Life under Thailand’s 2016 constitution | New Mandala

Life under Thailand’s 2016 constitution | New Mandala
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, 5 FEBRUARY 2016

Constitution Drafting Committee head Meechai Ruchupan. Photo: Reuters

Rather than acting for the people, Thailand’s latest constitution drafting committee are the junta’s loyal servants, writes Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang. 

Thailand’s 1997 and 2007 constitutions both contained elaborate protections for the rights and freedoms of the people. The 2016 draft constitution represents a major overhaul in the in this area, often for worse. Meechai Ruchupan, the President of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), has chosen a different path from his predecessors.

The most striking change is the general provision for the restriction of rights.  Normally, rights can be restricted only if the constitution has providedn explicit written ground for it — for example, concerns over public health, national security, or public morals. But the new draft allows the government to restrict rights and liberties even when the constitutional text is absent, provided that such restriction complies with the rule of law.

By citing the rule of law as a justification, the draft has broadened the government’s power beyond any imagination. However, the rule of law has never been concretely defined in Thailand. In the past, there are records of this term being abused to harass political enemies.

The draft imposes more restrictions on freedom of expression, under the broad idea that the expression shall not lead to hatred or division within society. Controlling hate speech is an admirable endeavour, long overdue amid Thailand’s conflicts. But how this new clause will play out in the country known for double-standards remains to be seen. Moreover, according to the new draft academic freedom, for the first time, must not be run contrary to citizens’ duty or public morals.

The draft’s stringent standards have severely limited political rights. The CDC demands that an MP must truly be the representative of the people and an honest man. A candidate must gain more votes than votes of abstention to win an election. Otherwise, that election is void. A re-election shall be held, but candidates of the first round will be disqualified. In the case of suspected electoral fraud, the Election Commission can ban that candidate for a year. If a candidate is found guilty, a ban from politics is extended from five to 10 years. Under this constitution, the life of a politician can’t be more perilous.

Less obvious is freedom of religion. While the draft recognises religious freedom for people of all beliefs, as always, the duty of the state has changed tremendously. Instead of promoting religious unity among Buddhism and other religions as the 2007 constitution did, the 2016 draft mandates the government to protect Buddhism from all forms of threats. Although the protection of religious freedom remains intact, the shift in religious policy should be red-flagged as it indicates less tolerance and more influence for radical Buddhist groups.

Absent as well is the right of individuals and communities to conserve a healthy environment. One of the most effective mechanisms of the 2007 Constitution, this right provided the ground for local communities to participate in the deliberation of policies that might be harmful to their well-being. Large-scale constructions had to carry out health studies and environmental impacts before they commenced. This clause did have any bite because it enabled individuals and communities to petition directly to the court and several projects were halted.

The 2016 draft does not recognise this right. Although the state still has the duty to exercise diligence in carrying out any project that might impact people, it is not the fundamental right of the people. It is not clear what this change means, but the level of protection is obviously reduced. The channel for direct petition to the courts is also taken away.

One improvement might be an upgrade of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). The NHRC was created by the 1997 constitution as an independent agency but was downgraded in the 2007 constitution into the category of “Other Constitutional Agencies.” Meechai has returned the NHRC’s independent agency status.

But the body has the duty to defend the country in case a human rights report concerning Thailand is inaccurate or unfair. This new addition makes the NHRC more like a mouthpiece for the regime than a safeguard.

The CDC has also stood firm on not adding sexual orientation to the constitution’s equality clause. The previous draft claimed it was huge progress in LGBT rights when it decided to prohibit discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. However, the term was taken down in the final draft of 2015, a disappointing defeat for LGBT advocates who saw the move as the triumph, again, of the conservatives.

Despite his protests, Meechai deserves his reputation as the junta’s lawyer.
Drafting committees for the 2007 constitution and the 2015 draft both expanded the protection of rights and liberties. This expansion was intended as a compromise. Previous drafters all hoped that more rights and liberties would appeal to wide array of interest groups including environmental, consumer protection, and energy activists to overlook an undemocratic or unstable political system.

But, Meechai has made no attempt at compromise. His draft accurately reflects Prayuth Chan-Ochan’s vision of how to run Thailand successfully. Economic growth is the priority so rights and liberties are considered an annoyance. Environmental protection must go. Dissent is not welcome. Academics are suspected of instigating the younger generation to rebel against the establishment so they shall be suppressed too.

For Prayuth, obedience is a virtue and strong government with full discretion is necessary. Ironically, this idea of government is contrary to what the draft constitution has designed the next government to be — a weak institution suffering heavy oversights.

Thailand’s junta does not seem concerned about a supposed referendum and its dwindling alliances. All mechanisms are work in unison to coerce approval. The Election Commission is planning to register persons who wish to campaign for or against the draft, probably for future prosecution.

Prayuth has already expressed his wish that the public accept the draft. Too vocal politicians were summoned for another round of attitude readjustment. Meechai threatened that any parties which contributed to the rejection of the draft shall be held liable. Obnoxious and condescending, he also reminded the public that this was not the worst yet for he could be harsher.

