The taming of the NLD… by the NLD | New Mandala

The taming of the NLD… by the NLD | New Mandala

TIMOTHY SIMONSON, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

12 AUGUST 2015

Have Myanmar’s Generals turned Aung San Suu Kyi into a lame duck in wolf’s clothing?

With the omission of several prominent figures from the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) party list for the upcoming general election, Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) appears to have accepted the military’s terms of engagement.

It’s another example of an unsettling trend of moderation often seen among marginalised parties.

After the release of the NLD’s list of 1,090 candidates, Myanmar’s Generals can breathe a sigh of relief, safe in the knowledge that their road map to ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ is being followed as planned.

In another telling sign, ‘the Lady’ has rejected the nominations of all but one aspiring candidate from the so-called ’88 Generation’ group – activists who took part in 1988’s mass student protests against General Ne Win’s misguided Burmese Path to Socialism.

Of the 88 Generation activists still alive and active – and who weren’t forced into exile, murdered by the army, or had their voices silenced otherwise – over a dozen applied for her patronage. They form a vanguard of opposition against the regime.

Moreover, their visibility continues to serve as a powerful reminder of even darker times of that brutal crackdown, which continues to hang over the moral conscience and integrity of the military, and its search for redemption.

The 88 Generation Group’s bravery in the face of persecution juxtaposes the concessions made by ASSK. The omission of key activists is extremely significant.

Among the rejected hopefuls, perhaps most surprisingly, was the student leader of the 1988 protests, Ko Ko Gyi, who had previously confirmed that he would stand for election in the NLD.  Many other loyal party members, assured of support in their local townships, have also been questionably stripped of patronage by the NLD’s central committee.

However, there is a silver lining; there are still some notable candidates on the party list, including Susanna Hla, a women’s rights activist, and Nay Phone Latt, a champion of free speech.  Yet, the promises of AASK in nominating more ethnic minority and female candidates have also appeared contradictory in practice: only 15 per cent of the candidates are women (with the ethnic minority figure being unavailable).

While many supporters and rank-and-file members of the NLD are said to beoutraged by the selections, some going as far as resigning, including 12 candidates who managed to make the list, the decision represents a predictable pattern of behaviour undertaken by leaders of radical, counter-elite parties when bestowing patronage.

What we see now is the dissociation and isolation of many of the more radical elements of AASK’s party who would potentially otherwise refuse to collude with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the National Parliament, thehluttaw.

It is also worth noting that the very design and features of the hluttaw itself, including a lack of private offices for its representatives and the encouragement of cross-party committees, favour coalition-building and consensus decision-making.

Evidently, the last thing AASK wants are trouble-makers who will try and push the Generals too far in her new parliament, which could ultimately lead to a repeated cycle of military action against the NLD.

Earlier this year, acknowledging the existential threat that she might pose to military interests, and subsequently, to her own party as a result of pushing the envelope too far, ASSK went out of her way to pledge that she would not be a ‘bully’ if she won by a landslide.

So what’s to be made of all this? Well, it is clearly an indication of an emerging ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’, as espoused by the military 10 years ago.  But on a deeper level, the most interesting assessment is provided by political thinker Michel Foucault, author of Discipline and Punish.
The power of ‘discipline’, according to Foucault, is an overbearing means of surveillance over populations (he imagines discipline working like the modern ‘panopticon’ prison system).  It establishes subtle forms of control in modern society, and maximises utility; making modern societies more productive without the need of carrying out actual physical torture.

Arguably these processes can be likened to the aesthetic changes that are gradually taking place in modern Myanmar. In turn, everyday political and social life becomes subjugated by mere reminders of punishment.

Later in his life Foucault brought in another mechanism of power into his critique, ‘governmentality’.  This roughly represents a type of power in which ‘a conduct of conduct’ is established – teaching others to govern themselves.

These are the processes by which governments set the bounds of acceptable conduct in society and opposition forces by embedding disciplinary techniques into their subjects’ social psychology (the interaction between individuals and groups and the effect of society on behaviour).

Once established, individual, societal and political processes self-regulate and realign themselves to concepts and reasoning prescribed to them by ruling powers. The ultimate aim is that rulers don’t need to intervene as directly with their subjects as they did before in order to regulate dissent.

