Opinion: This is militant Islamophobia in Burma, rooted in history | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

Opinion: This is militant Islamophobia in Burma, rooted in history | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Francis Wade, Mar 25, 2013
 
In November last year, a piece I wrote on the potential for the Arakan state violence to evolve into wider anti-Muslim conflict in other parts of Burma was met with accusations of sensationalism and a misreading of the root causes of the Arakan unrest. The piece had argued that the first obvious signal that this wasn’t just ‘communal’ or ‘inter-ethnic’ violence, as many observers were calling it, was the targeting of Kaman Muslims in Arakan in October, who are distinct from the Rohingya.

Half a year on from the first attacks on Kaman Muslims, and despite the current rioting in Meikhtila and surrounding areas, there still seems to be an attempt in Burmese ultra-nationalist circles to write this violence off as a series of isolated incidents. This reading suggests that the first wave of attacks on Rohingya in June last year are not linked to the first attacks on Kaman Muslims in October, and that the targeting of Kaman has nothing to do with the more recent Meikhtila riots. Instead, individual groups are reacting to provocation from Muslims, which happens to have increased in frequency since June 2012.

Smoke billows from a burning mosque following ethnic unrest between Buddhists and Muslims in Meikhtila Thursday. Pic: AP.

The stance is being used to counter accusations that the violence is born of anti-Muslim sentiment – that beyond just confronting ‘terrorists’ or ‘land-grabbers’, as the Rohingya were branded, an entire ideology is being targeted. This is obviously much harder to justify, and portrays Burma’s militant nationalist movement in a primitive and ugly light, which it doesn’t want.

The signs however are clearly there. In fact they’ve been there for decades, but religious persecution was never really part of the Burma story during the dictatorship, which the world viewed through a very black and white lens. Go back to the civilian government of U Nu, and you’ll see that he expelled the Burma Muslim Congress and made Buddhism the state religion; General Ne Win carried out several pogroms against Rohingya, and deported hundreds of thousands of Indian Hindus and Muslims. The army has for decades attacked sites of Christian and Muslim worship in the ethnic states in a deliberate attempt to Burmanise (“Buddhicise”?) the entire country.

Yet this latest wave of attacks on Muslims is so troubling because of the involvement of civilians, who have otherwise been tolerant of the Christian beliefs of their countrymen. (To be sure, it is highly likely that hardline elements in the government are driving this, and using civilian groups as proxies.)

It’s unclear why fear of Islam is so pervasive, and theories abound, but the geographical spread of this animosity is both hugely concerning and underreported. In Karen state for example, pamphlets were circulated last year ordering locals to cease all interaction with Muslims – trading, marriage, and so on. In the state capital of Pa’an there are reports that stickers bearing ‘969’ are now frequently appearing on buildings (’969‘ signifies Buddhist precepts, and has been used recently as a label by the militant nationalist movement to counter the ’786′ stickers used to identify Muslim buildings – which should of course also be debated). The Karen Human Rights Group has also documented massive forced relocation of Muslim communities by the army in the 1990s and 2000s.

The Meikhtila violence should be seen as the latest manifestation of an historic Islamophobic streak in Burma. Of course there is bitter irony in reports of civilians and monks colluding with security forces in last week’s attacks; that a monk threatened violence against a photographer who wants to shine a light on persecution in Burma; that agitators are roaming the streets of Rangoon provoking Muslims into attacking. It’s ironic because these monks and civilians, evidently suffering from some acute form of historical amnesia, can only embolden the military to recast itself as “protectors” of the nation.

The signs of a major pogrom against Muslims are now visible. This isn’t mass hysteria from ‘foreign anti-Buddhist saboteurs’, as anyone who comments critically on this issue is called, but is very real and evident. Of all the photos and videos of the Meikhtila riots, the charred bodies and the woman shouting “Kill them, kill them!” that circulated last week, it was this one that I found both effective in capturing the state of play in Burma now, and incredibly disturbing: Muslims being marched out of town by police with their hands above their heads and a child looking back in the crowd. They are being sent to a football stadium where the government will tell them they are being held for their own protection, under armed guard. Given there appears to be no attempt by the government to try to rebuild community cohesion (we only need to look to Arakan state for evidence), we must keep a close watch on whether these relocation sites become permanent, and the implications of this.

After the Thai TV monarchy debate, controversy is growing | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

After the Thai TV monarchy debate, controversy is growing | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Saksith Saiyasombut & Siam Voices Mar 22, 2013

A Thai TV program discussing the role of the monarchy has sparked growing controversy, with reactionary voices sparking a police investigation. The public broadcaster ThaiPBS aired a week-long special of its interview and  discussion program ”Tob Jote Prathet Thai” (“ตอบโจทย์ประเทศไทย”, roughly translated to “Answering Thailand’s Issues”) about the royal institution. The series culminated in a two-episode debate between Thammasat University historian Somsak Jeamteerasakul and royalist critic Sulak Sivaraksa, focusing on the draconian lése majesté law. However, ThaiPBS decided not to air the last part of the series, citing fears it could “spark social unrest”. (Read our previous post here).

