Bridget Welsh, 5 JANUARY 2016
Wednesday, January 6, 2016
Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala
Bridget Welsh, 5 JANUARY 2016
Tuesday, March 31, 2015
Social media machinations in Vietnam -- New Mandala
HUONG LE THU, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR – 26 MARCH 2015
Saturday, January 10, 2015
Grassroots democracy made in Vietnam | New Mandala
5 JANUARY 2015
Sunday, October 28, 2012
Opinion: Vietnam's Difficult Road to Reform | asia sentinel
Khanh Vu Du, 26 October 2012
If the recent intraparty dispute has proven anything, it is that the Communist Party, not its individual leaders, ultimately bears responsibility for Vietnam's failures
Reform, or what passes for reform in Vietnam, is not implausible. Democracy and individual rights are not foreign concepts to the Vietnamese. The arrest and detention of pro-democratic and human rights activists prove as much. The public outrage against the government’s economic mismanagement and corruption proves as much.
More often than not, reform is used as a catch-all solution for the failures of government. The problem is not the act of reform but the extent to which the government and political system is reformed. What is perhaps certain is that corruption, economic mismanagement and human rights abuses would have continued if the president and his faction had assumed power in the recent struggle between Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and President Truong Tan Sang.
In a country where power comes not from the people but the ruling (and only) party, merely replacing the individual at the top will do little, if nothing. What is required for real reform is a serious and concerted effort by the people and from those within the government to change the system. Of course, this is easier said than done, and the obstacles are many.
A Revolt of the Ruling Elite
The intraparty dispute between the Vietnamese prime minister and president was driven in part by Prime Minister Dung’s handling of the economy. While some blame can be assigned to the global recession, the corruption and mismanagement surrounding the prime minister could not be overlooked. The scandals at Asia Commercial Bank, Vinashin, Vinalines, in addition to a poorly performing economy had made Prime Minister Dung toxic.
Although President Sang and his supporters had a case for removing the prime minister, one should not mistake their desire to do so for the good of Vietnam. The struggle between the two factions was not one of protecting the people, but a struggle to protect and preserve their place in the party. This was not a revolt of the masses but of the ruling elite, And although Prime Minister Dung has retained his job, the “revolutionaries” are still in power, perhaps waiting, biding their time until the next opportune moment.
But another revolt by party members will achieve little. True, there exist the old communist hardliners, who view the liberalization of Vietnam’s economy as a betrayal of Ho Chi Minh’s principles. There are also those party members who have prospered in the new, open market Vietnam (oftentimes through patronage and perhaps even shady business dealings), and who are just as likely to invoke the spirit of Ho Chi Minh to defend the status quo.
Communism has failed in Vietnam, but the new, more economically liberalized country has also begun to show signs of stress. Vietnam, by its very political nature, has made it possible for the government to hide its failures and shield its party members from charges of corruption—that is until the situation becomes untenable, as was the case with Prime Minister Dung.
The Vietnamese people are not unaware of their government’s deficiencies, but for a long stretch of time it was easy for them to look the other way. Vietnam was once a booming economy with great promise in Southeast Asia. The people could see and experience the positive changes that had come about, and the government could take credit for the success. For a time, it was easy for the people to say, “Well, at least today is better than yesterday.”
Today, this sense of optimism has diminished.
The Party is the System
The public apology by Party Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong over the failures of the Communist Party in serving the people was in part a response to actual failures but also in part to shield and distance the party from Prime Minister Dung. As if the party secretary’s apology was surprising enough, even the prime minister was forced to issue an apology of his own in front of the National Assembly, pledging to reform state-owned corporations.
And here lies the greatest obstacle towards reform. It is not about purging the Communist Party of corrupt officials. The individuals themselves are not the problem but a side effect. The problem is not superficial but deeply rooted and structural in nature. Corruption, economic mismanagement, and human rights violations are merely symptoms of the problem: the political system.
Presently, the Vietnamese political system is the Communist Party. An independent oversight committee on governmental affairs does not exist. Had Prime Minister Dung been ousted and President Sang or someone else had taken his place, change would have only occurred at the leadership level. Of course, there might have been some movement in the rank and file, but none of these changes would have had any lasting effect on the average Vietnamese citizen.
