Showing posts with label Vietnam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Vietnam. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 6, 2016

Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala

Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala
Bridget Welsh,  5 JANUARY 2016


lese-majeste-imposed-on-two-theatre-activists-in-thailand










2015 was the year authoritarian governments struck back against democratic pressures.
The story of 2015 in Southeast Asia was Myanmar’s November election. In giving the National League for Democracy and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi a landslide, Myanmar citizens signaled their strong support for democratic change and better governance.
These calls have been loud in recent years — in Malaysia’s 2008 and 2013 elections, in Thailand’s repeated electoral victories for a non-military aligned government, in Cambodia’s 2013 and Singapore’s 2011 polls as well as strong electoral support for democracy in the Philippines and Indonesia. Democratic pressures on Southeast Asian governments have been increasing, and are not likely to recede in the near future.
2015 was the year authoritarian governments in the region struck back. Behind the Myanmar headlines there is a worrying trend of a significant democratic contraction taking place. The use of the authoritarian arsenal by Southeast Asian governments are not new, but in the course of the year regional governments expanded their use of incumbency and control of institutions to shore up their positions.
The most obvious trend has been the increased use of repression, especially targeted toward opposition politicians and critics. In Malaysia, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was jailed in February. In Thailand, a trial began against ousted PM Yingluck Shinawarta as she was denied the right to travel. In Cambodia, opposition politicians were physically attacked. The leader of the opposition Sam Rainsy has delayed his return to Cambodia from November as a result of jail threat. Malaysia has the highest number of opposition politicians facing various charges from sedition to violations of banking finance regulations.
The threats opposition members across the region face in calling for change extend from being physically attacked on the campaign trial (as occurred for Myanmar’s Naing Ngan Lin NLD candidate who was slashed by a machete) to potential bankruptcy.
The use of the law for political ends moves beyond opposition members. Journalists and bloggers remain targeted. Radio reporter Jose Bernardo was shot dead at a restaurant in Manila in November. He joins the other 77 journalists who have been killed in the Philippines since 1992, making this country one of the most dangerous places for media professionals in the world.
Myanmar tops the region’s list with the most number of journalists jailed, pipping Vietnam this year who released some of its bloggers. Notably, blogger Ta Phong Tan was released after 10 years in jail. The situation for bloggers in Vietnam remains serious, with a number of incidents where bloggers and associates were beaten up in mysterious circumstances rather than jailed. In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong won his defamation case against a blogger critic Roy Ngerng, who was asked to pay PM Lee S $150,000. Lee joins Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak as the second current leader in the region who filed charges for public criticism.
The crackdowns on freedom of expression extend to ordinary citizens, from artists and academics to taxi drivers.
Young Chaw Sandi Tun was sentenced to six months jail for insulting Myanmar’s army in her Facebook post noting the similarity in color between the Tatmadaw’s uniform and the opposition leader’s clothing. In Thailand, the cases involving lese majeste have extended the boundaries to include insults to the king’s dog. Thanakorn faces up to 15 years in jail for this reference, and joins a long list of cases that have involved jailing of university students for a play, taxi cab conversations, novelists and more.
A mother of two was sentenced to 28 years for her Facebook comments, while a hotel employee received 56 years for his posts in August as part of the lese majeste unending prosecutions. Cartoonist Zunar in Malaysia faces up to 43 years for his satirical art work. These developments have had chilling effects on public discourse. Even in more open Indonesia, discussion of the 1965 attacks on communists were shut down.
As power has been used to quiet alternative voices, the rule of law itself has faced erosion. In some cases the law is not being implemented. In July, the co-Investigating International judge Mark Harmon of the Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia resigned his position after the tribunal declined to arrest two former Khmer Rouge leaders for whom the court had issued warrants.
Despite having the technology to find the daughter separated from her mother Indira Gandhi for seven years by a husband who is abusing religion in a personal vendetta against his ex-wife, the Malaysian police have proven to be unwilling to use its tools to follow the court order to return the daughter to the mother.
In other cases, constitutional frameworks protecting rights have been by-passed through the introduction of military courts – as has been the case in Thailand and called for in Malaysia – and new measures that empower leaders to declare ‘security areas’ without checks on their authority, as occurred with the hurried passage of the National Security Council law in Malaysia. This law is being seen as a measure that will allow unpopular Prime Minister Najib to stay in office if he loses an election. In Myanmar, there are potential laws being considered that may give military impunity for alleged past crimes.