Drafting a constitution is all about power sharing. Unfortunately, all too often in Thailand the people are not involved in this process, and power is only shared by the military, technocrats, bureaucrats, judges, and business corporations. Meechai might be a loyal lawyer. But his loyalty extends only to his master, not the country as a whole.

The trouble with Thailand’s new democracy | New Mandala

The trouble with Thailand’s new democracy | New Mandala
Jim Taylor, 28 JANUARY 2016

To restore democracy and topple an ‘ancien regime’, anti-junta activism needs to transform into broad-based, anti-fascist movement, writes Jim Taylor.

The “New Democracy” Movement (NDM, sometimes written in English as “Neo- Democracy”), are now at the forefront of spontaneous anti-fascist activities in Thailand.

The group was founded by a core group of 14 mostly students of working class backgrounds from Bangkok and Khon Kaen, whose families benefitted from former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s pro-poor policies.

NDM says it is committed to “fighting for freedom and democracy”. Tyrell Haberkorn’sarticle in Dissent magazine outlines the importance of this group as potential for new democratic leadership. She raises the notion of the NDM as being somehow outside Thailand’s colour code.

The group, declining coded associations, in any case, are not going to paint themselves into a corner; such a move would be dangerous when trying to win over the middle ground sentiment. In general, people do not know about the “red shirts” and if they want to find out more online try, as my students did, a Google search for “red shirts” – all dedicated sites have been infected with viruses!

Any colour sentiments since 2014 that are not “yellow” remain close to the heart, not the mouth. Let’s be clear – ideologically, “red shirts” of whatever orientations adhere to the following values:

• The right to a “one person, one vote” electoral system (and to be able to elect a government of one’s choice);
• The right to social and economic opportunity (especially for the poor: this is one value which really rankles the Thai bourgeoisie who rely on cheap labour);
• The right to freedom of expression and personal liberty; and
• The right to an equitable and fair justice system (ceasing “double standards”, palace commands, and having a more credible and moral judiciary).

I would suggest that these are the core values for democracy in Thailand. It would be hard to see a “colourless” position possible due to intense decades’ long ultra-royalist institutionalised propaganda which has washed away any compromise position.

The salim (สลิ่ม), or “yellow-shirts” as they are called (re-coding themselves since 2006 under various royal colours) have appropriated what remains of the middle ground through sheer political cunning and semantics. This includes the use of terms such as “Reform”, “People’s” (implying a “mass” movement), and “Democracy”, used by fascistic street movements firstly PAD and then PDRC when their collective aspirations were far from “democratic”.  They have effectively pulled the rug from under the pro-democracy red-shirt movement.

Needless to say, declaring oneself “red” in the current fascistic environment is courting (no pun intended) retribution. There is little space of resistance above the ground for these pro-democracy activists. Around 30-40 academics in Thailand have also been active since 2015 and under constant intimidation. At many universities, the army makes regular incursions on campus during lectures and seminars.

Pheu Thai Party (PTP) and United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) leaders are pinned to the ground, in some cases individual bank accounts were frozen, individuals incarcerated for flippant reasons or under constant surveillance.  This is why the NDM have an important role to play on the front stage and as students, the media and international human rights organisations tend to watch over their wellbeing and whereabouts.

The NDM have been in the limelight since demonstrations on the one-year anniversary of the 22 May 2014 coup and in calling for an investigation into corruption allegations surrounding Rajabhakti Park in January 2016.

In a smart move, the regime has since renamed the park’s notorious foundation and placed it under royal patronage to silence critics under Article 112. The military court arrest warrants for six are among the 11 activists accused of breaching the military junta’s National Council for Peace and Order, Directive No. 3/2015 on “political gatherings”.

General Prayuth Chan-ocha’s junta and its royalist media lapdogs have been trying to link NDM leader Sirawith “Ja New” Seritiwat with backing from PTP and Thaksin. The fourth-year political science student lives hand to mouth most days, except for some occasional part-time work.  Sirawith, as readers may know, was recently abducted by eight soldiers attached, it seems, to 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment (King’s Guard) ostensibly under Section 44 of the interim constitution.

He was bundled into a vehicle without licence plates to be later dropped at a police station. He had been blindfolded, sworn at, beaten, taken to the bush area and threatened with a gun to his head as he heard the clicking sound of the trigger. This intimidation method is frequently used by Thai fascists.

Interestingly, the army abductors demanded to know why he did not call for an investigation into ousted prime minister Yingluck Shiawatra’s (highly popular) rice subsidy program, rather than drawing attention to army corruption and abuse of power! The five core activists (Sirawith Seritiwat, Chonticha Jaeng-rew, Chanoknan Ruamsap, Korakoch Saengyenpan, and Abhisit Sapnaphapan) have declared the junta’s actions to silence them as “illegitimate”. Among the group, 29-year-old activist Abhisit S needs special watching as he is no longer a student and will be taken before a military court.

Another student activist, Chakraphon Phonla-o “Kankan” was abducted from his home on 25 January and taken to Nawamintharachini Army Base in Chonburi Province. He was freed later in the day. Another example of the increasing abuse of power by the junta. We need to observe events closely in the coming days and weeks, as indeed are some international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are already doing.