Thai historian and academic Somsak Jeamteerasakul (left) and royalist critic Sulak Sivaraksa (middle) at a taping of the ThaiPBS interview program “Tob Jote Prathet Thai” with host Pinyo Traisuriyathamma, discussing the role of the constitutional monarchy. (Photo: ThaiPBS/Facebook)

During the whole run, the program was deemed controversial as it was both commended and condemned for openly discussing the role of the monarchy in Thailand on national television. Similar condemnation and commendation was aimed at ThaiPBS after their decision to cancel the airing of Friday’s episode, which sparked rumors about political intervention. A collateral damage was the show “Tob Jote” itself, when host Pinyo Traisuriyathamma announced shortly after the cancellation that he and his team would no longer produce any episodes of the program.

However, much to the surprise of everyone, ThaiPBS eventually reversed its decision and aired the second part of the Somsak-vs-Sulak debate on Monday night without any prior notice and promotion. An executive explained before the broadcast that by showing the final part, the audience would understand that part of the political crisis and divide stems form the lèse majesté law, and its abuse actually harms the royal institution.

The controversy over the show is now growing as a group of 100 “fed-up” ultra-royalists, led by self-proclaimed monarchy-defender Dr. Tul Sittisomwong (whose stances on pro-LM and against LM reform have been well documented), protested at the ThaiPBS headquarters on Wednesday and have called for the executives to resign. We have also already mentioned the 40 appointed (as in NOT democratically elected) senators claim that the show’s content is deemed lèse majesté.

The program also provoked army chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha to break his months of relative silence and to revert to his usual brazen rhetoric and also slammed the program and its makers. As seen in this video, Prayuth struggled to find the right words, in order not to be too harsh, but nevertheless said this:

“The TV show and its contents are allowed by law but we should consider if it was appropriate. If you think Thailand and its monarchy and its laws are making you uncomfortable, then you should go live elsewhere,” Prayuth told reporters.
“Thai TV show draws army wrath for lese-majeste debate“, by Amy Sawitta Lefevre, Reuters, March 20, 2013

The hawkish general has been previously quoted saying that victims of the lèse majesté law “should not be whining” because “they know it better.” He has also said the following (as previously blogged here), which kind of foreshadows his own words from this week and may should adhere to his own advice then:

“(…) คือกฎหมายเราและประเทศไทยก็คือประเทศไทย ผมไม่เข้า(ใจ)ว่าหลายๆคนอยากจะให้ประเทศไทยเป็นเหมือนประเทศอื่น มีเสรีทุกเรื่อง แล้วถามว่ามันจะอยู่กันยังไงผมไม่รู้ ขนาดแบบนี้ยังอยู่กันไม่ได้เลย” พล.อ.ประยุทธ์ กล่าว
“(…) Our laws are our laws and Thailand is Thailand. I don’t understand why so many people want Thailand to be like other countries – to have freedom in everything – how can we live? I don’t know… I can’t live even like it is now already!” said Gen. Prayuth
“‘ประยุทธ์’แจงปิดวิทยุชุมชนหมิ่นยันทำตามกฎหมาย“, Krungthep Turakij, April 29, 2011

The absolute low points so far in terms of reactions came from Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yubamrung and the Royal Thai Police, which are under his watch. They claim to found content in the show that is deemed lèse majesté and have now started to take action:

An initial check of the tapes of the fourth and fifth episodes of the monarchy-debate series found that some statements by guests on the programme were in violation of the law. [Royal Thai Police spokesman Pol Maj-General Piya Uthayo] said that because the programme has attracted a huge public interest and the issue has ramifications on national security, the police have appointed a team of 50 investigators led by Pol General Chatchawan Suksomjit with Pol Lt-General Saritchai Anekwiang as deputy investigator. Police from stations across the country have been instructed to accept complaints about the programme from members of the public.
The national police chief ordered the team to conduct a speedy yet careful investigation and report on their progress within 30 days.
The public is also warned against disseminating information on the Internet that might be deemed insulting to the monarchy and in violation of the Computer Crime Act. Anyone found involved in the dissemination of the lese majeste content would also face action.
“Monarchy debate broke law: police“, The Nation, March 22, 2013

This is basically calling for a crackdown on the program, its makers, the guests, and all online discussions about the content of the show!

As a countermeasure, ThaiPBS has meanwhile set up a legal team.

