Decades of dominance and a junta’s demise | New Mandala

Decades of dominance and a junta’s demise | New Mandala
Dr James L Taylor, 11 AUG, 2016

Thailand’s referendum has installed the military junta for the long haul. But could it also be their undoing? 

The result is out; it is back to 1978.

No surprises. Now the junta can gloat over its inevitable, foregone conquest and lecture the Western world about minding its own business, which they were quick to do after the win.

As one Thai person told me: “Well, maybe Thais now have the democracy they deserve!”

The suppression of free speech and critical debate around the referendum are well known, even begrudgingly among normally ‘yellow’ influenced Bangkok-based journalists.

It was clear that Thais were not given the details about the draft constitution, except those parts deemed suitable for public propaganda, and critiques of the draft were forbidden. Massive more-unpalatable sections of the translated version were left out.

If those sycophantic voters for the military’s constitution had no idea of the implication of their “yes” vote, in the not-too-distant-future they may soon think twice .

But the masses were never given the truth and many people continued to believe in the military-elite’s feel-good iron-fist nationalism. It all reminds me a little of a less tame version of Brexit.

That aside, more seriously, information from regional sources such as the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) indicates that the numbers were stacked at some crucial ballot centres, there were many more ballots that actual registered voters.

In one Bangkok district, for instance, there were 298 people coming to vote on the day and 335 ballots. There were no witnesses allowed at the ballot stations when the counting was carried out. (For a good summary see Prachatai).

It was reported (unofficially) that there were many more ballots that actual registered voters. In one Bangkok district for instance there were 298 people coming to vote on the day but 335 ballots counted. There were no witnesses allowed at the ballot stations when the counting was carried out.

It also appears that the kingdom was clearly divided along ancient divisions, with “Lanchang” (and the Northeast Region generally), Lanna (North) and Pattani, voting “no”, while the mid-southern (the PDRC stronghold) and central region voting “yes”.

But all may be not lost, despite the prospect of decades of dominant and repressive military rule ahead, and little chance of being able to amend the constitution – with the charter enshrining military ineffective coalition “governments”, unelected prime ministers, appointed senates, and so on.

At least this is the view of some red shirt leaders, such as exiled founder of the Organisation of Free Thai Network, Jakrapob Penkair (7 August 2016). He noted that the result was inevitable, “knowing the nature” of the amaat regime. But, he also outlined a few reasons for some optimism among all the gloom saying that the consequence of the new constitution will show to the world the true nature of the military-royal alliance and power.

The result will also encourage the pro-democracy (red) activists to reconcile as they have split into two primary factions over the past decade or so: the electoral faction and the revolutionary faction. While the electoral faction wanted elections quickly, the so-called revolutionary side ridiculed them (“revolutionary” in the sense of rhetoric not action).

Both sides he noted now need each other to establish a unified ideology and action, so as to bring power to the democracy movement. He said that the revolutionary faction did not understand the constraints that the previous elected governments were under, in the gaze of the amaat regime. These elected governments since 2005 had to work on the surface within the established legal framework. They had no real power to make lasting progressive changes being blocked at every turn.

Jakrapob noted that the situation now will enable a unified and systematic approach to bringing about democracy, liberty and rights in the coming decades.  But do not hold your breath — it will be a long-term project.

Meanwhile, the evidence has been mounting about massive military corruption since the last coup, despite attempts to silence critics. The military junta takes a page from boxing, where the best form of defence is attack.

In regard to the politicised notion of getting rid of “kong” (cheating) or corruption, Jakrapob said let the military regime continue with their propaganda until the “san phra phum” eventually falls (literally “spirit house”, but an illusion to monarchy).

When we reach that time the truth will shock the nation from trivial matters such as which subordinates under “higher ups” are selling the soil of Parliament House at 300 Baht per square metre(a budget was allocated to build a new Parliament House), to bigger matters — including who owns the PTT Public Company Limited? Who benefits? Who is the real owner of Temasek Holdings?

Who is behind stopping the construction of the Kra Isthmus Canal (an economic opportunity always stopped)? And who is behind extensive real estate interests, taking land from the people which makes it hard to undertake effective land reform?

