understand they must not agitate China. But almost everyone else in Burma, except for those embedded with the Chinese, seem more than ready to welcome the West. They know it is the best way to counter Chinese influence.

Though it has sparked ongoing debate in Naypyidaw among top leaders and opposition members, Burma’s bid to escape China’s shadow is obvious. Last year, Min Aung Hlaing visited China’s historical adversary Vietnam before going to Beijing. In addition to visiting China soon after his appointment to the presidency, Thein Sein went to India, indicating a desire to diversify Burma’s portfolio of strategic partners in the region. His former boss Snr-Gen Than Shwe did the same, making two state visits—to China and India—before leaving his throne.

Burma also seeks to expand defense ties with its neighbors. In the past, Burmese leaders allegedly allowed China’s listening posts and a radar facility on Burma’s Great Coco Island, reportedly to monitor regional military activities, especially air and naval movements in the Bay of Bengal, and to conduct surveillance of India’s strategically important tri-service facilities at Port Blair o n South Andaman Island. But in March, Burma and India conducted joint naval exercises and patrols in the Bay of Bengal, while India also reportedly ran a training program for Burma’s armed forces, including exercises for pilots of the Russian-built Mi-35 helicopter gunships.

In February, Burma also sent its two frigates, UMS 561 and UMS 562, to the Thai island of Phuket for the first time in 18 years. Thanasak Patimaprakorn, supreme commander of the Thai armed forces, said in Bangkok that the visit of the Burmese ships was intended to celebrate 65 years of diplomatic ties between both countries, with expectations for closer military ties going forward.

Since improving relations with the West, Burma has been invited by the United States to observe the annual Cobra Gold military exercise in Thailand. In the near future, the United States will likely provide non-lethal training to Burma’s army officers. And last month, Australia announced it was lifting restrictions on military engagement with Burma in recognition of the country’s democratic reforms.

Burma will probably bolster relations with Japan as well. Ties between both countries date back to the World War II era, and Japan’s interests run deep in Burma. Not wanting to miss the train now, Tokyo recently decided to resume aid in Burma, and more Japanese companies and NGOs will soon play a counterbalancing role against Chinese influence.

As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), Burma could also assume a proactive role in the regional grouping, as it did during the golden days of the 1950s. Ironically, Asean allowed Burma to join in 1997 because it wanted to pull the pariah state from China’s sphere of influence, but Burma’s reliance on its northern neighbor deepened. Now 15 years later, Burma must act with urgency to develop a foreign relations strategy for the world—not just China—as it integrates more with Asean, India and the rest of Asia.

Of course, Burma must get its house in order first, paying serious attention on the domestic front to its northern territory, where the national government has never been able to establish its law and order. (In 2010, Burma could not hold elections in the Wa region, and soon afterward fierce fighting broke out in Kachin State.)

But as the country continues opening up, Burma will test its independent and active foreign policy when it hosts Asean foreign ministers in 2014 at a summit in the country. Everyone will watch to see how the former pariah state exerts its emerging international status to placate neighbors and new friends from the West.

Is China Betting on a Suu Kyi Presidency? | The Irrawaddy Magazine

Is China Betting on a Suu Kyi Presidency? | The Irrawaddy Magazine
ECHO HUI / THE IRRAWADDY, Friday, January 17, 2014

RANGOON — China seems to have softened its stance toward opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party amid a democratic transition in Burma that could see the former political prisoner one day elected president.

More visible efforts have been made by China in recent months to reach out to Burma’s biggest opposition party, which many expect will beat out the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in elections scheduled for 2015.

In December, a 10-member delegation from the NLD led by Nyan Win, the party secretary and a close confidant of party leader Suu Kyi, traveled to China at the invitation of the Chinese People’s Institute for Foreign Affairs, a semi-official Chinese organization.

The visit by the NLD members was the fourth of its kind last year, and came as both sides seek to enhance engagement ahead of parliamentary elections in 2015, according to analysts. Following the polls, the new Parliament will select Burma’s next president.

Chinese Ambassador to Burma Yang Houlan told The Irrawaddy this week that China stands ready to engage with all of Burma’s political parties, including the NLD, as long as they are willing to help further the sound development of relations with China. He also assured that China would continue to maintain inter-party exchanges with the NLD in future.

“Myanmar-Chinese friendship and cooperation will not change fundamentally, but the way to deal with it has to be reviewed as there are new actors involved,” said former Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win in a meeting on the recent developments of Burma’s reform last week. “Previously it was easy because there was only the government, but today we are practicing multi-party democracy.”