Chalerm defended the police action, saying that it was his order to transcribe the two episodes and pledged to take legal action against whoever on that show broke the law. He also makes the bizarre statement that the government doesn’t need to get involved, since he is in charge of the police, despite also being deputy prime minister. He also said this:

“Don’t they have anything better to do than criticise the monarchy? It is their right to do so but there must be some limit,” he continued. “Thailand has a population of 64 million. Why give so much attention to the opinions of a small group of people?”
“Monarchy debate broke law: police“, The Nation, March 22, 2013

The same can be asked about the initial 20 (!), then 100 “fed-up” royalists protesting at ThaiPBS. These self-proclaimed defenders of the monarchy fail to understand that a reform of Article 112 of the Criminal Code does not seek to abolish or to overthrow the monarchy; that criticism of the draconian law does not equal disloyalty to the crown and the country; and that a public discourse about the vaguely written, arbitrarily applied law is essential if Thailand is to move forward.
____________________________
About the author:
Saksith Saiyasombut is a Thai blogger and freelance foreign correspondent based in Bangkok, Thailand. He writes about Thai politics and current affairs since 2010 and is also reports for international news media such as Channel NewsAsia. You can follow him on Twitter @Saksith.

Will Laos bend over EU pressure on Sombath? | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

Will Laos bend over EU pressure on Sombath? | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Rob O'Brien Mar 16, 2013

It has been more than three months since the activist and sustainable development campaigner Sombath Somphone was last seen on a busy road in Vientiane.

Asian luminaries pose at the backstage of the Cultural Center of the Philippines prior to awarding ceremony for the 2005 Ramon Magsaysay Awards Wednesday, Aug. 31, 2005 in Manila, Philippines. The awardees, from left, Senator Jon Ungphakorn of Thailand for Government Service, Teten Masduki of Indonesia for Public Service, Dr. V. Shantha of India for Public Service, Sombath Somphone of Laos for Community Leadership, Matiur Rahman of Bangladesh for Journalism, Literature and Creative Communication Arts and Yoon Hye-Ran of South Korea for Emergent Leadership. (AP Photo/Bullit Marquez)

The now infamous CCTV footage capturing his final moments offer the clearest indication that his disappearance was a carefully planned abduction. His jeep was stopped by police on December 15 before he was driven away in a separate vehicle and never seen again.

The government and police have continued to deny any role in his disappearance and an ongoing investigation has failed to yield any answers as to where Sombath is or why he was snatched in the first place.

Along with local and international NGOs and other supporters, his wife, Shui-Meng Ng, has built an international campaign that has kept up the pressure on the Lao government.

International delegations and diplomats continue to express concern about Sombath’s whereabouts, most recently an EU delegation, but to date Lao officials have remained staunchly on message and Shui-Meng says she’s heard the same answers time and time again.

“Members of diplomatic corp has met high level government leaders and ministers, but answers are the same: ‘We are also very concerned and doing all we can, the police have been doing an investigation, but we have not found Sombath – we are sad that this happened, etc..’” she says.

Next week will mark 100 days since his disappearance and the EU has vowed to crank up the pressure through “a new phase of international activity,” with Sombath’s case becoming a priority for the European Parliament at the UN Human Rights Council.

Dutch Senator and EU Delegation leader Tuur Elzinga was keen to spell out that the EU’s resolve won’t bend on the missing activist. “If Lao officials think the issue of Sombath’s disappearance will go away, they are wrong,” he said.

But as the 100-day milestone approaches, the long days of campaigning are beginning to take their toll on his wife.

“I am very tired and discouraged of week after week with no news and no leads, but what choice do I have but to keep trying and persevering and try every lead and every means to find Sombath?” she says.

“My life is on hold – waiting, waiting, hoping and hoping and at times feeling helpless and hopeless. I just have to keep faith that Sombath is still alive… as anything otherwise is completely unthinkable.”

Burma: No trust so far between government and KIO | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

Burma: No trust so far between government and KIO | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Zin Linn, Mar 12, 2013

Peace Delegates of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the government had a discussion until midnight on Monday at Ruili, a Chinese border town. But the two parties did not get to an armistice accord. However, they agreed to meet again before April 10, according to a joint statement.

As a consequence of civil war that has proceeded for more than sixty years has left Burma, one of the most insolvent countries in the world. Although Burma gained its independence in 1948, it cannot address its civil war with its ethnic population.

A few months ago, heavy fighting and government’s armed forces expansion keep on mainly in ethnic areas, especially in Kachin State. Burma Army maintained a brutal warfare on the ethnic Kachin people up to last month. The government armed forces put into practice using landmines, attacking ordinary civilians, taking hostages for forced labor, looting and destructing citizens’ properties, sustenance and agricultural farms and burning the ethnic villages and so forth.