These are the people who are actually cheating the nation and yet no one dares to challenge this. Therefore, it is good that the military’s constitution puts “kong” in the charter, so that one day we can use this to expose the nation’s real cheats.

This is similar to the great Ayutthaya poet Sri Prat who said that the owner of the sword will eventually kill themselves with their own weapon. This time we are defeated in the game, but not in the battle with the regime (rabob).

But now that Thailand has now slipped back in time one thing is clear — this generation and possibly the next will have to continue the struggle for democracy.

Dr James L Taylor is Adjunct Associate Professor, Anthropology & Development Studies, University of Adelaide.

Red and Yellow in Germany | New Mandala

Red and Yellow in Germany | New Mandala
Nick Nostitz, 04 JUL, 2016

On 18 June, I was invited to talk at a symposium at the University of Bonn in Germany, organised in conjunction with Stiftung Asienhaus and several Red Shirt groups in Europe.

I spoke at a workshop on the Red Shirts after the coup, and the final podium discussion on the future of democracy in Thailand. There were workshops on more sensitive topics as well, which I did not participate in.

After the opening talks in a large and fully occupied lecture hall, Ajarn Pitch Pongsawat and Nopporn Khunikha talked about the new constitution and Ajarn Pavin Chachavalpongpun spoke on the monarchy. Other workshops covered a range of topics, including the constitution and the referendum, led by Professor Wolfram Schaffar, Dr Pitch Pongsawat and Dr Vichien Tansirikongkhont; the monarchy and lese majeste, led by exiles Junya Jimprasert and Aum Neko, Dr Serhat Uenaldi and Andrew MacGregor Marshall; and human rights violations under the military regime, led by Kunthika Nutcharus and Kheetanat Wannaboworn.

A workshop on the Red Shirt movement was led by exiled Red Shirt leader Visa Kanthap, local Red Shirt activist Bangon Schwarz, Dr Claudio Sopranzetti, and myself. The final workshop examined exiled activists, the European Union and strategies for democracy, and was led by Din Buadaeng, exiled Red Shirt leader Jaran Ditapichai and Kwanjai Chularat.

In my workshop Bangon Schwarz talked about why she as an ordinary Thai became interested in politics. Visa Khantap talked about his long political struggle since the 1970s and the split of former friends into the Red and Yellow camps. I talked mostly about why the Red Shirts have not actively opposed the military coup, reasoning that the majority of Red Shirts are not revolutionaries, but normal citizens and a reflection of the Thai population, who want to express their political views via elections. In the present conditions active opposition would mean imprisoned and dead people, and that the UDD and most other Red Shirt groups had to design their strategies according to this.

I also mentioned that the demand that the Red Shirts should separate from Thaksin would be quite unrealistic, given that the majority of the Red Shirts were people who benefited under the populist schemes introduced by his government. In fact, such a demand would be an infringement on the people’s democratic right to support their politician of choice, and would therefore alienate these sectors of the population similar to what took place when the PAD began protesting against Thaksin in 2005/2006.

When it was asked if more aggressive strategies should be followed I said that this would be quite counterproductive as a civil war would not be in anyone’s interest, and that in the end both Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts are still Thais and have to find ways to continue to live with each other.

In our room three PDRC supporters took part as well. There were some frictions, naturally. Some of the Red Shirts in the room objected that the PDRC supporters filmed the talks, but as the event was live-streamed, and several of the participants filmed as well, I said that the PDRC supporters should also be allowed to film. One Danish PDRC supporter said that the Yingluck government came from vote buying and was therefore not democratic.

I answered that this is an unproven allegation, and referred to the ANFREL election observers who concluded that in general, the 2011 elections went well. I also mentioned Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker’s article, published on 6 December 2013, in The Bangkok Post, “Vote-buying claims nothing but dangerous nonsense”. When moderator Oliver Pye asked to get back to the main topic of the Red Shirt movement the three PDRC supporters walked out of the room.

During a break after the workshops, while participants had cake and coffee, about 15 PDRC supporters, who mostly came from Denmark, gathered near the university’s gate for a counter protest. Organisers of the seminar and the later Red Shirt protest march called the police, fearing that some incident might happen.