Meanwhile, Chinese state mouthpiece the Global Times published an interview with Yang on Oct. 21 of last year, in which the ambassador said his embassy would like to arrange a visit for Suu Kyi to China “at a convenient time for both sides.”

Though no concrete date has been set and Yang said Suu Kyi’s visit is “still out of the schedule,” the ambassador acknowledged that given her international profile and popularity among Burma’s people, an invitation from China was only a matter of time.

A retired deputy director general at Burma’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyee Myint, told The Irrawaddy that understanding sentiment toward China among the Burmese people was one of Beijing’s most important challenges. “The government of China has more capacity to control its own people, especially its business people, but China cannot control Myanmar’s people and their wishes,” he said.

Yang too stressed mutual respect between the two nations, adding that China would honor Burma’s democratic process and would not interfere in its internal affairs.

Suu Kyi has expressed a willingness to visit China in the past, but she has insisted that the invitation should come from the Chinese government. She has previously declined invitations that came from semi-official Chinese organizations.

The Burmese democracy icon Suu Kyi’s relations with China are a relatively new development. For decades, the Chinese government refrained from any formal contact with Suu Kyi or her party, with her strong pro-democracy stance at odds with China’s own record of human rights abuses under a one-party communist regime.

Burma has undergone seismic political changes since Snr-Gen Than Shwe, who sat at the top of the country’s military regime, officially stepped down to make way for his hand-picked successor, President Thein Sein. The latter took office in March 2011 and has since introduced democratic reforms to the nation’s formerly authoritarian political system.
Thein Sein early this year said he supported changing the country’s  Constitution to allow “any citizen” to become president, an apparent reference to Suu Kyi, whose political ambitions are constrained by a military-drafted Constitution that bans her from running for president.

However, Than Shwe is considered to still wield influence among leaders of the quasi-civilian government, and the retired dictator in October was reportedly “concerned about the ongoing political process,” according to Shwe Mann, a member of the former regime and current speaker of Parliament. That, and a shrinking window in which to pass constitutional amendments that would then need to be ratified by a national referendum, have cast doubts on the viability of a Suu Kyi presidency.

Is China wooing Burma to maintain its projects? | Asian Correspondent

Is China wooing Burma to maintain its projects? | Asian Correspondent
Zin Linn, Jun 25, 2013

President of  Burma Thein Sein received a Chinese delegation led by Member of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Mr. Yang Jiechi at the Credentials Hall of the Presidential Palace in Nay-Pyi-Taw on Monday, the state-run New Light of Myanmar newspaper said. Yang arrived in Nay-Pyi-Taw, the country’s new capital, on Sunday for a two-day visit at the invitation of the Thein Sein government.

According to the Chinese State Councilor, the two countries are traditionally friendly neighbors and Sino-Myanmar relations and bilateral cooperation were underway. He acknowledged great steps made by consecutive leaders cementing bilateral relations and mutual friendship. Yang Jiechi highlighted the President’s efforts for steps forward in bilateral friendship and cooperation in culture.

President U Thein Sein received a Chinese delegation led by Member of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Mr. Yang Jiechi at the Credentials Hall of the Presidential Palace in Nay-Pyi-Taw on 24 June 2013. (Photo: http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/)

Yang also acknowledged peace talks between the Burmese government and the KIA group held in Myit-kyi-na, the capital of Kachin state, saying China was pleased about it. Yang said he looked forward to seeing a ceasefire agreement as early as possible to build lasting peace and stability along the China- Burma borderline.  China will continue playing a positive role in these relations, he said.

Moreover, he said  his country always respects the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Burma. He also guaranteed to work together for development of both nations’ border-regions and economic development.

Yang expressed hopes for the implementation of the Kyauk-pyu Industrial Zone Project and said China seeks to play a part in the tasks of ensuring development of the southwest part of  Burma. He also made an offer to assist Burma in its XXVII SEA Games, the New Light of Myanmar said.

President Thein Sein said that the people of the two neighboring states have a good relationship, considering that they share a 2000 kilometer-long border. There is a history of bilateral cooperation between the two nations and completion of mutual comprehensive strategic partnership had started during his trip to China in 2011, Thein Sein said.

The country had seen extensive reform processes after his government took office and it was necessary to take lessons from China’s experiences of stability and economic growth within a 30-year time frame. He expressed thanks for the Chinese contribution to disbursement of loans for development of the agriculture sector.

