Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala

Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala
Bridget Welsh,  5 JANUARY 2016

2015 was the year authoritarian governments struck back against democratic pressures.

The story of 2015 in Southeast Asia was Myanmar’s November election. In giving the National League for Democracy and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi a landslide, Myanmar citizens signaled their strong support for democratic change and better governance.

These calls have been loud in recent years — in Malaysia’s 2008 and 2013 elections, in Thailand’s repeated electoral victories for a non-military aligned government, in Cambodia’s 2013 and Singapore’s 2011 polls as well as strong electoral support for democracy in the Philippines and Indonesia. Democratic pressures on Southeast Asian governments have been increasing, and are not likely to recede in the near future.

2015 was the year authoritarian governments in the region struck back. Behind the Myanmar headlines there is a worrying trend of a significant democratic contraction taking place. The use of the authoritarian arsenal by Southeast Asian governments are not new, but in the course of the year regional governments expanded their use of incumbency and control of institutions to shore up their positions.

The most obvious trend has been the increased use of repression, especially targeted toward opposition politicians and critics. In Malaysia, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was jailed in February. In Thailand, a trial began against ousted PM Yingluck Shinawarta as she was denied the right to travel. In Cambodia, opposition politicians were physically attacked. The leader of the opposition Sam Rainsy has delayed his return to Cambodia from November as a result of jail threat. Malaysia has the highest number of opposition politicians facing various charges from sedition to violations of banking finance regulations.

The threats opposition members across the region face in calling for change extend from being physically attacked on the campaign trial (as occurred for Myanmar’s Naing Ngan Lin NLD candidate who was slashed by a machete) to potential bankruptcy.

The use of the law for political ends moves beyond opposition members. Journalists and bloggers remain targeted. Radio reporter Jose Bernardo was shot dead at a restaurant in Manila in November. He joins the other 77 journalists who have been killed in the Philippines since 1992, making this country one of the most dangerous places for media professionals in the world.

Myanmar tops the region’s list with the most number of journalists jailed, pipping Vietnam this year who released some of its bloggers. Notably, blogger Ta Phong Tan was released after 10 years in jail. The situation for bloggers in Vietnam remains serious, with a number of incidents where bloggers and associates were beaten up in mysterious circumstances rather than jailed. In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong won his defamation case against a blogger critic Roy Ngerng, who was asked to pay PM Lee S $150,000. Lee joins Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak as the second current leader in the region who filed charges for public criticism.

The crackdowns on freedom of expression extend to ordinary citizens, from artists and academics to taxi drivers.

Young Chaw Sandi Tun was sentenced to six months jail for insulting Myanmar’s army in her Facebook post noting the similarity in color between the Tatmadaw’s uniform and the opposition leader’s clothing. In Thailand, the cases involving lese majeste have extended the boundaries to include insults to the king’s dog. Thanakorn faces up to 15 years in jail for this reference, and joins a long list of cases that have involved jailing of university students for a play, taxi cab conversations, novelists and more.

A mother of two was sentenced to 28 years for her Facebook comments, while a hotel employee received 56 years for his posts in August as part of the lese majeste unending prosecutions. Cartoonist Zunar in Malaysia faces up to 43 years for his satirical art work. These developments have had chilling effects on public discourse. Even in more open Indonesia, discussion of the 1965 attacks on communists were shut down.

As power has been used to quiet alternative voices, the rule of law itself has faced erosion. In some cases the law is not being implemented. In July, the co-Investigating International judge Mark Harmon of the Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia resigned his position after the tribunal declined to arrest two former Khmer Rouge leaders for whom the court had issued warrants.

Despite having the technology to find the daughter separated from her mother Indira Gandhi for seven years by a husband who is abusing religion in a personal vendetta against his ex-wife, the Malaysian police have proven to be unwilling to use its tools to follow the court order to return the daughter to the mother.

In other cases, constitutional frameworks protecting rights have been by-passed through the introduction of military courts – as has been the case in Thailand and called for in Malaysia – and new measures that empower leaders to declare ‘security areas’ without checks on their authority, as occurred with the hurried passage of the National Security Council law in Malaysia. This law is being seen as a measure that will allow unpopular Prime Minister Najib to stay in office if he loses an election. In Myanmar, there are potential laws being considered that may give military impunity for alleged past crimes.