The area where the laws are under real scrutiny continues to be corruption. 2015 showcased some shocking scandals.
In Malaysia the 1MDB $700 million ‘donation’ into Najib’s personal accounts remains inadequately explained, as the rule of law has not been properly applied to the premier and impunity appears to have allowed the premier to hold onto office even with his personal reputation in shatters. Efforts to undermine Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the recent demands for payments from Freeport to politicians to conduct business have showcased that persistent problem of bribery, lack of transparency and abuse of position.
From corruption concerns tied to the Aquino administration in the Philippines to persistent effects of corruption trails associated with Vietnam’s elite, there lacks effective leadership in tackling the region’s most serious governance problem. The end effect is that leaders at the top are seen to engage in graft, reinforcing a system where office is used for personal wealth rather than public service.
Control over resources and alliances with cronies remains a dominant feature of Southeast Asia’s political economy. Four countries in the region – Malaysia (3), Singapore (5), Philippines (6), Indonesia (10) – were in The Economist’s crony capitalist list, which measures the favoritism of wealth toward tycoons and politically-affiliated business interests.
Measures to enhance this favoritism expanded in 2015 through the introduction of consumption taxes in Malaysia and Myanmar, regulations that facilitated more burning rather than less in the haze-affected region in Indonesia and service fees in areas such as tolls to crony-companies. The region’s most vulnerable populations are feeling the economic pain, with depreciating currencies and a slowdown in growth in the region as a whole. These conditions have contributed to conditions where the use of state resources through populist policies have boosted incumbent governments, a factor that contributed to the People’s Action Party’s September 2015 electoral victory.
Those on the margins are being particularly impacted, with serious implications for rights. Southeast Asia was not immune from the global refugee crisis affecting over 60 million people worldwide. Conditions affecting the livelihoods of the Rohingyas in Myanmar remain severe, with conditions in camps across the region not much better. The shocking findings of death camps in Thailand and Malaysia involving torture, rape and human and organ trafficking in May have yet to be properly accounted for.
sedition
One reason for this lack of accountability lies with the upgrade the Obama administration gave Malaysia on its human trafficking assessment in the wake of the discovery of the gruesome murders. The Obama administration’s sell out of human rights principles was especially acute in 2015, where interests associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership overrode other concerns.
From questions tied to the trial of Burmese migrant workers in killing British backpackers Thailand to the persistent practice of ‘sea slaves’ with citizens hauled onto fishing boats, those that are vulnerable remain so at the end of the year, which limited measures to point to strengthening protections.
Vulnerability in 2015 extended to religious and ethnic minorities as well. Bogor was labeled Indonesia’s most intolerant city when it declared a ban of the Shia faith in the city. Hate speech toward Muslims persists in Myanmar, in spite of the electoral victory signaling greater inclusiveness. Churches were burned in Aceh. Christmas celebrations were banned in Brunei. Rights of religious minorities were curbed in Malaysia in cases involving child custody and worship.
Measures to forge peace with minorities fell apart, as the Philippines’ Bansamoro Basic Law did not pass the legislatures. In other places such as Myanmar, Protection Race and Religion Bills denying rights to marriage and religious freedom were introduced, as protections for rights were in fact eroded.
There were nevertheless bright spots in greater freedom across the region – a gender rights bill in Thailand, the end of the persecution of a book seller and academic by religious authorities in Malaysia, the reinstatement of direct local elections in Indonesia and the subsequent peaceful elections in December, to name but a few.
Southeast Asians continue to fight for their freedoms valiantly, over cyberspace, in courtrooms and in communities. The climate however has not been conducive to greater freedoms as those in office continue to use their offices to hold on to power.
As we look ahead, with a slowing economy and persistent insecurities by incumbents, the prospects for expanding rights does not appear promising in 2016. Last year has shown us however that we can expect the unexpected, with the military’s acceptance of the Myanmar’s electoral results as an example.
As ASEAN formally announced its community on 31 December 2015, many hold only to potentially a different ‘imagined community,’ where the ideas of brilliant scholar Benedict Anderson of shared belonging, human dignity and decency live on.
Bridget Welsh is Professor of Political Science at Ipek University, Senior Research Associate at the Center for East Asian Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University, Senior Associate Fellow of The Habibie Center, and University Fellow of Charles Darwin University.