He expressed his country’s welcome towards China’s investment which should assure to create good business enterprise environment and make certain the smooth launching of the two countries’ cooperation projects.

Regarding efforts in seeking peace and stability in the nation, President Thein Sein said his government would carry on driving the peace process to be aware of peace in the Kachin state and guarantee a peaceful borderline involving the two countries.

The President mentioned his thanks to Kyaukpyu Industrial Zone Project as a regional development. He also expressed thanks for the Chinese offer for opening and closing ceremonies of SEA Games and for assisting in Burma’s ASEAN Chairmanship in 2014.  In addition, he showed gratitude for donation of three Buddha tooth relics to Burma for public obeisance in Yangon and Mandalay.

Next, they held comprehensive discussions on matters related to development of the sectors of health, ensuring peace and stability in border regions of the two countries and cementing bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership, the state-run newspaper said.

Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi also had talks with Burma Vice President Nyan Tun and met the House Speaker Thura Shwe Mann during his visit. He exchanged words widely with Burma parliamentarians, members of political parties and different officials on promoting the two countries’ relations.

According to the Arakan Human Rights and Development Organization, China is planning to construct a major railway-line to link Yunnan Province’s capital of Kunming with the Kyaukphru deep-sea port and special industrial economic zone. The rail line is expected to be completed in 2015 and will provide China’s land-locked southwestern region with a trade outlet to markets in South and Southeast Asia, via Burma’s ports. A disregard of human rights for local stakeholders related to Burmese-Chinese managed development projects on Ramree Island in Arakan/Rakhine state has already been documented, AHRDO said.

China dominates the construction sector in Burma, including numerous hydropower projects and a deep-water sea port project in Kyauk-phru in Rakhine State. The most important Chinese project is a gas and oil pipeline across Burma from Kyaukphru to Ruili, on the China border. The 771-kilometer-long pipeline will provide a shortcut to carry crude oil from Africa and the Middle East into China instead of the sea route via Malacca Strait. The natural gas will come from fields off Burma’s west coast.

Afterward, the 771-kilometer-long Chinese pipeline project has been criticized by local inhabitants with reference to unfair land grabbing, controversial compensation and environmental disaster. Chinese companies should abide by the international norms doing development projects with respect to the voice of the people who live in the province.

According to analysts, criticism of the development projects has been swelling in Burma as pro-democracy and environmental activists have started using their citizens’ rights under the new government, which is calling itself a reformist and working to become a democratic administration.

However, President Thein Sein government has suspended a controversial $3.6 billion Myitsone dam hydroelectric power project in September 2011 since the Chinese-financed project has faced objections from various social strata nationwide, according to the media reports.

Why Burma is of Growing Importance to China | The Irrawaddy Magazine

Why Burma is of Growing Importance to China | The Irrawaddy Magazine
WILLIAM BOOT, November 27, 2012

Burma’s strategic importance to China will grow as Beijing’s dependency on the Middle East increases and the United States’ declines. That’s the message in a new assessment of trends in oil production and consumption over the next two decades by the International Energy Agency (IEA).

Iraq supplied only five percent of China’s oil imports in 2011—around 275,000 barrels per day—but this will increase to more than eight million barrels per day by 2035, IEA Chief Economist Fatih Birol forecast in a study on consumption trends. This will come on top of rising Chinese imports from Saudi Arabia.

Burma’s significance in this is as a conduit for Middle East oil bound for Chinese refineries.
One oil pipeline now being built through Burma into neighboring China’s southwest Yunnan Province by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will begin pumping Middle East oil from around the middle of next year.

When it reaches full capacity the pipeline will carry up to 23 million metric tons per year, Beijing’s Global Times newspaper reported. That’s not a huge amount per se but could be the vanguard of much bigger transshipments of Middle East crude through Burma in the future.

CNPC is spending a total of US $4.7 billion on the current pipeline and a dedicated transshipment terminal at Kyaukphyu, Arakan (Rakhine) State, to handle oil tankers from the Middle East.

“If the Burma pipeline scheme isn’t undermined by armed turmoil by militias operating in some of Burma’s northern regions then it is quite likely that the Chinese NOCs [National Oil Companies] will want to build more pipelines through the country,” regional independent energy industries analyst Collin Reynolds told The Irrawaddy.

“If China is going to increase its imports of oil from Mideast countries it also is going to want to take whatever steps it can to limit the risks of using the sea route through the Malacca [Melaka] Strait. That’s why the Chinese have invested in Burma as an alternative and they are also going to want to protect that route also.”