The area where the laws are under real scrutiny continues to be corruption. 2015 showcased some shocking scandals.

In Malaysia the 1MDB $700 million ‘donation’ into Najib’s personal accounts remains inadequately explained, as the rule of law has not been properly applied to the premier and impunity appears to have allowed the premier to hold onto office even with his personal reputation in shatters. Efforts to undermine Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the recent demands for payments from Freeport to politicians to conduct business have showcased that persistent problem of bribery, lack of transparency and abuse of position.

From corruption concerns tied to the Aquino administration in the Philippines to persistent effects of corruption trails associated with Vietnam’s elite, there lacks effective leadership in tackling the region’s most serious governance problem. The end effect is that leaders at the top are seen to engage in graft, reinforcing a system where office is used for personal wealth rather than public service.

Control over resources and alliances with cronies remains a dominant feature of Southeast Asia’s political economy. Four countries in the region – Malaysia (3), Singapore (5), Philippines (6), Indonesia (10) – were in The Economist’s crony capitalist list, which measures the favoritism of wealth toward tycoons and politically-affiliated business interests.

Measures to enhance this favoritism expanded in 2015 through the introduction of consumption taxes in Malaysia and Myanmar, regulations that facilitated more burning rather than less in the haze-affected region in Indonesia and service fees in areas such as tolls to crony-companies. The region’s most vulnerable populations are feeling the economic pain, with depreciating currencies and a slowdown in growth in the region as a whole. These conditions have contributed to conditions where the use of state resources through populist policies have boosted incumbent governments, a factor that contributed to the People’s Action Party’s September 2015 electoral victory.

Those on the margins are being particularly impacted, with serious implications for rights. Southeast Asia was not immune from the global refugee crisis affecting over 60 million people worldwide. Conditions affecting the livelihoods of the Rohingyas in Myanmar remain severe, with conditions in camps across the region not much better. The shocking findings of death camps in Thailand and Malaysia involving torture, rape and human and organ trafficking in May have yet to be properly accounted for.

One reason for this lack of accountability lies with the upgrade the Obama administration gave Malaysia on its human trafficking assessment in the wake of the discovery of the gruesome murders. The Obama administration’s sell out of human rights principles was especially acute in 2015, where interests associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership overrode other concerns.

From questions tied to the trial of Burmese migrant workers in killing British backpackers Thailand to the persistent practice of ‘sea slaves’ with citizens hauled onto fishing boats, those that are vulnerable remain so at the end of the year, which limited measures to point to strengthening protections.

Vulnerability in 2015 extended to religious and ethnic minorities as well. Bogor was labeled Indonesia’s most intolerant city when it declared a ban of the Shia faith in the city. Hate speech toward Muslims persists in Myanmar, in spite of the electoral victory signaling greater inclusiveness. Churches were burned in Aceh. Christmas celebrations were banned in Brunei. Rights of religious minorities were curbed in Malaysia in cases involving child custody and worship.

Measures to forge peace with minorities fell apart, as the Philippines’ Bansamoro Basic Law did not pass the legislatures. In other places such as Myanmar, Protection Race and Religion Bills denying rights to marriage and religious freedom were introduced, as protections for rights were in fact eroded.

There were nevertheless bright spots in greater freedom across the region – a gender rights bill in Thailand, the end of the persecution of a book seller and academic by religious authorities in Malaysia, the reinstatement of direct local elections in Indonesia and the subsequent peaceful elections in December, to name but a few.

Southeast Asians continue to fight for their freedoms valiantly, over cyberspace, in courtrooms and in communities. The climate however has not been conducive to greater freedoms as those in office continue to use their offices to hold on to power.

As we look ahead, with a slowing economy and persistent insecurities by incumbents, the prospects for expanding rights does not appear promising in 2016. Last year has shown us however that we can expect the unexpected, with the military’s acceptance of the Myanmar’s electoral results as an example.

As ASEAN formally announced its community on 31 December 2015, many hold only to potentially a different ‘imagined community,’ where the ideas of brilliant scholar Benedict Anderson of shared belonging, human dignity and decency live on.

Bridget Welsh is Professor of Political Science at Ipek University, Senior Research Associate at the Center for East Asian Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University, Senior Associate Fellow of The Habibie Center, and University Fellow of Charles Darwin University.