Tuesday, March 31, 2015

Social media machinations in Vietnam -- New Mandala

Social media machinations in Vietnam -- New Mandala
HUONG LE THU, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR – 26 MARCH 2015

As the country prepares for the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in January 2016, the public attention to power continuity appears natural. A phenomenon of ‘mushrooming’ social media platforms, blogs and information websites starts to play a novel role in the pre-Congress period.
A sequence of articles dedicated to the CPV in a critical tone has been a signature of the foreign-based Vietnamese news outlets for the occasion of the 85th anniversary of the Party. The Voice of America (VOA) Vietnamese featured an article entitled “Where is the CPV going?” expressing skepticism about the longevity of a single party future. On 1 February 2015 the BBC Vietnamese published an article with suggestive title “The Party doesn’t do any good for the country”. The news outlet reinforced this line as the next day it released another piece entitled with “Who is still taking pride of being a member of the CPV?” Based on significantly decreasing interests of young generation in joining the Party, this article spelled out the reluctance of being connected to the Party system among the Vietnamese nowadays. On the same day, the website published another article entitled “The Party and the question of legitimacy” featured a selfie of a Vietnamese young woman holding a banner “I don’t like the CPV”. The article reported growing Facebook groups united under the theme of “Ain’t like CPV”.
Before the power transition within the CPV, there surface new dimensions of political blogging. Chân Dung Quyền Lực (CDQL), translated as Profiles in Power, a website with mysterious sources, but with documentation that is believed to be in the possession within the top of the establishment. The aim of this blog is to provide the people with facts about the current leadership elected in the last 11th Party Congress and to allow them to understand better how the leadership of the approaching 12th Party Congress will decide about the future of Vietnam. The CDQL exposes concrete numbers and cases of illegitimate assets that each member Politburo has gained during the time in power. Cases include the Minister of Defense who used a private company name to ‘empty out’ the army’s budget, or how Deputy Prime Minister’s son-in-law exercised money laundering. Within a month since its inception, the website received over 14 million of visits.
The CDQL is considered as an ‘ace in the sleeve’ in the internal power battle among Party rivals. Although ‘just a blog’, the CDQL has shaken up the domestic stage of public information, forcing the mainstream media to comment on it. The fact that despite such directly confronting messages, the website is still accessible supports the suspicion that this is a project that has the blessing from someone in the top. Another attempt of tackling corruption by The Elderly, a printed newspaper established in 1995, was treated with severer treatment, including dismissing the chief editor, Kim Cuc Hoa. For ‘disseminating the distorted truth’ and ‘revealing state secrets’ The Elderly was fined for … publishing inappropriate advertisements.
The accumulation of doubtful voices, not only among the foreign-based news websites, but with a growing number of domestic platforms, suggests that there have started a new stage in the Vietnamese political environment. An indicator of change is that people are no longer afraid of self-identification when posting anti-regime banners, uploading their photos and revealing their online identities. Whether they are political activists managing regular blogs with quality information and discussions, or they are ‘just’ netizens expressing their sporadic opinions on Facebook groups, they have established a new generation of cyber-dissidents. Even Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who in 2013 said that “social media should not be used to share news or opinions on current issues” recently changed his opinion to: It’s impossible to ban information on social media”.
The CPV regime has proven that it has the capability to ‘deal’ with dissidents and limit the access. As a matter of fact, Vietnam is ranked 175 out of 182 in the 2015 World Freedom Press Index by the Reporters without Borders, and the government’s treatment of the prisoners of conscience remains a thorn in the eye of the US-Vietnam relations. However, it is rather doubtful that, with such a widespread number of Internet users in a social media-active young population, the Party will be able to continue to assert absolute control over dissemination of diversification of opinions and assessments towards its performance. Social media has become a form of emancipation through technology that has allowed pluralization of political opinions inside the country, unlike in the past where uncensored content could only be publicized on the exile. In fact, the Party has learned to recognize how social media can be a very efficient tool. It is now not only the domain of the dissidents, but it could also be used by those involved in the power struggle. As the atmosphere becomes increasingly tense towards next January more revealing developments in Vietnam’s political cyberspace are bound to occur.
Huong Le Thu is a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore



