Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala

Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala
Bridget Welsh,  5 JANUARY 2016

2015 was the year authoritarian governments struck back against democratic pressures.

The story of 2015 in Southeast Asia was Myanmar’s November election. In giving the National League for Democracy and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi a landslide, Myanmar citizens signaled their strong support for democratic change and better governance.

These calls have been loud in recent years — in Malaysia’s 2008 and 2013 elections, in Thailand’s repeated electoral victories for a non-military aligned government, in Cambodia’s 2013 and Singapore’s 2011 polls as well as strong electoral support for democracy in the Philippines and Indonesia. Democratic pressures on Southeast Asian governments have been increasing, and are not likely to recede in the near future.

2015 was the year authoritarian governments in the region struck back. Behind the Myanmar headlines there is a worrying trend of a significant democratic contraction taking place. The use of the authoritarian arsenal by Southeast Asian governments are not new, but in the course of the year regional governments expanded their use of incumbency and control of institutions to shore up their positions.

The most obvious trend has been the increased use of repression, especially targeted toward opposition politicians and critics. In Malaysia, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was jailed in February. In Thailand, a trial began against ousted PM Yingluck Shinawarta as she was denied the right to travel. In Cambodia, opposition politicians were physically attacked. The leader of the opposition Sam Rainsy has delayed his return to Cambodia from November as a result of jail threat. Malaysia has the highest number of opposition politicians facing various charges from sedition to violations of banking finance regulations.

The threats opposition members across the region face in calling for change extend from being physically attacked on the campaign trial (as occurred for Myanmar’s Naing Ngan Lin NLD candidate who was slashed by a machete) to potential bankruptcy.

The use of the law for political ends moves beyond opposition members. Journalists and bloggers remain targeted. Radio reporter Jose Bernardo was shot dead at a restaurant in Manila in November. He joins the other 77 journalists who have been killed in the Philippines since 1992, making this country one of the most dangerous places for media professionals in the world.

Myanmar tops the region’s list with the most number of journalists jailed, pipping Vietnam this year who released some of its bloggers. Notably, blogger Ta Phong Tan was released after 10 years in jail. The situation for bloggers in Vietnam remains serious, with a number of incidents where bloggers and associates were beaten up in mysterious circumstances rather than jailed. In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong won his defamation case against a blogger critic Roy Ngerng, who was asked to pay PM Lee S $150,000. Lee joins Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak as the second current leader in the region who filed charges for public criticism.

The crackdowns on freedom of expression extend to ordinary citizens, from artists and academics to taxi drivers.

Young Chaw Sandi Tun was sentenced to six months jail for insulting Myanmar’s army in her Facebook post noting the similarity in color between the Tatmadaw’s uniform and the opposition leader’s clothing. In Thailand, the cases involving lese majeste have extended the boundaries to include insults to the king’s dog. Thanakorn faces up to 15 years in jail for this reference, and joins a long list of cases that have involved jailing of university students for a play, taxi cab conversations, novelists and more.

A mother of two was sentenced to 28 years for her Facebook comments, while a hotel employee received 56 years for his posts in August as part of the lese majeste unending prosecutions. Cartoonist Zunar in Malaysia faces up to 43 years for his satirical art work. These developments have had chilling effects on public discourse. Even in more open Indonesia, discussion of the 1965 attacks on communists were shut down.

As power has been used to quiet alternative voices, the rule of law itself has faced erosion. In some cases the law is not being implemented. In July, the co-Investigating International judge Mark Harmon of the Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia resigned his position after the tribunal declined to arrest two former Khmer Rouge leaders for whom the court had issued warrants.

Despite having the technology to find the daughter separated from her mother Indira Gandhi for seven years by a husband who is abusing religion in a personal vendetta against his ex-wife, the Malaysian police have proven to be unwilling to use its tools to follow the court order to return the daughter to the mother.

In other cases, constitutional frameworks protecting rights have been by-passed through the introduction of military courts – as has been the case in Thailand and called for in Malaysia – and new measures that empower leaders to declare ‘security areas’ without checks on their authority, as occurred with the hurried passage of the National Security Council law in Malaysia. This law is being seen as a measure that will allow unpopular Prime Minister Najib to stay in office if he loses an election. In Myanmar, there are potential laws being considered that may give military impunity for alleged past crimes.

The area where the laws are under real scrutiny continues to be corruption. 2015 showcased some shocking scandals.

In Malaysia the 1MDB $700 million ‘donation’ into Najib’s personal accounts remains inadequately explained, as the rule of law has not been properly applied to the premier and impunity appears to have allowed the premier to hold onto office even with his personal reputation in shatters. Efforts to undermine Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the recent demands for payments from Freeport to politicians to conduct business have showcased that persistent problem of bribery, lack of transparency and abuse of position.

From corruption concerns tied to the Aquino administration in the Philippines to persistent effects of corruption trails associated with Vietnam’s elite, there lacks effective leadership in tackling the region’s most serious governance problem. The end effect is that leaders at the top are seen to engage in graft, reinforcing a system where office is used for personal wealth rather than public service.

Control over resources and alliances with cronies remains a dominant feature of Southeast Asia’s political economy. Four countries in the region – Malaysia (3), Singapore (5), Philippines (6), Indonesia (10) – were in The Economist’s crony capitalist list, which measures the favoritism of wealth toward tycoons and politically-affiliated business interests.

Measures to enhance this favoritism expanded in 2015 through the introduction of consumption taxes in Malaysia and Myanmar, regulations that facilitated more burning rather than less in the haze-affected region in Indonesia and service fees in areas such as tolls to crony-companies. The region’s most vulnerable populations are feeling the economic pain, with depreciating currencies and a slowdown in growth in the region as a whole. These conditions have contributed to conditions where the use of state resources through populist policies have boosted incumbent governments, a factor that contributed to the People’s Action Party’s September 2015 electoral victory.

Those on the margins are being particularly impacted, with serious implications for rights. Southeast Asia was not immune from the global refugee crisis affecting over 60 million people worldwide. Conditions affecting the livelihoods of the Rohingyas in Myanmar remain severe, with conditions in camps across the region not much better. The shocking findings of death camps in Thailand and Malaysia involving torture, rape and human and organ trafficking in May have yet to be properly accounted for.

One reason for this lack of accountability lies with the upgrade the Obama administration gave Malaysia on its human trafficking assessment in the wake of the discovery of the gruesome murders. The Obama administration’s sell out of human rights principles was especially acute in 2015, where interests associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership overrode other concerns.

From questions tied to the trial of Burmese migrant workers in killing British backpackers Thailand to the persistent practice of ‘sea slaves’ with citizens hauled onto fishing boats, those that are vulnerable remain so at the end of the year, which limited measures to point to strengthening protections.