India has also been expressing concerns about the increased presence of Chinese Navy vessels in the Indian Ocean.

The CNPC and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation are investing billions of dollars in Iraqi oil fields, said the IEA, leading Iraq to soon emerge as the world’s biggest oil producer after Saudi Arabia—with China its biggest customer.

“Increasing oil imports from Iraq is very possible and beneficial for China. Compared with other countries in the Middle East, Iraq is relatively stable at present, but we still should be aware of the risks,” Lin Boqiang, the director of the China Center for Energy Economic Research at Xiamen University, told the China Daily.

China’s domestic oil production is expected to peak at 220 million tons per year by 2020, but if China’s economy continues to expand at seven percent or more a year its oil consumption would then reach over 650 million tons a year, the Sinopec’s Economics and Development Research Institute has forecast.

The IEA report said China’s growing emphasis in Middle East oil will force it and other countries of the region to “focus on the security of the strategic routes” those tankers take.

Beijing is especially concerned with the narrow bottleneck of the Malacca Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia through which all its vessels must navigate via Singapore en route to East Asia. The Chinese are worried that the Strait could easily be blocked in a political  crisis.

Beijing’s emerging geopolitical reliance on Burma is becoming a concern as anger grows within the Southeast Asian nation over a perceived view of Chinese firms riding roughshod over local interests.

In the case of the oil pipeline, Burma would receive a maximum of $36.8 million a year in transit fees, according to CNPC’s partners Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and the Ministry of Energy. A flat right-of-way fee of $13.8 million will be supplemented by $1 per ton of oil pumped—a deal criticized by human rights groups as far too cheap.

NGOs allege numerous cases of social disruption, forced community relocations and land theft along the pipeline route which runs in tandem with a separate natural gas pipeline.

CNPC claims to have donated $6 million to “help the locals improve education and healthcare standards,” Global Times reported. CNPC has also agreed to contribute $2 million per year of the pipeline’s life to “further help develop villages along the pipeline.”

However, Chinese firms—mostly NOCs—have not endeared themselves to Burmese communities where they operate on contracts agreed secretly with the likes of MOGE or front firms belonging to the Burmese military leadership.

These are contracts which could cost Burma dearly in compensation if they are canceled, Burma’s President’s Office Minister Aung Min admitted this week during meetings with objectors to an expansion of the Monya copper mine in Saigaing Division.

The mine is jointly owned by Wanbao Company of China and the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings.

Aung Min was seen telling protestors that the Burmese government was “afraid” to upset Chinese businesses because of the possible financial consequences. This applied in particular to the Myitsone hydroelectric dam, construction of which has been officially suspended by President Thein Sein on environmental grounds.

“It would need a stronger Burmese government to take on CNPC and its oil shipments strategy,” said Reynolds.

Burma: Trouble Brewing for China | asia sentinel

Burma: Trouble Brewing for China | asia sentinel
Bertil Lintner, YaleGlobal , 07 November 2012

Government tolerates freedom of expression, and the Burmese target Chinese investments
Following the Burmese government’s suspension of a controversial joint-venture hydroelectric dam project with China in the far north of the country, another flashpoint has emerged in relations between the two countries – a massive copper mine at Latpadaung, a mountain near Monywa northwest of Mandalay in Upper Burma.

The Myitsone hydroelectric project, being built to supply power to China, was cancelled in the face of strong local resistance. This time, local residents are protesting against a Chinese company. Wanbao Mining, a joint venture with the Burmese military’s main commercial enterprise, Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, or UMEH. Wanbao has been accused of destroying cultivated fields, polluting nearby water sources and desecrating Buddhist shrines. No less than 3,150 hectares of land from 26 surrounding villages were confiscated for the project.

The public outcry could also force China to rethink its often insensitive – some would say aggressive – policies towards smaller countries in the region.

UMEH’s involvement is merely as a recipient of fees from Wanbao, a subsidiary of the North Industries Corporation, or Norinco, China’s main weapons manufacturer which is also involved in other business activities.

When the agreement between Norinco and the government of Burma was signed 10 June 2010, the Chinese company said on its website that Monywa is “abundant in copper mine resources with excellent mineral quality, which is of great significance to strengthening the strategic reserve of copper resources in our country, and to enhancing the influence of our country in Myanmar (Burma).”

