Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession | New Mandala

Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession | New Mandala
Llewellyn McCann, 23 JULY 2015

Thai royalist holds a portrait of King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Photo by EPA/ Rungroj Yongrit.

The King’s passing will create an enormous vacuum in Thai politics and there is palpable fear about Thailand’s future without him.

The imminent passing of the 87-year Thai monarch, Bhumibol Adulyadej, will send tectonic shock waves through Thailand’s body politic.

Bhumibol, the world’s longest-serving monarch, is a pillar of Thai politics. During his reign Thailand emerged as a $390 billion economy, a middle income state. Even the red shirt farmers in the impoverished northeast still understand the centrality he has played in their lives. Though criticism has grown, during his reign, they went from subsistence farmers to the aspirational middle class, setting the stage for the country’s current political conflict.  If nothing else, his passing creates an enormous vacuum in Thai politics and there is palpable fear about Thailand’s future without him. The uncertainty is real because the succession has the potential to upend Thai politics.

Under the 1924 Palace Law, which predates the establishment of the constitutional monarchy in 1932, the Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn should ascend the throne as the male heir.  But that’s where politics comes in.  There can be little doubt that the May 2014 coup was thrown, in large part, in order to control the succession.  Neither the military nor the ultra-monarchists could fathom the Pheu Thai under direct, or even indirect, control of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to be in power during the transition.

But over a year since the coup, schisms have emerged between the National Committee on Peace and Order (NCPO) and the ultra-monarchists who fear not enough has been done to purge Thaksin and his political machine, and that the junta is still too concerned with even the pretenses of constitutional democracy. But most of all, the ultra-monarchists fear that the NCPO is likely to acquiesce on the issue of the Crown Prince’s ascension to the throne.

The ultra-monarchists, led by 94-year old Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda, have made abundantly clear that the Crown Prince is unfit to rule.  Prem views Vajiralongkorn as a peril to the institution of the monarchy and an existential threat to the wealth, power and privilege of the ultra-monarchists. They are willing to use all of the tools at their disposal to orchestrate either Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn’s ascension or at the least her regency over the Crown Prince’s infant son, born to his fourth wife.

The 1997 and 2007 constitutions both allowed for female succession to the throne.  The only part of the 2007 constitution that is currently still in force, following the 22 May 2014 coup, is Chapter II, the section on the monarchy. It has been incorporated into Chapter I of the draft constitution released in April 2015.  Chapter I, Section 22 states clearly: “succession to the Throne shall be in accordance with the Palace Law on Succession, B.E. 2467.” In Section 23, if the King has appointed his successor, the Council of Ministers submits the name to the National Assembly for endorsement.

As there is no time frame for submission for endorsement, it’s possible that the Council of Ministers delays forwarding a name by calling for an “extended period of mourning”; that in itself would weaken Vajiralongkorn’s legitimacy.

The draft constitution is vague on how the King names his successor.  If no heir is named, or if there is any doubt, then it is up to the Privy Council to submit a candidate for endorsement. If the Privy Council bypasses the Crown Prince, it has the legal authority (Chapter 1, Section 19) to name a regent. And Prem could move very quickly before the Crown Prince could build up momentum to stop this from happening, while the Queen has been incapacitated by stroke.

While some argue that Prime Minister Prayuth and the NCPO are firmly behind the Crown Prince’s accession, it’s not so simple. They, too, have misgivings about the Crown Prince and have utmost respect for Sirindhorn who gave tacit approval for the coup. Prayuth made this year, the completion of her Fifth Cycle, an official celebration.  But they cannot support Prem’s machinations for several reasons.

First, Prayuth and many of the NCPO come out of the 2nd Army, the Queen’s Guards and, until her 2012 stroke, the Queen had been vocal about wanting Vajiralongkorn on the throne. Second, the NCPO is concerned about the legal order of succession.  Though they have no compunction against throwing coups and suspending the constitutional order, they would not interfere with Palace Law. Third, though they may not like the Crown Prince, they believe that he can be managed.

But that is a gamble, as the Vajiralongkorn’s ascension to the throne could have profound implications for the future of Thai politics.  Under the many Thai constitutions – including the draft charter – the King reigns, but does not rule.  Yet for any observer of Thai politics, this is complete nonsense.  Even if indirectly, things are done in his name by what Duncan McCargo terms the “network monarchy.”