Vulnerability in 2015 extended to religious and ethnic minorities as well. Bogor was labeled Indonesia’s most intolerant city when it declared a ban of the Shia faith in the city. Hate speech toward Muslims persists in Myanmar, in spite of the electoral victory signaling greater inclusiveness. Churches were burned in Aceh. Christmas celebrations were banned in Brunei. Rights of religious minorities were curbed in Malaysia in cases involving child custody and worship.

Measures to forge peace with minorities fell apart, as the Philippines’ Bansamoro Basic Law did not pass the legislatures. In other places such as Myanmar, Protection Race and Religion Bills denying rights to marriage and religious freedom were introduced, as protections for rights were in fact eroded.

There were nevertheless bright spots in greater freedom across the region – a gender rights bill in Thailand, the end of the persecution of a book seller and academic by religious authorities in Malaysia, the reinstatement of direct local elections in Indonesia and the subsequent peaceful elections in December, to name but a few.

Southeast Asians continue to fight for their freedoms valiantly, over cyberspace, in courtrooms and in communities. The climate however has not been conducive to greater freedoms as those in office continue to use their offices to hold on to power.

As we look ahead, with a slowing economy and persistent insecurities by incumbents, the prospects for expanding rights does not appear promising in 2016. Last year has shown us however that we can expect the unexpected, with the military’s acceptance of the Myanmar’s electoral results as an example.

As ASEAN formally announced its community on 31 December 2015, many hold only to potentially a different ‘imagined community,’ where the ideas of brilliant scholar Benedict Anderson of shared belonging, human dignity and decency live on.

Bridget Welsh is Professor of Political Science at Ipek University, Senior Research Associate at the Center for East Asian Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University, Senior Associate Fellow of The Habibie Center, and University Fellow of Charles Darwin University.

Fascist assemblages in Cambodia and Myanmar -- New Mandala

Fascist assemblages in Cambodia and Myanmar -- New Mandala
TIM FREWER, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR – 26 MARCH 2015

Khmer Souvanapoum ​ (the golden land of the Khmer) is the facebook profile of a Khmer nationalist – one of thousands, who is active on facebook. On a daily basis, he produces racist tirades aimed at the Vietnamese, and especially the Vietnamese living in Cambodia. He has called for a boycott of Vietnamese food, he produces racist memes of various varieties all aimed at the Vietnamese (which often get thousands of likes) and he personally attacked well known political analyst Ou Virak via facebook, when Virak publicly stated that anti-Vietnamese sentiment in the country was a major concern. His posts, and those of his followers and other nationalists (not to mention prominent opposition party members), often take on an element of absurdity. Like any fascist imaginings, they are quick to jump into the realm of conspiracy – Khmer Souvanapoum has often for instance suggested that the Vietnamese are trying to overrun Cambodia by setting up coffee stalls and noodle shops. It would suffice to leave his ranting’s at the level of absurdity if it wasn’t for the history of Khmer led Vietnamese massacres, or the fact that on more than one occasion in the last few years, the Vietnamese have been savagely killed by mob attacks, or that last year’s garment protests ended in mob directed destruction of Vietnamese businesses.

In Myanmar, countless Burmese nationalists regularly pollute facebook and twitter with anti-Muslim vitriol. So too, ultra nationalist Buddhist organisations like ‘969’ and Ma Ba Tha have been active in pushing Buddho-fascism to the centre of Myanmar politics. Last week, for instance Ma Ba Tha protested outside the Yangon court on two occasions – one to push for a harsher sentence for New Zealand owner of Gastro Barand his two Burmese managers for posting a facebook image of the Buddha wearing headphones (they all got 2.5 years of hard labour), and on the second occasion tosupport the passing of the ‘Race and Religion Protection Bills’, which Ma Ba Tha played a large role in conceiving, and which would limit the right of women in certain areas to have children (i.e Rohingya women in Rakhine state) and limit the right of Buddhist women to marry non-Buddhists. With the recent violence in Rakhine state, not to mention the history of mob violence against Muslims and Indians in Myanmar, the events of last week are extremely concerning.

But are these manifestations of fascism any different from what has occurred in Australia? Australia has its own long history of ‘race riots’, and within the last few years anti- Muslim sentiment has been on the rise – the ‘reclaim Australia’ rallies scheduled for next month, for instance, are overtly opposed to Islam and have thousands of signed up attendees.

Here I want to briefly consider this question by looking at fascism as an assemblage of desire, discourse and state power, and argue that there is nothing particularly unique about fascism – but rather that it is a particular configuration of desire and power – or a ‘diagram of power’ that is manifested or actualised according to particular trajectories of nationalism, racism and state interests.

Understanding Fascism

When looking at Cambodia and Myanmar, and recent incidents of ‘communal violence’ or ethnic and religious discrimination, there is a tendency to over emphasise local political, cultural and historic factors. In Cambodia, analysts have often fallen back on the ‘violent orientalism’ thesis (Springer, 2009) – that beneath the smiles and politeness of Khmer society there are hidden violent tendencies which manifest themselves in periods of political turmoil. So too for Myanmar there is a long history of scholars associating political violence with some notion of ‘Burmese ways’[i]. But rather than looking at fascism as purely an endogenous phenomena that can only be understood by a detailed analysis of the factors internal to a particular country, taking a lead from French philosopher Deleuze, I want to consider fascism as an assemblage.

Most important for Deleuze (and Guattari) (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009), fascism, or any assemblage for that matter, cannot be understood as operating within a closed-off entity. An assemblage, unlike classical conceptions of bodies, organisms and subjects are not individuated – there is no whole that can be easily delineated from the outside. Just as a human body is an assemblage of organs, blood and tissue, where flows of oxygen, carbon-dioxide, bacteria, nutrients and water sustain a bodies coherency, so too within a state, certain configurations of violence, capital, bureaucracy, discipline and desire maintain the coherency of a state. Also important is the ontological difference between ‘the event’, the virtual and actuality. The event is the messy reality of different overlapping power relations and bodies. The eruption of violence in Rakhine state in Myanmar for instance is the event – the manifestation of a long and complex history that cannot be reduced down to a single factor. Violence in Rakhine state is the messy result of: the colonial use of Rohingya in the post Japanese V-force, Rakhine resentment of the Burmese state, India-cum-East Pakistan-cum Bangladesh’s own conflicts and persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya, post-independence Rohingya rebellion, Rakine Buddho-fascism, and political exploitation of Rakhine the issue by national politicians garnering anti-Muslim sentiment.