That influence is now on the wane as Burma tries hard to distance itself from China - which for more than two decades has exerted considerable economic, political and even military influence over this Southeast Asian country - while improving political relations with the United States, the European Union and Japan. But after last year’s suspension of the US$3.6 billion joint venture Myitsone dam project in the northern Kachin State, which shocked the Chinese, Burma must tread carefully in dealing with Wanbao Mining. For the country’s new leaders, it is a dilemma: They cannot crack down on the movement in Monywa without risking its still tenuous relationship with the West. But a continuing struggle could impact relations with Burma’s powerful northern neighbor.

The campaign against the Chinese company is led by two unlikely local heroes: Thwe Thwe Win, 29, and Aye Net, 34. Neither of the two young women has more than the compulsory five-year primary education behind her, and more than a year ago, both were selling vegetables in the local market in Monywa.

“The Chinese company came and bulldozed our fields and the Chinese officials made rude gestures at us when we came to complain,” says Thwe Thwe Win in an interview in Monywa.

The police did nothing, except arrest the two women and some of their comrades. That ignited a mass movement, at a time when freedom of expression is becoming tolerated in Burma after decades of iron-fisted military rule and when anti-Chinese sentiment is rising across the country. Student and labor activists from the old capital Rangoon and elsewhere traveled to Monywa to show support. On 26 October, more than 1,000 local miners, Buddhist monks and members of the general public defied an order by local authorities restricting access to the mine and marched past roadblocks to make merit at a pagoda inside the mining area.

The two women vow not to give up until the project is scrapped and the Chinese company leaves Monywa.

Elsewhere in Burma, people are also complaining about how China treats their country. For more than 20 years, Chinese companies have stripped large swathes of the north of trees, denuding ecologically crucial watershed areas. Chinese merchants have also flooded Burma with cheap consumer goods and fake medicines, explains a local businessman in Rangoon. “China does produce goods of good quality, but only for export to the West,” he said. “Here, they sell only junk. This is an almost racial attitude towards us.”

Even within the ruling military, anti-Chinese feelings run high. Already in 2004, a document was compiled by Lieutenant Colonel Aung Kyaw Hla, a researcher at Burma’s Defence Services Academy located in Pyin Oo Lwin, an old hill station in the highlands northeast of Mandalay.

The 346-page top-secret, thesis, titled “A Study of Myanmar [Burma]-U.S. Relations,” outlines in Burmese the policies now being implemented to improve relations with Washington and lessen dependence on Beijing. The establishment of a more acceptable regime than the old junta after the November 2010 election has made it easier for the Burmese military to launch new policies and have those taken seriously by the international community.

The thesis bluntly states that having China as a diplomatic ally and economic patron has created a “national emergency” that threatens the country’s independence. Aung Kyaw Hla, probably a committee of army strategists rather than a single person, goes on to argue that although human rights are a concern in the West, the US would be willing to modify its policy to suit “strategic interests.” Although the author does not specify those interests, the thesis makes it clear that includes common ground with the US vis-à-vis China. The author cites Vietnam and Indonesia under former dictator Suharto as examples of US foreign-policy flexibility in weighing strategic interests against democratization.

If bilateral relations with the US were improved, the master plan suggests, Burma would also gain access to badly needed funds from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other global financial institutions. The country would then emerge from “regionalism,” where it currently depends on the goodwill and trade of immediate neighbors, including China, and “enter a new era of globalization.”

At the same time, China is clearly taking the new signals from Burma seriously. In February and March this year, the Beijing-based, Chinese-language weekly Economic Observer ran a series of articles about the suspension of the Myitsone dam trying to analyze what went wrong with China’s relations with Burma. “How could something like this happen?” columnist Qin Hui asked. The 14 October Global Times, a daily tabloid published under the auspices of The People’s Daily newspaper, said in a commentary that Chinese companies need to “attach more importance to grassroots voices” in carrying out investment projects such as the Monywa copper mine. According to Burmese journalists, reporters from The Global Times are calling them with questions about pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, which never happened before.

It’s too early to say whether Myitsone, and now Monywa, will become a turning point in China’s relations with Southeast Asia, paving the way for a more tactful relationship with countries such as Burma. But popular struggles against two Chinese megaprojects here have no doubt been wake-up calls for the leaders in Beijing. Even smaller countries – and a movement led by two former vegetable vendors in a town in the Burmese outback – are now brave enough to challenge the region’s most powerful economic and political player.

(Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist based in Thailand and the author of several works on Asia. He can be reached at lintner@asiapacificms.com. This is published with permission from the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization.)