Singapore after Lee Kuan Yew -- New Mandala

Singapore after Lee Kuan Yew -- New Mandala
HAMISH MCDONALD – 27 MARCH 2015

Will Singapore Inc survive the passing of its long-time CEO, and more importantly will there finally be time for rhyme, asks Hamish McDonald?

When James Minchin, an Anglican priest from Australia who had lived in Singapore for many years, wrote an insightful book about its then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew in 1986, he gave it the title No Man is an Island.

Yet when this week, after Lee died at the age of 91, his son and current prime minister Lee Hsien Loong broke the news to the nation by stating: “We won’t see another man like him. To many Singaporeans, and indeed others too, Lee Kuan Yew was Singapore.”

Now that his overpowering presence is gone, the question is whether the Singapore that was almost synonymous with Lee Kuan Yew will hold together or start to fragment (or free up, to use a less ominous term).

It was sometimes called Singapore Inc, reflecting its tight managerial style of government and directed thinking, but the island-republic has at times more closely resembled a family firm rather than an executive-run corporation.

Not only has the family provided two prime ministers, the Civil Aviation Authority, state-owned SingTel, the sovereign investment fund Temasek, and the Singapore Armed Forces have all had Lee family members in command positions.

The family law firm, Lee & Lee, for many years run by Lee Kuan Yew’s late wife, was one instrument used to break political challengers from outside the ruling People’s Action Party through the notorious defamation actions in a cowed judiciary.

The bureaucracy would dig up dirt on political defectors like former president Devan Nair or former solicitor-general Francis Seow. The details would then be slathered across the state-owned print and broadcast media. After standing as an opposition candidate, Chee Soon Juan lost his university job after alleged misuse of official stationery and postage was suddenly discovered.

Yet after continuous power since 1959, the grip of the PAP on the minds of Singaporeans has noticeably weakened.

The last elections in 2011 saw its vote share fall to 60 per cent, its lowest ever. Though the PAP still held 81 of the 87 seats in parliament, the first-past-the-post voting system could translate further electoral slippage into an avalanche of seats for the opposition.

With attractive young professionals like the lawyer-academic Sylvia Lim replacing the old soap-box orators like Jayaretnam in the Workers Party of Singapore, the opposition is much more presentable to the public vis-à-vis the high-achievers typically recruited by the PAP, and perhaps seen as less elitist.

The PAP itself could break up along factional lines, especially if Lee Hsien Loong hands over to a non-family successor.

Beneath the glittering achievement of Lee Kuan Yew and his chosen successors in raising per capita GDP to some US$55,000, are resentments over rising inequality and a sense of identity loss, with Singaporean citizens now less than two-thirds of the island’s 5.5 million residents.

Lee’s tough-minded and blunt views on international strategy made him a darling of conservatives in the Western world, who overlooked his domestic restrictions on free expression and the corporatist economics of high mandatory savings funnelled into state investment funds (which were not always well-invested).

Yet Singapore remains unpopular in its closest region, one reason why it maintains the best-equipped and most battle-ready armed forces in Southeast Asia.

It is resented not just for its success, but for the reason that part of the success has come from exploiting the weaknesses of its neighbours. Singapore is regarded as clean on corruption, but possibly $200 billion in corrupt earnings from Indonesia is held in its banks. Singapore was the conduit of choice for the Myanmar military and its business cronies when sanctions held.

Recently even Australia has been querying the use of Singapore as a pathway for profit shifting, though Australian businesses and institutions find the island a comfortable regional base and source of partnerships, and the two peoples, with comparable hybrid immigrant popular cultures, get along well.

So where does Singapore go from here? One reason for the question is the zig-zagging path of Lee Kuan Yew himself, usually defined as commendable “pragmatism”.

His background made him a chameleon. His wealthy Straits Chinese family gave him a sense of non-British identity. Working for three years for the Japanese state news agency Domei during the wartime occupation he perhaps learned a lot about media control. Then he became Harry Lee, the Cambridge and Inns of Court barrister. Moving into politics he enlisted Leftists as allies, then crushed them mercilessly.