The virtual is a potential for a particular relation of power and is always future orientated and typically unrealisable. Burmese Buddhist-nationalism for instance as an imagined community of ‘traditional’ Buddhists is primarily concerned with a particular future configuration – the dampening of Muslim influence and the establishment of laws and restrictions to ensure a population of ‘proper’ Buddhists. So too in Cambodia the Buddhist nationalist project reactively seeks to limit ‘outside’ influences on the nation in order to restore a proper Khmer-Buddhist constituency.

Actuality is where the virtual is actualised within a particular body – when a body is disciplined, or performs as a ‘Khmer’, ‘Burmese’ or ‘Australian’. But importantly, a body can never be entirely determined by a particular configuration of power – thus one is a father and a Buddhist and a Cambodian, depending on the particular set of relations one finds one in at any given moment.

Fascism is both virtual and actual. At the level of the virtual it is nearly always concerned with ‘the proper’- an imagining of a proper community, united together by sacrifice and obligation, that is constantly attempting to pre-emptively destroy or counter any outside influences which may challenge the coherency of the community (Esposito & Hanafi, 2013) . The Vietnamese in Cambodia or the Muslims/ Indians/ Rohingya in Myanmar and their minority religions, languages and cultures are often imagined as being a threat to ‘proper’ Cambodian/Rakhine/Burmese communities – a contaminant which can potentially destroy the homogeneity of the imagined community. On a micro-level, the common and violent mob attacks against small scale thieves in Cambodia is evidence of the spontaneous violence people are willing to engage in order to protect against threats to the community. Apart from Muslims, Rakhine mobs have also attacked aid workers in Rakhine state for ‘undermining the community’ by supposedly focusing aid resources on Rohingya groups. Fascism is thus always reactive, and based around policing the borders of a ‘proper’ community.

Colonialism and Fascism in Cambodia and Myanmar

Fascism in its virtual state travels – and this is where the similarities across different countries can be best seen. In form at least, fascism in Australia is little different to fascism in Myanmar – both espouse similar fears, anxieties and desires – to protect the community from contaminating Islam. In many cases fascist movements borrow from one another; U Wirathu (AKA ‘the face of Buddhist terror’), spokesman of Myanmar’s 969 movement openly admires the British Defence League, and Khmer Souvanpoum holds as his icon Otto von Bismark and supports Israeli ultra-nationalism. But on a much deeper level, fascism in Myanmar and Cambodia remains highly indebted to colonial legacies. The obsession of British and French colonial administers with managing discrete ethnic populations within fixed territories has endured into the 21^st century. Contemporary nationalists take for granted ethnic categories and differences established through early governmental interventions such as population surveys, education policies and migration policies (the actualisation of colonial nationalisms). Similarly, pre-independence colonial territorial maps have become the ultimate symbol of modern nationalisms, to which all border changes following independence have been marked with great suspicion (i.e. Khmer nationalists who bemoan the loss of koh Trahl to Vietnam, but conveniently stay silent on the large swaths of land ceded from the Lao Champasak King to Cambodia in 1901).

However, unlike colonial administrators, contemporary nationalists want to reversethe flows of bodies established under British and French rule. Just as the Vietnamese fulfilled nearly all positions in the Cambodian bureaucracy in the early 20^th century (Ovesen & Trankell, 2010), so too South Indians almost exclusively dominated the early Burmese bureaucracy and army (Callahan, 2004). Just as early 20^th century Rangoon had the highest immigration rate of any comparable city at the time(Myint-U, 2007), so too, within Phnom Penh the Khmer represented only one third of the population (Vietnamese and Chinese accounting for the other two thirds) (Osbourne, 2008). With the emergence of an urban Khmer and Burmese middle class, early colonial state backed nationalist projects began to morph into nationalist movements. In an attempt to protect their own class and economic interests, and position themselves as inheritors of the colonial state system, the middle class latched onto nationalist discourses which were attractive as they could legitimise themselves as the ‘proper’ subjects of the emerging nation state system.

French efforts to distinguish Cambodian Buddhism from Thai through the establishment of the Buddhist institute and cultivate a Cambodian identity through nationalist icons such as Angkor Watt (which have appeared on every flag since independence) gained momentum in the pre-war years and became attractive to the Khmer middle class (Edwards, 2007). In Burma, one of the first mass organisations, the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) was also cultivated by the state (most of its members being lower level government officials and clerks) and formed the basis for most early nationalist political parties (Taylor, 2009). Interestingly, it was from both the YMBA and from members of the Cambodia Buddhist institute, where anti-Indian and anti- Vietnamese nationalist sentiment began to arise (along with nationalist newspapers such as Nagaravatta in Cambodia, and the magazines ofDoBama Asiayone in Burma). State efforts to insulate the population from peasant revolts (eg the Si Votha revolts in southern Cambodia in the 1880’s and the Saya Sanrebellion in 1930-32 in Burma) through cultivating a conservative Buddhist nationalism, largely backfired. Here certain sects of Buddhism became a vehicle for nationalist sentiment.

For Deleuze, the most important thing about fascism is that it always takes amolecular or populist form. It is cancerous, in that it replicates and grows beyond what states are able to regulate. It is an investment of desire into nationalist/ethnic/religious identities that goes well beyond state led nationalist projects. This is what differentiates fascism from authoritarianism – it is a movement away from orderly, state discipline and passivity, towards a radical, yet reactive nationalism. For Deleuze it is a jumbling of the state coding machines – where individuals become policeman, judge and juror all–in-one. As Deleuze is at pains to point out, the rise of fascism is never wholly determined by economic or class interests as it is primarily an investment of desire – to love ones country/religion/community and be willing to kill/die to protect it. In many cases those swept up in fascist movements have gone directly against their own class and economic interests.

Early Cambodian and Burmese nationalists were initially drawn to Japanese fascism at the onset of WWII. Both Aung San and Son Ngoc Thanh made trips to Japan in the early 40’s and established themselves as local leaders during the Japanese occupation. As nationalism began to rise and the middle class became more confident about impending independence, hatred and violence towards ‘outsiders’ began to become a part of nationalist movements. Already in 1930, Burma had had a major fascist event – the massacre of 200 Indians in Rangoon by Burmese, which started as a conflict over Indian strikers at the Rangoon port. The British authorities had to employ a ‘shoot on site’ strategy in order to quell th riots. In Cambodia Sihanouk throughout the 1960’s undoubtedly cultivated a form of Khmer fascism, although his authoritarianism kept it in check. But it wasn’t until the Lon Nol coup in 1970 that the first major Cambodian fascist event was unleashed– the massacre of over 800 Vietnamese by voluntary Khmer militia in 1960. No doubt the difference in mortality rates between these two events was due to the fact that the British authorities actively suppressed the Indian massacre, while the Lon Nol regime actively encouraged the Vietnamese massacre.