Peace Talks restarts between representatives of Kachin Independence Organization and Myanmar government peacemaking team in Shweli, China-Myanmar border in China’s Yunnan Province on Monday, March 11, 2013. (Photo: U Ye Htut / Facebook)

September to December in 2012, armed conflict between the government and the KIA had been going on mostly in eastern and central Kachin State. The KIO targeted to block supply lines in southern Kachin state.  The then clashes took place in the state’s western jade rich Hpakant district where the Kachin resistance had claimed major victory during August 2012.  The government’s control of the Hpakant jade-land has reportedly earned billions in revenue since the early 1990s when the KIO gave up control of most of the rich district.

The government’s major offensive in Hpakant seems aimed at removing the KIA from important strategic positions that protect Laiza, the KIO’s de facto capital.  The government army had been gearing up for a major military offensive against the KIO last year using massive military strength of over 80 battalions.

The news about government airstrikes hit the headlines up to January 2013. However, the United States and the United Nations had to warn the government to stop air strikes against the Kachin rebels. The escalation of air attacks was even menacing the country’s reform process. The power of the air strikes with the threat of a ground invasion of Kachin administrative capital Laiza added difficult relations between Burmese government and the KIO.

Despite the President’s call for cooperation, the trust is not at hand. The ethnic armed groups do not believe the government’s peace call. The fact is that while offering peace, the government has been increasing its military deployment to the conflict zones.

Peace-talks on 30 October, 2012, between government and the KIO reached nowhere to end hostility, according to the then media reports. The talks which took place at Ruili (Shweli), a town on Sino-Burma border, on 30 October ended earlier than expected, since Brig-Gen Gun Maw and any other senior leaders from the KIO had not presented, Kachin News Group said. During that talk, the government peace-mission led by Minister Aung Min had reiterated the intolerable offer that mentioned further political talks in parliament under the framework of the 2008 military-drawn constitution.

The KIO’s Brig Gen Gun Maw and any other senior leaders could not attend the 30-October peace talk, since the government has been escalating its military actions in the area.  Government’s reinforced its troops around the KIO’s Laiza headquarters and prepared a systematic offensive on KIO outposts.

But, on February 4, the KIO and the government delegations met in Ruili, China, where both sides agreed to decrease military tension as well as to restart political talks later in February.

By chance, on 20 February 2012, an 11-member government peace delegation led by its Vice-Chairman Aung Min held talks with a 12-member delegation of United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) including Dr La Ja of KIO in Chiang Mai, Thailand media said later.

As a consequence, the talks on 20 February paved way for the 11-March (Monday) negotiations in China that generated a helpful progress after the most recent heavy fighting. Representatives of the KIO/KIA met government executives led by Minister Aung Min in the Chinese border town of Ruili.

The government’s peace delegation was led by Union Peacemaking Committee vice-chairman Minister Aung Min and Lt-Gen. Myint Soe. The KIO team consisted of Central Committee Member Sumlut Gam and Deputy Chief-of-Staff Brig-Gen Gum Maw, Mizzima news said.

Three Chinese diplomats attended the talks, including Wang Zongying from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Observers were 4 representatives from the United Nationalities Federal Council; 2 from the Shan State Progress Party; 2 from the Restoration Council of Shan State; 2 from National Democratic Alliance Army and 4 from the Peace-talk Creation Group.

Peace co-worker Hla Maung Shwe told Mizzima: “I would like to say that this was the most fruitful meeting in the past 10 months.”

According to Kachinland News, Burmese army sent more reinforcement to Kachin region as the two sides are preparing to meet in China-Burma border town Ruili on March 11, 2013.

The government armed forces had in January announced a one-sided break in fighting on the Kachin frontline after capturing key positions on the edge of the rebels’ headquarters Sino-Burma border. Even though some armistices are made between the ethnic revolutionary groups and the government, there has been little satisfactory progress.

The key question is most ethnic leaders highlight their mistrust of the 2008 constitution. They said it will not create a genuine federal union at all.

Sabah claim explained | Philippine Daily Inquirer / ANN

Sabah claim explained | Philippine Daily Inquirer / ANN 

Jovito Salonga, Philippine Daily Inquirer' 05 March 2013

(Editor’s Note: Following are excerpts from a speech that Sen. Jovito R. Salonga delivered on March 30, 1963, by way of rebuttal to the speech of Sen. Lorenzo Sumulong berating the Philippine claim to North Borneo (Sabah), which was filed by President Diosdado Macapagal on June 22, 1962, followed by the London negotiations of January 1963. Salonga was with the team of Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez who headed the London negotiations on behalf of our government. The Inquirer is reprinting excerpts from Salonga’s speech to shed light on the Sabah issue.)

A few days ago, Senator Lorenzo Sumulong spoke on the floor of the Senate to air his views on the Philippine claim to North Borneo. My first reaction was to keep my peace and observe this shocking spectacle in silence, particularly in the light of the request of the British panel during the London Conference that the documents and the records of the proceedings be considered confidential, until they could be declassified in the normal course of diplomatic procedure. In part, my reaction was dictated by the belief, so aptly expressed elsewhere, that the best way to answer a bad argument is to let it go on and that silence is the “unbearable repartee”.