The NLD’s recent ‘toning down’ of its candidate list raises serious questions.

Could it be that AASK is demonstrating Foucauldian mechanisms of modern control by realigning her party’s stance?  Could her actions – of excluding potential candidates that may have constituted thorns in the side of the USDP – be attributable to her party’s inclusion in the democratic process? Do these latest actions indeed expose a successful, and seemingly passive, internalisation of the USDP-led agenda into the NLD leadership’s conscious decision-making?

There are still 30 candidates who haven’t been named, mostly from peripheral regions.  ASSK may still pull out a surprise number of radical hardline and minority voices.

This, however, is doubtful; meanwhile, the questions are mounting.

The latest candidacy selection saga overwhelmingly shows the success of the Generals in engineering ASSK into a lame duck in wolf’s clothing.

Myanmar’s various post-independence regimes have frequently looked for new and innovative ways to establish a united front and crush dissent.

Perhaps their foray into parliamentary democracy may prove to be the most efficient and overtly bloodless way to neutralise, normalise, and regulate society.

Timothy Simonson is a master’s student at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

The Great Game Over Burma | The Irrawaddy

The Great Game Over Burma | The Irrawaddy
 AUNG ZAW / The Irrawaddy, June 10, 2015

China’s President Xi Jinping, right, and Burmese President Thein Sein attend an official welcoming ceremony as Thein Sein arrives for the Boao Forum, in Sanya, Hainan province, on April 5, 2013. (Photo: Reuters)Burma’s opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi began a five-day visit to China on Wednesday, the first time the National League for Democracy chairwoman has made an official trip to Burma’s northern neighbor.

In this April 11, 2013 story, The Irrawaddy looks at the changing dynamics of Burma’s relationship with China, and the wider world.

The recent political opening in Burma surprised many neighboring countries, including China. The government’s reforms have no doubt received welcome applause, but for Burma’s traditional friends and foes, they have also created room for new competition in the country. The rules of the game have changed quickly in Burma, and the world is watching to see how international relations, particularly with China, shift in turn.

Since Burma regained independence from the British in 1948, leaders and diplomats at the Foreign Affairs Ministry have devoted most of their time, energy and resources to improving ties with China. We have seen rocky relations as well as honeymoon periods between both countries.

In the past, China had openly supported Burma’s banned Communist Party. At points, the East Asian superpower even dispatched troops to the northern territory of Kachin State—forcing Burma to set rounds of border demarcation meetings in the 1950s and 1960s. Burma also saw anti-China riots in 1967, as Beijing stirred up disturbances by encouraging Chinese agents to support Communist cells in the country during the Cultural Revolution period.

Although both countries signed a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression based on five principles of peaceful coexistence, China has sometimes breached these core principles to test the so-called paukphaw relationship, while Burma has avoided antagonizing its northern neighbor.

Though many Burmese political observers dislike Gen. Ne Win, who came to power through a coup in 1962 and ruled Burma with an iron fist until his regime was ousted in 1988, some give him credit for playing a “neutral” foreign policy during the Cold War, which they say saved Burma from becoming the puppet of any giant power in the region or the West. For the Chinese Communist Party, Burma served as a buffer zone to deter proxies of the West along with India and the Soviet Union.

Certainly, however, in the back of their minds, Burma’s leaders have always feared China. Burma’s late Prime Minister U Nu, who held numerous meetings with Chinese leaders to settle several disputes, once publicly expressed this fear in a statement after the Chinese Communist Party assumed power in 1949. “Our tiny nation cannot have the effrontery to quarrel with any power,” he said. “And least among these, could Burma afford to quarrel with new China?”

But the situation is changing now. Last weekend, Burma’s President Thein Sein visited China, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. During his three-day visit for the Boao Forum, a summit of government and business leaders, Thein Sein played relatively safe but firmly stressed that Burma would practice an independent and active foreign policy while still adhering to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. He said Burma would focus more on developing ties with other countries in the Southeast Asian region. He also urged China to invest responsibly in Burma and to earn the trust of local Burmese people.

As Burma’s leaders continue to forge closer relations with the West and other Southeast Asian nations, the Chinese, like everyone else, are preparing to adapt.