Here, there is another important aspect of fascism; that for a fascist event to occur, there needs to be a great deal of resources mobilised, and existing power structures need to give at least tacit support to the movement. While fascist molecular movements are often beyond state control, there have always been historical moments when states have attempted to re-territorialise fascism and channel it for their own political benefits- although this can be extremely dangerous as colonial regimes discovered. Ne Win in 1960s Burma cultivated a particular variant of Burmese Buddhist chauvinism and set in place many of the structures which have played a role in giving rise to the current plight of the Rohingya, as well as anti-Islam and anti-Indian sentiment (i.e expelling Indo Burmese and restricting citizenship to some groups). In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge, at least initially, could be considered a fascist movement, but which by 1975 had transformed itself into a genocidal authoritarian state. In Both Burma and Cambodia, the tumultuous cold war period which saw civil conflict and the rise of authoritarianism, essentially thwarted any fascist movements.

Contemporary Fascisms

Jumping back to contemporary Cambodia and Myanmar, fascist movements have been on the rise – although for different reasons. In Cambodia, anti-government protest and the increasing confidence at which the populace can display discontent with the government has gone hand in hand with anti-Vietnamese fascism. The historical cultivation of anti-Vietnamese sentiment has largely been supressed by the Hun Sen regime due to the historic ties and economic interests of the ruling elite with the Vietnamese government. This is however rapidly changing at Cambodia aligns its economic and political interest with China. Anti-government protests including garment strikes, and even land conflict protests have been a medium through which long held anti-Vietnamese sentiments can be expressed. Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha of the opposition party have also unashamedly stoked anti-Vietnamese sentiment for short term political gain – especially in Phnom Penh were such sentiments are amongst the strongest.

In Myanmar, anti-Muslim fascism is also on the rise. Yet in Yangon itself, the situation is more complicated. The historic mistrust of central authorities has meant state backed efforts at provoking anti- Islam movements have been viewed suspiciously. No doubt, contemporary Yangon has come a long way from 1930s Rangoon. South Indian and Islamic Burmese have long established ties and links to the city and are an accepted part of the city’s social fabric – after all south Indian cultural import such as betel nut chewing, longyi wearing and south Indian food, are ubiquitous across Myanmar. In Mingala township, one of the biggest Muslim areas of Yangon, people I talked to said they saw government policies creating tensions more than any intra communal issues. Registration card difficulties in particular were a salient issue. However, with the rise of militant Buddhism as espoused by the 969 movement and Ma Ba Tha, anti-Islam and anti-Indian fascism is on the rise. In key places such as Mandalay and Rakhine state, such fascist movements are starting to gain a foothold.

Possibly the key difference to Cambodia is that there is increasing evidence that the current Myanmar regime is tacitly allowing these movements to grow, while in Cambodia, anti –Vietnamese rhetoric is largely monopolised by the opposition party. In Myanmar, there is mounting evidence that state forces were aware of mob violence, but failed to intervene during the 2012 Rohingya massacre. The 2014 anti-Islam Mandalay riots were also largely ignored by state forces and said to have beenperpetuated by ‘suspicious outsiders’. Also, both U Wirathu and Ma Tha Ba have high level political supporters, which make them politically a powerful force for both the USDP and the NLD. However, of most concern are the fascist molecular movements which such political interventions set free – and are subsequently unable to be controlled as in the case of the 2012 Rakhine riots.  As nationalism fuels the rise of opposition parties and democracy politics, discontent with the dire situation most Cambodian’s and Myanmarese find themselves in, is being re-territorialised into fascist politics. Extreme Buddhism and ethno-nationalisms have in particular become important vehicles through which to actualise fascism. If the state continues to cultivate these fascisms – as in the case in Myanmar, and could potentially be the case in Cambodia if the opposition party were to gain power, previous fascist events such as Vietnamese, Indian and Muslim massacres, will no doubt occur again.

Tim Frewer is a PhD candidate at Sydney University

References

Callahan, M. P. (2004). Making enemies: War and state building in Burma: NUS Press.

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2009). Anti-Oedipus. New York: Penguin.

Edwards, P. (2007). Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation 1860-1945. Hawaií: University of Hawaii Press.

Esposito, R., & Hanafi, Z. (2013). Community, Immunity, Biopolitics. Angelaki, 18(3), 83-90. doi: 10.1080/0969725x.2013.834666

Myint-U, T. (2007). The river of lost footsteps: histories of Burma: Macmillan.

Osbourne, M. (2008). Phnom Penh – a Cultural History. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ovesen, J., & Trankell, I.-B. (2010). Cambodian’s and Their Doctors – A medical Anthropology of Colonial and Post colonial Cambodia. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Springer, S. (2009). Culture of violence or violent Orientalism? Neoliberalisation and imagining the ‘savage other’in post‐transitional Cambodia. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 34(3), 305-319.

Taylor, R. H. (2009). The state in Myanmar: NUS Press.

Note

[i] For instance after the Saya Sun Rebellion in 1932 the British reported that the rebellion occurred primarily because ‘the Burman is by nature restless and excitable’. In Making Enemies (2003) Mary Callahan considers a wide rang of other authors who promote cultural explanations to Burma’s problems such as Lucien Pye, John Furnivall and Michael Gravers.

The wrong kind of refugee: Australia exports its problems to Cambodia | Asian Correspondent

The wrong kind of refugee: Australia exports its problems to Cambodia | Asian Correspondent
 Michelle Tolson Oct 02, 2014

A Cambodian Buddhist monk shouts slogans together with protesters near the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Friday. Pic: AP.

Escaping conflict in their home countries, asylum seekers came by boat to wealthy Australia only to be packed off to a small island that built its economy on mining phosphates from bird droppings (known informally as “Bird Shit Island”) for holding and processing. With the phosphate supply depleted, South Pacific island state of Nauru signed in 2001 a $10 million aid package with Australia to be funneled to health care, education and infrastructure withAustralia paying for the holding and processing its asylum seekers. Now Australia has inked a $40 million deal with Cambodia, one of the poorest nations in the world, to take processed refugees who volunteer to go.

CAMBODIA and Australia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) last Friday to take processed and refugees off Australia’s hands that are currently being held on the remote island of Nauru.

Pisey Ly, a grassroots Cambodian activist who advocates for marginalized groups such as homeless migrants and sex workers, told Asian Correspondent “although Australian and Cambodian governments claimed that they’re only sending and receiving refugees who voluntarily agreed to be resettled in Cambodia, I question whether or not those refugees have… a real choice. They ran from their own countries escaping war, conflicts, violence, political threats and poverty, and seek a better place for survival and protection.”