Appointments and elections are held within the Communist Party. Investigations into corruption are initiated by the Communist Party. All of this is to repeat the obvious: the Communist Party is not simply the sole, ruling party but the government. It is the system. None of this is particularly revealing, but it is worth mentioning.
A Need for Structural Reform
The obvious and only solution for Vietnam is to reform and democratize. Of course, the nature of the Vietnamese government means change on this level must be initiated from within. Or, in a worst case scenario, the government somehow falls apart and a new one takes its place. Either way, the path to democracy will not prove to be easy.
Whatever the journey, the goal for the Vietnamese people is to reform the political infrastructure. The government and the institutions of government should be geared towards carrying Vietnam into the future. An obvious change is an increase in transparency. The present system merely provides the opportunity to propose band-aid solutions. Much like the party secretary’s apology, blame will be cast, action will be taken, and it will be business as usual.
Power must ultimately be transferred away from those who create laws and into the hands of the people. Reform is not simply replacing the party leaders. It is not simply replacing members of the Politburo. Reform is not lip service paid to constitutional changes.
Reform in the case of Vietnam is the complete and thorough renovation of its political system. It is the democratization of Vietnam, because anything less than that will simply be incomplete and ineffective. Anything less than the distribution of power and improvement in government transparency is to invite the same old thing.
When the communist policies of old failed, the Vietnamese government changed: it modified its economic policies. The result of these changes was an increase in living standard and invitation for foreign investment. But now there is a new problem, and that problem is not its economic policies but the political system. If the Vietnamese government serves the people, as it purports to do so, then it must accept the need for real change.
While none of this can occur without support from within the existing government, none of this will occur without pressure from the public.
Change is not easy. Change in an authoritarian government, in particular, is not bloodless. As we have witnessed throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa, beginning in Tunisia and now being fought in Syria, change is often violent. But the Middle East and Northern Africa is not Vietnam. However, it is guaranteed that reform will be hard fought.
This is not to say that the Vietnamese people should take to the streets and risk their safety and future, but at some point the people must ask themselves, “Is this the country I deserve?”
(Khanh Vu Duc is a Canadian lawyer who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel)
Saturday, October 13, 2012
Vietnam requests China to respect its sovereignty | Vietnam News
October, 12 2012
HA NOI (VNS)— Viet Nam has demanded that China respect its sovereignty and refrain from wrongful actions so as to make practical contributions to developing the friendship and co-operation between the two countries as well as maintaining peace and stability in the East Sea.
Answering reporters' questions at the Foreign Ministry's regular press conference in Ha Noi on October 11 on Viet Nam's response to the Chinese side's recent acts, spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi said that they had violated Viet Nam's sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagos.
Following a series of illegal activities, including building and developing the so-called "Sansha city", China held a flag raising ceremony to mark its National Day on Phu Lam island in the Hoang Sa archipelago on October 1.
Two days later the Chinese navy's Nanhai Fleet held an exercise in the waters of the Hoang Sa archipelago and the week after China opened a meteorological station in the new city.
Earlier, on September 23, the Chinese press reported that China would deploy unmanned aircraft to strengthen the surveillance of the waters, including the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos.
The Chinese actions seriously violated Viet Nam's sovereignty according to international law and the agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues between Viet Nam and China signed in October 2011, Nghi stressed.
They also ran counter to the spirit of the Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the East Sea (DOC) signed between ASEAN and China in 2002, thus further complicating the East Sea situation, he added.
Agreement
Also at the press conference, Nghi responded to a question about the co-operation agreement between Sudan and South Sudan signed on September 27, saying that Viet Nam welcomed the agreement and believed that the document would contribute to boosting the two countries' relations for the common interests of each country's people and for peace and stability in the region.