Recently, the outgoing Chinese ambassador publicly met democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyidaw. Chinese diplomats have acknowledged previous meetings between them. To handle Burma going forward, China has appointed a veteran diplomat in Asian affairs, Yang Houlan, who served in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. His appointment is reminiscent of the past. In 1963, a year after Ne Win took power, China appointed Geng Biao as vice foreign minister to Burma. Geng Biao was a senior diplomat who had served missions in Europe soon after the formation of the People’s Republic of China.

In the face of rising Western influence, it is likely that China will employ “soft power” to win back the hearts and minds of the Burmese people. During a previous visit, Thein Sein confessed a fondness for Chinese television dramas. “Since childhood, I’ve been watching Chinese television,” the president told China Radio International.

On the political front, Yang Houlan’s appointment as ambassador and China’s involvement in ceasefire talks between Kachin rebels and the Burmese government are signs that Beijing is serious about settling Burma’s lingering ethnic conflicts, which have threatened border stability as well as Chinese gas pipelines and a railway project in the country. Kachin military leader Gen. Gun Maw, who is now involved in ceasefire dialogues with the Burmese government, told The Irrawaddy that Kachin leaders asked international observers including the United States, the United Kingdom and the United Nations to observe the peace talks, but that the Chinese did not want any outsiders (i.e. Westerners) getting involved. Instead, China invited the Burmese government and Kachin leaders to hold a series of meetings on Chinese soil.

A stable and prosperous Burma will no doubt benefit everyone. However, Burma’s improved relations with the West, and particularly with the United States, will complicate relations with China. The more Burma improves ties with the West, the more Western influence in the country is expected to rise.

Burma has seen growing anti-China sentiment at home. Most ordinary people in the country were repulsed by Beijing’s support for the previous brutal regime, and many continue to protest against China’s extraction of natural resources with little regard for the environment and local populations. Some critics say China has only given its support to exploit Burma’s natural resources and gain strategic access to the Indian Ocean.

China is Burma’s largest investor, channeling between US$14 billion and $20 billion into the country since 1988. Energy-hungry China has poured money into hydropower projects in the country’s ethnic regions, and its three major oil corporations have a strong foothold. Many Burmese worry that Chinese investments and aid programs are like a Trojan horse. However, given the government’s suspension of the China-funded Myitsone dam project and public protests over the controversial Letpadaung copper mine, it seems likely that civil society groups will target many more Chinese-backed projects in the future and that these investments will become political time bombs.

The fact is that Burma no longer needs to hide behind China. Nevertheless, pundits argue that Beijing will not let go easily. When former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Burma for the first time in November 2011, Chinese leaders played it coy. The Global Times newspaper, a mouthpiece for the Chinese government, wrote during Clinton’s visit that China did not resist Burma’s attempts to improve relations with the West but would not accept “seeing its interests stomped on.” The message was clear: China would not tolerate Burma becoming an ally of the United States.

In October 2011, Burma announced its decision to suspend construction of the Myitsone dam in Kachin State, a project that had provoked strong public opposition. China was bewildered by the announcement, which came just five months after Thein Sein’s first official visit to Beijing, where he signed nine cooperation agreements including a $765 million credit package and a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.

But the question remained, would Burma turn against China? The answer is simple: no. Burma doesn’t yet have that luxury.

It will be interesting to watch how Burma handles the delicate balancing act between China and the rest of the world, maintaining its old alliance while proving it is not a satellite state. Burma’s generals are well versed in the art of pitting international powers against one another. But if Burma falters at the game this time, the country’s leaders will no doubt face accusations of playing with fire.

Just before her trip to Burma in 2011, Clinton, who announced the US policy of a pivot toward Asia, received a counterbalancing message from Naypyidaw: Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, commander in chief of Burma’s armed forces, flew to China to meet with then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. The military chief signed a defense cooperation agreement, and the two sides talked of enhancing their comprehensive strategic partnership.

At home, Thein Sein told Clinton that Burma would continue its relationship with China while strengthening ties with other countries. He pointedly called Beijing a strong, geopolitically important partner that had encouraged Burma to improve relations with the West. Ironically, China secretly hosted a rare meeting between Burma and US officials in Beijing just four years earlier, in 2007.

In September 2012, before making his first official visit to the United States, Thein Sein traveled to China. Ne Win, the former dictator, likewise received Chinese leaders in Rangoon before making trips to the West, and they urged him not to make political commitments to the United States.