Saturday, January 10, 2015

Grassroots democracy made in Vietnam | New Mandala

Grassroots democracy made in Vietnam | New Mandala
 5 JANUARY 2015
More than a decade since the birth of the Grassroots Democracy Decree in Vietnam, which became an Ordinance in 2007, the core tenet of this mandate – ‘people know, people discuss, people do, people supervise’ — is entering the political mainstream of the Communist party state. It is meant to be practiced between officials and residents at communes, wards and towns: the administrative levels that are two tiers below provinces and cities. A rural commune  is divided into hamlets (ấp), where the above tenet is getting real. It is seeing the social and the political mixed up.
Let me take a look at a hamlet meeting in Long An Commune, a rural area in Dong Nai Province, held at a resident’s house with a big front yard. The key agenda was to report on the financial contributions and expenses of all households to turn a dirt road into a concrete one, which now has come to its final stage. The hamlet head and deputy chaired an evening meeting with around 25 people representing their households. It proceeded as the head (1) reported the monthly collections of funds and how they were spent, (2) repeated which issues had been agreed in previous meetings, (3) briefly informed the group about a new policy guideline by the province, then leaving time for participants to discuss, raise their concerns and make suggestions.
Some people were questioning the quality of the new road, the credibility of the constructor, and the need for extra funds to be collected. They talked about numbers and exchanged rebuttals, while the hamlet head tried to address their concerns and come up with feasible resolutions. This is perhaps the  best part of the meeting when the people truly contributed their thoughts to a public affair and had them addressed on the spot.
According to an official report by the provincial government on the practice of democratic mechanism up until 2012, a hamlet is not an administrative unit but only a self-rule community. In that same report, following that sentence, activities in a hamlet are claimed to positively contribute to the exercise of the democratic ordinance. Thus, by encouraging and reinforcing communal exchanges, for instance, on a small infrastructure project that was fund-raised from local households, the hamlet head and upper authorities could be happy that the philosophy of the Ordinance has been fulfilled.
One participant told me that the meeting was meant to ‘make finance public’, adding ‘which is the term they [the authorities] use’. So far each household had contributed approximately 1.5 million Vietnamese dong (a little more than 70 US dollars). Other than these grassroots funded constructions, he commented, ‘the authority is not interested in letting the people know how “they” fund other buildings and roads’. Perhaps they might make it public in some form other than holding public meetings; if so, it could be that he is not interested in finding it out.
Of course it is an oversimplification to say that grassroots democracy of the Vietnamese brand is just about meetings where people deliberate on what makes a good road for their neighbouring area. Some other avenues, as stated in the report, include the right to nominate candidates to the municipal legislative body, to vote for the inspection committee and the hamlet head, alongside the right to request handling of grievances, complaints related to housing, land compensation, and civil issues. All these avenues posture a form of people-oriented authority, when better infrastructure, less rural poverty, more civilised communities, and a greater percentage of dispute handling, are time and again stated to serve the people’s good.
Besides, promoting new policy guidelines down to the hamlet level, in direct interactions between the hamlet head and people, is not a bad idea to bring the governed closer to the governing, putting them within a real regulatory conversation. In that meeting the hamlet head mentioned a new mandate on registering permits for house construction. Perhaps it makes a greater and deeper sense to people in such a face-to-face manner than through notices, newspapers and radios.
As in the report, the task of grievance and complaint handling is a part of the broader bureaucratic reform. The turnouts of this task are the number of people that have paid visits to the municipal government office, and the percentages of complaints and denunciation letters solved which are 100 percent. The evaluation includes adjective clichés like ‘serious’ (nghiêm túc), ‘timely’ (kịp thời), and ‘good’ (tốt). This is at best an effective quantifying of bureaucratic performance, leaving a big question mark over its substance.
The meeting discussed here lasted for one hour and a half, when I heard the hamlet head urging everyone to reach a consensus so that he could finalise its minutes, and that they all could go home. The people exchanged some more points, looking contented that they had been given a chance to socialise and know who else had or had not contributed a fair share to rebuilding the road. Unfortunately it was already dark and the dim bulbs in the front yard failed my photography.
Tu Phuong Nguyen is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political and Social Change, ANU. This piece emerges from her recent field observations.


Sunday, October 28, 2012

Opinion: Vietnam's Difficult Road to Reform | asia sentinel

Opinion: Vietnam's Difficult Road to Reform | asia sentinel
Khanh Vu Du, 26 October 2012

If the recent intraparty dispute has proven anything, it is that the Communist Party, not its individual leaders, ultimately bears responsibility for Vietnam's failures

Reform, or what passes for reform in Vietnam, is not implausible. Democracy and individual rights are not foreign concepts to the Vietnamese. The arrest and detention of pro-democratic and human rights activists prove as much. The public outrage against the government’s economic mismanagement and corruption proves as much.

More often than not, reform is used as a catch-all solution for the failures of government. The problem is not the act of reform but the extent to which the government and political system is reformed. What is perhaps certain is that corruption, economic mismanagement and human rights abuses would have continued if the president and his faction had assumed power in the recent struggle between Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and President Truong Tan Sang.

In a country where power comes not from the people but the ruling (and only) party, merely replacing the individual at the top will do little, if nothing. What is required for real reform is a serious and concerted effort by the people and from those within the government to change the system. Of course, this is easier said than done, and the obstacles are many.


A Revolt of the Ruling Elite

The intraparty dispute between the Vietnamese prime minister and president was driven in part by Prime Minister Dung’s handling of the economy. While some blame can be assigned to the global recession, the corruption and mismanagement surrounding the prime minister could not be overlooked. The scandals at Asia Commercial Bank, Vinashin, Vinalines, in addition to a poorly performing economy had made Prime Minister Dung toxic.