Viet Nam hoped that the two sides would continue negotiations to seek ways to solve all issues on the spirit of mutual understanding, he added. — VNS
Tuesday, October 2, 2012
Stricter Web Regulation in Southeast Asia | Prachatai English
Mong Palatino, Global Voices Onlin, October 2, 2012
While Southeast Asian governments are enhancing the delivery of online services for the benefit of their citizens, they are also instituting tougher internet regulations which many analysts believe could be used to curtail media freedom.
This post is a summary of recent Global Voices articles which discussed several controversial internet regulation policies in the region.
In Cambodia, the government is enforcing a circular drafted earlier this year which requires internet cafes to set up surveillance cameras and to register callers. It’s supposedly a crime prevention measure but critics have argued that it violates privacy rights.
In Singapore, the proposed Code of Conduct for bloggers which didn’t get a favorable response from the local internet community was finally discarded by the government in favor of a Media Literacy Council. Established last August 1, the council is tasked to promote public education on media literacy and cyber wellness. But critics have questioned the lack of transparency in appointing the members of the council which is seen by some as another internet censorship tool.
Andrew Loh reminds the Singaporean government that netizens or bloggers should not be viewed as troublemakers:
Nah, the problem is with a Government which still wields much control, and which has little patience for messiness, for diversity, for spontaneity and indeed for robust debates and disagreements."
Recently, the Philippines enacted the Anti-Cybercrime Law which aims to prevent the cyberspace from degenerating into a ‘lawless realm.’ But the law was described as a threat to media freedom by journalists who protested the last-minute inclusion of libel in the law.
Lawyer JGBernasSJ Blogs mentions the ‘frightening’ provisions of the law:
Like the Philippines, Malaysia has introduced amendments in the law which could curtail internet freedom. Under section 114A of the revised Evidence Act of 1950, law enforcement authorities are able to identify the persons who should be made accountable for uploading or publishing content in the internet. Media freedom advocates have warned that the amendment could force online writers to resort to self-censorship and web moderators could disallow critical comments in order to avoid prosecution and harassment suits.
The Lee & Chong Team explains how the amendment can affect ordinary internet users:
The Philippines and Malaysia may have been inspired by Thailand’s experience which has gained notoriety for using restrictive laws to punish government critics. Article 112 of Thailand’s criminal code is often described as the world’s harshest Lese Majeste (anti-royal insult) law. The controversial law is often invoked to censor web content and shut down websites. Global Voices conducted an interview with a former member of the police committee that handles Lese Majeste cases.
Elsewhere, Vietnam has recently convicted three bloggers accused of spreading anti-government propaganda. Earlier, the Prime Minister has openly criticized some opposition-leaning blogs whom he accused of fomenting disunity in the country.
Governments in the region have justified the imposition of harsh web policies ostensibly to protect the rights of ordinary internet users and uphold public morality. The new policies were met with public opposition but so far the governments have remained firm in implementing the new internet laws.
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This article by Mong Palatino was originally published by Global Voices Online, a website that translates and reports on blogs from around the world.
Friday, September 7, 2012
The US and the Future: Middle East to Asia | Asia Sentinel
Whether under President George W. Bush or Barack Obama, America’s strategy in the Middle East has been fairly consistent. Although President Obama succeeded in drawing down and withdrawing troops from Iraq, the continuing campaign in Afghanistan remains more or less the same, punctuated only by talks of withdrawal dates. If anything, Obama has reinforced America’s resolve in neutralizing terrorist leaders through the increased use of drone strikes.
However, the unilateralism so readily displayed by Bush has softened, in part perhaps by a nation subdued after the costly Iraq debacle, as well as a stagnant domestic economy. With the death of Osama bin Laden and disruption of terrorist networks, the Middle East, while still important, is slowly being supplanted by Asia.
But there is no war to be fought in Asia. To be sure, terrorism and piracy are regional US concerns, but the focus has shifted towards a more economic-oriented objective. Hampered by the recession, the US is looking towards Asia as a path towards recovery.
Turning to Asia-Pacific
Whether it is President Obama or President Romney next year, both men will not shy away from promoting an American presence in the Asia-Pacific.