Washington is also being careful not to upset China. During his historic visit to Burma in November last year, President Barack Obama said in a speech that the United States welcomed China’s peaceful rise. And when asked whether US policies in Burma centered on relations with China, US Ambassador Derek Mitchell told The Irrawaddy that his country’s increasing engagement was “about Burma.”

“It’s always been about Burma,” he said. “There’s a misunderstanding in China, and even among some commentators, that everything we do in Asia is about containing China or encircling China, but that’s simply not the case. Our policy toward Burma has been about Burma for 20 years, 25 years, before China was so-called rising or re-emerging. Our policy toward Burma is evolving because Burma itself is evolving.”

Burma and the United States both understand they must not agitate China. But almost everyone else in Burma, except for those embedded with the Chinese, seem more than ready to welcome the West. They know it is the best way to counter Chinese influence.

Though it has sparked ongoing debate in Naypyidaw among top leaders and opposition members, Burma’s bid to escape China’s shadow is obvious. Last year, Min Aung Hlaing visited China’s historical adversary Vietnam before going to Beijing. In addition to visiting China soon after his appointment to the presidency, Thein Sein went to India, indicating a desire to diversify Burma’s portfolio of strategic partners in the region. His former boss Snr-Gen Than Shwe did the same, making two state visits—to China and India—before leaving his throne.

Burma also seeks to expand defense ties with its neighbors. In the past, Burmese leaders allegedly allowed China’s listening posts and a radar facility on Burma’s Great Coco Island, reportedly to monitor regional military activities, especially air and naval movements in the Bay of Bengal, and to conduct surveillance of India’s strategically important tri-service facilities at Port Blair o n South Andaman Island. But in March, Burma and India conducted joint naval exercises and patrols in the Bay of Bengal, while India also reportedly ran a training program for Burma’s armed forces, including exercises for pilots of the Russian-built Mi-35 helicopter gunships.

In February, Burma also sent its two frigates, UMS 561 and UMS 562, to the Thai island of Phuket for the first time in 18 years. Thanasak Patimaprakorn, supreme commander of the Thai armed forces, said in Bangkok that the visit of the Burmese ships was intended to celebrate 65 years of diplomatic ties between both countries, with expectations for closer military ties going forward.

Since improving relations with the West, Burma has been invited by the United States to observe the annual Cobra Gold military exercise in Thailand. In the near future, the United States will likely provide non-lethal training to Burma’s army officers. And last month, Australia announced it was lifting restrictions on military engagement with Burma in recognition of the country’s democratic reforms.

Burma will probably bolster relations with Japan as well. Ties between both countries date back to the World War II era, and Japan’s interests run deep in Burma. Not wanting to miss the train now, Tokyo recently decided to resume aid in Burma, and more Japanese companies and NGOs will soon play a counterbalancing role against Chinese influence.

As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), Burma could also assume a proactive role in the regional grouping, as it did during the golden days of the 1950s. Ironically, Asean allowed Burma to join in 1997 because it wanted to pull the pariah state from China’s sphere of influence, but Burma’s reliance on its northern neighbor deepened. Now 15 years later, Burma must act with urgency to develop a foreign relations strategy for the world—not just China—as it integrates more with Asean, India and the rest of Asia.

Of course, Burma must get its house in order first, paying serious attention on the domestic front to its northern territory, where the national government has never been able to establish its law and order. (In 2010, Burma could not hold elections in the Wa region, and soon afterward fierce fighting broke out in Kachin State.)

But as the country continues opening up, Burma will test its independent and active foreign policy when it hosts Asean foreign ministers in 2014 at a summit in the country. Everyone will watch to see how the former pariah state exerts its emerging international status to placate neighbors and new friends from the West.

Aung San Suu Kyi in 2015 | New Mandala

Aung San Suu Kyi in 2015 | New Mandala

NICHOLAS FARRELLY, 

 3 FEBRUARY 2015

2015 will be a defining year for Aung San Suu Kyi. There is no doubt that the months to come, as the election campaign heats up, will test her mettle.

At the start of the year I wrote a short essay on this theme for Mizzima. That essay concludes by noting:

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is often criticised for her inability to adjust to new challenges. To her credit, since she was released from house arrest in late 2010 she has made great strides as a political player. Her speeches are on topic and her campaign tactics are better than ever.