In office he stressed English language, then Mandarin. Races were ranked as “hard” and “soft”. The promotion of “Asian values” waxed and waned as the Western economic model was seen as in decline or revival. Population growth was discouraged, then promoted as wealthier Singaporeans showed unwillingness to propagate their genes. Strict morality was eased to accommodate a synthetic version of Bugis Street, the old transvestite hangout, and two lavish casinos to capture more of Asia’s stray money.

No doubt Singapore will continue to go with the global and regional trade winds.

Internally, its system and political culture seem ripe for change. As expatriate Singaporean writer Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan wrote in Foreign Policy this week, the island’s younger and educated people are no longer inclined to accept Lee’s 1960s statement that “Poetry is a luxury we cannot afford.”

Hamish McDonald is Journalist-in-Resident at the Australian National University’sCollege of Asia & the Pacific, and a former regional editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review.

Lee Kuan Yew’s political legacy – a matter of trust | New Mandala

Lee Kuan Yew’s political legacy – a matter of trust | New Mandala

BRIDGET WELSH, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

24 MARCH 2015

As Singaporeans mourn their charismatic leader Lee Kuan Yew (LKY), whose political acumen, drive and ideas defined the young nation and played a major role in its successful development, attention turns to assessment. Moments of transition always bring reflection, and this is especially the case with the passing of the man who both personified and defined Singapore. The fact that LKY has passed on in the pivotal year of the nation celebrating the country’s 50^th anniversary only serves to reinforce the need for review.

There is good reason to acknowledge the accolades of a man who has been labeled as one of Asia’s most influential leaders. Most of the media, especially in the government-linked media of Singapore, lay out these reasons well. LKY was a force to be reckoned with, a complex man who made no excuses in his views and was direct in stating his opinions. He trusted few, but chose to collaborate with those who shared his hard work ethic with talent and ideas to develop the busy port of Singapore into a safe dynamic cosmopolitan city-state. He will rightly be remembered for not only putting Singapore on the world map, but as a model that is admired and respected by many the world over.

LKY was a man who was respected, but importantly not loved by all. He used fear to stay in power. From the inception of Singapore’s independence – when it was expelled from Malaysia – the ideas of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘survival’ were used to justify decisions. He promoted the idea that Singapore had to have a strong armed forces, requiring national service in 1967, to protect itself as a nation surrounded by the perceived threat of its Malay neighbors. The enemies outside were matched by those inside, who had to be displaced and in some cases detained.  Among the most controversial were the arrests of men labeled as communists in Operation Coldstore of 1963 and Operation Spectrum of 1987 (a.k.a. the ‘Marxist Conspiracy’) that targeted social activists who promoted greater social equality and were seen as challenging LKY’s People’s Action Party’s (PAP) authority. Two other round-ups occurred with Operation Pecah (Split) in 1966, which coincided with the year of the arrest of Dr. Chia Thye Poh who was held under detention and restriction until 1997, and the arrests of the ‘Eurocommunists’ in 1976-77. Many others from opposition politics, business to academia faced the wrath for challenging and questioning LKY, his PAP and the politicized decisions of its institutions, castigated in the government controlled media, removed from position, forced to live in exile and, in some cases, sued and bankrupted. In the relatively small city state, it did not take much to instill a political culture of fear by making a few examples.

A main point of contention goes that LKY sparred with Western critics over democracy and human rights, with LKY dismissing these ideas as not part of ‘Asia’s values.’ The debate was never about differences in values, but the justification of holding power in the hands of a few for nearly five decades. Singapore’s political model is at its foundation about the elites, with Lee, his family and loyalists at the core. In recent years, reports in Singapore have highlighted a growing trust deficit in the PAP government that LKY founded. The real deficit that defined LKY and became embedded within the party he molded is that he never fundamentally trusted his people.

The group that received the special focus of LKY’s distrust was the Malay population, who now comprise over 10% of the country’s population. Even as LKY matured as a politician, he continued to reinforce negative stereotypes of this community that rioted over their grievances in 1950, 1964 and 1969 when LKY was in his early years in power, and with whom he expressed hard judgments about their religion, Islam. This distrust was shaped in part by a worldview that was not only shaped by his early experiences in political life but had sharp racial cleavages, drew from eugenics and believed in a clear social order. Part of LKY’s outlook prioritized women as homemakers and disparaged single women who opted not to marry or follow a career – another group similar to Malays that faced discrimination within LKY’s Singapore.