King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Queen Sirikit and Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn review troops in Bangkok. Photo by AFP.

The Crown Prince’s views of the coup are unknown.  He was in Europe during the military takeover and has said little publicly since. The Crown Prince has a tenuous relationship with the military and ultra-monarchists, who largely despise him for hisscandalous behavior.

Yet, he appears to be making efforts to patch up the relationship to ensure his succession. In December 2014, he divorced his wife Princess Srirasmi and cut their son out of the line of succession.  Srirasmi was reviled by the monarchist elites; often described as a “bar girl,” whose presence soiled the royal lineage. She not only relinquished all of her royal titles, but her parents, three brothers, and members of her extended family were convicted of lese majeste and sentenced to three to five year prison terms in March 2015.

But Prem’s real concern is that Vajiralongkorn has the power to fundamentally upend Thai politics and roll back everything that the ultra-monarchists have tried to achieve since the 2006 coup.  The King is able to grant amnesties (Chapter 4, Section 194).  Thaksin and the Crown Prince were for many years quite close, infuriating the ultra-monarchists.  Though less public since Thaksin’s ouster, the two have met on at least one occasion, and they both have bristled with the old monarchist elites and military.

If the new king were to grant Thaksin amnesty, there is nothing that the military-dominated government or ultra-monarchists could do to prevent him from returning.  This would be a massive setback for the military that has done everything they can to keep Thaksin outside of the country and politically emasculated since 2006.

Is there a deal being done between the Crown Prince and Thaksin? Thaksin needs the support of the Crown Prince as without an amnesty, he will unlikely be allowed to return or recover his seized fortune.  But the Crown Prince also needs Thaksin, who can help legitimise his rule in the most populated parts of the country, especially Issarn, important as he enjoys none of the popular legitimacy of his father.

Even if Thaksin were to “retire” from active politics, his influence and presence in the country would be enormous.  Since the 2014 coup, Thaksin has maintained a low profile and called on his supporters to work with the junta.  This is the real reason that there was less violence following the coup than predicted: the military wasn’t necessarily adept at neutralising the red shirts; it’s that Thaksin ordered them to stand down as he tried to negotiate a grand bargain for himself and his sister, Yingluck.

There have been suggestions that junta member General Prawit Wongsuwan has quietly negotiated with Thaksin, which may seem completely counterintuitive. After all, the goal of the coup was to purge Thaksin from national politics, now enshrined in the draft constitution.  But here the junta is simply being realistic, betting that despite Prem’s efforts, the Crown Prince will ascend the throne.  While the junta seems completely unwilling to push through any sort of national reconciliation, the new king might force just that in attempt to quickly broaden his legitimacy.

Second, Prayuth does care about peace and security.  If Prem goes forward and installs Sirindhorn as either the monarch or the regent, Thaksin has no reason to hold back his red shirt supporters.

But there is a long-term calculation. King Bhumibol signed off on the 22 May coup, and “endorsed” the 250 person National Reform Committee and the replacing of martial law with rule under Article 44.

What if the new king doesn’t sign off or fails to endorse a cabinet, or prime minister, all of which are in his purview? Would he intervene if the NCPO tried to hold on to power or endorsee a constitution that all objective commentators view as destabilising?

This would be disastrous for the NCPO, but also for the military in the long run.  Although the coup was ostensibly thrown so the military will not have to throw another coup, it’s really hard to imagine the military not intervening in politics again.  The draft constitution sows the seeds of future political conflict.

To put it another way, could there be another coup, done in the name of the King, if the King is against the coup or does not acquiesce?  That’s the thing about Thai coups, once they get a “royal endorsement,” they are legal.

Prayuth and the military need the support of the Crown Prince, though Prem and the ultra-monarchists are doing everything they can to prevent such a deal.  What are the implications?

Violence, although a low possibility, cannot be ruled out. There is some concern about the 1st Army, which has been disenfranchised since the 2006 coup, taking orders from Prem. There is also concern about the “watermelon” soldiers from Issarn who are sympathetic to the red shirts.

If the King dies before an elected government comes to power (now pushed back toearly 2017), the military will likely hold on to power for an extended period of mourning.

The King will appoint a new 18-person Privy Council, people loyal to him.  It is highly unlikely that he will keep many, if any, of the current members; and many would refuse to serve under him. The Privy Council is also how the crown maintains control over the judiciary: currently three of its 20 members are former presidents of the Supreme Court, and their patronage networks run deep.