Phil Robertson, deputy director of the Asia division of Human Rights Watch told Asian Correspondent by telephone from Bangkok that “the accepted [processed] refugees are made up of a variety of people such as Hazara [from Afghanistan], Pakistani, Rohingya [from Burma/Myanmar], with Australia observing the process. They are seen as poor, arriving on boats, so they are viewed as not worth supporting. Yet if they fly in, they are treated completely differently.” In December 2014, Australia changed the parameters to make itnearly impossible to get accepted as a refugee if one arrives by boat.

Many decades previously, Cambodia and neighboring Vietnam had their own refugees fleeing by boat, many of who were resettled in Western countries.

“Boat people in previous times were processed correctly but in this case it is being undermined,” explained Robertson. “I think the really sad part of this is it will undermine refugee protection and allow countries to pick and choose which refugees they want. If a claim is legitimate, it should be accepted.  Refugees are not cars or cargo on a ship.”

This situation has been compared to the buying and selling of human beings. While Robertson does not quite accept this arguement, local activists do.

Ly explains “according to the UN Trafficking Protocol, trafficking requires three elements: recruiting, transporting, harboring or receiving persons with the use of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation.” Ly says reviewing the parameters, the situation looks coercive. “That’s why I am wondering about the legal aspect in relation to the transfer of refugees under this recent Australian-Cambodian government’s resettlement agreement whether or not it is a trafficking on removing adults and minors against their wills and exchange for values and the value here is aid from Australian government to Cambodian government.”

The details of the deal are indeed shrouded in mystery. The signing occurred two days after the end of a major Cambodian holiday when an exodus of urban workers returned to their family members in the countryside to honor departed ancestors. A hastily organized protest occurred at the Australian Embassy on Friday, September 26. Activists have not been able to see what the MoU entails and press were not allowed to ask questions.

Sophea Chrek, a former garment worker and labor activist told Asian Correspondent “we don’t know what is in the deal but know that $40 million USD is part of the agreement, but not the details.

“There were about 100 people at the protest. We wish there were more but there was a big national holiday [P’chum Ben] and everyone was getting back from the countryside. Not many people knew. We only knew from sharing information with other activist groups.”

This lack of transparency is worrisome to activists like Chrek and Ly. On Tuesday, local media reported an unsigned copy of the MoU revealed that refugees were required to leave the capital Phnom Penh after a year in order to continue receiving support.

Robertson says “that’s kind of worrisome. That indicates these people are not getting a full ride from Australia’s tax payers. After 2-3 years when the news cycle dies down, they are sent off to the countryside.”

In terms of existing rehabilitation centers already set to support marginalized Cambodian people, Ly says “Department of Social Affairs continue to rely on NGOs vocational training centers with few basic counselling skills, not professional ones, to receive some of these people both adults and children. We know that these NGOs are relying on external aid for [their] operation with inadequate staff and skills to accommodate these vulnerable people. This is not to mention some of the cases that involve physical and sexual abuses.”

In short, she does not see the situation as an improvement for Australia’s asylum seekers. Cambodia is greatly lacking in mental health services for its own people and is known to have high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder from the years of conflict which continued in the provinces through the late 1990s.

“Transcultural Psychosocial Organization Cambodia (TPO Cambodia) is known as a good organization providing mental counselling service but again it is not a state service and we are not sure how much capacity they have for the operation,” Ly continues. “Once the funding has a shortfall, will the service be reliable? Similar to the Cambodian government in this case, once the Australian government ends its aid, will the government have sufficient funds to operate services for refugees? But I am not sure if it will be the government’s operation, or if the Australian government will [place] conditions to hire private company to run rehabilitation centers like they do in Papua New Guinea and Christmas Island.”

Given Cambodia continues to rely heavily on foreign aid and has a shortfall of government funds to support basic healthcare, education and other social services without international funds, Cambodia looks like an unlikely destination for refugees. But perhaps that it why the country was chosen. Aid-dependent and indebted countries while not lacking in free will, have limited options.

“The island [of Nauru] itself is heavily indebted, with low employment,” Robertson explains. “There is nothing there so they [asylum seekers] are stuck in the middle of the Pacific. The island formerly was $20,000 per capita and comparable to Singapore but it was mined heavily for phosphates from bird droppings and the funds were poorly managed. The government made a deal with Australia to hold their refugees but it has gone very, very wrong. Nauru itself has very little negotiating leverage.”

As an impoverished country, Cambodia surely is not in a better negotiating position?

Ly states “I see this as the business opportunity between Australian and Cambodian governments, and possibly contract private institutions to operate either companies or NGOs over vulnerable and marginalized human lives.”

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has publicly distanced itself from the situation. Chrek wishes for it to take a stronger position. “I wonder what the role of the UN is in this. What are you doing? Where are you in this?”

UNHCR in Cambodia has no listed budget for refugees according to its website, but Robertson believes there are about 50 accepted refugees and 20 in process, with most reliant on NGOs for support as they are not allowed to work in the country while their case is being determined.

Robertson explains it has only one representative in Cambodia who must report to the regional office. A poor, international aid-dependent country and a minimal UNHCR presence provides little push-back against the relatively wealthy Australian government’s reach, which is making it known that they do not want to accept the wrong kind of refugee.

As Robertson says, “they say they are respecting the principal [of the refugee convention] but they are undermining it actually. It’s not ‘Well you are a Hazara from Afghanistan so we can’t take you.’”

Cambodia’s garment factory workers: Ripe for exploitation

Cambodia’s garment factory workers: Ripe for exploitation
Albeiro Rodas, Jan 11, 2014

Eight days after the crackdown on garment factory workers and opposition rallies in Phnom Penh, Cambodia seems normal this weekend. The national television continues its regular programs showing Thai and Korean soap operas, karaoke videos and news about curious things in the West like the polar freezing in US or “national news” like the January 7′s Liberation Day Anniversary. The crackdown gets some mentions on TV, such as to announce that factories are  filing cases in court against trade unions for “incitement to strike, damage to property and assets”.

Cheap manpower has attracted companies from countries like China, South Korea and Vietnam to Cambodia to serve big customers such as Nike, Adidas, Puma, Gap and H&M.

Cambodia has two very important factors to guarantee such cheap manpower: a lot of young people and a large rural population. Eighty percent of Cambodians were living in rural areas in 2009 (NIS, 2009, p.1), while 22 percent of Cambodians are between 15 and 24 years old (Index Mundi, 2013). As poverty is mostly concentrated in rural areas, factory workers are mostly farmers with low levels of education and few options to do other things in their fight to break the poverty line.