To have any impact on a well-armed, cunning and well-financed ancien régime there needs to be a shift in focus (if not ideology) among informal segmentary student groups such as NDM towards the creation of a sustainable broad-based (anti-fascist) social democratic movement.

“Anti-junta” small group protests are a means to achieving some media attention, but they are readily crushed and the consequence of actions are short-lived. Behind this military junta, there will always be another military junta, similarly tied to royalist apron-strings.

Most silenced red shirts, sickened and hardened by events in 2010, lacking weapons, money and logistics, wait for the inevitable outcome at the palace, or the consequence of a spontaneous battle between two establishment military factions and their respective royal sides.

All the masses can do in the interim is to seemingly wait and endure the social, political and economic consequences of this high-level connivance. Any uprising, should this happen, will be spontaneous in nature.

Dr Jim Taylor is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Anthropology & Development Studies at the University of Adelaide.

Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path | New Mandala

Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path | New Mandala
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, 15 JANUARY 2016

As the religion finds it harder to compete in today’s world, its becoming more hardline and seeks greater state power.

The Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) has finally confirmed that it will not recognise Buddhism as Thailand’s official religion. The decision brought relief to many and anger to others.

The rejection proved that, no matter how radical and conservative the CDC has been, it is still neutral in the relationship between the state and religion (as its predecessors were in 1997, 2007, and 2014). The committee realises the possible danger of alienation and sectarian disunity, and, once again, withstood pressure from Buddhist fundamentalists and to escape further controversy.

However, with each new drafting of the constitution, the call for Buddhism as Thailand’s official religion has grown louder, and the CDC’s chances of escape are getting slimmer.

The movement has played the nationalism card, citing the historical and cultural contribution of Buddhism to ‘Thainess’. It’s an effective tactic. Debates about Buddhism as a national religion have very quickly turned sensational and emotional. Even when the CDC countered this demand by referring to the King’s speech discouraging the idea, extremists were able to find another where Bhumipol admitted that Buddhism was Thailand’s official religion.

After learning that the CDC have rejected their demand, several Buddhists are campaigning to vote against the draft in the coming referendum. This is bad news for the junta as it jeopardises the government’s dwindling support.

For many Thais, the recognition of Buddhism as Thailand’s official religion would be a crucial element of making a good constitution. Buddhist morals would help the country out of the ongoing political turmoil, which they have simplified into a crisis caused by a lack of ethical politicians. With official status, the state would be obliged to promote Buddhism. Monks and followers agree that Buddhism must receive better safeguards, subsidies, and prominence in Thailand’s public life.

But historically Buddhism has been well protected in Thailand’s constitutions, and references to the religion and its ideals abound in such documents, notwithstanding its unofficial status. Since 1997, Thai constitutions have always mentioned the state’s duty to protect and promote Buddhism and other religions.

The King must also profess Buddhism. In 2007, when debating between the termsnitirat and nititharm for the rule of law, the latter was chosen for it more closely resembled Dhamma in Buddhism. The failed draft of 2014 explicitly emphasised the importance of selecting ethical persons for public positions and harsh punishment for the absence of good morals.

Although the 2014 CDC did not specifically mention Buddhist ethics, it was widely understood to embody them. At ground level, the state always allocates the largest slice of spending to Buddhism compared to other religions. Buddhism is practiced and taught in public schools across the country. Buddhist values provide justification for the state’s public positions on alcohol, abortion, and censorship. During political demonstrations, monks led the Dhamma troop and broke several laws without liability. Indeed, Thailand is a de facto Buddhist state.

But a large proportion of Thais are not satisfied; they believe that there will never be enough protection for Buddhism unless it becomes Thailand’s official state religion. Among many possible causes is the fear of losing its leading status among the country’s younger generations.

Because Thailand’s Buddhism has never been modernised and rationalised, it cannot provide solutions appropriate for contemporary Thailand. Interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching is deemed absolute, and yet by dismissing challenges to its doctrine, Buddhist philosophy has become outdated. Criticism is also growing about the Sangha’s weakness, evident in abbots’ wealth and their misbehaviour. Buddhism has failed to appeal to the younger and more critical generations of Thailand.

In addition to internal problems, Buddhists perceive threats from outside as well. The insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South has seen monks slain by Muslim fighters. Thailand’s accommodation of Islam, possibly in response to the Southern unrest, is seen by Buddhist extremists as dangerous tolerance.

The growing popularity of Christianity among the population is another possible danger. These tensions have led to erratic behaviour from the Sangha, including the prohibition of a Muslim girl from wearing a hijab at her Buddhist school, a call for creating a “Buddhist Bank” to compete with the government-backed Islamic Bank, a suggestion to burn a mosque in retaliation for a the killing of a monk, and a demand to confiscate books and advertisements funded by a Christian charity.

Thai Buddhism’s weakness and its ambition for power are symptoms of years of state entanglement. Buddhism has become so spoiled that it is too weak to compete in a more diverse world. It has turned to state power as the final solution. Although this hardline plan might turn moderates away, it still draws support from many.

Unfortunately, Buddhist politics is leading Thailand down a dangerous path.

Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang is a Thai constitutional law scholar.

Review of Unequal Thailand | New Mandala

Review of Unequal Thailand | New Mandala
T.F. Rhoden, 12 JANUARY 2016

Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, editors, Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth and Power, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016) 

Reviewed by T.F. Rhoden

Does Thailand have an oligarchy? If so, how do we define it? And most importantly for this collection of essays, what is the proof of its existence in contemporary Thailand?

These are some of the main questions that pervade Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth and Power, edited by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. Translated and reworked from a Thai-language edition,Su sangkom thai samoe na [Towards a More Equitable Thailand] published in 2014 by Matichon, this volume is a timely and useful review of some of the political economy issues facing Thailand today.

With nine chapters by Thai scholars and technocrats, the aim of the book is to provide up-to-date data and analysis on those material foundations that have fostered a growth in inequality and a strengthening of oligarchy in recent years. Some chapters do this better than others, but all provide insight into these issues.

In terms of raw empirical analysis, all of the research essays are a success, particularly the second chapter on land distribution as an indicator of both inequality and oligarchy. For those interested in the possible material foundations of recent turmoil in Thai political society, this volume is an absolute gem and is more than worth adding to one’s library.

Theoretically speaking, the introductory chapter by the editors utilises very recent publications on inequality and oligarchy to frame the research-based chapters that follow. Noteworthy out of this list are Thomas Piketty’s bestselling Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) and Jeffery Winters’ comparative political economy treatise Oligarchy (2011).

Those familiar with either of Piketty’s or Winters’ thinking on these topics will find evidence for both within the volume. Regarding the latter’s theory of oligarchy, however, the editors seem to have undervalued the analytic nuance of Winters’ repositioning toward the term’s original Aristotelian meaning—one that highlights the unique power position of material wealth without falling into the structural (or teleological) constraints of Marxist historical materialism.

In its place, the editors create the moniker “flexible oligarchy”, to mean any group of elites (whether they be military, political, bureaucratic, royal, business or so on) that network to “rule” the nation. This is frustrating, as insights on how wealth is defended, why oligarchs fight, and what this means for a political society are consequently lost.

At best oligarchy then means any “network” of individuals that are somehow more powerful or more influential than the average Thai person. There are networks in Thailand, but to ignore the difference between an oligarch and an elite is to misunderstand the challenge that inequality and oligarchy in Thailand pose.

Misgivings regarding theory aside, all of the follow-up chapters present new and crucial research.

The most startling for the volume is the initial analysis by Duangmanee Laovakul in the second chapter on land title documents (chanot) provided by the Land Department. This has never been done before in a private publication. Traditionally, the Land Department does not publish this information for those outside of government.

The results are as fascinating as they are somewhat depressing. Gini Index numbers for Thailand for yearly income, hovering around 0.50 for the last decade, pale in comparison to the Gini Index number of 0.89 for inequality in nationwide titled land distribution.

The landholding analysis is also broken down by region via Thai rai (14.4 million hectares) and by MPs via declared value. In the past, the best resource a researcher had for measuring a Thai oligarch’s net worth were the annual Forbes “Thailand 50 Richest” articles.

With the addition of landholding data, a more detailed picture of the distribution of assets beyond that of just publically traded companies is presented. The greatest strength of this analysis—and the reason it was likely trusted to the scholar in the first place—is also its greatest weakness: the landholding data are completely anonymous.

Granted, one can make educated guesses about who some of these owners are, but for a political economy analysis in a nation where over a third of the population work in agriculture, knowing who owns what parcel of land is of utmost importance. I am still waiting for a day when one can see a map of Thailand, or at least of Bangkok, delimiting who owns what exactly.

Factor into this the complication of how much land the Crown Property Bureau of the Thai monarch does or does not own and these seemingly economic issues of inequality take on a decidedly more political tone of oligarchy. Hence, the importance of a theoretically robust theory of oligarchy beyond that of just “network” becomes even more significant.

Another compelling research article from this important volume is the fifth chapter by Nualnoi Treerat and Parkpume Vanichaka on elite networking via special executive courses.

The interviews with course attendees are of great value for understanding how it is that specific policies benefiting the oligarchy come to fruition. The inclusion of members of “billion families” into the courses brings to light some of the behind-the-scene mechanics of how an oligarch can connect with those in the parliament, military, bureaucracy, university sector, or the media.

Public-sector courses have been offered by the National Security Academy for Government and Private Sector (Po Ro Or), the Office of the Judiciary, the King Prajadhipok Institute, and the Election Commission. Two private-sector courses include the Capital Market Academy by the Stock Exchange of Thailand one by the Chamber of Commerce. In a political society where scholars have argued there is limited social capital, these executive courses take on a greater meaning. As in other chapters in this volume, the authors deepen the theoretical discussion begun by the editors in the introductory chapter.

Overall, this is an engaging and well-crafted volume that delivers much-needed new empirical research on the challenges of inequality and oligarchy in Thailand. This book represents some of the best minds from Thailand on the state of the country’s current political economy.

This volume will be of interest to scholars and students of Southeast Asian political economy as well as researchers examining how inequality and oligarchy can vary across the globe.