Although President Sang and his supporters had a case for removing the prime minister, one should not mistake their desire to do so for the good of Vietnam. The struggle between the two factions was not one of protecting the people, but a struggle to protect and preserve their place in the party. This was not a revolt of the masses but of the ruling elite, And although Prime Minister Dung has retained his job, the “revolutionaries” are still in power, perhaps waiting, biding their time until the next opportune moment.

But another revolt by party members will achieve little. True, there exist the old communist hardliners, who view the liberalization of Vietnam’s economy as a betrayal of Ho Chi Minh’s principles. There are also those party members who have prospered in the new, open market Vietnam (oftentimes through patronage and perhaps even shady business dealings), and who are just as likely to invoke the spirit of Ho Chi Minh to defend the status quo.

Communism has failed in Vietnam, but the new, more economically liberalized country has also begun to show signs of stress. Vietnam, by its very political nature, has made it possible for the government to hide its failures and shield its party members from charges of corruption—that is until the situation becomes untenable, as was the case with Prime Minister Dung.

The Vietnamese people are not unaware of their government’s deficiencies, but for a long stretch of time it was easy for them to look the other way. Vietnam was once a booming economy with great promise in Southeast Asia. The people could see and experience the positive changes that had come about, and the government could take credit for the success. For a time, it was easy for the people to say, “Well, at least today is better than yesterday.”

Today, this sense of optimism has diminished.



The Party is the System

The public apology by Party Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong over the failures of the Communist Party in serving the people was in part a response to actual failures but also in part to shield and distance the party from Prime Minister Dung. As if the party secretary’s apology was surprising enough, even the prime minister was forced to issue an apology of his own in front of the National Assembly, pledging to reform state-owned corporations.

And here lies the greatest obstacle towards reform. It is not about purging the Communist Party of corrupt officials. The individuals themselves are not the problem but a side effect. The problem is not superficial but deeply rooted and structural in nature. Corruption, economic mismanagement, and human rights violations are merely symptoms of the problem: the political system.

Presently, the Vietnamese political system is the Communist Party. An independent oversight committee on governmental affairs does not exist. Had Prime Minister Dung been ousted and President Sang or someone else had taken his place, change would have only occurred at the leadership level. Of course, there might have been some movement in the rank and file, but none of these changes would have had any lasting effect on the average Vietnamese citizen.

Appointments and elections are held within the Communist Party. Investigations into corruption are initiated by the Communist Party. All of this is to repeat the obvious: the Communist Party is not simply the sole, ruling party but the government. It is the system. None of this is particularly revealing, but it is worth mentioning.




A Need for Structural Reform

The obvious and only solution for Vietnam is to reform and democratize. Of course, the nature of the Vietnamese government means change on this level must be initiated from within. Or, in a worst case scenario, the government somehow falls apart and a new one takes its place. Either way, the path to democracy will not prove to be easy.

Whatever the journey, the goal for the Vietnamese people is to reform the political infrastructure. The government and the institutions of government should be geared towards carrying Vietnam into the future. An obvious change is an increase in transparency. The present system merely provides the opportunity to propose band-aid solutions. Much like the party secretary’s apology, blame will be cast, action will be taken, and it will be business as usual.

Power must ultimately be transferred away from those who create laws and into the hands of the people. Reform is not simply replacing the party leaders. It is not simply replacing members of the Politburo. Reform is not lip service paid to constitutional changes.

Reform in the case of Vietnam is the complete and thorough renovation of its political system. It is the democratization of Vietnam, because anything less than that will simply be incomplete and ineffective. Anything less than the distribution of power and improvement in government transparency is to invite the same old thing.

When the communist policies of old failed, the Vietnamese government changed: it modified its economic policies. The result of these changes was an increase in living standard and invitation for foreign investment. But now there is a new problem, and that problem is not its economic policies but the political system. If the Vietnamese government serves the people, as it purports to do so, then it must accept the need for real change.

While none of this can occur without support from within the existing government, none of this will occur without pressure from the public.

Change is not easy. Change in an authoritarian government, in particular, is not bloodless. As we have witnessed throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa, beginning in Tunisia and now being fought in Syria, change is often violent. But the Middle East and Northern Africa is not Vietnam. However, it is guaranteed that reform will be hard fought.

This is not to say that the Vietnamese people should take to the streets and risk their safety and future, but at some point the people must ask themselves, “Is this the country I deserve?”

(Khanh Vu Duc is a Canadian lawyer who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel)


Saturday, October 13, 2012

Vietnam requests China to respect its sovereignty | Vietnam News

Vietnam requests China to respect its sovereignty | Vietnam News
October, 12 2012

HA NOI (VNS)— Viet Nam has demanded that China respect its sovereignty and refrain from wrongful actions so as to make practical contributions to developing the friendship and co-operation between the two countries as well as maintaining peace and stability in the East Sea. 