In the heyday of Singapore’s economic miracle, the 1970s through the 1990s, the LKY PAP government worked to win over the trust of its people. It did so by providing for the basic welfare of its citizens, with an impressive housing program, affordable food prices, a living wage, job security, safety, education and opportunity. This involved hard work of LKY’s founding team of PAP cadre, as well as the sacrifice of ordinary Singaporeans. It also reflected the wise realization of LKY that fear was not enough to stay in power. There needed to be a healthy balance of deliverable. The LKY decades of economic growth translated into real rewards – at least through the 1980s.

Singapore’s trajectory of sharing the benefits of development has followed a pattern of diminishing returns, as the country now boasts the highest per capita of millionaires and is the world’s most expensive city, with a large number its citizens unable to save and afford the lifestyle promised in the nation’s early narrative. As much as LKY deserves credit for Singapore’s success, he also should be seen to be part of today’s shortcomings. Elitism has breed arrogance, and a distance between those in power and those governed. Most of the new leaders of the PAP have come from subsequent wealthy generations that do not fully understand the sacrifices of the country’s working poor – shocking in number – and the obstacles elderly and young people face in an era of high costs. Years of following the LKY’s example and being told that the PAP is made up of the ‘best and brightest’ has imbued a mindset of superiority, a lack of empathy, and frequent dismissal of difference in engagement with the public.

While LKY’s son Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has worked to win over support, he has suffered consecutive drops of support in the two elections he has led since he assumed office, failing to match the 75% popular vote height of the predecessor Goh Chok Tong in 2001. Unlike in the information controlled era of his father, Lee Hsien Loong is not able to effectively censor and limit public discussions in today’s wired and connected Singapore.  His recent expansion of social services and incentive packages that provide small sums for pensioners, modest support for health and childcare and tax reductions for the middle class are a drop in the bucket for the growing grievances and costs faced by ordinary citizens.

This has to do in part with the challenge Lee Hsien Loong faces in dealing with his father’s legacy. In 2007 LKY claimed that he governed without ideology. This was not quite true. The ideological foundation of LKY’s pragmatic tenure was materialism. This obsession with money, saving it and forcing the public to save it in rigid regulated ways, assuring that government funds were only given to those ‘worthy’ and loyal and defining the value of the performance of his government ministers by pegging their salaries to growth numbers comprised the lifeblood of LKY’s state. With annual ‘bonuses’ to perform, there is a focus on short-term gains rather than long-term investments. The irony is that it is not even clear how much money the government of Singapore and its linked companies actually have. Singapore is one of the few countries in the world that does not follow the International Monetary Fund guidelines on its budget reporting. It also does not transparently report losses in many of the financial accounts of the government linked companies (GLCs). Lee Hsien Loong has had to tackle head-on the ingrained pattern of limited government spending on social welfare and services, as he attempts to move away from his father’s restrictive parsimony and secretive mindset that originated from a lack of trust in people.

Lee Hsien Loong also has to address the problems of a government dominated economy. Singapore Inc. emerged out of the political economy LKY put in place, with the government and its linked companies controlling over half the country’s economy and undercutting almost all domestic business. LKY did not trust local capital, and did not want to strengthen an alternative power center to his own. As such, Singapore’s economy is not a genuinely competitive one. It favors big business, especially property developers, and those allied with government rather than independent entrepreneurs. Those in the system have apparently disproportionately benefited from it, although the exact amounts and assets remain unknown. The accumulated assets of individuals remain hidden as the estate tax was removed in 2008. What is known is that workers have limited rights in the LKY-shaped political economy. A recent example is the sexual harassment bill passed in parliament that excludes employer liability. The harsh response to the bus driver strike in in 2012 is another. Much is made about the limited corruption of Singapore, but few appreciate that the country ranks high on the Economist crony-capitalism index, an important outgrowth of the government dominance of the economy. The ties between companies and government are close, at times with government and family members on their boards and a revolving door that never really closes.