The Privy Council has sway over the military as it forwards the names of all flag officers to the King for endorsement. Thailand currently has 1,092 generals or flag officers, all appointed by  Bhumibol. The Crown Prince, who holds the rank of Air Chief Marshall, will promote a cadre that is loyal to him. Here the new King, should he chose, could thwart the power and the influence of the Eastern Tigers, who have dominated the Thai military politics and staged the 2006 and 2014 coups.  The new King could completely alter the seeding of protégés that Prayuth has overseen to maintain his influence, including his younger brother Preecha, a frontrunner to become the next army chief.

In short, there will be a wholesale turnover across the “Network Monarchy,” including the Crown Household Bureau, the Privy Council, the Crown Property Bureau, and all the royal foundations, a massive loss of institutional memory. The coronation of Vajiralongkorn is the greatest threat to the power and influence of the ultra-monarchists.

The military may also fear this, but they are looking to cut a deal to protect their own interests.  Vajiralongkorn is not a young man, already 62, and rumored to have hadserious health issues.  The military will most likely wait this one out and hope that Sirindhorn’s regency for his infant son comes sooner, rather than later.

Finally, there are human rights implications. Army chief General Udomdej Sitabutr has stated that the army’s primary responsibility is the “defense of the monarchy” and it has pursued lèse-majesté (Article 112 of the Criminal Code) cases aggressively, with some 51 cases since the coup, many of which have been tried in military courts with no right of appeal. Can the RTA continue to do this with a less popular monarch? Or conversely, will it increase the number to ingratiate themselves with the new King?

What is clear is that the institution of the monarchy will emerge weaker, at a time when popular agency is growing. Thai democracy cannot move forward when it is up against an elitist bureaucracy that is deferential to the crown, a judiciary that pledges allegiance to the King, not the constitution, a military that acts in its own self-interest, though in the name of the crown, and the crown itself, four institutions that see majoritarian democracy as an existential threat.

A weakened monarchy will ultimately undermine the military and bureaucracy. Then and only then, will Thai democracy begin to have a fighting chance.

Nothing scares the generals and ultra-monarchists more than this.

Llewellyn McCann is a pseudonym. The author is a long-time watcher of Southeast Asian politics.

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat - The Republic of Siam? | New Mandala

The Republic of Siam? | New Mandala
Chatwadee Rose Amornpat, 24 JULY 2015

Bangkok’s Democracy Monument shrouded in darkness. Photo by Natt Muangsiri on flickr.

If I had my way, my troubled home country would not be called Thailand, but the People’s Republic of Siam.

Lately, I’ve been thinking about how the Thai people should react to the country’s latest coup led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha.

So far, the people have largely been too scared to say or do anything, because there are thieves in uniform everywhere.

But for me, the problem in Thailand has always been the monarchy and its network. Nothing ever happens in Thailand without the top royal’s approval, and this latest attack against the Thai people is no exception.

Now that the constitution has been illegally “cancelled” by General Prayuth, he has a free hand to do just about anything under the direction and watchful eyes of top royals.

The previous constitution wasn’t democratic either and was, in fact, titled in favour of the country’s elites. For example, the majority of the senators were appointed rather than elected.

The whole political game in Thailand during the past six months has been ludicrous. It has wasted so much money and time, and put Thailand backward in terms of economic progress and prestige.

Top elites and royals have always had the upper hand in Thailand. But I am not sure if they will prevail this time. We, the freedom and democracy loving Thai people inside Thailand and abroad, should move quickly to declare a republic.

This would have three immediate and major effects.

Firstly, everyone would be financially better off, as the Thai king’s personal fortune of some US$30 billion dollars, according to Forbes, could be confiscated and shared among poor Thai people.

Secondly, Article 112, which supports the country’s lese majeste law, would be declared null and void. Political prisoners will be set free. All pending Article 112 cases would be dismissed without prejudice.

All of the country’s brave and patriotic men and women could come home to rebuild a better nation. The ills of the country would then also be openly discussed without fear of reprisal.

Thirdly, the nation would immediately experience a period of political and economic stability, as King Bhumibol’s negative influence in Thai politics is neutralised, putting an end to decades of royal meddling.

Long live democracy and long live the great people of Siam.