But silence could be tortured out of context and construed by others, not familiar with the facts, as an implied admission of the weakness of the Philippine stand. And so, I decided to make this reply, fully aware that in an exchange such as this, considering that our claim is still pending and each side is feeling out the other’s legal position, none but our British friends and their successors may well profit.

The good senator, whose patriotism I do not propose to impugn, has had access to the confidential records and documents of the Department of Foreign Affairs. By his own admission, he attended closed-door hearings of the Senate committees on foreign relations and national defence, where crucial matters of national survival and security were taken up. He knows the classified, confidential nature of the records and documents bearing on the Philippine claim.

Senator Sumulong has now found it proper and imperative, if we take him literally, to ventilate his views berating the merit and validity of the Republic’s claim, accusing his own government of gross ignorance and holding in unbelievable disdain the Philippine position on the British-sponsored Malaysia plan. He has chosen to assault the Philippine position at a time when his own government, by virtue of the British request, may be said to be somewhat helpless in making, right in our own country, an adequate, fully documented defence of the Philippine stand. I trust our British friends, here and across the seas, will understand if, in defence of our position, we come pretty close to the area of danger.

The good senator tells us that in view of the “importance and magnitude” of the subject, he decided to wait “until all the relevant facts and information” were in, that he had made his own “studies and researches,” which on the basis of the press releases issued by his office, must have been quite massive. The morning papers last Monday (March 25) quoted the senator as having bewailed, in advance of his privilege speech, that “only one side of the problem has been presented so far,” (meaning the Philippine side) seemingly unaware, despite the depth and range of his studies, that in the world press, only the British side has been given the benefit of full and favourable publicity and that the Philippine side has been summarily dismissed, just as the senator dismisses it now with apparent contempt, as “shadowy”, “dubious” and “flimsy”.

It may interest the good senator to know that his statements, particularly on the eve of the talks in London, consistently derogatory of the Philippine claim, were seized upon by the English press with great delight, as if to show to the Philippine panel how well informed the senator was. It is, of course, not the fault of the senator that the British, in an admirable show of unity, enjoyed and were immensely fascinated by his press releases and statements.

Frame of reference

But before I take up the senator’s arguments in detail, it may be well to set our frame of reference by restating the position of the Philippine government on the North Borneo claim.

Thousands of years ago, what is now known as the Philippines and what is known today as Borneo used to constitute a single historical, cultural, economic unit. Authoritative Western scientists have traced the land bridges that connected these two places. The inhabitants of the Philippines and Borneo come from the same racial stock, they have the same colour, they have or used to have similar customs and traditions. Borneo is only 18 miles away from us today.

North Borneo, formerly known as Sabah, was originally ruled by the sultan of Brunei. In 1704, in gratitude for help extended to him by the sultan of Sulu in suppressing a revolt, the sultan of Brunei ceded North Borneo to the Sulu sultan.

Here, our claim really begins. Over the years, the various European countries, including Britain, Spain and the Netherlands, acknowledged the sultan of Sulu as the sovereign ruler of North Borneo. They entered into various treaty arrangements with him.

In 1878, a keen Austrian adventurer, by the name of Baron de Overbeck, having known that the sultan of Sulu was facing a life-and-death struggle with the Spanish forces in the Sulu Archipelago, went to Sulu, took advantage of the situation and persuaded the sultan of Sulu to lease to him, in consideration of a yearly rental of Malayan $5,000 (roughly equivalent to a meagre US$1,600), the territory now in question. The contract of lease—and I call it so on the basis of British documents and records that cannot be disputed here or abroad—contains a technical description of the territory in terms of natural boundaries, thus:

“… all the territories and lands being tributary to us on the mainland of the island of Borneo commencing from the Pandassan River on the NW coast and extending along the whole east coast as far as the Sibuco River in the south and comprising, among others, the states of Peitan, Sugut, Bangaya, Labuk, Sandakan, Kinabatangan, Muniang and all the other territories and states to the southward thereof bordering on Darvel Bay and as far as the Sibuco River with all the islands within three marine leagues of the coast.”

Contract to Dent

Overbeck later sold out all his rights under the contract to Alfred Dent, an English merchant, who established a provisional association and later a company, known as the British North Borneo Company, which assumed all the rights and obligations under the 1878 contract. This company was awarded a Royal Charter in 1881. A protest against the grant of the charter was lodged by the Spanish and the Dutch governments and in reply, the British government clarified its position and stated in unmistakable language that “sovereignty remains with the sultan of Sulu” and that the company was merely an administering authority.