Emigration is also high, with Thailand, China, Malaysia and South Korea the main destinations. There is a wave of legal migration through certain agencies promoting domestic servants in Malaysia or construction workers in Thailand.  In 2013 Thailand agreed to pay 300 baht per day as minimum wage to employees, approximately 10 US dollars or 40,000 Riel. In Cambodia, many workers earn just $3 a day. However, those working in other countries are not there legally. According to VOA Khmer, 160,000 migrant Cambodian workers are looking to be legalized in Thailand alone, with many working off the books in the sex trade, illegal fishing or construction jobs (Chun Sakada, 2012, para. 1)

(MORE: Civil society groups ramp up pressure on Cambodian govt)

Strikes at Cambodian garment factories are not rare, with conditions so bad and hours so long that mass faintings are also not uncommon. As these workers suffer, Cambodia’s leaders and industrialists are getting rich. A few years ago most of these workers supported the CPP government, but policies of land grabbing and eviction of farmers and now the latest brutal crackdown is further undermining the popularity of the government.

For many the impact would be deeply negative causing a sudden inflation and unemployment. What is true is that keeping a low minimum wage in Cambodia, will attract soon a crisis not only in the garment sector, but in other areas too. Offering cheap manpower to promote foreign investment can be a good thing, but not when the government stands by as its people toil for pittance. At the same time, discontent young workers will tend to look jobs in other sectors such as the tourist industry.

The strike crackdown attracted international condemnation as security forces opened fire on protesters armed with stones asking to earn US$160. It shocked not only human rights defenders around the globe, but also multinationals that are at last becoming more sensitive to  the conditions of the workers that make their products. International clothing retailers like Adidas, Columbia, Puma, Gap, H&M and Levi Strauss, said this week that they oppose violence and called on the government to find a peaceful solution to the problem, stating also that workers have the right to work in a safe and secure environment. (Kimseng Men, 2014, para. 5)

The Washington Post has a good article on whether the minimum wage kills jobs or not, saying “it doesn’t appear to worsen unemployment in any noticeable way” (B. Plumer, 2013, para. 2).

In a study by the Center for Economic and Policy Research, it is explained why the increase of minimum wage does not mean necessary an increase on unemployment:

In the traditional discussion of the minimum wage, economists have focused on how these costs affect employment outcomes, but employers have many other channels of adjustment. Employers can reduce hours, non-wage benefits, or training. Employers can also shift the composition toward higher skilled workers, cut pay to more highly paid workers, take action to increase worker productivity (from reorganizing production to increasing training), increase prices to consumers, or simply accept a smaller profit margin. Workers may also respond to the higher wage by working harder on the job. But, probably the most important channel of adjustment is through reductions in labor turnover, which yield significa

Cambodia: Human rights groups condemn excessive use of force

Cambodia: Human rights groups condemn excessive use of force
Clothilde Le Coz, Sep 25, 2013

It was 20 years on September 24 since the Cambodian Constitution was first signed, marking the end of the UN transitional authority in the country (Untac). Today’s Constitution was drafted in July and August 1993 by 12 persons. One of them told the local press on Tuesday that, while  the “essentials for democracy” are in the text, its implementation has been “completely diverted from its goal”.

Under the Constitution, the King names a representative of the party gaining the most parliamentary seats to form a government. This is how Hun Sen was appointed by King Norodom Sihamoni to do so. However, the Constitution requires 50% of the votes of the National Assembly to confirm the new government.  On Tuesday, a truncated National Assembly of 68 members re-elected Mr. Hun Sen with a new mandate as Cambodian Prime Minister for the next five years, as 68 does represent more than half the seats. Sam Rainsy, one of the leaders of the CNRP, called the Constitution a “big disappointment”, echoing the opinion of the lawmaker who participated in the drafting process of the Constitution.

Elected members of the main opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) led by Sam Rainsy and Khem Sokha, have boycotted the National Assembly this week, stating that authorities have not held any inquiry about the massive electoral frauds and calling the meeting “a violation of the Constitution”. From September 7-17, the CNRP held a number of non violent demonstrations in Phnom Penh to ask for further investigations into the results. According to Transparency International, the CPP should have won these elections with 48.9% of the votes and the CNRP with 44.2%, showing that the competition between the two parties is tighter than it actually seems and stating that the official results announced on September 8 might not be reflective of people’s will because of widespread irregularities.

A number of incidents have occurred in recent weeks that  highlight the tensions surrounding the election result. On September 15 security forces fired at civilians in Phnom Penh, killing one person and wounding several others. These practices have been denounced by Human Rights Watch.

On September 20, hundreds of armed security forces dispersed a peaceful gathering led by CNRP official Prince Sisowath Thomico, who was on hunger strike and accompanied by a group of Buddhist monks and other supporters. Two days later, at the same place, police and gendarmes armed with guns as well as civilian auxiliaries with tasers and slingshots broke up a peaceful vigil by representatives of people evicted from their homes in Phnom Penh. The participants were reiterating their demand for electoral fairness and calling for the release of imprisoned Boeng Kak housing rights activist Yorm Bopha. At least 10 community members were injured and seven journalists attacked.

These events were condemned on September 24 by a group of five NGOs – including HRW and Amnesty International – denouncing “the authorities’ unnecessary and excessive use of force” and urging “foreign governments and the United Nations [to] speak out and condemn violations of the right to peaceful assembly and related rights”. The Oversees Press Club of Cambodia (OPCC) also condemned the attacks against local and foreign journalists.

China gives Cambodia 19 millions military aid before meet

China gives Cambodia 19 millions military aid before meet
Vong Sokheng, 29 May 2012

China granted Cambodia about $19 million in defence aid yesterday as part of a military agreement signed between the two countries.

The pledged funds came less than 24 hours before Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie is scheduled to speak at the ASEAN Defence Ministers meeting, ostensibly to explain the country’s stance on the disputed South China Sea.

ASEAN members the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, along with China and Taiwan, claim portions of the resource-rich body of water, and it has been a flashpoint of conflict for years.

In recent weeks, the temperature has heated back up, with China and the Philippines sending boats to a disputed reef that both countries claim.

“It is good that is he is going to explain China’s stance directly to ASEAN defence ministers,” Cambodian Minister of Defence Tea Banh said in explaining Cambodia’s decision to invite China’s top-ranking defence official to speak.

Calls to the embassies of Vietnam, the Philippines and China seeking further clarification about today’s meeting were not returned yesterday.

Last week, representatives from ASEAN countries polished a draft of a Code of Conduct governing relations in the South China Sea.

The final version is due to arrive in China over the summer.

The military agreement was signed after a closed-door bilateral discussion between Tea Banh and China’s Guanglie.

Guanglie came to Cambodia on Sunday for a four-day official visit. He is also scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Hun Sen.