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat is based in London. She was charged with lese majeste by the Thai military junta in July 2014. For previous New Mandalacoverage of her situation see this post.

The gold farmers in West Kalimantan, Indonesia | New Mandala

The gold farmers in West Kalimantan, Indonesia | New Mandala

NANCY LEE PELUSO, 

17 JULY 2015

ABOVE: The photo essay accompanying this article is hosted on YouTube. We recommend viewing in enlarged or full-screen mode.

……………………

Small-scale illegal mining in West Kalimantan is dangerous to human and environmental health.  It’s also a shot at economic independence for marginalised rural people.

“We are the petani kecil (small farmers),” Bang Adam said as we stood talking on top of a flow of dry tailings in a gold mining pit in western Kalimantan. It was only 9 am, but an excruciatingly hot equatorial sun shone down on us. The gnashing sound of dredges sucking up mud and sand in other parts of the pit caused him to talk more loudly than usual.

Bang Adam (not his real name) is a self-made man—not rich, but a small businessman who is proud that small-scale gold mining allowed him to escape poverty. He was orphaned at age nine. His mother died of cancer and his father left Adam and his eight brothers and sisters for another wife and family.

Today, Bang Adam has worked his way up from labouring in others’ mining pits to the status of ‘mine boss’. He runs three dredge sets, each with a nine-man crew of gold workers, all related to him. Over the past 10 years, he has provided work and training in the art of small-scale gold mining to many of his younger siblings and nephews. Having started from nothing, he was today contributing substantial income to the 27 families attached to those men. He regards the mining site as where he works, not as his home. His village, on the other hand, does not offer much remunerative work, though he and his family have access to several hectares of farm land. Moreover, the village in which he lives managed to keep oil palm companies from buying up their land. The costs of everyday living are just too high without off-farm work.

The crews’ three-month verbal contracts were almost up. They had found little gold this time, like most of the other crews in this sprawling mining complex some 600km from their home villages. Like other bosses this contract period, Bang Adam would forgive the advances loaned to workers’ families before the miners left for the mine site and absorb the costs of feeding the crews and running the operation. He was resigned to the losses but was optimistic that they would find more gold soon. He felt this 200 km² site, mined intensively over the last 20 years, had not yet given up all that it contained.

An economic opportunity
Smallholder gold mining has exploded across Indonesia over the last 20 years. Each site has its own history and manners of working; each pit or shaft within the broader mining sites experiences trajectories of boom and bust. Both the mining activities and the gold produced in these sites compete with those from the gigantic corporate miners known around the world: Freeport, Newmont, and Aurora. Though ‘small-scale’—in the sense that crews work at the direction of a mining boss/small businessman who runs the operations with his or her own money or others’ investments—its effects generate as much shock and awe to the uninitiated observer as do those of their corporate counterparts.

Yet despite the size, depth, and impacts of the behemoths, small-scale mining touches on many more Indonesian lives, environments, and livelihoods. Miners in the sites pictured in the photo essay above hail from nearby villages, or migrate from other parts of West Kalimantan or Java. Through the labour of small-scale miners and mine workers, gold mining provides a major source of income to rural families. This income is particularly important as rural families suffer from the declines in agricultural commodity prices. Most miners we spoke to described the organisation of work and the sharing of the finds as more acceptable and profitable than offered by plantation work or other labouring opportunities in their home areas.

Three main economic reasons—the decline in agroforestry commodity prices, the high potential returns from participation in gold mining, and the organisation of work among small-scale mining crews—are what keep interest in mining alive even when gold sources seem to be running thin.

No easy work
Most mining takes place in pits carved out in swamp or drier lowlands. After an initial hole in the ground is opened by inserting high-powered hoses into the ground, the miners spray water against the walls to make it deeper. Some pits give up gold at depths as shallow as 2 or 3 metres. Many run more dangerously deep—to 18 or 20 metres. Mine pits at that depth cannot be worked by the usual dredge sets (popularly called dompeng, after a brand name of a dredge imported from China). The smaller, 20-30 horsepower dredges can’t boost the gold-bearing mud out of such a deep mine pit; four to six cylinder automobile engines (mesin auto) are deployed for this task. Whether medium-sized dompeng or larger mesin auto, the engines send the mud up through long flexible hoses onto and over a wooden sluice structure.