Singapore’s economy also favors foreigners. LKY was to start this trend, with the appeal to outsiders for capital rather than a focus on domestic business. Foreigners may have been easier to engage, as they could always be kicked out. Foreign investment has been extremely important in Singapore’s growth numbers initially in manufacturing and later in services. To maintain global competitiveness, keep wages low and maintain high growth numbers, Singapore also turned to foreign labor – cheap workers to staff their construction sectors and to work as domestic help and foreign talent to bring in ideas and the occasional sports medal. This prioritization of outsiders has fostered resentment. When LKY assumed office he worked to force a nation, but with his passing many in Singapore feel the government he left behind is working for others and undermining the fabric of the nation. The crowded trains, strain on services and displacement of Singaporeans in the job market and advancement have angered many, who now see LKY’s legacy as one that in fact left many Singaporeans vulnerable and worried about survival.

No one can take away LKY’s contributions. He lived a long meaningful life, and shaped the lives of all Singaporeans. This does not mean that there is agreement on what he left behind. Singapore now faces the challenge of moving beyond LKY’s ideas and shaping a more promising future for all of its citizens. An integral part of this dynamic will be moving away from fear, promoting more effective policies for inclusion in the economy and society and building trust. It starts with placing more trust in Singaporeans.

It is arguably the latter that is the hardest. LKY lived in an era where societies trusted their leaders. He was given the benefit of the doubt. The PAP remains a relatively closed institution, with the distrust of those not inside deeply embedded. Today in the age of social media and instant messaging there is not as much leeway to work behind closed doors. There is an urgent need to forge genuine dialogue, connectivity and understanding that moves beyond materialism, and reignites the sense of belonging that LKY forged in his early years.

Singapore today has become a more politically divided nation, with those who strongly defend LKY’s incumbent government, die-hard opponents and the majority in the middle. As the country marks its 50^th year it moves toward a different narrative, the task at hand is to forge a new Singapore story, one in which LKY is a valued part of its past, but not a constraint on the dreams and aspirations of Singaporeans’ future.

Bridget Welsh is a Senior Research Associate of the Center for East Asia Democratic Studies of the National Taiwan University where she conducts research on democracy and politics in Southeast Asia.

Singapore ‘close down STOMP’ campaign about more than freedom of speech

Singapore ‘close down STOMP’ campaign about more than freedom of speech
Kirsten Han Apr 20, 2014

A screengrab from the petition page on Change.org.

People have had enough. After years of “citizen journalism” platform STOMP indulging in public shaming, a petition has popped up on Change.org asking Singapore Press Holdings – the owner and publisher of the website – to shut it down. Started by Robin Li, the petition now has over 22,000 signatures.

The response from both SPH and the Media Development Authority (MDA) has been lukewarm. The MDA took the opportunity to ask people to propose stronger regulatory measures of licensed websites. An editor of the digital media group at SPH’s Digital Division portrayed the issue as one of “freedom of the Internet”, accusing the anti-STOMP camp of hypocrisy. SPH questioned the support the petition is receiving, alleging that the petition could have been astroturfed and that its support base could actually be much smaller. “Under the circumstances, the number of petitioners being cited is likely to be grossly inflated,” said their spokesperson Ginny Lim.

@kixes absolutely atrocious. I take it hugely as an insult. The same can be said for those “Stomp” likes on FB which is unreliable
— Robin Li (@thoughtsovrobin) April 18, 2014

It is of course possible that not all of the over 22,000 signatures are valid. There is always the potential of surveys and petitions being astroturfed, online or offline.

But for SPH to suggest that a huge number of the signatories are false is a weak defense of STOMP. We may quibble about the exact number of signatures on the petition, but SPH is delusional if they do not realize that the opposition to STOMP is significant. Their persistent refusal to admit that there is anything wrong with STOMP casts doubt on their integrity as a media organization; something that ultimately hurts not just its brand, but also the professional reputation of the journalists and other employees who work within the company.

The website has already been called out for both false and bullying posts. These are both things that fall within the remit of the MDA, whose Internet Code of Practice prohibits content that “glorifies, incites or endorses ethnic, racial or religious hatred, strife or intolerance.” The MDA also already has the power to regulate against fake content on websites. If it already has such power, why then is it acting as if it has no knowledge of STOMP’s problems, or that it does not have the ability to do anything beyond issuing statements about not condoning bad behaviour?

Which is why the whole “freedom of the Internet” argument invoked by the SPH editor is simply a red herring. It is not about free speech if the information is false. It is not about free speech if a website is just going to be a repository of bullying, sexism and xenophobia. The petition is directed at SPH rather than the state, which suggests that people are not asking the state to forcibly shut the website down. SPH can continue to publish online, or on any of its numerous print publications. They can even continue publishing on STOMP, but they should know that a significant number of their customers/potential customers want to see some changes.