But she needs the people of Myanmar to put their faith in her. That is also why she has been so reluctant to court controversy. Human rights activists can judge her harshly for her inability to advocate on behalf of the Rohingya or Kachin.

Yet, sadly, there are no votes to be won in taking a bold stand on these issues, and millions may be lost. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi – after all her sacrifices and those of her party – cannot afford to let that happen.

Such hard-headed electoral maths can’t be ignored.

That essay doesn’t deal with one of the other ways that Aung San Suu Kyi has adroitly positioned herself, and her party, for the rough-and-tumble of 2015. Every sitting day, as she strides into the Hluttaw chambers in Naypyitaw, she further legitimises a system about which she still apparently has misgivings.

Whatever her sense of the reform trajectory, it’s clear that her personal role in Naypyitaw is pivotal. In 2012, on the eve of the April by-election, I wrote about this issue: Aung San Suu Kyi’s relationship to the wider reform process. One of myassessments back then was that:

It is much more dangerous for President Thein Sein if Aung San Suu Kyi fails to win her seat. Such an outcome would lead to inevitable cries of vote-rigging and could spark an uncontrollable backlash. It may even spell the end of the nascent democratising project. To further his wide-ranging agenda, Thein Sein, and his allies, need Aung San Suu Kyi in parliament. After fighting for so many years to keep her sidelined it is a remarkable change of fortunes.

I don’t pretend that this logic necessarily applies to the Presidency, or any other high office, but I still expect it holds some weight. It may be worth considering how much could be lost if Aung San Suu Kyi doesn’t get the prominence that she, her backers and many in the international community thinks she deserves. Of course there are obvious constitutional impediments, and much push-and-shove about what they entail.

At this juncture, I guess the calculations in Naypyitaw are becoming more concerted. Aung San Suu Kyi’s future status won’t be conjured in a vacuum. The tricky decisions will deal with how her chances stack up against the ambitions of others jockeying for position: Thein Sein, Shwe Mann, Min Aung Hlaing, Khin Aung Myint, Soe Win, Min Ko Naing, and so many more.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, for his part, has recently given an analysis of themilitary role in politics, drawing on recent events in Bangkok. Reflecting on Thailand’s 2014 coup experience he said:

During that time, the military tried its best to mediate. When this didn’t work, depending on the country’s situation, they took control. There was no bloodshed. In our country a similar event happened in 1988.

Back in 2013 here at the Australian National University we discussed the chances ofanother coup in Myanmar. It’s something else for Aung San Suu Kyi, and the rest of us, to consider.

China’s Deputy Minister Visits NLD | The Irrawaddy

China’s Deputy Minister Visits NLD | The Irrawaddy
KYAW PHYO THA / THE IRRAWADDY|Thursday, February 27, 2014

RANGOON — A high-ranking Chinese government official has paid a visit to the headquarters of Burma’s biggest opposition party for the first time in more than two decades, according to the party’s patron.

China’s deputy minister of foreign affairs, Ai Ping, met with senior members of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party on Wednesday.

NLD patron Tin Oo said the visit was intended to boost ties not only between the two countries, but also between the NLD and the Communist Party of China (CPC).

“After all these years, it’s the first visit by a Chinese government official to our headquarters,” Tin Oo told The Irrawaddy. He said the last time a Chinese official visited the NLD head office in Rangoon was in 1990, right after the party won a landslide victory in nationwide elections.

During the nearly one-hour meeting on Wednesday, a Chinese delegation led by Ai Ping and Yang Houlan, the Chinese ambassador to Burma, met with Tin Oo as well as NLD central committee members Nyan Win and Monywa Aung Shin.

“They only focused on promoting a good relationship between China and Burma, and they didn’t utter a word about Myitsone, Letpadaung or the Chinese gas pipeline,” said Tin Oo, referring to Chinese-backed business ventures in Burma.

“They are also curious about the NLD’s international relationships, especially if the party comes to power. We explained that we will stick to our policy of having good relationships with every country.”

According to Monywa Aung Shin, the deputy minister said China had been unable to build relations in the past with the NLD due to Burma’s military dictatorship. “Now the political situation here is more open, so they said they want to promote party-to-party relations,” the NLD member told The Irrawaddy.

