Malaysia’s political polarisation | New Mandala

Malaysia’s political polarisation | New Mandala
James Giggacher, 11 APRIL 2016

Political conflict in Malaysia, already high in 2015, has escalated in 2016.

And New Mandala readers in Canberra can get their head around the increasingly complex issue and deepening crisis with a public seminar taking place at the Australian National University this Thursday.

The panel features long-time Malaysia observers James Chin, John Funston, Miles Kupa and Ross Tapsell. Each will cover the ongoing political crisis from different perspectives including leaders and parties, the media, upcoming state elections, and Australia’s interests. They will also examine what the current state of play means for Malaysia’s political future.

Taking place from 5.30-7.30pm at the Hedley Bull Centre, the panel promises to be illuminating and lively.  So make sure you get along if you can.

Here’s more detail from the panel’s publicity (also available online here):

In January the Attorney-General declared Prime Minister Najib Razak had no case to answer over a sum of nearly $700 million in his private bank account. It was not from the controversial government investment agency 1MDB, but a donation from a Saudi prince without consideration, and some $620 million had been returned because it was not needed. Najib welcomed the finding, saying the controversy was an unnecessary distraction and had now been comprehensively put to rest. It was time to unite and move on.

That hope has not been realised. Soon after the Attorney-General’s announcement the Wall Street Journal reiterated that the funds came from companies linked to 1MDB, and in fact totalled over $1 billion. The Swiss Attorney-General said his investigations had revealed a sum of around $4 billion misappropriated by Malaysian companies involved with 1MDB.

Opposition to 1MDB-linked issues has intensified in Malaysia, led by 90-year old former Prime Minister Mahathir. The sacking of Mahathir’s son from the post of Kedah Mentri Besar on 3 February, and ruling party UMNO’s suspension of former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin as deputy party leader on 26 February, has heightened tensions. (In July 2015 Muhyiddin was controversially sacked as Deputy Prime Minister.)

Mahathir resigned from UMNO on 29 February, then joined forces with erstwhile opponents from opposition political parties, UMNO dissidents, and civil society activists. They issued a Citizen’s Declaration calling for Najib’s resignation and institutional change, and launched a Save Malaysia campaign. For its part, the government has sought to contain dissent by tightening controls on the Internet, including blocking the popular The Malaysian Insider which closed some three weeks later, mooting an increase in penalties for leaking government secrets (from maximum seven years, to life plus ten strokes of the rotan), and stepping up investigations under the Sedition Act.

Do these events threaten UMNO’s long dominance of Malaysian politics? To what extent are proposed changes to the Malaysian Commission of Multimedia and Communications Act and Official Secrets Act a setback for democracy? How will these developments impact on a state election in Sarawak, due in a few months? And what is their relevance to Malaysia’s foreign policy and relations with Australia?

About the Discussants

John Funston is a visiting fellow with the Department of Political and Social Change, ANU. He has published several works on UMNO, and will focus on whether the Mahathir-led united front threatens UMNO’s rule.

Ross Tapsell is a lecturer in the Asian Studies School of Culture, History and Language, ANU. He is a specialist on media issues in Southeast Asia, and will examine how far existing and proposed media restrictions limit freedom of expression in Malaysia.

James Chin is Director of the Asia Institute, University of Tasmania. He has written extensively on Malaysian politics, and has a particular interest in Sarawak state.

Miles Kupa is a visiting fellow with the Department of Political Change in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, ANU. He was formerly a senior diplomat in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and was High Commissioner to Malaysia in his last posting.

Najib and Malaysia’s road to redemption? | New Mandala

Najib and Malaysia’s road to redemption? | New Mandala
Dr Amrita Malhi, 19 FEBRUARY 2016

As leading party UMNO and its embattled PM desperately cling to power, there could be even darker times ahead for Malaysia’s democracy. 

The actions of Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak have been met with widespread disbelief from domestic and international observers.

For many, there seems to be no end to the series of scandals directly or indirectly linked to Najib and his associates, beginning with a financial investigation abruptly brought to an end by a newly-appointed Attorney-General, Mohamed Apandi Ali.

The investigation, concerning the alleged misappropriation of nearly US$4 billion through entities linked to a state investment vehicle, now continues in international jurisdictions, not in Malaysia. Najib is also being investigated in France in relation to an older scandal involving the payment of illegal commissions to a close associate, linked to Malaysia’s purchase of French submarines in 2002.

Public discussion of Najib’s credibility will likely continue, even though the Attorney General is considering amending the Official Secrets Act to impose severe punishments on those who leak to the media, along with reporters and editors who act on those leaks.

To date, media coverage of leaked documents has been a major source of information about the scale and severity of the allegations against Najib. If these amendments are enacted, this tightening up of information flows would come on top of travel restrictions preventing individuals from lodging crime reports against Najib in Europe and elsewhere in Asia. Nevertheless, it appears that international investor confidence in Malaysia is declining, regardless of any potential future restrictions.

Despite this decline, governments, including Australia’s, remain reluctant to criticise Najib, and public questioning about his administration has largely been confined toAustralian media outlets. This reluctance likely stems from Malaysia’s importance as a trade and regional security partner for Australia, and from the belief that Najib, who has been taking steps to shore up his political future, will lead the nation for some time to come.

At the same time, however, any observer with an interest in Malaysia would be advised to keep a close eye on the measures Najib is adopting. These measures are designed to protect his position, but they might also make for uncertain times in future.

Australia’s investment in Malaysia
Australia and Malaysia need each other, and each nation is on the other’s list of top 10 trading partners. Malaysians consume Australian food, raw materials, manufactured goods and education exports, sending ever large numbers of students who require more goods and services in our cities when they arrive. Malaysia is also a party to the Five Power Defence Arrangements and an important partner in counter-terrorism and migration surveillance.

For Malaysia, Australia is an essential source of education and training for its most productive economic sectors, and an important destination for thousands of migrants who leave Malaysia every year. In this sense, Malaysia’s strong relationship with Australia is also a useful pressure valve, as Australia now hosts debates about Malaysia’s future that engage its diaspora of students and professionals, effectively letting off domestic political steam.