The petition against STOMP has launched interesting conversations on the media landscape in Singapore and the type of media content that Singaporeans would like to see. Discussions – including those taking place on international news outlets – have taken place on the role of public shaming in the media, and whether it benefits society.

It is unfortunate that SPH and MDA’s responses have indicated an unwillingness to join in on the conversation.

Stricter Web Regulation in Southeast Asia | Prachatai English

Stricter Web Regulation in Southeast Asia | Prachatai English
Mong Palatino, Global Voices Onlin, October 2, 2012

While Southeast Asian governments are enhancing the delivery of online services for the benefit of their citizens, they are also instituting tougher internet regulations which many analysts believe could be used to curtail media freedom.

This post is a summary of recent Global Voices articles which discussed several controversial internet regulation policies in the region.

In Cambodia, the government is enforcing a circular drafted earlier this year which requires internet cafes to set up surveillance cameras and to register callers. It’s supposedly a crime prevention measure but critics have argued that it violates privacy rights.

In Singapore, the proposed Code of Conduct for bloggers which didn’t get a favorable response from the local internet community was finally discarded by the government in favor of a Media Literacy Council. Established last August 1, the council is tasked to promote public education on media literacy and cyber wellness. But critics have questioned the lack of transparency in appointing the members of the council which is seen by some as another internet censorship tool.

Andrew Loh reminds the Singaporean government that netizens or bloggers should not be viewed as troublemakers:

"The problem is not with the Internet, or its practitioners. The problem is not with bloggers or, as the Government like to call them, “netizens”. It is not a problem with those who are actually active online, as opposed to those who sit in their comfortable offices tucked somewhere in some unknown places dictating what and how the online landscape should look like.

Nah, the problem is with a Government which still wields much control, and which has little patience for messiness, for diversity, for spontaneity and indeed for robust debates and disagreements."

Recently, the Philippines enacted the Anti-Cybercrime Law which aims to prevent the cyberspace from degenerating into a ‘lawless realm.’ But the law was described as a threat to media freedom by journalists who protested the last-minute inclusion of libel in the law.

Lawyer JGBernasSJ Blogs mentions the ‘frightening’ provisions of the law:

"Libel has been decriminalized in other civilized jurisdictions. Our legislature, instead, will throw us back to the dark ages by imposing a higher penalty for libel. In effect, advance in communication technology is being treated not as a boon but as bane."

Like the Philippines, Malaysia has introduced amendments in the law which could curtail internet freedom. Under section 114A of the revised Evidence Act of 1950, law enforcement authorities are able to identify the persons who should be made accountable for uploading or publishing content in the internet. Media freedom advocates have warned that the amendment could force online writers to resort to self-censorship and web moderators could disallow critical comments in order to avoid prosecution and harassment suits.
The Lee & Chong Team explains how the amendment can affect ordinary internet users:

"This amendment will create troubles for the public. Everybody is using the Internet daily and with this new amendment, the public has to change the password for the network service and also social network site frequently to avoid being misuse by other people. Besides that, the café or restaurant that used to provide free wifi service may no longer provide the free wifi service to their customer. This will indirectly affect the business of the restaurant or café"

The Philippines and Malaysia may have been inspired by Thailand’s experience which has gained notoriety for using restrictive laws to punish government critics. Article 112 of Thailand’s criminal code is often described as the world’s harshest Lese Majeste (anti-royal insult) law. The controversial law is often invoked to censor web content and shut down websites. Global Voices conducted an interview with a former member of the police committee that handles Lese Majeste cases.

Elsewhere, Vietnam has recently convicted three bloggers accused of spreading anti-government propaganda. Earlier, the Prime Minister has openly criticized some opposition-leaning blogs whom he accused of fomenting disunity in the country.

Governments in the region have justified the imposition of harsh web policies ostensibly to protect the rights of ordinary internet users and uphold public morality. The new policies were met with public opposition but so far the governments have remained firm in implementing the new internet laws.

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This article by Mong Palatino was originally published by Global Voices Online, a website that translates and reports on blogs from around the world.