T.F. Rhoden is a PhD Candidate at Northern Illinois University. His most recent peer-reviewed publication is “Oligarchy in Thailand?”, in the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, vol. 34, no. 1 (2015).

Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala

Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala
Bridget Welsh,  5 JANUARY 2016

2015 was the year authoritarian governments struck back against democratic pressures.

The story of 2015 in Southeast Asia was Myanmar’s November election. In giving the National League for Democracy and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi a landslide, Myanmar citizens signaled their strong support for democratic change and better governance.

These calls have been loud in recent years — in Malaysia’s 2008 and 2013 elections, in Thailand’s repeated electoral victories for a non-military aligned government, in Cambodia’s 2013 and Singapore’s 2011 polls as well as strong electoral support for democracy in the Philippines and Indonesia. Democratic pressures on Southeast Asian governments have been increasing, and are not likely to recede in the near future.

2015 was the year authoritarian governments in the region struck back. Behind the Myanmar headlines there is a worrying trend of a significant democratic contraction taking place. The use of the authoritarian arsenal by Southeast Asian governments are not new, but in the course of the year regional governments expanded their use of incumbency and control of institutions to shore up their positions.

The most obvious trend has been the increased use of repression, especially targeted toward opposition politicians and critics. In Malaysia, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was jailed in February. In Thailand, a trial began against ousted PM Yingluck Shinawarta as she was denied the right to travel. In Cambodia, opposition politicians were physically attacked. The leader of the opposition Sam Rainsy has delayed his return to Cambodia from November as a result of jail threat. Malaysia has the highest number of opposition politicians facing various charges from sedition to violations of banking finance regulations.

The threats opposition members across the region face in calling for change extend from being physically attacked on the campaign trial (as occurred for Myanmar’s Naing Ngan Lin NLD candidate who was slashed by a machete) to potential bankruptcy.

The use of the law for political ends moves beyond opposition members. Journalists and bloggers remain targeted. Radio reporter Jose Bernardo was shot dead at a restaurant in Manila in November. He joins the other 77 journalists who have been killed in the Philippines since 1992, making this country one of the most dangerous places for media professionals in the world.

Myanmar tops the region’s list with the most number of journalists jailed, pipping Vietnam this year who released some of its bloggers. Notably, blogger Ta Phong Tan was released after 10 years in jail. The situation for bloggers in Vietnam remains serious, with a number of incidents where bloggers and associates were beaten up in mysterious circumstances rather than jailed. In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong won his defamation case against a blogger critic Roy Ngerng, who was asked to pay PM Lee S $150,000. Lee joins Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak as the second current leader in the region who filed charges for public criticism.

The crackdowns on freedom of expression extend to ordinary citizens, from artists and academics to taxi drivers.

Young Chaw Sandi Tun was sentenced to six months jail for insulting Myanmar’s army in her Facebook post noting the similarity in color between the Tatmadaw’s uniform and the opposition leader’s clothing. In Thailand, the cases involving lese majeste have extended the boundaries to include insults to the king’s dog. Thanakorn faces up to 15 years in jail for this reference, and joins a long list of cases that have involved jailing of university students for a play, taxi cab conversations, novelists and more.

A mother of two was sentenced to 28 years for her Facebook comments, while a hotel employee received 56 years for his posts in August as part of the lese majeste unending prosecutions. Cartoonist Zunar in Malaysia faces up to 43 years for his satirical art work. These developments have had chilling effects on public discourse. Even in more open Indonesia, discussion of the 1965 attacks on communists were shut down.

As power has been used to quiet alternative voices, the rule of law itself has faced erosion. In some cases the law is not being implemented. In July, the co-Investigating International judge Mark Harmon of the Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia resigned his position after the tribunal declined to arrest two former Khmer Rouge leaders for whom the court had issued warrants.

Despite having the technology to find the daughter separated from her mother Indira Gandhi for seven years by a husband who is abusing religion in a personal vendetta against his ex-wife, the Malaysian police have proven to be unwilling to use its tools to follow the court order to return the daughter to the mother.

In other cases, constitutional frameworks protecting rights have been by-passed through the introduction of military courts – as has been the case in Thailand and called for in Malaysia – and new measures that empower leaders to declare ‘security areas’ without checks on their authority, as occurred with the hurried passage of the National Security Council law in Malaysia. This law is being seen as a measure that will allow unpopular Prime Minister Najib to stay in office if he loses an election. In Myanmar, there are potential laws being considered that may give military impunity for alleged past crimes.

The area where the laws are under real scrutiny continues to be corruption. 2015 showcased some shocking scandals.

In Malaysia the 1MDB $700 million ‘donation’ into Najib’s personal accounts remains inadequately explained, as the rule of law has not been properly applied to the premier and impunity appears to have allowed the premier to hold onto office even with his personal reputation in shatters. Efforts to undermine Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the recent demands for payments from Freeport to politicians to conduct business have showcased that persistent problem of bribery, lack of transparency and abuse of position.