Australia permits these debates without openly interfering, including rallies like Bersih last year, at which 5,000 people gathered in Melbourne to call for cleaner elections and transparent government. Malaysia tacitly permits them as well, usually allowing government critics to travel freely to speak to Malaysians and international lobby groups, albeit accompanied by expressions of disapproval aimed at domestic audiences.

Australia has also moved in subtle ways to signal its understanding that Malaysian society is politically divided, and even official functions and programs have begun to accommodate non-government actors. In August 2015, for example, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop attended a function for women leaders that included Ambiga Sreenevasan, a prominent lawyer and Bersih leader. There have also beenexchange schemes involving staffers from opposition parties.

This form of quiet diplomacy creates options for Australia without causing a backlash, unlike the open intervention which triggered the deportation of South Australian Senator Nick Xenophon in 2013.

Australian engagement with non-government actors is unlikely to become more vocal or obvious, despite Najib’s approval rating having fallen to 23 per cent, as reported by the Singapore media based on Merdeka Centre polling from August last year. This is unsurprising, as there is no alternative government for Australia to establish more open links with, or, at present, for Malaysians to elect.

Based on current realities, this situation is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, although two years remain between now and the next election, and the contest for Malaysia’s future remains competitive and fluid.

Domestic political moves
The move to close down the corruption investigation has been one in a sequence of many, initiated by Najib and his supporters, to realign Malaysian politics in their favour between now and 2018. The aim is to reconstruct a strong Malay Muslim electoral bloc, led by Najib and his UMNO party, whose majority position cannot be challenged by a weak and divided opposition.

This is a tried and tested UMNO strategy, and if it is successful, the opposition will have been limited to a ‘Chinese’ group of naysayers stoked by a few ‘liberal’ Malay Muslim supporters. A successful realignment along these lines is intended to prevent a 2018 election victory from attracting the same criticisms as the contested 2013 result. It should appear more like a triumph for Malay Muslim unity and rural grassroots politics, and less like a product of the Malaysian electoral system.

This is why UMNO’s moves since 2013 have also included splitting up the opposition coalition, beginning with jailing Anwar Ibrahim a year ago for the crime of sodomy, based on charges that are widely believed to be politically-motivated. Additional moves have included hosting discussions on hudud laws that seemed to convince Islamist party PAS to leave Anwar’s rebranded coalition, now in a much weaker position than in 2013.

Now espousing an independent position after UMNO eventually declined to supporthudud, PAS has begun to extract important concessions from UMNO regardless, including a sharia index which is likely to trigger a new round of Islamisation in Malaysian politics. Such rounds are usually accompanied by debates about the position of liberal Muslims and Malaysia’s non-Muslim minorities, leading to fears that Malaysians’ famous tolerance might be stretched beyond its limits. Indeed, observers question whether Malaysia’s commitment to countering radicalisation is in reality undermined by its government’s willingness to Islamise public life.

Since 2013, government spokespeople have admitted to funding NGOs espousing precisely this aim, including ISMA and Perkasa, both of which advance majoritarian arguments that infuse Malaysian debates.

Other moves have included portraying last year’s Bersih rally as just another Chinese protest, a portrayal enabled by a government decision to declare the rally illegal,thereby preventing (mostly Malay Muslim) civil servants from attending. The ‘Chinese’ effect was also supported by the noticeable absence of PAS activists, after PASdeclined to mobilise to support the rally.

Najib has also moved to suppress rebellions inside UMNO, beginning by sacking the last Attorney-General, Abdul Gani Patail, who had been leading the investigation against him. He also sacked his high-profile former deputy Muhyiddin Yassin, who had openly cast doubt on UMNO’s future electoral chances. Since then, Najib has ‘oppositionalised’ figures linked to former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, an open Najib critic who even attended the Bersih rally in Kuala Lumpur.

In this vein, state parliamentarians apparently aligned with Najib recently managed to oust the former prime minister’s son, Mukhriz Mahathir, from his Chief Minister position in the Kedah state legislature. Mahathir has responded by declaring himselfpatron of a group of anti-Najib UMNO branch chiefs, drawing immediate criticism that they are ‘shit-stirrers’ whose agitation is likely to fail.

Not surprisingly, public mistrust has not abated through this sequence of extraordinary political moves. Set against a backdrop of financial scandal, they seem to only compound Malaysians’ misgivings over the state of the economy.

These fears are also being stoked by revelations of financial difficulties at Tabung Haji, a taxpayer-guaranteed entity through which aspiring Muslim pilgrims save for travel to Mecca for the Haj. The August 2015 poll by the Merdeka Centre found 78 per cent of Malaysians disapproved of Najib’s economic management, and that result is unlikely to have improved much in the months since.

No guarantees for anyone
UMNO continues to invest heavily in Najib, and its strategy of working to rally a Malay Muslim majority. Yet there remain serious questions around whether this strategy will work to deliver an election result that UMNO can defend at home and abroad.

If UMNO’s project of restructuring the Malaysian political contest fails to achieve its desired effect, the party’s popular vote could potentially fall again, shredding the legitimacy of a 2018 victory and raising more questions about Malaysia’s direction. The resulting damage to Malaysia’s image as a parliamentary democracy would inevitably affect Australia’s relations with a neighbour it relies on for Southeast Asian security and social cohesion.

Dr Amrita Malhi is a researcher and writer on histories and politics in Southeast Asia, especially Malaysia and its interAsian contexts. She is Secretary of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, and holds an affiliation with the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. Her website is www.amritamalhi.com. 

Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala

Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala
Bridget Welsh,  5 JANUARY 2016

2015 was the year authoritarian governments struck back against democratic pressures.

The story of 2015 in Southeast Asia was Myanmar’s November election. In giving the National League for Democracy and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi a landslide, Myanmar citizens signaled their strong support for democratic change and better governance.

These calls have been loud in recent years — in Malaysia’s 2008 and 2013 elections, in Thailand’s repeated electoral victories for a non-military aligned government, in Cambodia’s 2013 and Singapore’s 2011 polls as well as strong electoral support for democracy in the Philippines and Indonesia. Democratic pressures on Southeast Asian governments have been increasing, and are not likely to recede in the near future.

2015 was the year authoritarian governments in the region struck back. Behind the Myanmar headlines there is a worrying trend of a significant democratic contraction taking place. The use of the authoritarian arsenal by Southeast Asian governments are not new, but in the course of the year regional governments expanded their use of incumbency and control of institutions to shore up their positions.