Front and center is China, whose economic practices, such as currency manipulation, including issues pertaining to intellectual copyright, have been a constant source of irritation for the US. Moreover, Chinese activities in the South China Sea (claiming the entirety of the sea as Chinese) have raised alarms among its neighbors.
The US’s return will therefore serve two purposes: one, to confront China on its activities on and off the market, directly or indirectly; and, two, to improve ties between the two countries. The latter, however, may prove difficult. Most recently, China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi issued a not-so-subtle warning to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to steer clear of issues pertaining to Chinese sovereignty, specifically the South China Sea.
Not yet recovered from the economic recession, the US finds itself vulnerable. The vast fortunes spent in Iraq and Afghanistan have made for a war-weary American public, which has translated to a less confrontational (but not less aggressive, e.g. increased drone strikes) American foreign policy. Libya perhaps best exemplified this new and fairly relative internationalist, multi-lateral US demeanor.
Where the battle lines were drawn clearly in Libya, the same cannot be said about the Asia-Pacific. Competing claims over territory do not simply pit China against country “x” but also fellow American allies such as Japan and Korea over the Takeshima/Dokdo islets. Resolutions to these territorial disputes will therefore require more carrot and less stick, diplomatic finesse over military might.
The US, perhaps in anticipating the difficulties and complexities of these territorial disputes, has yet to openly come down on one side or the other, although it has maintained an interest in them. Its desire to see a multilateral resolution serves as a sore point for China, which has sought to resolve matters through bilateral negotiations, but emboldened other claimant states such as the Philippines and Vietnam.
Whether the US is truly above the fray can be argued otherwise; however, its actions thus far have demonstrated a country that is comfortable keeping its distance. Rather, the US has worked to establish and strengthen its position in the region. Joint naval exercises with allies and non-traditional partners (Vietnam) are becoming increasingly common. Instead of tackling matters head-on, American policy in the region, it seems, is to build a coalition of like-minded nations and to find strength through numbers. While American unilateralism has not faded, the American public’s appetite for unilateralism has surely been sated.
Looking at Vietnam
Vietnam, for example, a potential regional partner for the United States, proves just how difficult this outreach might be. In espousing peace, prosperity, and democracy, the US will find some countries in the area that do not place much importance on these values. Vietnam, with its record of human rights abuses and lack of democracy, will prove especially challenging, for said reason and more.
Vietnam has the undesirable situation of being China’s neighbor. This is a fact made worse than it sounds given the history between these two countries. Ultimately, size matters, and Vietnam is constantly living in the shadow of its much larger neighbor to the north.
Hanoi can neither come out against China nor can it fall in line with Beijing without upsetting the Vietnamese people, many of whom regard China with distrust. The US administration should therefore be wary of cornering the government in its dealings and pushing the country into the hands of China. Ultimatums along the lines of “take it or leave it” will achieve little, if nothing, in the long run. Having already proved its contempt for the rights and dignity of its citizens, the Vietnamese government, although desiring American weapons technology, could and would just as well purchase its armaments from other suppliers.
The Vietnamese government’s natural inclination to resist may prove to be the primary obstacle to democratic reform rather than whatever concerns voiced by China. One need only look at the slow democratization process occurring in Burma, which has thus far been free of direct Chinese interference. Presently, there appears to be little love lost between the Communists of Vietnam and China. Shared ideologies are second to financial interests. Whether Vietnam is a democracy or a Communist single-party state, China’s outlook on Vietnam will hardly change.
Undoubtedly, any US-proposed effort to reform Vietnam will be met with some suspicion by the Vietnamese people; however, if one to is to draw conclusions from events occurring within the country, it seems Vietnam is ready for democracy. If the US wishes to strengthen ties with Vietnam, progress can only come about after political reform.
The Communist Party has become fractious as intra-party rivals threaten to destabilize the government. In a multi-party state, none of this would be particularly shocking given policy and ideological differences; however, where the Communist Party’s power in Vietnam is absolute, a political coup d’état could be disastrous for a country where a sense of progress, stability, and continuity is paramount.