From corruption concerns tied to the Aquino administration in the Philippines to persistent effects of corruption trails associated with Vietnam’s elite, there lacks effective leadership in tackling the region’s most serious governance problem. The end effect is that leaders at the top are seen to engage in graft, reinforcing a system where office is used for personal wealth rather than public service.

Control over resources and alliances with cronies remains a dominant feature of Southeast Asia’s political economy. Four countries in the region – Malaysia (3), Singapore (5), Philippines (6), Indonesia (10) – were in The Economist’s crony capitalist list, which measures the favoritism of wealth toward tycoons and politically-affiliated business interests.

Measures to enhance this favoritism expanded in 2015 through the introduction of consumption taxes in Malaysia and Myanmar, regulations that facilitated more burning rather than less in the haze-affected region in Indonesia and service fees in areas such as tolls to crony-companies. The region’s most vulnerable populations are feeling the economic pain, with depreciating currencies and a slowdown in growth in the region as a whole. These conditions have contributed to conditions where the use of state resources through populist policies have boosted incumbent governments, a factor that contributed to the People’s Action Party’s September 2015 electoral victory.

Those on the margins are being particularly impacted, with serious implications for rights. Southeast Asia was not immune from the global refugee crisis affecting over 60 million people worldwide. Conditions affecting the livelihoods of the Rohingyas in Myanmar remain severe, with conditions in camps across the region not much better. The shocking findings of death camps in Thailand and Malaysia involving torture, rape and human and organ trafficking in May have yet to be properly accounted for.

One reason for this lack of accountability lies with the upgrade the Obama administration gave Malaysia on its human trafficking assessment in the wake of the discovery of the gruesome murders. The Obama administration’s sell out of human rights principles was especially acute in 2015, where interests associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership overrode other concerns.

From questions tied to the trial of Burmese migrant workers in killing British backpackers Thailand to the persistent practice of ‘sea slaves’ with citizens hauled onto fishing boats, those that are vulnerable remain so at the end of the year, which limited measures to point to strengthening protections.

Vulnerability in 2015 extended to religious and ethnic minorities as well. Bogor was labeled Indonesia’s most intolerant city when it declared a ban of the Shia faith in the city. Hate speech toward Muslims persists in Myanmar, in spite of the electoral victory signaling greater inclusiveness. Churches were burned in Aceh. Christmas celebrations were banned in Brunei. Rights of religious minorities were curbed in Malaysia in cases involving child custody and worship.

Measures to forge peace with minorities fell apart, as the Philippines’ Bansamoro Basic Law did not pass the legislatures. In other places such as Myanmar, Protection Race and Religion Bills denying rights to marriage and religious freedom were introduced, as protections for rights were in fact eroded.

There were nevertheless bright spots in greater freedom across the region – a gender rights bill in Thailand, the end of the persecution of a book seller and academic by religious authorities in Malaysia, the reinstatement of direct local elections in Indonesia and the subsequent peaceful elections in December, to name but a few.

Southeast Asians continue to fight for their freedoms valiantly, over cyberspace, in courtrooms and in communities. The climate however has not been conducive to greater freedoms as those in office continue to use their offices to hold on to power.

As we look ahead, with a slowing economy and persistent insecurities by incumbents, the prospects for expanding rights does not appear promising in 2016. Last year has shown us however that we can expect the unexpected, with the military’s acceptance of the Myanmar’s electoral results as an example.

As ASEAN formally announced its community on 31 December 2015, many hold only to potentially a different ‘imagined community,’ where the ideas of brilliant scholar Benedict Anderson of shared belonging, human dignity and decency live on.

Bridget Welsh is Professor of Political Science at Ipek University, Senior Research Associate at the Center for East Asian Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University, Senior Associate Fellow of The Habibie Center, and University Fellow of Charles Darwin University.

New Mandala’s 2015 in review (and Christmas dance)

New Mandala team, 24 DECEMBER 2015

We take our traditions pretty serious at New Mandala. This year some familiar faces are back to dance up a storm. Click through here to check out their moves.

It’s also time to do a recap of what was our busiest year yet.

2015 proved to be massive for Southeast Asia, with free and fair elections in Myanmar (the first in 25 years), as well as Singapore’s first vote in the post-Lee Kuan Yew era.The ballot in Myanmar saw long-time democracy campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi romp home in a ‘red wave’ that has also been seen as a repudiation of military rule in the country.

Elsewhere, 2014’s man of the moment, Indonesia President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, quickly went from hero to zero, blundering from one policy failure to another and seemingly unable to control his own cabinet, let alone a say in his own party; controlled by matriarch oligarch Megawati Sukarnoputri.

We saw a major scandal in Malaysia that nonetheless hasn’t knocked the PM from his perch (yet). Thousands of Rohingya from Myanmar and neighbouring Bangladeshwere left adrift at sea. And of course Thailand continued its downward spiral from fractious politics into farce; this year seeing a man charged with lese majeste due to a comment he made about the king’s dog.

With so much happening across the region, it’s no surprise that New Mandala also had a huge 12 months.

To date, we’ve published more than 460 articles and other posts (many republished in Australian and regional media), which have generated more than 3,600 comments (that we could actually approve; some of you were very naughty and probably shouldn’t expect a visit from Santa). And of course, we continued to attract many tens of thousands of weekly readers.