In the morning, mine crews lay out carpet pieces on the downward sloping surface of the sluice to catch the heavier-than-mud gold flakes and (they hope!) gold chunks as the water propels them down it. A cone-shaped pile of tailings forms at the bottom edge of sluice. Someone may choose to rework these tailings at a later date, as they are likely to contain several grams of gold that were not captured on the first filtering. At the end of the day, miners remove the carpets from the sluice and shake the dust they contain into homemade panning pools of blue tarpaulin. The crew boss who works for the mining boss is entrusted with panning in that pool for the gold. Pools are not shared with other mining crews.

Mercury is used to consolidate the flakes in the pan and detergent is added to rid the gold flakes of the mud and sand that have stuck to them. A ball of gold, appearing encased in silvery mercury, is produced at the end of the panning exercise. The mercury is then burned off using small torches and home made ‘ovens’.  This is one of the most dangerous parts of the process—vaporised mercury is more available to be taken up by both human bodies and the environment. Moreover, clouds of mercury are thought to remain over a site for many days, increasing the time of exposure to humans in the area.

Shaft mining involves different labour processes. Shafts are dug into a hillside by hand, members of a mining crew taking turns with the hoe (cangkul), seeking an underground vein of gold-inflected rocks. Every man in the crew is required to take part in the digging, descending into the pit to pull up rocks, and cooking. The gold comes out embedded in rocks, not as swamp mud, and is generally found in conjunction with pyrite or what is known in American and Australian mines as ‘fool’s gold’. There is no ‘boss’; the gold, and money, are divided equally among the crew members after 10 per cent is given to the tuan tanah or land claimant, and either a percentage or a flat fee is paid to the gelondong, the owner of the gold mill.

The main shafts may be dug as deep as 30 metres. No canaries in these mines: diggers wear compressors (air tanks) to enable them to breathe at that depth. Many more perch air blowers on the shaft’s edges to literally blow air into its depths, sometimes directing the air through hoses or pipes. If they find a vein, they dig horizontally, following the vein as far as the available air will take them.

Deadly mistakes
This is not work for the squeamish or the timid.  Small-scale gold mining, like large scale gold mining, entails serious risks.  Miners know they are putting their lives on the line to do the work; they justify the risk by chalking it up to ‘luck’ and ‘fate’. In pits, the threat of landslides and burial alive is ever present. Indeed, when or whether a wall might collapse is partially a matter of chance—and carelessness.

One boss within the last year was distracted by the work in the pit when he walked up to an unstable edge thereof. It collapsed under him, and the sandy particles comprising the soil moved so fast that he could not claw his way back up to avoid burial. Four miners in the pit were buried with him. In other cases of pit mining, inexperienced miners can endanger their entire crew by spraying too far into the base of the wall, literally undermining it and causing it to collapse. Hillside shafts are also liable to collapse inward if miners do not bolster the walls with boards.

Some mining goes on under rivers, lakes, or in very wet swamps. In these liminal spaces where land and water mix unstably, miners dive, using compressors to provide their oxygen while they dig tunnels through the swampy soils under the river or lake. The danger in these environments is unknowingly digging into an old tunnel or breaking through the upper wall of soil that tenuously separates miners from the water body.  Rupturing the wall takes away their buffer, leading to the water rushing into the tunnel and causing many to drown. The uncertainties in all these risk scenarios are, again, regarded as fate. They are well known among miners— as are the specific cases in which five, eight, 10, 18 and more deaths have occurred in mere instants.

Part of the landscape
Why does this activity persist despite its criminalisation and the severe risks entailed in participation? Many miners we interviewed are not interested in the slow and low returns of smallholder agriculture, and are even less attracted by the low pay, conflicts, and poor conditions of labouring on the expanding plantations taking over West Kalimantan’s landscapes.  At all levels of work—as diggers, crew bosses, or mine bosses—many have come to regard themselves as professional miners. Those who stopped school after ninth, sixth, or even third grade explained that participation in gold mining is perhaps their only chance to work for more than a subsistence wage. These labour opportunities provided by the sector for the masses are not recognised or appreciated by the government. “Where else”, as one man said to us, “do people put their lives on the line for a job?” They are not forced to stay. They can opt to work in less risky, if lower- paying, locations.