Tea Banh said that China will continue to support members of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces who train in the country.

“Chinese assistance is greatly contributing to building Cambodian army’s capacity in national defence, and the military co-operation between China and Cambodia has really improved,” Tea Banh said.

He also reaffirmed Cambodia’s stance to support the “One-China” policy, in which China claims sovereignty over Taiwan.

Boycott Nike, says Mu Sochua, Cambodian Opposition MP

Boycott Nike, says  Mu Sochua, Cambodian Opposition MP
Nimol and Vincent MacIsaac, 09 April 2012

Opposition MP Mu Sochua yesterday called for a boycott of global sports brand Nike, following two fainting incidents at a factory that supplies it last week.

She also warned that global brands and the Cambodian government were taking a huge gamble by failing to address the causes of the mass fainting incidents that have plagued the country’s most lucrative export industry.

“This is economic exploitation on the back of workers to the point that they are fainting,” she told the Post, adding that the Labour Ministry lacked the expertise and training to get to the root of the problem.

Questionable conditions

Global brands should be sending experts to investigate working conditions at the factories that supply them, she said, adding it was possible conditions at some factories could cause long-term damage to workers’ health.

“Some of these women are pregnant,” she said, referring to the 970 workers the Labour Ministry estimated fainted at garment and footwear factories in the first three months of this year.

Mu Sochua also took aim at the ministry, saying it was failing to protect workers.

“The ministry has no respect for workers’ rights or human rights,” she said.

Fainting fiasco
Her comments followed three fainting incidents last week, two of  which occurred at a factory that supplies Nike: Sabrina (Cambodia) Manufacturing.

On Friday, 195 workers fainted at its factory in Kampong Speu after 107 fainted there on Wednesday.

A further 28 workers fainted at Mirae Apparel in the capital’s Meanchey district on Friday, said Meng Hong, a member of a panel set up by the Labour Ministry to probe and prevent mass faintings.

A 'big risk'

“The brands are taking a big risk,” Mu Sochua warned. “Consumers are beginning to learn what’s going on.”

Dave Welsh, country director for the American Centre for International Labour Solidarity, said the problem was unnecessary.

He said both the government and the Garment Manufacturers Association in Cambodia were deeply concerned about the faintings and that the onus was on the brands to help alleviate the underlying conditions. 

“The buyers are the ones who are making out like bandits,” he said.

Rectifying rights

Welsh identified the causes of the faintings as poor nutrition, forced overtime and poor occupational health and safety, saying all three were easily fixable.

Sochua said the faintings would continue until workers mobilised to ensure their rights were respected.

Meng Hong said his committee would monitor both factories today to ensure they had been sanitised and their ventilation systems improved.

ASEAN to up defence against crisis - Phnompenh Post

ASEAN to up defence against crisis  - Phnompenh Post
Don Weinland, 20 March 2012

Cambodia and other members of ASEAN were in talks to double a regional currency swap to US$240 billion as a source of funds in the event of a future economic crisis, officials and experts said yesterday.

Discussion on increasing the fund, which began with multilateral swaps in 2010 and is known as the Chiang Mai Initiative, would continue at ASEAN meetings next week, National Bank of Cambodia chairman and spokeswoman Nguon Sokha said.

“It is a goal, and it will be an objective at the meeting,” she said yesterday by phone.

“This discussion started before the debt crisis in Europe and is more associated with the global financial crisis.”

Doubling the swap would increase Cambodia’s contribution to $240 million, and likely lift the amount the country is entitled to borrow to $1.2 billion, Jayant Menon, lead economist at the Asian Development Bank’s Office of Regional Economic Integration, said yesterday in an email.

The increase was likely to happen, and would be announced formally in May, Menon said.

“The doubling is designed to address the concern that the fund was too small at $120 billion, especially if [several] members needed liquidity in a contagious crisis,” he said.

Up to 20 per cent of each country’s entitlement can be borrowed without taking a loan from the International Monetary Fund, another figure Menon said could change.

The IMF might loosen this restriction to 30 per cent or beyond, he said.

China, Korea and Japan – so-called ASEAN+3 members – contribute more than 70 per cent to the current $120 billion swap.

Cambodia contributes 0.1 per cent, and countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand nearly four per cent each.

“The main purpose is to build a resilient regional grouping in coping with future financial crises,” Chheang Vannarith, executive director of the Cambodia Institute for Cooperation and Peace, said yesterday, adding that the increased access to funds would help both private and government sectors deal with financial uncertainty and instability.

Cambodia had about $3 billion in dollar-denominated foreign reserves during the first half of 2011, the Post reported.

The Kingdom has significant exposure to US and EU markets via its garment-manufacturing industry, which was worth $4.25 billion and accounted for about 32.1 per cent of gross domestic product last year.

Garment and textile shipments to the US and Europe composed about three-quarters of the trade, or $3.14 billion, the Post reported

Cambodians in bid to escape Thai boats

Cambodians in bid to escape Thai boats
Phnompenh Post, May Titthara, 31 January 2012

A desperate group of Cambodian men have made calls to their families from Indonesia asking for help to escape from forced labour aboard exploitative Thai fishing boats.

The families of 14 men from Trea commune in Kampong Thom province’s Stoung district filed a complaint to rights group Licadho yesterday pleading for help to repatriate their loved ones.

Gnan Van, 33, said yesterday that her husband Yean Phean called her while docking at an Indonesian island on Sunday pleading for help to escape a fishing boat owner who made him work “night and day” and paid no salary.

“I’ve missed my husband for two years. Since [late] 2009, I did not get any news from him,” she said. “I just got his phone call yesterday, he asked me to ask NGOs to help him and other people back to Cambodia.”

Her husband, along with 13 others, crossed into Thailand from Banteay Meanchey’s Malai district in December 2009 with a broker to work as pig farmers in Thailand despite her warnings about the risks of migrant work.

“I got some news about illegal border crossings to work in Thailand or Malaysia but my husband did not listen to me,” she said.

Oun Pheap, 59, said her son Sok Ly also ignored her when she warned him about the risks of travelling to Thailand with a broker.

“I told my son, ‘Don’t believe people who urge you to work in Thailand,’ but he did not listen to me, he just said to me that he can earn a lot of money working in Thailand,” she said.

Chhoung Run, Licadho’s Banteay Meanchey provincial coordinator, said yesterday’s complaint was the second he had received in relation to the case.

“[A court official] already sent this case to the head office for them to contact our embassy in Indonesia to help them,” he said.

Mao Naream, a consular affairs official at the Cambodian embassy in Indonesia, said he was unaware of the case but would look into it.

More than 100 Cambodian men have been rescued from Indonesia, Malaysia and Mauritius since December after they were trafficked onto fishing boats in Thailand.