The most obvious trend has been the increased use of repression, especially targeted toward opposition politicians and critics. In Malaysia, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was jailed in February. In Thailand, a trial began against ousted PM Yingluck Shinawarta as she was denied the right to travel. In Cambodia, opposition politicians were physically attacked. The leader of the opposition Sam Rainsy has delayed his return to Cambodia from November as a result of jail threat. Malaysia has the highest number of opposition politicians facing various charges from sedition to violations of banking finance regulations.

The threats opposition members across the region face in calling for change extend from being physically attacked on the campaign trial (as occurred for Myanmar’s Naing Ngan Lin NLD candidate who was slashed by a machete) to potential bankruptcy.

The use of the law for political ends moves beyond opposition members. Journalists and bloggers remain targeted. Radio reporter Jose Bernardo was shot dead at a restaurant in Manila in November. He joins the other 77 journalists who have been killed in the Philippines since 1992, making this country one of the most dangerous places for media professionals in the world.

Myanmar tops the region’s list with the most number of journalists jailed, pipping Vietnam this year who released some of its bloggers. Notably, blogger Ta Phong Tan was released after 10 years in jail. The situation for bloggers in Vietnam remains serious, with a number of incidents where bloggers and associates were beaten up in mysterious circumstances rather than jailed. In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong won his defamation case against a blogger critic Roy Ngerng, who was asked to pay PM Lee S $150,000. Lee joins Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak as the second current leader in the region who filed charges for public criticism.

The crackdowns on freedom of expression extend to ordinary citizens, from artists and academics to taxi drivers.

Young Chaw Sandi Tun was sentenced to six months jail for insulting Myanmar’s army in her Facebook post noting the similarity in color between the Tatmadaw’s uniform and the opposition leader’s clothing. In Thailand, the cases involving lese majeste have extended the boundaries to include insults to the king’s dog. Thanakorn faces up to 15 years in jail for this reference, and joins a long list of cases that have involved jailing of university students for a play, taxi cab conversations, novelists and more.

A mother of two was sentenced to 28 years for her Facebook comments, while a hotel employee received 56 years for his posts in August as part of the lese majeste unending prosecutions. Cartoonist Zunar in Malaysia faces up to 43 years for his satirical art work. These developments have had chilling effects on public discourse. Even in more open Indonesia, discussion of the 1965 attacks on communists were shut down.

As power has been used to quiet alternative voices, the rule of law itself has faced erosion. In some cases the law is not being implemented. In July, the co-Investigating International judge Mark Harmon of the Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia resigned his position after the tribunal declined to arrest two former Khmer Rouge leaders for whom the court had issued warrants.

Despite having the technology to find the daughter separated from her mother Indira Gandhi for seven years by a husband who is abusing religion in a personal vendetta against his ex-wife, the Malaysian police have proven to be unwilling to use its tools to follow the court order to return the daughter to the mother.

In other cases, constitutional frameworks protecting rights have been by-passed through the introduction of military courts – as has been the case in Thailand and called for in Malaysia – and new measures that empower leaders to declare ‘security areas’ without checks on their authority, as occurred with the hurried passage of the National Security Council law in Malaysia. This law is being seen as a measure that will allow unpopular Prime Minister Najib to stay in office if he loses an election. In Myanmar, there are potential laws being considered that may give military impunity for alleged past crimes.

The area where the laws are under real scrutiny continues to be corruption. 2015 showcased some shocking scandals.

In Malaysia the 1MDB $700 million ‘donation’ into Najib’s personal accounts remains inadequately explained, as the rule of law has not been properly applied to the premier and impunity appears to have allowed the premier to hold onto office even with his personal reputation in shatters. Efforts to undermine Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the recent demands for payments from Freeport to politicians to conduct business have showcased that persistent problem of bribery, lack of transparency and abuse of position.

From corruption concerns tied to the Aquino administration in the Philippines to persistent effects of corruption trails associated with Vietnam’s elite, there lacks effective leadership in tackling the region’s most serious governance problem. The end effect is that leaders at the top are seen to engage in graft, reinforcing a system where office is used for personal wealth rather than public service.

Control over resources and alliances with cronies remains a dominant feature of Southeast Asia’s political economy. Four countries in the region – Malaysia (3), Singapore (5), Philippines (6), Indonesia (10) – were in The Economist’s crony capitalist list, which measures the favoritism of wealth toward tycoons and politically-affiliated business interests.

Measures to enhance this favoritism expanded in 2015 through the introduction of consumption taxes in Malaysia and Myanmar, regulations that facilitated more burning rather than less in the haze-affected region in Indonesia and service fees in areas such as tolls to crony-companies. The region’s most vulnerable populations are feeling the economic pain, with depreciating currencies and a slowdown in growth in the region as a whole. These conditions have contributed to conditions where the use of state resources through populist policies have boosted incumbent governments, a factor that contributed to the People’s Action Party’s September 2015 electoral victory.

Those on the margins are being particularly impacted, with serious implications for rights. Southeast Asia was not immune from the global refugee crisis affecting over 60 million people worldwide. Conditions affecting the livelihoods of the Rohingyas in Myanmar remain severe, with conditions in camps across the region not much better. The shocking findings of death camps in Thailand and Malaysia involving torture, rape and human and organ trafficking in May have yet to be properly accounted for.

One reason for this lack of accountability lies with the upgrade the Obama administration gave Malaysia on its human trafficking assessment in the wake of the discovery of the gruesome murders. The Obama administration’s sell out of human rights principles was especially acute in 2015, where interests associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership overrode other concerns.

From questions tied to the trial of Burmese migrant workers in killing British backpackers Thailand to the persistent practice of ‘sea slaves’ with citizens hauled onto fishing boats, those that are vulnerable remain so at the end of the year, which limited measures to point to strengthening protections.

Vulnerability in 2015 extended to religious and ethnic minorities as well. Bogor was labeled Indonesia’s most intolerant city when it declared a ban of the Shia faith in the city. Hate speech toward Muslims persists in Myanmar, in spite of the electoral victory signaling greater inclusiveness. Churches were burned in Aceh. Christmas celebrations were banned in Brunei. Rights of religious minorities were curbed in Malaysia in cases involving child custody and worship.