He added that at least four NLD delegations had traveled to China since last year.

China has stepped up engagement with the Burmese opposition and public in the past year after some of its megaprojects in Burma sparked popular backlash. In 2011, Burmese President Thein Sein suspended the US$3.6 billion Myitsone dam project, which is backed by the state-owned China Power Investment Corporation (CPI). Suu Kyi, chairperson of the NLD, was among many public voices calling for the dam’s suspension.

During a trip to China in May last year, an NLD delegation was approached by CPI and told that the company wanted to restart the suspended project. A month earlier, Yang Houlan, the newly appointed ambassador, met with Suu Kyi at her home in Rangoon, following up on a visit by his outgoing predecessor, Li Junhua. The Chinese Embassy in Burma also donated 1 million kyats ($1,000) to the NLD National Health Network several months ago.

In December last year, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited NLD members to China for the first time. A delegation led by the party’s central executive committee members and spokesman Nyan Win made the visit.

Is China Betting on a Suu Kyi Presidency? | The Irrawaddy Magazine

Is China Betting on a Suu Kyi Presidency? | The Irrawaddy Magazine
ECHO HUI / THE IRRAWADDY, Friday, January 17, 2014

RANGOON — China seems to have softened its stance toward opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party amid a democratic transition in Burma that could see the former political prisoner one day elected president.

More visible efforts have been made by China in recent months to reach out to Burma’s biggest opposition party, which many expect will beat out the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in elections scheduled for 2015.

In December, a 10-member delegation from the NLD led by Nyan Win, the party secretary and a close confidant of party leader Suu Kyi, traveled to China at the invitation of the Chinese People’s Institute for Foreign Affairs, a semi-official Chinese organization.

The visit by the NLD members was the fourth of its kind last year, and came as both sides seek to enhance engagement ahead of parliamentary elections in 2015, according to analysts. Following the polls, the new Parliament will select Burma’s next president.

Chinese Ambassador to Burma Yang Houlan told The Irrawaddy this week that China stands ready to engage with all of Burma’s political parties, including the NLD, as long as they are willing to help further the sound development of relations with China. He also assured that China would continue to maintain inter-party exchanges with the NLD in future.

“Myanmar-Chinese friendship and cooperation will not change fundamentally, but the way to deal with it has to be reviewed as there are new actors involved,” said former Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win in a meeting on the recent developments of Burma’s reform last week. “Previously it was easy because there was only the government, but today we are practicing multi-party democracy.”

Meanwhile, Chinese state mouthpiece the Global Times published an interview with Yang on Oct. 21 of last year, in which the ambassador said his embassy would like to arrange a visit for Suu Kyi to China “at a convenient time for both sides.”

Though no concrete date has been set and Yang said Suu Kyi’s visit is “still out of the schedule,” the ambassador acknowledged that given her international profile and popularity among Burma’s people, an invitation from China was only a matter of time.

A retired deputy director general at Burma’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyee Myint, told The Irrawaddy that understanding sentiment toward China among the Burmese people was one of Beijing’s most important challenges. “The government of China has more capacity to control its own people, especially its business people, but China cannot control Myanmar’s people and their wishes,” he said.

Yang too stressed mutual respect between the two nations, adding that China would honor Burma’s democratic process and would not interfere in its internal affairs.

Suu Kyi has expressed a willingness to visit China in the past, but she has insisted that the invitation should come from the Chinese government. She has previously declined invitations that came from semi-official Chinese organizations.

The Burmese democracy icon Suu Kyi’s relations with China are a relatively new development. For decades, the Chinese government refrained from any formal contact with Suu Kyi or her party, with her strong pro-democracy stance at odds with China’s own record of human rights abuses under a one-party communist regime.

Burma has undergone seismic political changes since Snr-Gen Than Shwe, who sat at the top of the country’s military regime, officially stepped down to make way for his hand-picked successor, President Thein Sein. The latter took office in March 2011 and has since introduced democratic reforms to the nation’s formerly authoritarian political system.
Thein Sein early this year said he supported changing the country’s  Constitution to allow “any citizen” to become president, an apparent reference to Suu Kyi, whose political ambitions are constrained by a military-drafted Constitution that bans her from running for president.