Small-scale mining was made illegal by the Mining Law of 2009, requiring a formal permit from Jakarta’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM). But Jakarta is a long way from these mining sites. Moreover, the numerous police, military, and other government officials using the informal power of their office/positions to extort miners, shopkeepers, and other business people serving the mining community have effectively created underground governing and taxation structures that illegally benefit them. Regulation and formal taxation would  benefit the government if small scale mining were decriminalised.  As individuals, however, these government actors are not interested in seeing this happen. As a result of these complex relationships, mining sites and miners such as those depicted here are likely to remain part of Indonesia’s rural landscapes.

Though they ‘busted’ in this last contract period, Bang Adam was optimistic that in the next contract period or sooner they would find more gold–before encroaching oil palm companies fill in the massive swamp pits with their industrial-scale ‘excavator’ shovels. They have already begun doing so, putting piles of tailings back into the pits and hiding these 20 years of gold mining under thousands of oil palm trees. The trees thrive, but it is unclear whether the palm fruits will absorb mercury, diesel oil, and gasoline from the soils that now support them. No one, in any case, is asking.

Five years from now, your favourite bananas fried in palm oil might be glowing more brightly.

Nancy Lee Peluso is the Henry J Vaux Distinguished Professor of Forest Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. This article and accompanying photo essay (in the player above) are part of a current book project focusing on agrarian transformations and small scale gold mining in Indonesia’s West Kalimantan province. 

She will give the keynote speech at the Australian National University’s 2015 Indonesia Update Conference, Land and Development in Indonesia: Searching for the People’s Sovereignty.

Uncle Sam and Uncle Ho go from old foes to new friends | New Mandala

Uncle Sam and Uncle Ho go from old foes to new friends | New Mandala

HUNTER MARSTON, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

16 JULY 2015

Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong shakes hands with US President Barack Obama.

The US-Vietnam partnership is gaining ground amid high-level visits, and China’s re-emergence.

There has been a lot of chatter in Washington lately about the strengthening of an emerging strategic partnership between two old foes, the United States and Vietnam.

On 7 July, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong met with President Obama, the first General Secretary of the Communist Party to visit the US and a watershed moment for the two countries. 2015 marks 20 years of normalised relations between the US and Vietnam.

The tone and level of talks between the two countries have changed rapidly in the last two years, as the US has moved to reassure allies and partners in the region in light of China’s increasingly bullish maneuvers in the South China Sea. Last year, the USpartially lifted its ban on weapons exports to Vietnam in light of maritime security concerns. Last year, President Obama reportedly told Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung that he would visit Vietnam soon.

The Obama administration has struggled to define and implement its strategic “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia which the White House announced in 2011. Asian leaders responded with a mix of optimism and consternation. China’s leadership in particular construed the announcement as a policy of containment.

US policymakers have vociferously reiterated that the pivot is not meant to contain China, but to promote freedom of navigation on the high seas, commerce, and peaceful economic growth in a region that is home to many of today’s highest performing economies.

China has rapidly built up islands and atolls from rocks and submerged sandbars, laying down landing strips and fortifying strategic positions in the South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines have both expressed grave concerns over China’s increasingly aggressive forays in what they perceive as their territorial waters.

Last year, the Philippines took its grievances against China’s encroachment in the South China Sea to the International Court of Justice. Vietnamese officials haveexpressed solidarity with the Philippines and sought to strengthen its partnership with the United States in an effort to forestall China’s assertive maneuvers. Vietnamsubmitted statements to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague in December 2014. The US for its part has sought to encourage China to be a “responsible stakeholder” and criticised its territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Last year, when China’s National Petroleum Corporation moved an oil survey rig into disputed waters, Vietnamese citizens took to the streets burning down Chinese factories in violent protests. Several days of mayhem led to the evacuation of thousands of Chinese expatriates before Vietnamese police forces finally clamped down on unrest. The disorder showed clearly Vietnam’s sensitivity to Chinese intrusion in its territorial waters.

The unfolding maritime security complex remains fluid. One Vietnam analyst, who requested confidentiality, told me, “The momentum is with the initiator. The problem is China is going to ask first and ask for forgiveness later.” Hawkish voices in Washington have encouraged the US Government to take a firmer stance to counter China’s moves in the Pacific.

From the Vietnamese standpoint, “the US is a fickle ally,” according to the same analyst. When President Obama declares the importance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) for promoting rules-based trade with Asian countries, but the Congress can barely pass Trade Promotion Authority, the US loses credibility in the eyes of Asian leaders.