Measures to forge peace with minorities fell apart, as the Philippines’ Bansamoro Basic Law did not pass the legislatures. In other places such as Myanmar, Protection Race and Religion Bills denying rights to marriage and religious freedom were introduced, as protections for rights were in fact eroded.

There were nevertheless bright spots in greater freedom across the region – a gender rights bill in Thailand, the end of the persecution of a book seller and academic by religious authorities in Malaysia, the reinstatement of direct local elections in Indonesia and the subsequent peaceful elections in December, to name but a few.

Southeast Asians continue to fight for their freedoms valiantly, over cyberspace, in courtrooms and in communities. The climate however has not been conducive to greater freedoms as those in office continue to use their offices to hold on to power.

As we look ahead, with a slowing economy and persistent insecurities by incumbents, the prospects for expanding rights does not appear promising in 2016. Last year has shown us however that we can expect the unexpected, with the military’s acceptance of the Myanmar’s electoral results as an example.

As ASEAN formally announced its community on 31 December 2015, many hold only to potentially a different ‘imagined community,’ where the ideas of brilliant scholar Benedict Anderson of shared belonging, human dignity and decency live on.

Bridget Welsh is Professor of Political Science at Ipek University, Senior Research Associate at the Center for East Asian Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University, Senior Associate Fellow of The Habibie Center, and University Fellow of Charles Darwin University.

The Borneo Project releases new documentary on Sarawak's controversial mega-dams | Asian Correspondent

The Borneo Project releases new documentary on Sarawak's controversial mega-dams | Asian Correspondent
Rowena Dela Rosa Yoon May 08, 2015 

The Borneo Project has released a new documentary film, ‘Commerce or Corruption?’, exposing the controversies surrounding the proposed mega-dams in Sarawak, Malaysia.

The release this week coincides with the 555th day of the community-led Baram Dam blockades. Various local groups have been fighting to stop 12 mega-hydro projects being pushed by the Malaysian government through the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy or SCORE. The groups said the dams will destroy the rivers – the lifelines of the Borneo jungle. It is feared the Baram Dam alone will inundate 26 villages and displace between 6,000 and 20,000 people, if completed.

Local residents watch trucks intruding into their community for the construction of mega-dams. (Photo: Supplied)

Jettie Word, executive director of The Borneo Project, said the dams will displace people, wipe out their livelihoods, drive unknown species to extinction, and emit more greenhouse gas. The dams will “produce more greenhouse gas emissions per megawatt of energy than a coal-fired power plant,” Word said, adding: “The damage inflicted by these dams would be massive, and the benefits are still unclear. Given that there is no sound reason to build these dams, the question becomes, why are these dams being built, and why now? ”

‘Commerce or Corruption?’ is a second film in a series of short documentaries that tries to unveil the government’s hidden agenda. Word said it is all about personal financial gains, adding that private companies involved in construction and transmission stand to make gigantic profits from building the dams. Many of the companies are allegedly controlled by relatives and friends of the governor of the state, Abdul Taib Mahmud, who has been in power for four decades. Doling out the contracts would add even more gold to the already over-flowing coffers of politicians and their well-connected family members.

Murum Dam under construction (Photo:Supplied)

The mega-dams are also expected to create “an outrageous” energy demand growth rate. Word said Sarawak currently produces significantly more energy than it can use, and proponents have no concrete plans for how to use or sell the energy.

The ongoing Baram Dam blockades, community-led non-violent direct actions, involve men, women and children and have prevented loggers and the dam developer, Sarawak Energy Bhd (SEB), from accessing the construction area since October 2013.

The blockade is maintained by indigenous Kenyah, Kayan, and Penan people and demonstrates the tremendous local resistance to dam development and logging. Despite opposition to the dams, the government of Sarawak and SEB continue to overlook widespread grievances and push for unnecessary and harmful development. If completed, the Baram Dam will flood 26 villages and displace between 6,000 and 20,000 people.

‘Broken Promises’, the next film in the series, will be released in July. It will highlight the devastating impacts of forced relocation on indigenous communities.

The office of Taib is yet to respond to the film.

Commerce or Corruption? from The Borneo Project on Vimeo.

“Children of the revolution” to revolutionary grandchildren? | New Mandala

“Children of the revolution” to revolutionary grandchildren? | New Mandala

RUEDIGER KORFF, 

22 APRIL 2015

An old Chinese proverb says that wealth does not pass three generations. The first generation works hard to establish the family fortune the second, still has a knowledge of hard times, but has learned the skills will  maintain it, and the third, often made up by kids spoiled by the wealth they grew up in, will waste it. A study by Merill Lynch endorses this view. The study “found that, in two out of three cases, family wealth did not outlive the generation following the one that created it. In 90 per cent of cases, it was exhausted by the end of the third generation.” Besides kids being spoiled by their wealthy parents, the decline can as well be due to the larger number of persons to inherit the wealth and often conflicts between them. In Southeast Asia most of the large enterprises and tycoons are family based. Family relations do play a role in politics as well, and often political families are connected to tycoon families based on intermarriage. Thus, does this curse apply for Southeast Asian elites as well?

A generation is commonly estimated between 30 to 36 years. It depends on live expectancy, age of marriage and birth of children as well as when people reach their working life and retire. Instead of a chronological view of generations, Mannheim (1928) speaks of experiences shared by a generation. Generation is a loose assembly of persons in a similar age cohort. They share similar perspectives based on similar experiences. However, crucial is not only the experience as such, but its interpretation in common frames.

Generations in Southeast Asia

Taking the chronological approach as starting point, and using the present as initial period of the third generation, the first generation would cover the time form the 1940th to the 1970th, the second the period roughly from the 1970 to around 2000. Are there any important transformation of society, politics and the economy and cultural interpretations of these that might be interpreted as “generational experiences”?

The first generation or the formation of a post-colonial elite

Certainly the most important experience of this generation was the second world war, the struggle for independence and the creation of the new countries. In Thailand instead of the independence struggle, the end of the absolute monarchy can be taken. This period was characterized by far reaching transformations and shifts of elites. The colonial masters dominating the bureaucracy left which allowed for the rise of new groups entering into these positions. As the main framework of integration of the countries was changed, different groups started to compete to set up a new framework and to establish themselves as dominant. Typically in such a situation of loose integration of society (including politics and economy) charismatic authority becomes most relevant. In fact, when we look at Southeast Asia for this periode, we have charismatic leaders like Sukarno, Ho Chih Minh and Giap. Pridi Panomyong and Phibul Songkran, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Aung San, U Nu and Ne Win.