During the symposium authorities had watched over the PDRC supporters, to protect them against possible attacks from over-emotional Red Shirts, which did not happen. While not happy about the PDRC, the Red Shirts treated them respectfully. Police then arrived, and politely asked the PDRC supporters to gather at a nearby place where they have announced their protest, and the PDRC supporters soon left to their protest venue.

The following day, Naewna newspaper published coverage on thePDRC protest and a scathing report on the seminar.

The final podium discussion took again place in the lecture hall, with Junya Yimprasert, Jaran Ditapichai, Wolfram Schaffar and me on the podium, moderated by Oliver Pye. An interesting friendly side debate took place on the podium between Wolfram Schaffar, who framed the conflict in Thailand in context with the worldwide developments on liberal democracy under attack by rich elites and problems over distribution of wealth, and me, who looked at the Red-Yellow conflict as primarily an identity crises, a transformation conflict and a conflict over participation that is part of the development towards democracy in Thailand.

After, a protest march through Bonn’s inner city was organised. The lecturers flown in from Thailand opted not to take part, as to not violate their university rules. Naturally, I also did not participate, but used the opportunity to take pictures. The day ended in a picnic and party in the villa of one of the organisers in a suburb of Bonn.

Nick Nostitz is a photo-journalist and long-time contributor to New Mandala. Following are some of the images he captured at the symposium.

Andrew MacGregor Marshall prepares for his workshop.

Thailand - A state of madness | New Mandala

Dr James L Taylor, 18 DECEMBER 2015

The insidious creep of fascism in contemporary Thailand.

Tim Frewer’s New Mandala article from March 2015, “Fascist Assemblages in Cambodia and Myanmar”, is an interesting Deleuze and Guattari inspired piece on Thailand’s neighbours. Yet, no mention of the situation in Thailand is made.

Most academics and commentators are reluctant to use the descriptive term “fascism” for Thailand under military dictatorship and its authoritarian ultra-nationalist ideology. Labels are often misleading and ambiguous, especially a term that carries such emotive historical context.

The lack of democracy in Thailand, the repression by state apparatuses (under a compact among civil and military elites) and the annihilation of opposition to authoritarian rule, the use of an ultra-nationalist discourse, and the de facto support by royalist elites for its parastatal armed forces (from pro-palace sanctioned thugs such as the ‘garbage collection organisation to the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, or PDRC) have eerie resonances with aspects of the early 20th century Spanish fascists known as Falange Española Tradicionalista or falangistas.

Falangism is taken from the name of the right-wing Spanish movement that imitated elements of pre-war German and Italian fascism under the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. The movement was opposed the Republicans and supported General Franco’s Nationalist coup of 1936, but only as a minor element. It momentarily reappeared later in European history in the post-war years until the mid-1970s.

As self-exiled pro-democracy leader Surachai “Sae Dan” Danwattananusorn told me in 2011, while fascism” may be seen as a defining historical moment, we are now seeing new forms in a desperate push by the ruling elites/aristocracy (amaat) to hold back democracy for their own interests, whatever the social, economic, and political cost to the nation.

For instance we can hark back to Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat’s 1958 coup d’état,supported by the royalist/amaat regime wanting to regain its influence and power through the monarchy. Nothing has changed since then, only intensified as we near the end of the ninth reign. Nothing it seems is above personal interests and power under an authoritarian national leadership inspired by notions of an organic, hierarchical regal state.

Yet, Thais do not have a word for fascist or fascism.

Instead, Thai uses (though rarely) the foreign loan word latthi-fasit. Historian and expert on European fascism Stanley Payne sees this ideology as “a form revolutionary ultranationalism for national rebirth…” structured on “extreme elitism” and mass mobilisation in a “vitalist” philosophy that does not shirk at the notion of violence, intimidation and a repertoire of coercive tactics to achieve its ends.  (See A short history of fascism, 1914-45, p 14).

Prayuth Chan-ocha, the new Thai Fuhrerprinzip, was enforced through absolute idiosyncratic authority and emplaced by the amaat in 2014 for their own ends.  Indeed, the political climate under authoritarianism in Thailand masked by a perverse nationalist democratic rhetoric (Thai democracy”?) is characterised by extreme ethnic chauvinism, embellished monarchical patriotism, and an ultra-nationalism articulated (poorly at that) from the likes of orchestrated street movements such as People’s Alliance for Democracy or PDRC.