In 1946, the British North Borneo Company transferred all its rights and obligations to the British Crown. The Crown, on July 10, 1946—just six days after Philippine independence—asserted full sovereign rights over North Borneo, as of that date. Shortly thereafter former American Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, then special adviser to the Philippine government on foreign affairs, denounced the cession order as a unilateral act in violation of legal rights. In 1950, Congressman Macapagal—along with Congressmen Arsenio Lacson and Arturo Tolentino—sponsored a resolution urging the formal institution of the claim to North Borneo. Prolonged studies were in the meanwhile undertaken and in 1962 the House of Representatives, in rare unanimity, passed a resolution urging the president of the Philippines to recover North Borneo consistent with international law and procedure. Acting on this unanimous resolution and having acquired all the rights and interests of the sultanate of Sulu, the Republic of the Philippines, through the president, filed the claim to North Borneo.

Basis of PH claim

Our claim is mainly based on the following propositions: that Overbeck and Dent, not being sovereign entities nor representing sovereign entities, could not and did not acquire dominion and sovereignty over North Borneo; that on the basis of authoritative British and Spanish documents, the British North Borneo Company, a private trading concern to whom Dent transferred his rights, did not and could not acquire dominion and sovereignty over North Borneo; that their rights were as those indicated in the basic contract, namely, that of a lessee and a mere delegate; that in accordance with established precedents in international law, the assertion of sovereign rights by the British Crown in 1946, in complete disregard of the contract of 1878 and their solemn commitments, did not and cannot produce legal results in the form of a new tide.

(Full text of Salonga’s and Sumulong’s speeches are available at Inquirer.net.) 

Is Singapore done with race-based policies? | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

Is Singapore done with race-based policies? | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Kirsten Han, Mar 04, 2013

  ingapore has often boasted about its multiracial society, trumpeting nation-wide efforts to integrate and live side-by-side. Citizens are warned time and again of the importance of maintaing harmony, although whether racism has truly been eradicated in Singapore remains to be seen. A recent youth forum organised by the Workers’ Party has taken it one step further, calling for an end to the government’s race-based policies.

The YouthQuake forum, which had litigation lawyer Terence Tan and civil activist Nizam Ismail on its panel, brought up policies such as the ethnic quota in public housing, the listing of race on identity cards and the Group Representative Constituency (GRC) system in elections.

Nizam pointed out that the government’s traditional ‘CMIO’ model – representing Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others – was fast breaking down and becoming meaningless in the face of increasing globalisation, migration and intermarriage.

“If we see 6.9 million people by 2030 or more, it will be a very different Singapore,” Yahoo!SG reported him as saying. “There will be a very cosmopolitan society, there’ll be people from all over the world, and your CMIO model, which is already so problematic at this stage, will become utterly meaningless in 2030, because there’s no way you can put people in CMIO. So what happens to the rest of your race-based government policies that you have? It makes it even more meaningless.”

With the breakdown of the CMIO model, Singapore’s ethnic quota for public housing is on its way towards irrelevance. As the number of interracial families increases, things become more and more arbitrary and pointless. As Nizam highlighted: ““If you call yourself Chinese-Indian, you are treated as Chinese for the purposes of the EIP, but if you call yourself Indian-Chinese, then you are treated as an Indian.”

Beyond these policies, both panellists also found ethnic community self-help groups problematic, worrying that they re-enforced a “cultural deficiency fallacy”, which suggests that particular ethnic groups are inherently weaker and in need of more help than others.
“Could we have a slightly more homogenous construct where potentially any Singaporean is deserving of financial or educational assistance?” Tan asked.

These suggestions are a long time coming. Like numerous countries around the world, Singapore’s population is quickly moving beyond old-fashioned racial classifications. With more mobility and interaction, such labels are losing their relevance. The government would do well to respond to these changes.

Thai Rice Farmers Threaten Protest if Intervention Price Cut | The Irrawaddy Magazine

Thai Rice Farmers Threaten Protest if Intervention Price Cut | The Irrawaddy Magazine
APORNRATH PHOONPHONGPHIPHAT / REUTERS WRITER, March 5, 2013

 
BANGKOK — Thai farmers vowed on Monday to stage a major protest after the government signaled it was weighing a plan to cut rice intervention prices by a tenth, in another sign that the state could be running short of funds for the scheme.

Thailand’s generous rice subsidy scheme has won the support of millions of rural voters, but has generated huge grain stockpiles, sparked graft allegations and unnerved markets.

“We have sent our letter to Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra that we don’t agree to cut the intervention price,” said Vichien Phuanglamjiak, vice-president of the Thai Rice Farmers Association, which represents 700 to 800 farmers.

“And if we don’t get an appropriate response, we will stage a protest and it would be a big one.”

The remarks came in response to comments last week by permanent commerce secretary Vatchari Vimooktayon, that the government was considering cutting the price it pays farmers to 13,000 baht from 15,000 baht (US $500) per tonne.