Answering reporters' questions at the Foreign Ministry's regular press conference in Ha Noi on October 11 on Viet Nam's response to the Chinese side's recent acts, spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi said that they had violated Viet Nam's sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagos. 

Following a series of illegal activities, including building and developing the so-called "Sansha city", China held a flag raising ceremony to mark its National Day on Phu Lam island in the Hoang Sa archipelago on October 1.

Two days later the Chinese navy's Nanhai Fleet held an exercise in the waters of the Hoang Sa archipelago and the week after China opened a meteorological station in the new city. 

Earlier, on September 23, the Chinese press reported that China would deploy unmanned aircraft to strengthen the surveillance of the waters, including the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos. 

The Chinese actions seriously violated Viet Nam's sovereignty according to international law and the agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues between Viet Nam and China signed in October 2011, Nghi stressed. 

They also ran counter to the spirit of the Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the East Sea (DOC) signed between ASEAN and China in 2002, thus further complicating the East Sea situation, he added. 


Agreement

Also at the press conference, Nghi responded to a question about the co-operation agreement between Sudan and South Sudan signed on September 27, saying that Viet Nam welcomed the agreement and believed that the document would contribute to boosting the two countries' relations for the common interests of each country's people and for peace and stability in the region. 

Viet Nam hoped that the two sides would continue negotiations to seek ways to solve all issues on the spirit of mutual understanding, he added. — VNS

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Stricter Web Regulation in Southeast Asia | Prachatai English

Stricter Web Regulation in Southeast Asia | Prachatai English
Mong Palatino, Global Voices Onlin, October 2, 2012

While Southeast Asian governments are enhancing the delivery of online services for the benefit of their citizens, they are also instituting tougher internet regulations which many analysts believe could be used to curtail media freedom.

This post is a summary of recent Global Voices articles which discussed several controversial internet regulation policies in the region.

In Cambodia, the government is enforcing a circular drafted earlier this year which requires internet cafes to set up surveillance cameras and to register callers. It’s supposedly a crime prevention measure but critics have argued that it violates privacy rights.

In Singapore, the proposed Code of Conduct for bloggers which didn’t get a favorable response from the local internet community was finally discarded by the government in favor of a Media Literacy Council. Established last August 1, the council is tasked to promote public education on media literacy and cyber wellness. But critics have questioned the lack of transparency in appointing the members of the council which is seen by some as another internet censorship tool.

Andrew Loh reminds the Singaporean government that netizens or bloggers should not be viewed as troublemakers:

"The problem is not with the Internet, or its practitioners. The problem is not with bloggers or, as the Government like to call them, “netizens”. It is not a problem with those who are actually active online, as opposed to those who sit in their comfortable offices tucked somewhere in some unknown places dictating what and how the online landscape should look like.

Nah, the problem is with a Government which still wields much control, and which has little patience for messiness, for diversity, for spontaneity and indeed for robust debates and disagreements."

Recently, the Philippines enacted the Anti-Cybercrime Law which aims to prevent the cyberspace from degenerating into a ‘lawless realm.’ But the law was described as a threat to media freedom by journalists who protested the last-minute inclusion of libel in the law.

Lawyer JGBernasSJ Blogs mentions the ‘frightening’ provisions of the law:

"Libel has been decriminalized in other civilized jurisdictions. Our legislature, instead, will throw us back to the dark ages by imposing a higher penalty for libel. In effect, advance in communication technology is being treated not as a boon but as bane."

Like the Philippines, Malaysia has introduced amendments in the law which could curtail internet freedom. Under section 114A of the revised Evidence Act of 1950, law enforcement authorities are able to identify the persons who should be made accountable for uploading or publishing content in the internet. Media freedom advocates have warned that the amendment could force online writers to resort to self-censorship and web moderators could disallow critical comments in order to avoid prosecution and harassment suits.
The Lee & Chong Team explains how the amendment can affect ordinary internet users:

"This amendment will create troubles for the public. Everybody is using the Internet daily and with this new amendment, the public has to change the password for the network service and also social network site frequently to avoid being misuse by other people. Besides that, the café or restaurant that used to provide free wifi service may no longer provide the free wifi service to their customer. This will indirectly affect the business of the restaurant or café"

The Philippines and Malaysia may have been inspired by Thailand’s experience which has gained notoriety for using restrictive laws to punish government critics. Article 112 of Thailand’s criminal code is often described as the world’s harshest Lese Majeste (anti-royal insult) law. The controversial law is often invoked to censor web content and shut down websites. Global Voices conducted an interview with a former member of the police committee that handles Lese Majeste cases.