The institutions of old are weakening, and as fears of China’s assertiveness continue to mount, the United States can offer itself as an alternative to balance China’s rise. Although the US has made it its goal to engage China and help the latter grow to become a partner on the world stage, this should not prevent countries like Vietnam from seeking American assistance.
Rather than stamp its feet and loudly announce its arrival, the US should cultivate relationships with regional countries, so as to better its standing in the region. Efforts to promote democracy and protect human rights, such as in Vietnam, would go far to establish goodwill with the people. Rather than strong arming the government of these countries into agreement, a softer touch is required. Rather than appealing to authoritarian regimes, it may be necessary for the US to appeal to the people of these states.
(Khanh Vu Duc is a Vietnamese Canadian lawyer in Ottawa who researches on international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel.)
Saturday, August 4, 2012
Viet Nam: Pro-democracy bloggers face harsh penalties in upcoming trial | fidh.org
fidh.org, 31 July 2012
The three outspoken bloggers have been charged under Article 88.2 of the Criminal Code for “conducting propaganda against the state” for their online writings and criticisms of the government. They face a maximum of 20 years in prison if convicted. Article 88 is among several repressive provisions in Vietnamese law that are routinely used to criminalise free speech and imprison peaceful dissidents.
During his detention, Mr. Dieu Cay has reportedly faced intense pressure from the authorities to plead guilty to the charges laid against him, which he has consistently refused. His lawyers also stated that Mr. Dieu Cay went on hunger strike in prison in March 2012 to protest his detention, and had to be hospitalised. He was previously convicted on trumped-up charges of ‘tax evasion’ after a manifestly unfair and closed trial in 2009 and the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared his detention to be arbitrary and in violation of international law [2]. His current prolonged detention began on October 19, 2010, the same day he completed the prison terms he received in 2009. Mr. Phan Thanh Hai and Ms. Ta Phong Tan have also been in pre-trial detention in Ho Chi Minh City since their arrest, respectively on October 18, 2010 and on September 5, 2011.
In his online writings, Mr. Dieu Cay, one of the founders of the Club of Free Journalists, calls for greater respect for human rights and democratic reforms. He is also known for his criticisms of China’s claims over disputed islands in the South China Sea. In January 2008, Mr. Dieu Cay and other activists staged an anti-China demonstration in Ho Chi Minh City.. Before their arrests, Mr. Hai has published a number of articles on his blog, including one that criticised and called for the repeal of Article 88 of the Criminal Code, while Ms. Tan has blogged about police abuse and violations of human rights by the State.
“Vietnam plans to run for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council, but it no longer even makes an effort to put up a façade of compliance with international human rights law, as it regularly parades human rights defenders before kangaroo courts and makes a crime out of free speech”, said Mr. Vo Van Ai, President of VCHR.
In addition, on July 30, 2012, Ms. Ta Phong Tan’s mother (Mrs. Dang Thi Kim Lieng) immolated herself outside the People’s Committee headquarters in Bac Lieu to protest her daughter’s unfair imprisonment. She had suffered repeated Police harassments and interrogations since her daughters’ arrest. She died later the same day.
Since 2009, Vietnamese human rights and pro-democracy bloggers have been harassed, intimidated, arrested and jailed for their online writings and activism. Those imprisoned for their Internet activities include Mr. Tran Huynh Duy Thuc, Mr. Nguyen Tien Trung, Mr. Le Thang Long, and Mr. Tran Kim Anh [3]. On July 13, Government agents attacked bloggers Nguyen Hoang Vi, Bui Thi Minh Hang and Lee Nguyen while they were driving back after a birthday party in Ho Chi Minh City. Mrs. Duong Thi Tan, Mr. Dieu Cay’s wife, was also in the car when the attack occurred.
Bloggers and other netizens who participated in or tried to attend anti-China demonstrations in several cities in early July also faced intimidation. On July 1, a group of knife-wielding men, allegedly led by the son of a local official, entered the house of outspoken blogger Nguyen Huu Vinh in Hanoi and attacked him, after he came home from the demonstrations. Bloggers Ms. Nguyen Hoang Vi and Ms. Huynh Thuc Vy were among several people briefly taken into police custody and interrogated during or after the anti-China demonstrations in Ho Chi Minh City. Following an appeal to support the July 1 demonstrations launched by Venerable Thich Quang Do, leader of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), Police forcibly impeded Thich Quang Do and at least sixteen UBCV monks from joining demonstrations in Ho Chi Minh City and Hue. Several monks were assaulted by Police.