China presents a more uniform and predictable foreign policy when President Xi Jinping delivers on major infrastructure investments and high-stakes political projects abroad. Chinese policymakers travel to foreign countries with business leaders in tow, ready to make deals with their foreign counterparts. The US has a different way of doing business and keeps diplomacy separate.

However, if the leaders of the 12 nations negotiating the TPP come to an agreement on a final deal, the US stands to retain credibility regarding its global leadership. While the Chinese “no strings attached” investment model has achieved notable success internationally, securing vital natural resources for energy-hungry China vis-à-vis oil pipelines and other major projects, many nations, particularly Vietnam, have pushed back against the invasive Chinese approach.

Vietnam’s leadership has dragged its feet on a controversial Chinese bauxite mining project in its central highlands in response to loud opposition from environmental activists and civil society groups. PM Dung faced challenges to his leadership in 2012, but he is now as strong as he has ever been. His privatisation and anti-corruption drive have simultaneously strengthened the economy and concentrated his power, despite provoking some hostility from the conservative ranks in his Communist Party. 

The TPP might just be the icing on the cake that Dung needs for Vietnam’s economic revitalisation.  The Vietnam analyst cited earlier told me, “They need the external pressure to drive it home domestically” due to reluctance among conservatives distrustful of further liberalisation and international treaties.

Estimated at 6 per cent GDP growth this year and around 6 per cent projected for next year, the Vietnamese economy seems to be on stable footing and has buoyed Dung’s push to secure the top position in the upcoming leadership transition.

Dung appears poised to replace Trong as General Secretary of the Communist Party sometime in early 2016. President Truong Tan Sang was favored for the top position for some time, particularly around the nadir of Dung’s strength around 2012, when conservative forces mounted a putsch that nearly removed the Prime Minister from power.

General Secretary Trong’s visit to Washington comes at a very interesting time, likely lending him, a bitter opponent of PM Dung, political capital at home. Despite political rivalry heating up in Hanoi ahead of the leadership transition, Washington has shown its interest in strengthening relations with Vietnam’s leadership.

Obama’s decision to receive the General Secretary, for which there is no equivalent position in the US Government, evidenced the White House’s commitment to developing the partnership. The two reportedly discussed climate change, defence, and trade, while Obama did not shy away from candid discussion of differences over human rights.

With bilateral trade at $35 billion last year and expected to grow to $57 billion by 2020, and with shared security concerns over Chinese posturing in the South China Sea, the two have a great deal of common ground to work upon.

Members of Congress, the White House, the Defense Department, and human rights groups, should work together to encourage a productive relationship between the two countries going forward.

Hunter Marston is a Southeast Asia analyst based in Washington, DC. He has a MA in Southeast Asia Studies from the University of Washington and spent two years in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. His publications appear regularly in The Diplomat and other sources.

Thai democracy’s waiting game | New Mandala

Thai democracy’s waiting game | New Mandala

SARAWUT METHAROM, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

9 JULY 2015

An anti-coup protestor demonstrates in Bangkok on 24 May, 2014. Photo by AFP.

To heal current political wounds should Thailand wait five years for free and fair elections?
On any given day, if you are driving between Bangkok and the suburbs, you are likely to encounter traffic jams in the most unusual of places. Most often than not, it will be the police controlling the traffic.

Thai police have the tendency to alternatively block one side of the road to let the traffic flow faster for a while and vice versa. But any traffic engineer will tell you that it is continual flow which is more important, whether fast or slow. Selectively switching the flow on or off actually induces a traffic jam.

This is typical of Thailand.

The country is once again stuck now that a military coup has led to traffic flow for one side of politics, but jammed progress for the rest of the country.

After the coup, one side believed that there would be uprising and democracy would be restored. The other side believed that the economy would roar back and the flow of money to peoples’ pockets would silence any opposition.

But both have not happened.

To make matters worse, the current myriad of actors have no credibility and whatever they achieve will hardly be accepted by their own supporters, let alone the masses.

In the case of both stark choices the country now faces – continuous military rule or elections and the formation of a new government – the outcome is also highly uncertain.

Thailand is in a typically switched off mode. For its citizens, facing so much uncertainty, not knowing if any immediate outcome will solve such an intractable problem, it is easy to enter this phase.