A crucial factor in the competition between multiple different groups and persons to gain dominance and form the newly rising elite, was the ability to organize and set up working networks. In this the military and state bureaucracy was favoured, as both implicitly require a high level of organisational integration. In the economic field to achieve such an organisational level was more difficult. A way out was to ally and develop closer relations to the bureaucratic/military leaders. A special case are communist parties, grown from the resistance against the Japanese occupation and the struggle for independence.  Not the least due to their military experiences these were well organized too.

In Indonesia during the Sukarno period we have a competition and fight between the communist party (PKI) and the military, which was ended with the victory of the military in 1965 by Soeharto. In Myanmar we have well organized separatist and communist movements that were pushed back when the military took over under Ne Win in 1962. In Malaysia we have a combination of the emergency, confrontasi, Singapore being part of Malaysia and leaving Malaysia, and quite strong leftist parties. There the state bureaucracy maintained its power and organisational strength, and the political dominance of the sultans remained undisputed. However, competition related to ethnicity gained in importance. Existing ethnic based organisations became relevant like the parties, networks etc. This culminated in the race riots of 1969 that lead to the end of the government of Tunku Abdul Rahman. In Thailand we have the competition between the civilian and military faction of the revolutionary group and the aristocracy. After the failed Bovoradej revolt, the junior military faction with Phibul Sonmgkran became strong. After the second world war, the military lost its power, while the civilian faction in combination with the aristocracy gained in strength. Finally, with the coup of 1957 and 1958 Sarit and the military established themselves as dominant power.

An interesting aspect of changes during this first generation is the shift from charismatic leaders to bureaucratic or in the case of Malaysia political leaders roughly during the sixtieth, starting with the substitution of Phibul by Sarit in 1958, the turmoil in Indonesia in 1965, the substitution of Ho Chi Minh and Giap by Le Duan and Le Duc Tho in 1965, the coup of Ne Win in 1962, the race riots in 1969 and the coup of Lon Nol against Sihanoug in 1970.

The period up to the sixtieth is characterized by competition, and instability due to a low level of social integration. In the competition between the different groups, individual success be it in terms of which faction within the military becomes dominant or what business gets stronger, personal relations combing economy (business) administration/military were crucial for success. After the sixtieth stabilization set in when the new post-colonial elite as a combination of Tycoon business, high ranking bureaucrats and military established itself.

This transformation is accompanied by an interesting ideological shift. The main ideology after independence (or the end of absolutist monarchy) was modernization, and modernization basically meant to become like the west, with proper nation states, industries, social welfare systems etc. Unfortunately, the policies of modernization did not fulfil the promises, but lead in Indonesia, Thailand and Burma to economic and political crisis. The end of the charismatic leaders required a new ideology of the post-colonial elites. This was the construction of a pre-colonial culture and traditions. A better future should be achieved by a re-vitalization of these traditions. Such a shift of ideology required intellectuals as interpretators of culture to define what the genuine culture was, before alienation from colonialism and western influences set in. In Thailand Kurkit Pramote can be cited as example. These intellectuals soon associated and became part of the new elite. In short, the ideology of modernization for a better future was substituted by forms of neo-feudal ideologies.

The second generation or the economic miracle (with a focus on Thailand and Malaysia)

The first generation depended on personal ties and links between business and bureaucracy/military. The bureaucracy provided licences and monopolies as basis for economic success, while business provided the resources necessary to finance clientelist networks within the bureaucracy. The main problem was that any change like f.e. through a coup meant that new relations had to be established. This arbitrariness was dysfunctional for business as well as for bureaucratic efficiency and lasting political stability. But, economic growth was necessary to satisfy increasing demands. Furthermore, the first generation was getting older and the world was changing. In addition, the ideologies were quite in contrast to political processes.

In Thailand the dominance of the military faction around Kirttikachorn (after the death of Sarit) lead to dissatisfaction by other military groups. The power of the military and its involvement in the economy was a problem for business, and the attempts of the middle classes for advancement were frustrated. These formed part of the background for the student protests (basically a middle class protest movement) in 1973. Malaysia followed an open economic policy to attract investment for further economic growth. Burma is a different case, with its policy of isolation. The new policies required new skills for business and administration.

The second generation, or the “children of the revolution” n the double sense that they were the children of those who had made the revolution, and they themselves pushed forward a form of radical change through protest etc. In difference to many of the first generation, the children had a good education. Especially the children of the elites studied abroad and became professionals. In general, after a period of instability, we have strong technocratic, professional developments. In Thailand the generational change was longer and accompanied by instability until the coup of Kriangsak 1977 and in particular the start of the governments of Prem Tinsulanond. In Malaysia since 1969 we have quite a few elections and changing prime ministers, until Mahathir. The governments of Mahathir (1981 – 2003) and Prem (1980 – 1988) were based on a technocratic, professional approach. The success of these policies became obvious especially in the ninetieth and the Southeast Asian economic miracle.

For the second generation the personal ties that were the base for success of the first generation were still of relevance, but the common technocratic, professional orientation among those now in business and the administration provided a far more sustainable form of articulation and integration as an elite. Again we have a shift of ideology. The pre-colonial traditions were maintained as “Asian values”, which were interpreted as the base for economic success and Asian modernization. Economic growth in turn allowed for social mobility and consumerism  as values for the middle classes. (the study of Kanokrat of the “Octobrists” dealing with a quite large segment of the “children of the revolution” is very interesting in this context)

In terms of generational experience and generational culture, for the second generation the “revolution” that is studying and protesting in the seventieth were crucial. These were part of academic studies to gain professional knowledge and technocratic competence.