So what mattered to us, and more importantly what did our readers care about? Here’s our top 10 articles published in 2015.

In 10th is Singapore swing, Bridget Welsh’s post-ballot box wrap of Singapore’s general election in September, which saw the incumbent and long-ruling People’s Action Party win comfortably. With many arguing PAP would lose seats in this vote, the result proved to be the optimal pendulum swing says Welsh.

Gerhard Hoffstaetder’s snappy photo essay on Malaysia’s massive citizen march for clean politics in August comes in at ninth. Bersih 4.0 takes over Kuala Lumpur combines strong imagery and cogent analysis to beautifully set the scene for the major political rally. Unfortunately, this year’s trends paint a much worse picture for Malaysian politics in general, with people power maybe not enough to improve things.

Sticking with Malaysia, Bridget Welsh’s article on Prime Minster Najib Razak’s introduction of a goods and services tax in April, Najib’s taxing problem: The politics of Malaysia’s GST, takes out eighth. In addition to the excellent insight, the photo of his cat makes this article well worth re-reading (it’s a bit “one million dollars!”. See the video below.)

Good news for those who love bad news. Max Grömping’s article on electoral integrity in the region, Southeast Asian elections worst in the world, takes out seventh.

A meeting between Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Noam Chomsky proved to be popular coming in sixth. A conversation with Chomsky recounts the pow-wow with the well-known intellectual (take your pick which we’re referring to), in which they cover Thai politics, the monarchy and Thaksin.

In fifth is Llewellyn McCann’s look at the Thai monarchy, Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession. In it he looks at whether democracy will move forward with a change at the top, and the palpable fear people have about the current king’s inevitable departure.

Malaysia’s 1MDB scandal garnered worldwide attention this year and Tom Pepinsky’s examination of how it fits in with similar examples of corruption in the country’s past also proved hugely popular. Taking out fourth, Malaysia’s long history of financial scandals paints a sobering picture of how common this type of situation really is.

In the bronze medal position and a spot on the podium, third is Lee Jones’ Thai junta turning tragedy into farce. If you follow Jones on Twitter you will be familiar with his acerbic wit and hot takedowns. Casting his eye over the manner in which Thailand’s military leaders continued to fluff their lines when it came to the investigation of August’s Bangkok blast, this must-read piece is no different!

Bridget Welsh scoops silver with her third appearance in our 2015 top 10, taking outsecond for her article Lee Kuan Yew’s political legacy – a matter of trust. Her assessment of the LKY legacy was not only popular in the wake of the long-time leader’s death, but is sure to be a “go to” reference for future looks at how he helped shape Singapore.

Finally in first (and by some margin) is Michael Buehler’s exposé of dealings between mysterious representatives of the Indonesian government and lobbyists in the US. Waiting in the White House lobby recounts how a third-party paid some $80,000 to US lobbyists during President Jokowi’s less than impressive visit to Washington.

It caused a serious stir in Indonesia, leading to at least two press conferences by senior ministers and generating more than 400 articles in local and international press. (Indonesian media even reported on the fact that we changed the image accompanying the article.) It is an important contribution on politics in Indonesia and the region, and more than a worthy winner for 2015.

An honourable mention must be made of an article that only missed the top 10 by a couple of reads. In 11th, Clive Kessler’s essay on modern Islam and terrorism, A rage against history, examines whether Islam is a religion of peace today. One reader labelled it “deeply unsatisfying, both intellectually and emotionally.” It certainly got people talking – and will continue to do so.

Lastly, we want to say thanks to all our readers, contributors and commenters — you are the lifeblood of the website. See you all in 2016, which, for those keeping score, marks our 10th anniversary. It will be big. In the meantime, be good to each other and yourselves.

The New Mandala team: James Giggacher, Mish Khan, Nicholas Farrelly and Andrew Walker.  

Thailand - A state of madness | New Mandala

Dr James L Taylor, 18 DECEMBER 2015

The insidious creep of fascism in contemporary Thailand.

Tim Frewer’s New Mandala article from March 2015, “Fascist Assemblages in Cambodia and Myanmar”, is an interesting Deleuze and Guattari inspired piece on Thailand’s neighbours. Yet, no mention of the situation in Thailand is made.

Most academics and commentators are reluctant to use the descriptive term “fascism” for Thailand under military dictatorship and its authoritarian ultra-nationalist ideology. Labels are often misleading and ambiguous, especially a term that carries such emotive historical context.

The lack of democracy in Thailand, the repression by state apparatuses (under a compact among civil and military elites) and the annihilation of opposition to authoritarian rule, the use of an ultra-nationalist discourse, and the de facto support by royalist elites for its parastatal armed forces (from pro-palace sanctioned thugs such as the ‘garbage collection organisation to the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, or PDRC) have eerie resonances with aspects of the early 20th century Spanish fascists known as Falange Española Tradicionalista or falangistas.

Falangism is taken from the name of the right-wing Spanish movement that imitated elements of pre-war German and Italian fascism under the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. The movement was opposed the Republicans and supported General Franco’s Nationalist coup of 1936, but only as a minor element. It momentarily reappeared later in European history in the post-war years until the mid-1970s.