The similarities between falangism and the current Thai experience are a less ideological (“softer”) but no less insidious form of contemporary fascism. Examples are plentiful, including:

• an internal organic corporatism;
• ethnic (Thai)-based ultra-nationalism;
• conservative anti-democratic trade unionism;
• conservative modes of state Buddhism (through elements in the administrative royalist line of the Thammayut nikai that frowns on democratic state sangha governance);
• a dislike for separatism of any kind; anti-communism, anti-anarchism, and anti-(new) capitalism (where this is seen as working outside amaat networks);
• anti-democratic sentiments and control of all media, emplaced through editorial committees with royalist lackeys);
• paternalistic pastoral values (communal ethnic-Thai’ism and the hypocrisy inscribed in elite visions of the poor in a discourse of “self -sufficiency”);
• dislike of welfare-based neo-liberal economic (efficient) management (as in the case of Thaksin’s neo-liberal Populist government);
• and as a union of non-competitive, traditional conservative units seeking to maintain their monopolies and ensuing privilege through nationalistsyndicated consensus.

In addition, the link between the palace network and its vast financial interests and the many large national/global Thai corporations such as the Charoen Pokphand Group, Thai Beverage, and so on is self-evident. Many of these Falangist corporations provided financial support to the anti-democratic street movements leading up to the last two coups (PAD and then PDRC).

Indeed, another characteristic of the Thai falange also includes the agencies of state security and forms of para-militarism such as the ideological arm of the summit-state, the Yellow Shirts (and its pink and blue variants in the past decade). These share similarities with the European Falangist Blue Shirt street brigade.

This complex social and political arrangement in Thailand is controlled by an alliance of central bureaucratic elites, political representatives of the middle class, reactionary (pro-Prem Tinsulanond) elements in civil society, traditional network mafias, and ultra-conservative military factions with close ties to the royalist establishment.

The Thai amaat are opportunistic; every time a new structure of governance was put in place (three times since 2006) they ruthlessly crushed it using a complicit media and propaganda campaign with the use of street thugs to create destabilisation.

The synchronisation and multi-layered scheming for the last two coups involving so many elements of the monarchy network was impressive, if immoral and unscrupulous. The real fear among Thai falange is an election in which they have no control of the outcome and a real democracy which is engendered at the grass-roots.

In summary, the immense power of persisting propaganda and control of information in the hands of extreme right-wing pro-monarchists has been particularly worrying.

They generated and maintained a well-orchestrated vilification of Thaksin, Thailand’s first popularly elected prime minister; in fact they could have been saying “Thaksin is Jewish!” The hatred created and perpetuated is the same as in pre-war fascist Europe.

Fascists need to vilify in order to mobilise their support, particularly among the petty bourgeoisie and urban middle classes. The control of information, censorship and the immense reach of the monarchy network into all layers of society (like a computer virus or worm) have been factors in regulating society and the economy under new fascism.

There is no middle ground remaining in Thailand, no platform for dialogue or impartiality. Following the fascist dictate, the Thai regime created disorder on the streets and insecurity before every coup in order to recreate a semblance of their own constructed and self-interested order.

The radical royalists, including the military, established a compact with corrupt social elements – the Rajabhakti Park scandal is the tip of iceberg — all the while using Article 112 (the infamous lese majeste law) to silence and intimidate opposition.

If all of this is not new fascism in Thailand, then what other name?

Dr James L Taylor is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Anthropology & Development Studies at the University of Adelaide.

Academics face unjust detention in Thailand | New Mandala

Academics face unjust detention in Thailand | New Mandala

 

ROBERT DAYLEY, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR

 – 22 NOVEMBER 2015

Academic freedom is under grave threat in Thailand.

Since the May 2014 Coup, scholars at Thailand’s institutions of higher learning have faced ongoing harassment and intimidation. Military presence on campus has now been coupled with new rules and restrictions on everyday instruction and standard university activities.

The intellectual and pedagogical environment for Thai professors is increasingly suffocating with no end in sight. Out of frustration, Thai historian Dr Attachak Sattayanurak (Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai University) and seven colleagues held a news conference on 31 October to request that the military reduce its involvement in university life.