The third generation or from the Asia-crisis to a system crisis

The elites survived the Asia-crisis surprisingly well. Although in Indonesia Soeharto had to resign, his children and the Tycoons could maintain their property. In Malaysia Anwar tried to use the crisis for a shift from Mahathir to him as real (not only as acting) prime minister. This however would have meant that his cronies gain. However, Mahathir won the struggle and Anwar went to jail. In Thailand Chavalit had to resign and Chuan Leekpai faced the task to handle the crisis in such a way that the elite could survive it with limited losses, and to keep the farmers etc. at bay. The ability of the second generation elite to survive the crisis is an indicator of their success and strength. However, parts of the ideology were now challenged, not the least because the future perspectives of the rising middle classes got frustrated. F.e. Asian values were hardly mentioned anymore. Instead, cultural traits (Thainess or Islam) became prominent.

There is an important difference between politics and the elite in Thailand and Malaysia. In Malaysia, politicians are representatives of the elite and thus elite decisions are formulated as decisions of politicians. In short, in Malaysia political decisions concerning the future of the country are made by politicians. In Thailand, in contrast, politicians hardly make political decisions. Throujgh the military, economic power, bureaucrats and courts, as well as intellectuals important political decisions are made by the elite. If any important political decision is planned by politicians in parliament, we hear about the military contemplating a coup, the courts making it clear that such a decision is against the law and the intellectuals noting that it is in contrast to Thai culture, and finally the administrations showing it unwillingness to implement it.

In Malaysia the conflict centred on who will be prime minister and what parties form the government. Although Mahathir could, based on his long experience,  manage to maintain the power of the elite, the elections indicated that their power is declining. The opposition, although quite a motley crue reaching from PAS to DAP, was able to attract surprising high numbers of voters. In terms of ideology the cultural campaigns, not mainly centred around Islam as indicator of Malayness were boosted, but the result is ambiguous, as many regard the governing parties (Barisan Nasional) not as genuine upholders of religion.

In Thailand the tensions are most strongly expressed. Chuan was facing strong opposition and demands from middle classes as well as peoples groups like the forum of the poor. Thaksin, as representative of the successful secondary elite of new business men, was regarded as a better choice to provide stability. Thaksin was successful. With his popular policies to help the poor and the farmers, not the least influenced by the second generation, he received their support. The middle classes were happy as he tried to solve problems like drugs etc. in a CEO-manner. As a result he was re-elected with a 60% majority in 2005. After this success, Thaksin tried to change the system in the sense that now political decisions should be made by politicians, which for him meant basically by himself. This was, of course, a problem for the elites. They faced though a problem: If they try to compete with Thaksin through elections with f.e. the Democrat Party, they implicitly endorse the political power of politicians, which is against their inherent interests. Thus, the only way out was a coup. This happened in 2006 and 2014. However, even though the current powers can hardly be challenged, it was accompanied by a big loss of legitimacy.

The current problem is that the countries are facing a generational change. The second generation of the elite, the modern technocrats who could manage quite well, even during the crisis, has to, sooner or later, hand over to their children. Do they have the necessary skills, and can they compete with rising new challengers?

Ruediger Korff works at the Department for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Passau

Islam, politics and violence in Malaysia | New Mandala

Islam, politics and violence in Malaysia | New Mandala

MOHD NAWAB MOHD OSMAN, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

9 JANUARY 2015

In Kuala Kedah, the Chinese community burned a Qur’an piece by piece during their religious ceremony

Dr Mashitah Ibrahim at the 2014 UMNO General Assembly meeting

The recent United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) meeting was full of contradictions. While Prime Minister Najib Razak exhorts the need for the government to be more inclusive of non-Muslims while others such as Dr Mashitah, a famous preacher and former junior minister, called for Islam to be protected from the threat of secularism, liberalism and Christianity. From the debate over the usage of the term Allah to describe God in the Malay translation of the bible to the discrimination of the minority Shiite community in the country, the Malaysian government has taken a conservative stance depicting a shift in its own Islamic orientation.  Recent revelations that about thirty Malaysians are fighting alongside the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq has further underscored the more conservative turn that is taking place within the Muslim community in Malaysia.

Playing with the fire of Islamism

Since the 1990s, the Malaysian government has attempted to use its own brand of Islamist politics to counter the political threat from the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). The Islamisation race between PAS and UMNO led to a series of Islamic policies to be introduced. This race subsided in the mid-2000s mainly due to the strategy of moderation undertaken by PAS. Following the 2008 elections which saw a strengthened Pakatan Rakyat (PR), UMNO has once again focused its rhetoric on the need for the position of Islam to be defended in the country. The debate over the usage of the word Allah in the Malay language bible was portrayed as UMNO’s defence of Islam from the threat of Christianisation in Malaysia. During the 2013 elections, the threat of Christianisation was used as a bogeyman to coax Malay voters to support UMNO.

More recently, UMNO in the state of Kelantan, has openly supported PAS’s plan to implement hudud laws in Kelantan. On its part, PAS today sees the hudud issue as an integral part of its struggle. Since the 2013 elections, many PAS leaders feel that the party’s move away from its Islamist agenda has reduced support for the party. The failure of Anwar Ibrahim to be more consultative in making key decisions for the coalition such as the recent Kajang Move has convinced some in PAS that the party’s future lies in being an opposition party outside the fold of the PR. Interestingly, the conservative turn in both UMNO and PAS have brought their agendas closer. While some observers have argued that this will inevitably lead to a future coalition between PAS and UMNO, sources within PAS noted that a vast majority of PAS members do not support this alliance. As such, both PAS and UMNO will once again engage in an Islamisation race to prove that their respective party is indeed the true champion of Islam in Malaysia.

Normalising intolerance: The chicken has come home to roost

Another manifestation of this conservative turn in Malaysia is the recent discovery that a number of Malaysians were fighting and recruiting for ISIS in the country. ISIS fighters have been adept in using modern technology to spread their message. This could be seen in the case of Mohd Lotfi Ariffin, a former PAS member from Kedah who was fighting in Syria, who regularly posts pictures and videos of himself and other militants, seeking to inspire other Malaysian youths to fight there. Lofti had in July 20 been killed during fighting in Syria. Beyond the power of the social media, a number of Malaysian government policies have been instrumental in creating mind-sets that are fertile for recruitment by extremist groups like ISIS.

Since June 2013, the Malaysian religious authorities and government have been on an anti-Shiite frenzy. The Shiites, which represent the minority sect of Islam, were deemed as deviant and was banned. A number of Shiite religious scholars were detained and their places of worship were shut down. The Syrian conflict further exacerbated this anti-Shiite sentiment. The struggle against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad is portrayed as a holy war against the Shiite “infidels”.