Elsewhere, Vietnam has recently convicted three bloggers accused of spreading anti-government propaganda. Earlier, the Prime Minister has openly criticized some opposition-leaning blogs whom he accused of fomenting disunity in the country.

Governments in the region have justified the imposition of harsh web policies ostensibly to protect the rights of ordinary internet users and uphold public morality. The new policies were met with public opposition but so far the governments have remained firm in implementing the new internet laws.

###

This article by Mong Palatino was originally published by Global Voices Online, a website that translates and reports on blogs from around the world.

Friday, September 7, 2012

The US and the Future: Middle East to Asia | Asia Sentinel


Saturday, August 4, 2012

Viet Nam: Pro-democracy bloggers face harsh penalties in upcoming trial | fidh.org

Viet Nam: Pro-democracy bloggers face harsh penalties in upcoming trial | fidh.org
fidh.org, 31 July 2012

Bangkok-Paris-Geneva, August 1, 2012. The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, a joint FIDH and OMCT programme, together with the Vietnam Committee on Human Rights (VCHR), call on the Vietnamese authorities to drop all charges against three pro-democracy bloggers and release them immediately and unconditionally. Mr. Nguyen Van Hai (aka Dieu Cay), Mr. Phan Thanh Hai and Ms. Ta Phong Tan are scheduled to be tried by the Ho Chi Minh People’s Court on August 7, 2012 at 8am.
 
Viet Nam: Pro-democracy bloggers face harsh penalties in upcoming trial
Ta Phong Tan, Dieu Cay, Phan Thanh Hai – Courtesy Dânlànbáo
 
Putting these bloggers on trial during summer holidays behind closed doors reveals the government’s fear of media and international scrutiny. On July 31, 2012, the Observatory and VCHR wrote to the European Union delegation to Viet Nam and to 31 embassies of African, Asian, European, and Latin American states [1], urging them to call on Viet Nam to drop the charges against the bloggers and to send high-level observers to access the courtroom in order to attend the trial on August 7.

The three outspoken bloggers have been charged under Article 88.2 of the Criminal Code for “conducting propaganda against the state” for their online writings and criticisms of the government. They face a maximum of 20 years in prison if convicted. Article 88 is among several repressive provisions in Vietnamese law that are routinely used to criminalise free speech and imprison peaceful dissidents.

During his detention, Mr. Dieu Cay has reportedly faced intense pressure from the authorities to plead guilty to the charges laid against him, which he has consistently refused. His lawyers also stated that Mr. Dieu Cay went on hunger strike in prison in March 2012 to protest his detention, and had to be hospitalised. He was previously convicted on trumped-up charges of ‘tax evasion’ after a manifestly unfair and closed trial in 2009 and the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared his detention to be arbitrary and in violation of international law [2]. His current prolonged detention began on October 19, 2010, the same day he completed the prison terms he received in 2009. Mr. Phan Thanh Hai and Ms. Ta Phong Tan have also been in pre-trial detention in Ho Chi Minh City since their arrest, respectively on October 18, 2010 and on September 5, 2011.

In his online writings, Mr. Dieu Cay, one of the founders of the Club of Free Journalists, calls for greater respect for human rights and democratic reforms. He is also known for his criticisms of China’s claims over disputed islands in the South China Sea. In January 2008, Mr. Dieu Cay and other activists staged an anti-China demonstration in Ho Chi Minh City.. Before their arrests, Mr. Hai has published a number of articles on his blog, including one that criticised and called for the repeal of Article 88 of the Criminal Code, while Ms. Tan has blogged about police abuse and violations of human rights by the State.

“Vietnam plans to run for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council, but it no longer even makes an effort to put up a façade of compliance with international human rights law, as it regularly parades human rights defenders before kangaroo courts and makes a crime out of free speech”, said Mr. Vo Van Ai, President of VCHR.

In addition, on July 30, 2012, Ms. Ta Phong Tan’s mother (Mrs. Dang Thi Kim Lieng) immolated herself outside the People’s Committee headquarters in Bac Lieu to protest her daughter’s unfair imprisonment. She had suffered repeated Police harassments and interrogations since her daughters’ arrest. She died later the same day.

Since 2009, Vietnamese human rights and pro-democracy bloggers have been harassed, intimidated, arrested and jailed for their online writings and activism. Those imprisoned for their Internet activities include Mr. Tran Huynh Duy Thuc, Mr. Nguyen Tien Trung, Mr. Le Thang Long, and Mr. Tran Kim Anh [3]. On July 13, Government agents attacked bloggers Nguyen Hoang Vi, Bui Thi Minh Hang and Lee Nguyen while they were driving back after a birthday party in Ho Chi Minh City. Mrs. Duong Thi Tan, Mr. Dieu Cay’s wife, was also in the car when the attack occurred.