Following this news conference, the involved professors were charged for violatingNCPO Order 7/2014, for gathering in a group larger than five people for political purposes. Most have been summoned to appear individually to police in relation to these charges beginning Tuesday 24 November. Imprisonment up to one year plus additional fines are possible. Out of principle, Dr Attachak has pledged to refuse bail if detained.

In response to these events, Dr Anusorn Unno (Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Thammasat University) drafted the following statement in his capacity as Coordinator of the Academic Network for Detained Students (ANDS).

ANDS is currently collecting signatures in support of the letter from scholars in Thailand and abroad. Dr Anusorn plans to submit the letter to Prime Minister Prayuth on Monday, 23 November. Timely support is thus needed.

As a friend and research colleague of Dr Attachak, and in support of the other unfairly charged professors, I add my name in support of Dr Anusorn’s letter.

If any New Mandala readers would like to pledge your signature to this letter, please send ANDS a short email with your name, professional title, and your institutional affiliation (to: anusorn.unno@gmail.com); please write “Support Academic Freedom” in the subject box.

Dr Attachak and colleagues extend their deepest appreciation for your support of academic freedom in Thailand.

Respectfully,
Robert Dayley, PhD
Professor
The College of Idaho

The ANDS letter to be submitted to Prime Minister Prayuth  on Monday 23 November:

Academic Network for Detained Students

Statement no. 6

Universities are not barracks

Thailand is not a concentration camp

On 31 October 2015, a group of academics which call themselves “Network of University Academics” issued a statement “Universities are not barracks” which reaffirms the liberty to pursue knowledge for our teachings. However some members of the network were summoned by the police and charged with “having a political gathering of five persons or more in violation of the order of the head of the National Council for Peace and Order” (NCPO), a crime which carries a sentence of up to 1 year in prison or a fine of up to 20,000 Baht or both.

The Academic Network for Detained Students (ANDS) views such a charge against the academics to be in violation of our rights and liberties, aiming at threatening those who express opinions in contrary to the position of the NCPO. The threat was made despite the fact that the academics openly expressed their opinion in good faith and with good intention in accordance with their academic duty to share ideas and knowledge with the public. Other academics who called for the release of the students from detention and expressed their views are still threatened and the students are banned from and pressured against organizing political activities. Meanwhile, the NCPO has ordered an inclusion of university teaching materials saluting the military, which completely contravenes the principle of academic rights and liberty.

We reaffirm that “universities are not barracks”. Universities are places to pursue knowledge, to have free discussions and debates on the basis of facts and rationale, bringing about new knowledge and the growth in wisdom as the world is changing and new solutions are required for Thailand’s problems. The liberties to pursue knowledge and to express views are therefore the founding elements of universities and the society.

We reaffirm that “Thailand is not a concentration camp”. The Thai people enjoy diverse political views and beliefs. The path towards a peaceful society requires the liberty to believe and to express views based on facts and rationale. However, the Thai people are being treated as if we are detainees in concentration camps; we are being instilled with a singular ideal or belief in order to have the society fallen under a power structure controlled by a certain groups of individuals. This is done by shutting our ears and eyes, imposing force, threats and aggression using legal power that is unjust towards those holding differing opinions. This will bring about further conflicts while equality, liberty, democracy, fairness and peace will not be achieved in the Thai society.

ANDS members whose names appear following this statement therefore demand the following from the NCPO:

1. End all threats and aggressions against academics who expressed their political views in good faith;
2. End all bans on political activities and end all threats and aggressions against the students and citizens who wish to organize them; and
3. End all interventions to make university teachings comply with the guidelines or substance preferred by the NCPO.

Should the NCPO ignore these demands, the ANDS shall consider the next level of actions on the matter.

With our faith in rights, liberties, and equality

Academic Network for Detained Students

23 November 2015

Thailand’s rocky road to democracy | New Mandala

Thailand’s rocky road to democracy | New Mandala
Paul Sanderson, 18 NOVEMBER 2015

On average Thailand rewrites its constitution every four years. The next is likely to tilt more towards dictatorship than democracy.