As self-exiled pro-democracy leader Surachai “Sae Dan” Danwattananusorn told me in 2011, while fascism” may be seen as a defining historical moment, we are now seeing new forms in a desperate push by the ruling elites/aristocracy (amaat) to hold back democracy for their own interests, whatever the social, economic, and political cost to the nation.

For instance we can hark back to Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat’s 1958 coup d’état,supported by the royalist/amaat regime wanting to regain its influence and power through the monarchy. Nothing has changed since then, only intensified as we near the end of the ninth reign. Nothing it seems is above personal interests and power under an authoritarian national leadership inspired by notions of an organic, hierarchical regal state.

Yet, Thais do not have a word for fascist or fascism.

Instead, Thai uses (though rarely) the foreign loan word latthi-fasit. Historian and expert on European fascism Stanley Payne sees this ideology as “a form revolutionary ultranationalism for national rebirth…” structured on “extreme elitism” and mass mobilisation in a “vitalist” philosophy that does not shirk at the notion of violence, intimidation and a repertoire of coercive tactics to achieve its ends.  (See A short history of fascism, 1914-45, p 14).

Prayuth Chan-ocha, the new Thai Fuhrerprinzip, was enforced through absolute idiosyncratic authority and emplaced by the amaat in 2014 for their own ends.  Indeed, the political climate under authoritarianism in Thailand masked by a perverse nationalist democratic rhetoric (Thai democracy”?) is characterised by extreme ethnic chauvinism, embellished monarchical patriotism, and an ultra-nationalism articulated (poorly at that) from the likes of orchestrated street movements such as People’s Alliance for Democracy or PDRC.

The similarities between falangism and the current Thai experience are a less ideological (“softer”) but no less insidious form of contemporary fascism. Examples are plentiful, including:

• an internal organic corporatism;
• ethnic (Thai)-based ultra-nationalism;
• conservative anti-democratic trade unionism;
• conservative modes of state Buddhism (through elements in the administrative royalist line of the Thammayut nikai that frowns on democratic state sangha governance);
• a dislike for separatism of any kind; anti-communism, anti-anarchism, and anti-(new) capitalism (where this is seen as working outside amaat networks);
• anti-democratic sentiments and control of all media, emplaced through editorial committees with royalist lackeys);
• paternalistic pastoral values (communal ethnic-Thai’ism and the hypocrisy inscribed in elite visions of the poor in a discourse of “self -sufficiency”);
• dislike of welfare-based neo-liberal economic (efficient) management (as in the case of Thaksin’s neo-liberal Populist government);
• and as a union of non-competitive, traditional conservative units seeking to maintain their monopolies and ensuing privilege through nationalistsyndicated consensus.

In addition, the link between the palace network and its vast financial interests and the many large national/global Thai corporations such as the Charoen Pokphand Group, Thai Beverage, and so on is self-evident. Many of these Falangist corporations provided financial support to the anti-democratic street movements leading up to the last two coups (PAD and then PDRC).

Indeed, another characteristic of the Thai falange also includes the agencies of state security and forms of para-militarism such as the ideological arm of the summit-state, the Yellow Shirts (and its pink and blue variants in the past decade). These share similarities with the European Falangist Blue Shirt street brigade.

This complex social and political arrangement in Thailand is controlled by an alliance of central bureaucratic elites, political representatives of the middle class, reactionary (pro-Prem Tinsulanond) elements in civil society, traditional network mafias, and ultra-conservative military factions with close ties to the royalist establishment.

The Thai amaat are opportunistic; every time a new structure of governance was put in place (three times since 2006) they ruthlessly crushed it using a complicit media and propaganda campaign with the use of street thugs to create destabilisation.

The synchronisation and multi-layered scheming for the last two coups involving so many elements of the monarchy network was impressive, if immoral and unscrupulous. The real fear among Thai falange is an election in which they have no control of the outcome and a real democracy which is engendered at the grass-roots.

In summary, the immense power of persisting propaganda and control of information in the hands of extreme right-wing pro-monarchists has been particularly worrying.

They generated and maintained a well-orchestrated vilification of Thaksin, Thailand’s first popularly elected prime minister; in fact they could have been saying “Thaksin is Jewish!” The hatred created and perpetuated is the same as in pre-war fascist Europe.

Fascists need to vilify in order to mobilise their support, particularly among the petty bourgeoisie and urban middle classes. The control of information, censorship and the immense reach of the monarchy network into all layers of society (like a computer virus or worm) have been factors in regulating society and the economy under new fascism.

There is no middle ground remaining in Thailand, no platform for dialogue or impartiality. Following the fascist dictate, the Thai regime created disorder on the streets and insecurity before every coup in order to recreate a semblance of their own constructed and self-interested order.

The radical royalists, including the military, established a compact with corrupt social elements – the Rajabhakti Park scandal is the tip of iceberg — all the while using Article 112 (the infamous lese majeste law) to silence and intimidate opposition.

If all of this is not new fascism in Thailand, then what other name?

Dr James L Taylor is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Anthropology & Development Studies at the University of Adelaide.