Numerous television programmes, newspaper articles and ceramahs throughout Malaysia were filled with anti-Shiite rhetoric. The anti-Shiite fervour has led to a number of Muslim scholars in the country to declare that it is permissible for Sunni Muslims to wage a holy struggle against the Shiites. While Malaysian government leaders have never themselves called for a violent struggle against Shiites, the anti-Shiite rhetoric provided important religious justifications for some Malaysian youths to fight for groups like ISIS against Shiites in Iraq and Syria.

Likewise, the growth of Salafism in Malaysia is another important factor that has an impact on the strong support that ISIS has received from some Malaysian Muslims.Salafism is a religious orientation denoted by puritan and legalistic interpretation of the Qur’an. Salafis reject interpretations of classical Muslim scholars and seek to rid Islam of any cultural practices that are deemed as innovations. The Salafis are particularly notorious for their fervent rejection of Sufi and Shiite Muslims whom they deem as deviant. While most Salafis belong to the non-violent strand of Salafism, ISIS subscribe to the Salafi-jihadi strand which legitimise the use of violence in the name of Islam. The Salafi-jihadi doctrine argues that given the fact that most of the regimes in the Muslim World are in the state of jahiliyyah (idolatrous condition), it is the duty of all Muslims to rebel using violence to uphold hakimiyyah (God’s sovereignty). It must be added that the boundaries between the two Salafi ideologies are porous and Salafis can easily slide from one group to another. This could be seen from the example of the Salafi movement in Indonesia led by the preacher Jaafar Umar Thalib, which was a politically quietist movement that quickly transformed itself into a Salafi-jihadist movement (Lashkar Jihad) following the collapse of the Suharto government.

The vast majority of Salafis in Malaysia do not subscribe to the ISIS ideology. Nonetheless, the mindset created by Salafism is susceptible for recruitment by groups like ISIS. In more recent times, UMNO itself has promoted the Salafi doctrine through their recruitment of a number of prominent Salafi scholars including Ustaz Fathul Bari, as part of its young ulama wing. These scholars have also formed an organisation, Pertubuhan Ilmuwan Malaysia (ILMU) which has been in the forefront in defending the government’s Islamic credentials. The Salafi ulama are also fervent enemies of the Shiite community in Malaysia. They have gone out of their way to portray the Shiites not only as deviant but a group that seeks the destruction of Islam and the Muslim community. While the ILMU ulama have categorically rejected the ISIS ideology and discouraged Malaysian Muslims from joining the group, the similarities in the mind-set and religious doctrine between ISIS and the Salafi ulama are making some Malaysian Muslims more susceptible to ISIS’ recruitment strategy.

The future of Islam in Malaysia

It is clear that there has been a conservative turn in Malaysia. Nonetheless, there are voices within Malaysia that are now opposed to this conservatism. 25 prominent Malays comprising a number of retired high level civil servants cautioned Malaysian Muslims about the implementation of Islamic laws, and the way Islam is being used to shape public policies in this country. This came shortly after the Selangor Islamic Religious Department issued a fatwa declaring the Sisters in Islam (SIS), a Muslim feminist group as deviant. Indeed, it will take more than just 25 prominent Malays to ensure that this conservative turn will not alter Malaysia’s social fabric. As long as Islam is politicised and puritan understanding of the religion is promoted, Malaysia will see the radicalisation of more Muslims in the country.

Dr Mohd Nawab Mohd Osman is an Assistant Professor and Coordinator of the Malaysia Programme (IDSS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 

Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta or civil society?| New Mandala

Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta or civil society?| New Mandala

SOPHIE LEMIERE, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

7 JANUARY 2015

For over 30 years, Pekida has been one of the shadow allies of the ruling party, UMNO; emerging in the media only in 2008. The election results of 2008 were seen as an awakening of political consciousness among the majority of Malaysians. Facing this new wave of awareness, certain UMNO leaders felt even more threatened, fearing that their power and the accompanying benefits might be jeopardised by the growing discontent emanating from Malaysians, particularly the Malays. The strategy of the gangs and the party thus changed, and new NGOs and gangs mushroomed in the public sphere, forming what is often seen as a new ethno-nationalist “ultra-Malay” movement.

Pekida is often referred to as Tiga Line (or the 3 Lines) alluding to the colours of its official flag: red, yellow and green. The use of these three colours signifies Pekida‘s allegiances: to the Malay community (red as in blood), to the Sultan (yellow symbolising royalty) and to Islam (green). But Pekida’s nebula cannot be reduced to a set of colours: the NGO is in fact an umbrella for a nationwide network. Pekida is a complex and loose network of discreet NGOs created by gangs for which political militancy is a business. Pekida is indeed a generic name used to describe this network, but in reality the name “Pekida” is the name of one of those numerous NGOs created by this network to offer political support and to legalise parts of their activities.

Pekida, in its widest meaning, is a polymorphic entity: a thousand headed hydra, none of which talk to each other nor look in the same direction. Pekida groups share the same roots, hierarchy, codes of honour and similar introductions rites, while bearing different ethnic compositions (exclusive or inclusive), nature of business (legal or illegal: drugs, clubs, racketeering), level of political involvement and degree of violence. Leadership rivalries have sealed these differences and led to a political split. Each network is composed by several sub-groups, which may answer to different names. Names and logos, if any, are often representing numbers and animals – tiger, dragon, eagle, etc. – inspired by the names of kongsi gelap[i]. The name Pekida, often wrongly used, thus became a generic term, a label that embraces a very large national network of gangs spread across the country.

The popular perception of Pekida is disparate: a militia, the arm of UMNO, the Malay mafia etc. In fact, categorising Pekida as a gang or a mafia is difficult. Most members of Pekida identify themselves as “gangster”, hence the term gang was chosen to describe the organisation. The definition of Pekida as a nebula of gangs is based on the work of Hagerdorn (2008)[ii] and has been substantiated by fieldwork observation.