There are few countries where being a constitution writer results in regular employment, but Thailand is one of them. There is even a long-running gag in which a student wanders around lost in the parliamentary library while trying to find a copy of the constitution. “Oh, it’s among the periodicals,” a librarian says. “There’s a new one every year.”

The reality is a little slower: a 21-member committee was installed in September to draft the nation’s 20th charter since the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932, putting the average at more than four years.

Thailand’s cycle of coups and ripping up constitutions is well-documented, and the 2013 film Paradoxocracy does a decent job at exploring the difficulties democracy has faced and explaining the template the military usually follows when it takes power.

The most recent attempt at drafting a constitution failed on September 6, ultimately for political reasons: the junta ordered military members of the rubber-stamp National Reform Council to vote the draft down after it became obvious there was no support for a proposed crisis panel that would effectively legalise future coups.

With the country’s two largest political parties finding themselves in the strange position of being united in opposition to the draft, there was little to no chance of it passing a referendum.

There was no downside for the administration of General Prayut Chan-o-cha in going back to the drawing board, apart from having to tell the world the “roadmap to democracy” was set back 20 months to mid-2017.

There was, however, the advantage of maintaining power longer as the king languishes in hospital.  It is widely thought the military wants to be in control during the succession, or at least have a constitutional structure in place that limits the influence any civilian government can have.

The painfully obvious symbolism of the generals lining up behind the unpopular Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn for a national bike ride for the ailing queen on April 16 was lost on no one.

Constitution writers will no doubt have the potentially troublesome consequences of his coronation, or the potentially worse consequences of overlooking the playboy prince in favour of his more well-regarded sister, in mind when charting the path ahead.

As for the committee itself, it was a case of out with the old and in with the older.

Borwornsak Uwanno, 61, a veteran of the 1992 and 1997 constitution-drafting processes, was replaced as chairman by Meechai Ruchupan, 77, who has been aligned with military governments since the 1980s and has written undemocratic charters in the past.

His interim charter after the 1991 coup was the framework under which the snap poll of March 1992 was held, and contained a loophole that allowed parliament to appoint Gen Suchinda Kraprayoon as an unelected prime minister.

This in turn led to street protests and the “Black May” crackdown in which 52 people were killed, many more disappeared and thousands were arrested. Gen Suchinda’s deception may have directly sparked the protests, but Mr Meechai was his enabler.

Mr Meechai was not involved in 1997’s “People’s constitution”, which was far and away the country’s most democratic. The legal expert returned to the fore in 2006, creating the post-coup interim charter that served as a template for the much more conservative 2007 constitution, which he approved and submitted for royal endorsement as then-president of the National Legislative Assembly.

This all indicates the 20th Thai constitution will more likely err towards dictatorship rather than democracy. Not only can we infer Mr Meechai’s disdain for popular rule from his history of siding with ultra-conservative regimes, he has said as much. Elections are “not always necessary” for the Senate, he told the Bangkok Post in October. Indeed, he would work to ensure the Senate was not an echo of the House of Representatives.

In places like Australia and the United States, this might mean a Senate where states have equal representation, in Thailand this typically means a significant proportion of the seats will be reserved for establishment figures. Appointed senators have typically included retired judges, bureaucrats and military figures: so-called “good people”. Expect to see a significant number of appointed senators in the next Meechai charter, with perhaps one elected senator from each of the 77 provinces.

Mr Meechai has also reopened the idea of an outsider prime minister, despite this leading to disaster in 1992.

Under his current thinking, the non-elected prime minister would be appointed by MPs and this would be democratic enough. Anyone charged with corruption – not found guilty of, mind – would also be banned from politics. This is all clearly designed to keep anyone with the surname Shinawatra from ever being prime minister again, which will appeal to a significant and noisy minority.

The best way to prevent abuses by those elected to power is to strengthen democratic institutions, foster a free press and hold consistent elections where the people can vote corrupt politicians out.

History has shown Mr Meechai and those around him have always taken the opposite approach, and we are likely to see more of the same with the next constitution and next election, if and when it happens in mid-2017.

Paul Sanderson is a pen name. The author is an independent writer and consultant based in and around Southeast Asia.

This article is published as a collaboration between New Mandala and Policy Forum, Asia and the Pacific’s platform for analysis and discussion on public policy.