Blogger Nguyen Xuan Dien, whose online writings focus on abuses of land rights, has recently been questioned by the authorities over his Internet activities. It also appears that his blog had been attacked by hackers. As of writing, articles no longer appear on Mr. Dien’s blog [4].
The escalation of crackdown on online dissent comes amidst a government effort to adopt a new Decree on Management, Provision, and Use of Internet Services and Information on the Network that, if passed in its current form, would grant the authorities expansive discretionary power to censor, control and possibly criminalise Internet use in Viet Nam. In June 2012, the UN Human Rights Council adopted by consensus a resolution affirming the right to freedom of expression must be protected online, and that States are called on to “promote and facilitate access to the Internet”.
“Such prosecution of ‘speech crimes’ will only worsen if the new draft Internet decree is adopted, and the international community must urge Viet Nam to break away from its already atrocious record in respecting freedom of expression”, warned Debbie Stothard, Deputy Secretary-General of FIDH.
“Judicial proceedings behind closed doors not only violate Viet Nam’s obligations under international law, they also clearly indicate that the judicial authorities have no intention to try the defenders according to international fair trial standards. But the bloggers’ pleas for justice will be heard even behind those doors”, said Gerald Staberock, Secretary-General of the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT).
Wednesday, June 27, 2012
Vietnam deputy PM voices commitment to develop nuclear power | Viet Nam News / Asia News Network
Viet Nam News, June 27, 2012
Vietnam Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai emphasised yesterday that the country would be consistent in its policy of developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes.
The Prime Minister made the statement at a reception for Denis Flory, deputy general director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who was heading a delegation of overseas experts from the Nuclear Regulatory Co-operation Forum (NRCF) to attend an international seminar in Hanoi.
He said that the country would keep obeying the international convention on nuclear safety and expressed his hope that the IAEA would assist in implementing this.
Flory said the seminar, which drew participation from experts from countries such as Russia, the United States, Japan, France, South Korea and India, aimed to work out solutions on improving the capacity of Vietnam's nuclear regulatory agency to manage and develop the country's nuclear power plants.
At the meeting, the two sides also discussed issues related to safe infrastructure systems for nuclear power programmes.
Thursday, December 8, 2011
Transparency sought in Xayaburi decision
Transparency sought in Xayaburi decision
Kristin Lync, Thursday, 08 December 2011
A day before the Mekong River Commission is scheduled to deliver its long-awaited decision on the future of Laos’ controversial Xayaburi dam project, government officials, NGOs and scholars meeting in Phnom Penh called for transparency and collaboration in the decision-making process.
“We must ensure that decisions about water, food and energy are not taken in isolation from each other and that trans-boundary implications are carefully considered,” Australian ambassador to Cambodia Penny Richards said as she opened the first Mekong Forum on Water, Food and Energy.
The gathering brought together a diverse group of more than 120 for a three-day forum to discuss sustainable development along the river, but while the event was held in the capital, much of the focus was some 250 kilometres away.
“Today in Siem Reap, the council members of the MRC are assembling, and the world is watching to see what they have to say about Lower Mekong mainstream dams,” she said, adding that dams were “altering” water flows.
“Natural river flows are being altered by new infrastructure, such as the Upper Mekong hydropower dams in China, and other new dams on major rivers and tributaries,” she said.
Nao Thouk, director general of the Fisheries Administration, echoed the Australian Ambassador’s worries about dam development, saying that “the ways in which dams might affect water productivity, fish habitats, fish migrations and fish production” are “concerning”.
Today the MRC, comprised of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, is expected to issue its decision on the proposed 1,260-megawatt dam in Laos’ Xayaburi province. Many environmental groups have said the plan could have devastating effects on the region.