The scheme has cost Thailand its ranking as the world’s top rice exporter and built up stockpiles of around 17 million tonnes of milled rice, or nearly twice the exports of a normal year, leaving authorities struggling to find warehouse space, and the threat of rice being dumped on world markets at a loss.

Last month officials and bankers said the government had paid less than a sixth of what it owed a state bank funding the intervention program.

With storage space running out, Thai rice exporters have said it will only be a matter of time before the government is forced to sell the grain. It will almost certainly have to sell at a big loss, which will ultimately be covered by the taxpayer.

Although Vatchari made a quick U-turn on Monday, saying the government had made no change to the rice scheme, traders and industry officials said his comments could be a signal from the government, implying it was struggling to fund the scheme.

“The truth must be revealed one day or another that the government could not go further with this aggressive intervention,” said Vichai Sriprasert, an honorary president of the Thai Rice Exporters Association.

Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra took power in 2011 on a promise to pay farmers well above what was then the market rate for their rice, and the intervention has gone on even though it has priced Thai rice out of the international market.

The intervention price drove the export price of Thai rice to $565 per tonne, making it uncompetitive with the range of $390 to $410 at which Vietnam and India offer the same grade.

The government has declined to give further details about rice stocks and has stopped publishing trade data for the grain.

It reiterated that it had sold up to 7.3 million tonnes of rice from stocks via government deals and would gradually repay the state bank.

But loading activity at ports does not suggest large volumes of rice were shipped, industry officials have said.

Desperately Seeking Success in the Thai Deep South | Asia Sentinel

Desperately Seeking Success in the Thai Deep South | Asia Sentinel
Murray Hunter, 02 March 2013

Malaysia to host negotiations with Thailand's Islamic insurgents

The surprise of an agreement signed between the Thai government and Malaysia during Premier Yingluck Shinawatra's visit to Kuala Lumpur for negotiations with one of the major insurgent groups, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), should actually not be a surprise. It is also questionable whether there is anything to the agreement.

Malaysia is heading into what could be called a watershed election. Premier Najib Tun Razak's personal popularity rating has fallen although it is still well into positive territory, there have been a number of campaigning mishaps for him of late, and there is an embarrassing military stand-off in Sabah with a group loyal to the Sulu Sultan, where the Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino is the one taking initiatives.

In this environment, both the Thai and Malaysian governments need a breakthrough. Of late, the insurgents have undertaken many embarrassing ploys like displaying Malaysian flags on Aug. 31, Malaysia?s Independence day. In addition, troops and other security forces are all tied trying to protect major towns like Hat Yai and Chana from attacks, and Yingluck has her brother's legacy of poor handling of the insurgency hanging over her. Najib badly needs some form of diplomatic coup to bolster his credentials, particularly with the rural Malays in Kelantan who are not unsympathetic to the insurgent cause, and the general population of Malaysia with the oncoming election.

The memorandum was signed in Malaysia?s administrative capital of Putrajaya by Lieutenant-General Panradom Pattanathabur, Secretary general of Thailand's National Security Council, and Utaz Hassan Taib, who was identified as the chief of the BRN liaison office in Malaysia. The document, signed on Feb. 28, has been heralded by all as an historical agreement and has been reported widely in both the mainstream Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur Press, although it's interesting Malaysia's online press hardly mentioned it.

The BRN, formed in 1963, is one of up to 20 different insurgency groups in Thailand?s deep south. Although it may one of the largest groups, it is yet to be seen if any others may come on board, or even take a hostile view, believing that they have been left out and should be the group that the government negotiates. With jealousies between some of these groups, this is a minor risk that the Thai government has taken.

As it has actually not been spelt out by the various insurgency groups what demands and aspirations they have, this process will at least put these points on the table for examination. In this sense the memorandum is a potential breakthrough because it may establish the gambit of positions both sides will talk from. Ironically through this insurgency, very few concrete demands or aspirations have actually been aired, although the various groups harbor ideals and aspirations alone a wide continuum.

Malaysia?s will be interesting. With an election nearing, the federal government wants peace along the border and there are actually great trade advantages to a peaceful south through the IMT-GT. The Malaysian military and police are generally cooperative with the Thai authorities over border security issues and have established good relationships. However some insurgents are also Malaysian citizens, or at least have very close Malaysian relatives, and to some degree are integrated within the "pondok communities" within Kelantan. Perhaps Malaysia's prime role will be just acting as a chairman to these meetings to maintain negotiations, rather than acting more proactively in suggesting solutions. The true value of the Malaysian role will therefore be just to hold the process together, which may not be an easy task, given the emotional issues involved.