Bloggers and other netizens who participated in or tried to attend anti-China demonstrations in several cities in early July also faced intimidation. On July 1, a group of knife-wielding men, allegedly led by the son of a local official, entered the house of outspoken blogger Nguyen Huu Vinh in Hanoi and attacked him, after he came home from the demonstrations. Bloggers Ms. Nguyen Hoang Vi and Ms. Huynh Thuc Vy were among several people briefly taken into police custody and interrogated during or after the anti-China demonstrations in Ho Chi Minh City. Following an appeal to support the July 1 demonstrations launched by Venerable Thich Quang Do, leader of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), Police forcibly impeded Thich Quang Do and at least sixteen UBCV monks from joining demonstrations in Ho Chi Minh City and Hue. Several monks were assaulted by Police.

Blogger Nguyen Xuan Dien, whose online writings focus on abuses of land rights, has recently been questioned by the authorities over his Internet activities. It also appears that his blog had been attacked by hackers. As of writing, articles no longer appear on Mr. Dien’s blog [4].

The escalation of crackdown on online dissent comes amidst a government effort to adopt a new Decree on Management, Provision, and Use of Internet Services and Information on the Network that, if passed in its current form, would grant the authorities expansive discretionary power to censor, control and possibly criminalise Internet use in Viet Nam. In June 2012, the UN Human Rights Council adopted by consensus a resolution affirming the right to freedom of expression must be protected online, and that States are called on to “promote and facilitate access to the Internet”.

“Such prosecution of ‘speech crimes’ will only worsen if the new draft Internet decree is adopted, and the international community must urge Viet Nam to break away from its already atrocious record in respecting freedom of expression”, warned Debbie Stothard, Deputy Secretary-General of FIDH.

“Judicial proceedings behind closed doors not only violate Viet Nam’s obligations under international law, they also clearly indicate that the judicial authorities have no intention to try the defenders according to international fair trial standards. But the bloggers’ pleas for justice will be heard even behind those doors”, said Gerald Staberock, Secretary-General of the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT).

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Vietnam deputy PM voices commitment to develop nuclear power | Viet Nam News / Asia News Network

Vietnam deputy PM voices commitment to develop nuclear power |  Viet Nam News / Asia News Network
Viet Nam News, June 27, 2012

Vietnam Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai emphasised yesterday that the country would be consistent in its policy of developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

The Prime Minister made the statement at a reception for Denis Flory, deputy general director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who was heading a delegation of overseas experts from the Nuclear Regulatory Co-operation Forum (NRCF) to attend an international seminar in Hanoi.

He said that the country would keep obeying the international convention on nuclear safety and expressed his hope that the IAEA would assist in implementing this.

Flory said the seminar, which drew participation from experts from countries such as Russia, the United States, Japan, France, South Korea and India, aimed to work out solutions on improving the capacity of Vietnam's nuclear regulatory agency to manage and develop the country's nuclear power plants.

At the meeting, the two sides also discussed issues related to safe infrastructure systems for nuclear power programmes.




Thursday, December 8, 2011

Transparency sought in Xayaburi decision

Transparency sought in Xayaburi decision

Kristin Lync, Thursday, 08 December 2011

A day before the Mekong River Commission is scheduled to deliver its long-awaited decision on the future of Laos’ controversial Xayaburi dam project, government officials, NGOs and scholars meeting in Phnom Penh called for transparency and collaboration in the decision-making process.

“We must ensure that decisions about water, food and energy are not taken in isolation from each other and that trans-boundary implications are carefully considered,” Australian ambassador to Cambodia Penny Richards said as she opened the first Mekong Forum on Water, Food and Energy.

The gathering brought together a diverse group of more than 120 for a three-day forum to discuss sustainable development along the river, but while the event was held in the capital, much of the focus was some 250 kilometres away.

“Today in Siem Reap, the council members of the MRC are assembling, and the world is watching to see what they have to say about Lower Mekong mainstream dams,” she said, adding that dams were “altering” water flows.

“Natural river flows are being altered by new infrastructure, such as the Upper Mekong hydropower dams in China, and other new dams on major rivers and tributaries,” she said.

Nao Thouk, director general of the Fisheries Administration, echoed the Australian Ambassador’s worries about dam development, saying that “the ways in which dams might affect water productivity, fish habitats, fish migrations and fish production” are “concerning”.

Today the MRC, comprised of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, is expected to issue its decision on the proposed 1,260-megawatt dam in Laos’ Xayaburi province. Many environmental groups have said the plan could have devastating effects on the region.

Transparency sought in Xayaburi decision