However, Than Shwe is considered to still wield influence among leaders of the quasi-civilian government, and the retired dictator in October was reportedly “concerned about the ongoing political process,” according to Shwe Mann, a member of the former regime and current speaker of Parliament. That, and a shrinking window in which to pass constitutional amendments that would then need to be ratified by a national referendum, have cast doubts on the viability of a Suu Kyi presidency.

Analysis: Battle lines drawn in Burma’s fight for democracy | Asian Correspondent

Analysis: Battle lines drawn in Burma’s fight for democracy | Asian Correspondent
Zin Linn, Jan 07, 2014


Burma’s existing Constitution, approved in a May 2008 referendum, is controversial since it was prearranged by means of subjective legal principles. It says the military commander-in-charge can take sovereign power if the country is in a dangerous situation. In late July last year, a three-day Ethnic Conference organized by the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) held in Chiang Mai, Thailand unanimously rejected the military-sponsored 2008 constitution after serious discussion.

The Ethnic Conference also made a resolution to draft a new constitution based on federalism by the end of the year. Some politicians have expressed worries that the move could bring about more conflict between ethnic rebels and the military.

Ethnic-based political parties in Burma (Myanmar) and ethnic rebel groups negotiating armistice agreements with the government after decades of military conflict have called for amendments that allow self-determination for ethnic citizens.

Speaking while on a trip to Australia in November, Burmese opposition leader and democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi told an audience at the Sydney Opera House that the country had still not “successfully taken the path to reform” because the military-written 2008 constitution bars the country from becoming a democracy.

Trevor Wilson, a visiting fellow at the Department of Political & Social Change, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, said, “Both publicly and privately, Suu Kyi urged Australians and Australian organisations dealing with Myanmar to be aware of policies and practices consistent with responsible, transparent and democratic standards, and not to focus unduly on building relationships with the present undemocratic government and its supporters, including business cronies. She made it clear that she hoped Australia would provide increased support for Myanmar’s democratisation process, as being advocated by the NLD [National League for Democracy], and would have carefully noted reactions to these calls.”
Burmese army Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing holds significant influence on the proposed constitutional reforms considering the constitution reserves 25 percent of seats in parliament for the military. It also requires a 75 percent parliament majority for a charter changes following a nationwide referendum. Suu Kyi insists that a constitution is undemocratic when it can be amended or not amended in line with the will of one man who is in an unelected position.

According to the Nobel Laureate, the measures for making any constitutional change in Burma (Myanmar) were among the most inflexible in the world. Citizens cannot have genuine democracy under such a constitution.

Last month Burma’s ruling party leader was cautioned after speaking out in favour of reform. Thura Shwe Mann, chairman of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), made his remarks during the party’s central committee meeting on December 28.
“Myanmar’s democratic reform attracts attention both locally and internationally. Failure to take correct measures for national unity and national reconciliation can cause difficulties in the reform efforts. That can also harm the process for peace, stability and development, provoking unexpected consequences,” said Shwe Mann, according to news reported by the Eleven Media Group.

The NLD’s chairperson earlier said that the opposition would boycott the next general election unless the Constitution was changed. The NLD refused to take part in the 2010 poll, criticizing the voting as inequitable. The Constitution and election laws unfairly gave privileged to the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party in the 2010 election through which former general Thein Sein became president.

This time the National League for Democracy (NLD) said that it will contest in the 2015 election though Article 59 (F) of the Constitution blocks party leader Suu Kyi from running for president, a NLD spokespersons told a press conference on December 28.

For the time being, the NLD has already put forward its proposition to revise 168 provisions in the existing Constitution to the parliamentary 109 joint-committee on constitutional review, Nyan Win said. One of the constitutional clauses that the NLD suggested to amend is Article 59 (F) that bars anyone whose spouse or children are overseas citizens from leading the country— a clause widely believed to be targeted at Suu Kyi whose two sons are British citizens.

However, there is discontent among the public with the situation of within NLD. Some old members say that several former USDP followers are joining the party in search of opportunities. According to some pro-NLDs, the main opposition party needs to re-organize its structure of the village and ward-ship levels in order to be tough enough for 2015 general elections.

Suu Kyi has publicly warned party members against in-fighting and jockeying for position that could damage the party ahead of next year’s elections.