I define gang as: (1) a hierarchical group federated under a leader; (i) that may exists on its own, (ii) belong to a larger network, or (iii) be allied to other groups of different leadership allegiance. The credibility and longevity of the group is reliant on its level of institutionalisation; (2) The main objective of the gang is to make profit, and increase its power through various means. Members are involved in illegal activities and may use different degrees of violence. This basic ambition is often reshaped into pseudo-ideological terms in order to facilitate recruitment, group cohesion, and justify the use of violence; (3) The sustainability of the group is ensured by its potential for adaptation to political and social changes. A gang’s political and sociological identity, and discourse, may change according to opportunity. This means that gangs are entities that transcend space and time. Gangs are neither the exclusive products of cities and urbanisation nor a consequence of industrialisation: gangs may be grounded in rural or semi-urban areas, and pre-industrialised or industrialised societies; (4) Authoritarian or transitional political contexts are favourable to the development of an opportunist relationship between gangs and political parties. In this context, gangs may become an entrepreneur of politics or connivance militants to whom political actions are sub-contracted too in order for certain political parties to sustain political power.

While I chose to describe Pekida as a “gang”, interestingly the older generation of members often used the term “mafia”, or “Mafia Melayu”. These expressions were found widely on blogs and i-chat room in English and in Malay. I believe the use of the term mafia by Pekida members and outsiders have two origins: first it lies in the influence of stereotypes and fantasies conveyed by the idea of the mafia, and secondly it reveals a generational gap between members: the elder using the term mafia and the younger, the term gang. American, Asian and Malaysian movies and TV series[iii] and Malaysian and/or American inspired Hip Hop music[iv] have had an influence on the younger generation, while the older generations have identified with the classical themes presented in Italian mafia movies where being an outlaw typifies sophistication and masculinity, based on idealisations developed since the 1970s (Larke-Walsh 2010)[v].

Diego Gambetta’s (1993)[vi] analysis of the Italian mafia’s organisation gives a precise idea of how the study of criminalised phenomena raises stereotypes that will ineluctably lead to scientific solecisms. His work disentangled some “beliefs” regarding the mafia’s organisational structures. These beliefs echo the rumours spread around Pekida’s nature and to some extent has shaped the fantastical narratives of gang members about their own organisation, to quote Gambetta’s words:

1. Mafia families are bound by well-defined organisational arrangements which coordinate their action to the point that the mafia can be treated, at least some of the time, as a single agent (the most plausible version in this claim is that the mafia is a sort of overarching secret society).
2. Mafia arrangements include a set of well-defined norms, which regulate behaviour across families.
3. The organisation is fully Sicilian but has national and international ramifications
4. The organisation has a name, a language, and a style of its own.
5. Membership status is precisely defined, possibly by an initiation.

The striking points of this comparison are: first the fact that the stereotypes usually convey a concept of the mafia as “a single agent” or a “secret society” possessing “family laws” which has often been noted as a similar characteristic of the stereotypes concept of gangs. Secondly, mafia and gangs are seen as different forms of “organised crime” or criminal organisation”. These expressions bear the idea of a rigorous hierarchy, uncompromising codes and a deeply bound “family”.

Pekida’s structure is what distinguishes it from the classification usually conveyed by gang stereotypes (and stereotypes of mafia) in terms of its organisation, norms and codes; invalidating the idea of universality – without discrediting its strong sense of brotherhood. Despite possessing a common hierarchy, norms or regulations are in fact defined by leaders and thus an internal constitution or code does not exist.Pekida can be described as a union of firms that use the same brand name “Pekida” and occasionally associate among the different groups. In the same vein as the mafia as described by Gambetta, Pekida’s dark chapters are in fact many individual “firms” united by a “brand name and, intermittently, a cartel” forming an “industry of protection” or connivance militancy. Secondly, despite the existence of several codes –signs and strategies of communication-, and similar rituals the norms existing within the groups are often breached and manipulated and should not be seen as part of a fixed and universally agreed-on rule.

Pekida gangs are mostly local or national organisations; international connections may exist but they rely mostly on personal relationships rather than being a result of “family” ties. The membership status in gangs is well defined and initiation rituals are used to demonstrate the potential of violence as well as being a means for imposing the gangs’ order and hierarchy onto new recruits.

The members’ beliefs express a reformulation of dogmatic religious-inspired stories (like the return of Imam Mahdi[vii]) and the ultimate goal of safeguarding the Malays: rhetoric embedded in the ethno-nationalist discourse usually found in UMNO’s propaganda. Interestingly, and despite the fact that all respondents were of Malay descent, Pekida and its satellites should not be seen as an exclusively Malay organisation. Pekida’s gangs form an ethnically diverse nebula organisation where Malays are the majority. As such, these gangs mirror Malaysian society and its political environment: its sociological mix and political rivalries.

Despite the rumours and the fact that most members believe in a very strong brotherhood-link and network; Pekida gangs are not a homogeneous entity but a nationally spread nebula. Each branch and group share similarities to each other but remain independent in loose alliance. These gangs may share their history but are marked by different evolutions and may eventually, as opportunist groups, change their political allegiance in a timely manner.

Concludes with Part 4. Part 1 can be read HERE and Part 2 can be read HERE.

Sophie Lemière is the Jean Monnet Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. She holds a PhD and a Masters in Comparative Politics from Sciences-Po (France). She is the author of Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People.

[i] Colloquial term referring to Chinese organised crime.

[ii] A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gangsta Culture, University of Minnesota Press, 2008. John Hagerdon has made a valuable contribution to the field of gang studies by comparing gang’s behaviour in America from a sociological perspective.

[iii] American movies like the Godfather or the TV show the Sopranos ; Hong Kong, Korean, Japanese and Thai gangsters movies like « Internal Affairs », « City on fire », « The Killer » …etc.

[iv] American « gangsta Hip Hop » or East and West coast (of the United States) rap, as well as Malaysian hip-hop singers mostly from the label Kartel produced by Joe Flizzow.

[v] Screening the Mafia: Masculinity, Ethnicity and Mobsters from The Godfather to The Sopranos, George S. Larke-Walsh, McFarland 2010

[vi] Diego Gambetta is one of the world’s leading experts on the Italian Mafia. He is based at the European University Institute. The Sicilian Mafia: the Business of Private Protection, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993

[vii] Imam Mahdi the prophesied redeemer of Islam, who upon Christ’s return, aid him in cleansing the world of evil and uniting humanity.