Preah Vihear villagers take case to Cambodian PM

Preah Vihear villagers take case to Cambodian PM 
Phak Seangly , Phnompenh post, January 6, 2012

Nearly 70 villagers from Preah Vihear’s Choam Ksan district gathered in the capital yesterday and submitted a letter to Prime Minister Hun Sen urging his intervention in a land dispute with provincial authorities.

Last Friday, the National Authority of Preah Vihear began dismantling the homes of residents in Kantuot commune’s Svay Chrum village to make way for a government office. The residents have been forced to relocate to a nearby village they claim lacks infrastructure.

Representative Phan Poeun said the villagers made stealth trips to the capital, careful not to draw the attention of provincial authorities. “We came secretly because if the authority found out, they would stop us and arrest us,” he said.

The villagers gathered at Butom Votey pagoda yesterday and displayed 10 banners with photos of the authorities in question and the plea, “[we] ask Samdech Hun Sen and Bun Rany to grant us the right to live in Svay Chrum village forever”.

Kong Chamroeun, a member of Hun Sen’s cabinet, accepted the letter and said that while he “forwarded it to the group who works on these cases,” he did not “know whether the letter has been read by them”.

Preah Vihear provincial governor Om Mara, meanwhile, denied that the villagers were residents of Svay Chrum.

Cambodia: Protest ends, dispute goes on

Cambodia: Protest ends, dispute goes on
Tep Nimol , Phnompenh post, 4 January 2012

A protest at a Taiwanese-owned garment factory in Kandal province ended yesterday with an agreement between management and workers, following an urgent meeting with local officials to avoid a traffic jam in front of the factory on Highway No 4.

Protesters at Kwei Yang garment factory in Ang Snuol district said they had nine demands but would return to work this morning after having settled or agreed to continue negotiating with management on seven points, with the two most contentious demands to go to the Arbitration Council.

Tok Kim San, the factory’s chief of administration, said some workers had been confused about the US$5 monthly health bonus announced by Prime Minister Hun Sen in November, which takes effect this month.

They convinced other workers that they had been cheated out of the bonus and incited them to strike, he said.

“The company follows the law,” Tok Kim San said, adding that some demands went beyond what the law requires and that these would be brought to the Arbitration Council.

Factory worker Moy Samlot said yesterday’s protest by more than 400 workers in front of the factory followed a protest by about 200 workers on Saturday.

The company failed to negotiate with them on Saturday so they protested again, she said.

Moy Samlot said the main disagreement was over a monthly $5 bonus.

“Last month, the company divided the bonus into weekly payments and deducted it from workers who declined to work overtime,” she said.

Cheng Sovann, vice-president of the Cambodian National Confederation for Labourers’ Protection, said union representatives, officials from the provincial labour department, the district military commander and company representatives held an urgent meeting to resolve the strike to avoid bringing traffic on the highway to a standstill.

“Workers and the company settled five points and agreed to discuss two other points on January 12,” he said. Two other demands, the $5 monthly incentive and alleged deductions of bonuses, would be sent to Arbitration Council for a solution, he said.

Sok Khem, deputy director of the labour department’s labour office, said she joined the meeting to explain labour laws to workers, not to negotiate a resolution.

She said the Arbitration Council would invite both sides to a meeting today.

“The workers’ demands exceed benefits allowed under the law.

They still do not understand clearly, although legal points were explained many times,” she said.

Cambodia: A battle for Borei Keila

Cambodia: A battle for Borei Keila
Khouth Sophak Chakrya with additional reporting by Mary Kozlovski, Phnompen hpost, 4 January 2012

At least 10 people were injured and another 10 arrested during an armed clash in the capital’s Borei Keila community yesterday morning, as more than 100 police officials, guards and workers from a private company demolished more than 200 homes.

District police and military police officials and security guards from developer Phan Imex, along with hired workers carrying axes, hammers and crowbars, began to tear down villagers’ houses in Prampi Makara district’s Veal Vong commune, sparking protests from residents.

In 2003, Phan Imex Company signed an agreement with the government to construct 10 buildings on two hectares of land to house 1,776 families, in exchange for development rights to a remaining 2.6 hectares.

The firm has so far constructed only eight of the buildings, leaving nearly 400 families in limbo.

Some families have since accepted offers of compensation and housing in two resettlement areas.

In June, the Post reported that Phan Imex owner Suy Sophan had penned a letter to Prime Minister Hun Sen in 2010 requesting permission to forego construction of the remaining two buildings and asking that the land be granted to the company. On Monday, more than 10 local officials and company guards attempted to dismantle 27 houses in Borei Keila, but were prevented by about 50 residents.

During the clash yesterday morning, two women were injured by police, while more than 100 villagers threw bricks and petrol-filled bottles, which injured deputy municipal police chief Phoung Malay and deputy district governor Sok Ath.

Officials, guards and workers briefly withdrew to the district hall while residents gathered bricks, logs, branches and tyres and formed a blockade on the road leading to the village.

An hour later, officials returned with three fire trucks, an excavator and a bulldozer, breaching the blockade within half an hour and firing tear gas at residents who burned piles of rubbish and threw lit petrol-filled bottles and bricks.

District military police chief Soy Chandy sustained a head injury during the confrontation. Ten villagers, including a woman and two boys, were arrested.

Por Un, 73, whose house was demolished, spoke tearfully that she had waited for five years to receive housing from the company.

“They acted cruelly toward poor people,” she said.

“They have to pay us with a house or give us money, so that we can buy a new house or we will not leave from here.”

Var Ponlok, a military official whose house was torn down and who was due to be married in Borei Keila on Thursday, said the workers had bulldozed villagers’ homes without seeking a resolution for residents.

Villager Um Nam said that he wanted the company and authorities to implement the 2003 agreement.

Seven-year-old Noun Socheata cried when she returned from school to see her grandparents collecting their possessions from a pile of demolished houses.

Phan Imex owner Suy Sophan could not be reached for comment yesterday.

Municipal police chief Touch Naruth declined to comment yesterday, while deputy municipal police chief Hy Prou referred questions to fellow deputy municipal police chief Phoung Malay and deputy provincial governor Noun Someth, neither of whom could be reached.

Kiet Chhe, deputy municipal administration chief, said that 30 officials had sustained injuries in the clash and one district commander had been hospitalised. He added that eight villagers were being detained by authorities.

In a joint statement released yesterday, 11 civil society groups condemned the “violent eviction” of Borei Keila residents.

“The destruction of these homes marks yet another sad turn for a development that was once promoted as a model alternative to the eviction and off-site relocation of …Phnom Penh’s urban poor,” the statement said.