But, Burma’s political scenario in 2014 seems more complicated than ever because there will be do-or-die struggles between the ‘pro-2008 Constitution faction’ and ‘anti-2008 Constitution parties’ that is basically connected with the presidential selection in 2015. In addition, there are many more challengers for the presidency office; with rumours putting sitting President U Thein Sein, Lower House Speaker U Thura Shwe Mann, and the military chief Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing as the frontrunners.

Amid constitutional barriers, the chances of Aung San Suu Kyi becoming president next year seem very slim. To challenge the presidential position in 2015, she has an uphill battle to change the most restrictive articles of the current constitution. So, 2014 will be a hostile year ahead as the democratic parties have to defend a fierce offensive by the ruling party and its crony alliance that monopolizes the country’s business interests.

Rohingya Citizenship a Burmese Decision: Suu Kyi to Foreign Critics | The Irrawaddy Magazine

Rohingya Citizenship a Burmese Decision: Suu Kyi to Foreign Critics | The Irrawaddy Magazine
THA LUN ZAUNG HTET/ THE IRRAWADDY, February 26, 2013 

NAYPYIDAW—Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has said that Burma “must decide for itself” whether or not to grant citizenship to the Muslim minority Rohingya, but she added that the government “should listen” to foreign experts and uphold international standards in its citizenship laws.

Suu Kyi was responding to criticism by Jose Ramos-Horta, the former president of Timor Leste, and Muhammad Yunus, founder of microfinance institution Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, who wrote in The Huffington Post on Feb. 20 that Burma should amend its laws and grant the Rohingya “full citizenship.”

The two Nobel Peace Prize laureates said Burma was failing to address the ongoing “ethnic cleansing” of the group in Arakan State, western Burma. Other international rights workers have previously also called on Burma to accept Rohingya citizenship.

A 1982 Citizenship Law, introduced by Burma’s military regime, excluded the Rohingya from the recognized 135 minorities in the country, rendering them effectively stateless.

When asked about the criticism in Naypyidaw on Friday, Suu Kyi said, “A country must decide its citizenship for itself, but in doing so it should meet international standards.”

“We should listen to and learn from what foreign scholars say,” she said of her fellow Nobel laureates. “And, finally, we have to make a decision by ourselves if what they say is appropriate in our country’s situation,” Suu Kyi told The Irrawaddy.

The government of President Thein Sein has given conflicting signals on how it seeks to resolve the issue of Rohingya citizenship. Most recently, on Feb. 20, Deputy Minister of Immigration and Population Kyaw Kyaw Win told Parliament that Burma knows “no Rohingya” ethnic group.

Since mid-2012 ethnic violence has plagued Arakan State. Scores of people, including women and children, have been killed and about 110,000 people, mostly Rohingyas, were displaced after inter-communal violence broke out between Arakanese Buddhist and Muslim Rohingya communities, according to UN estimates.

Local Arakanese authorities have been accused of being complicit in the violence against the Rohingya, who are referred to locally as “Bengali’s” from neighboring Bangladesh. Thousands of Rohingya have fled Arakan State in small boats since violence flared.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Antonio Guterres has repeatedly expressed deep concern over the plight of those who flee on boats into the Bay of Bengal. The UN said about 13,000 Rohingya fled western Burma and Bangladesh in 2012, and an estimated 500 refugees died at sea.

In recent weeks there have been almost daily reports of Rohingya’s being picked up on boats in the open ocean.

On Tuesday, Guterres again called for governments in the Asia Pacific region to work together to end the humanitarian tragedy taking place in the Bay of Bengal.
“This is an alarmingly high number of lives lost, and begs a far more concerted effort by countries of the region both with regard to addressing the causes and to preventing lives being lost,” he said.

“Push-backs, denial of disembarkation, and boats adrift for weeks will not solve a regional problem that clearly needs better, more joined-up, and more compassionate approaches by everyone,” Guterres said

The commissioner referred to some of the approaches taken by regional governments such as Thailand, which, on occasion, has pushed back boats of Rohingya into the open ocean.
The UNHCR said it plans to facilitate a regional government meeting in mid-March in Indonesia on irregular movements by sea in the Asia-Pacific, in order to address the Rohingya refugee crisis.

Additional reporting by Paul Vrieze.