Any success will depend upon there not being any hidden agendas between the 2+1 parties. With the complexities of Thai politics, the military, the various insurgency groups and their splinters, and Malaysian politics, particularly related to the constituency of Kelantan, this could be a tall order. However there is also the hope that all sides are tired and through this process, there can be reaching out to other insurgency groups.

Much of this will personally depend upon the skills and attitude taken by Panradom Pattanathabur and the reception he gets from members of the BRN delegation. The other question here is over who Hassan Taib actually represents within the BRN, which has a number of splinter groups. Even if Hassan is speaking for a wide series of groups, every point of negotiations would have to be discussed in community shariah in every province to obtain any consensus, which could be daunting.

One must also remember this is not the first time peace talks have been attempted with many different moderators including former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed in the Langkawi talks a few years ago, and later with former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Both went nowhere.

One aspect that has not been tackled by both governments in this agreement is the role drug traffickers, bandits, gangsters, and other criminal elements are playing in this insurgency problem. It is in their interest to have turmoil in the deep south so they can carry out their trade. These groups are part of the problem and they need to be dealt with in any process for it to be a success.

The first meeting is scheduled to be held in Malaysia within the next two weeks, and every fortnight afterwards. It would be surprising if much information about these talks actually leaks out. However the meeting itself is something positive and who actually turns up to these meetings from the insurgents side will be very telling of eventual success of this process.

What is sure, while the violence will not stop immediately, the immediate level of violence may indicate how seriously various groups look at this upcoming process of negotiation. The Yingluck government has given some authority to the military to negotiate, who may take a more hardline than the government would. However from the Thai point of view some process is going on which is better than no process. The agreement to the Malaysian Government as the moderator is a redeeming event in foreign policy for the Najib Government. The BN will be hoping that this may provide some positive mileage among the rural Malays of Kelantan, who they need to win over if any positive electoral.

Meanwhile the people of the deep south will continue to go about their daily lives with extreme caution.

(Murray Hunter is an Australian academic teaching at a Malaysian university and a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel.)

Burmese militia leader behind Mekong murders executed in China | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

Burmese militia leader behind Mekong murders executed in China | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Patrick Boehler Mar 01, 2013 3:29PM UTC

Naw Kham, the Burmese militia leader sentenced to death in China for piracy and murder, was executed in China’s border province Yunnan on Friday afternoon.

The 43-year-old ethnic Shan was executed by lethal injection along with three other co-defendants in the provincial capital Kunming, after pleading guilty and being sentenced to death on charges of murder, kidnapping, drug smuggling and ship hijacking on Nov. 6 last year. He retracted his guilty plea after the verdict.

The sentence was carried out by lethal injection, the Xinhua news agency reported in a microblog post. Yunnan was the first Chinese province to adopt this form of death penalty in 2003. Their remains will be incinerated and handed over to the Burmese consulate in Kunming.

The execution was preceded by unprecedented television coverage of the trial and the preparations for the executions. National television even showed a live broadcast of the four being escorted from their cells.

Naw Kham had first appealed for a reprieve of the death penalty, but the Supreme People’s Court of Yunnan province upheld the sentence on Dec. 26. The sentence had been confirmed by the national Supreme People’s Court in Beijing in February, China National Television said, citing the Kunming People’s Intermediate Court in charge of handling procedures.

Naw Kham and his militia were accused of masterminding the kidnapping and murder of 13 Chinese sailors on the Mekong River on Oct. 5, 2011, after these allegedly refused to pay protection money. The incident received international media attention.

The trial in Kunming had been given much publicity in China as it was celebrated as a first trial of a “terrorist” who killed Chinese citizens abroad.

A 200-man strong investigative team had been set up to find the former member of the Mong Tai Army in Burma’s lawless Shan State. The first ever known use of a drone strike by China was considered by the investigators, according to recent revelations.

Riparian countries also set up a joint patrol mechanism on the Mekong River, which is still in place under Chinese leadership.

Naw Kham was eventually captured in April last year when he crossed from Burma into Laos. He was then extradited to China, where he faced a Chinese court with an assigned defence lawyer, who has since stated publicly that she had made no attempt to defend her client’s interests.

The nationalistic newspaper Global Times compared Naw Kham’s capture with that of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s by US Navy Seals in May 2011, saying it was even more difficult in part because Naw Kham was not executed on the spot, but faced, an albeit questionable, trial.

He didn’t stand much of a chance in a country where the conviction rate for criminal trials stood at 99.9% in 2010 according to figures by China’s Supreme Court. The world’s most populous country does not publish figures on how many death sentences are carried out.

The announcement of his execution on Wednesday has caused a stir among Chinese microbloggers with thousands of posts and comments in the first hours, mostly jubilant of China’s final decision on Naw Kham’s fate.

The execution comes four days ahead of the once in a decade leadership transition in China with the convention of a new session of its rubber-stamp legislature, the National People’s Congress.