Thais are aware of what they have been deprived of by both this and previous governments. But in a situation so confusing, when one doesn’t know who is their friend and who is their enemy, people withdraw. This is the most dangerous situation a country can descend into.

People don’t just withdraw from politics but economic activities as well. The reason why the Thai economy has stalled is because of this.

An example is neighbouring Myanmar, which stagnated for 50 years. It is only starting to catch up to its past levels of economic development today. Remember, in the 1950s, Myanmar was considered to be the rising star of Asia.

Countries do not become underdeveloped overnight. It is a process which happens slowly when growth stalls for one country while others move forward. Thailand started stalling intermittently in 2005 and is now in full blown decay. The effect is apparent in many spheres.

Physical infrastructure is slowly deteriorating, the education system in tatters, and the economy is uncompetitive and is therefore trying to force down wages. The country also faces a huge ageing problem including an ageing workforce.

Most of these require urgent action and attention, but as the country is not able to come together politically it is suffering economically. Parties which are fighting now will be left with a crippled country. It is like parents fighting over a child and not feeding it, to only later realise that whoever has won is left with a lifeless child.

I don’t want to point fingers. Most of the long-term problems crept into the country long ago and political troubles have only caused crippling inaction. But the question remains; how can Thailand get out of this quagmire? What can trigger progress?

First let us accept that the basic problem is political. Political problems are solved either by confrontation, where one side is often annihilated, or by compromise. As confrontation has resulted in the current untenable situation, it seems to me that compromise is essential.

Who will be the architects of this compromise? We always hear about some backroom dialogue between Thaksin and the elites, but will any agreement between them work in the larger context? Thailand has moved beyond factions and beyond rallies; people have their own ideas and they should be respected.

I think there are some vital steps needed to take the country out of this current mess. There should be grand bargain between current rulers and the people. All current reforms, including the drafting of a new constitution should be disbanded. Instead, the 1997 constitution should be adopted.

The interim administration led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha should only be made up of technocrats and run by decree. These technocrats should be neutral or be chosen by each side. In order to modernise, the country needs to change key systems, including education and the judiciary. Thailand should also improve its criminal justice. And, we must reduce the influence of religious institutions in public life.

Finally, Thailand must aim for a sustainable democratic system within five years. This is because it is not just democracy but the long-term health of the country that is at stake.

After five years Thailand must hold free and fair elections, giving the elected legislature the option to nullify/modify any decree within a year, or else it becomes law. In addition, constitutional change should only be allowed with a two-thirds majority of votes form the lower house and senate.

It may seem distasteful for any liberal commentator to consider not having elections and continuing with an administration led by a prime minister ruling by decree for the next five years. I fully agree with this sentiment.

However, Thailand today is not only stuck in traffic; it is a wounded runner. One side is prodding the country to run while the other side wants to amputate the leg to get rid of the injury.

As hard as it may be, the solution is to let the wound heal.

Sarawut Metharom is a pseudonym. The author is a long-time resident of Thailand.

Solidarity, students and shackles | New Mandala

Solidarity, students and shackles | New Mandala

 

SCHOLARS FOR SOLIDARITY, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

8 JULY 2015

Today 14 Thai students arrested for peacefully protesting against the country’s ruling military junta on 26 June were released from jail.

Although the Bangkok Military Court ruled against further detention on 7 July, the case against the students, who were charged with sedition and breaching an order against public gatherings, still stands. This means they still face the prospect of seven years in jail.

Now out of prison, the students have said that they will continue to use peaceful means to demand democracy.

Thailand’s ruling junta came under sustained pressure to drop the case against the 14 students after the case sparked international condemnation.

Human rights groups slammed the jailing, labelling it as an escalation in the ruling junta’s repression. Last week both the EU and UN both called on the junta to drop the charges and free the activists.

Joining the global calls to free the 14, were scholars, writers, and citizens from around the world.

The campaign, organised under the ad hoc name of International Solidarity for Thai Students and Teachers, saw over sixty people calling for the immediate release and dropping of all charges against Chatupat Boonyapatraksa, Apiwat Suntararak, Payu Boonsopon, Panupong Srithananuwat, Suvicha Tipangkorn, Supachai Pukrongploy, Wasant Satesit, Rattapol Supasupon, Rangsiman Rome, Songtham Kaewpanpruk, Chonthicha Jaengraew, Rattapol Supasophon, Apisit Sapnapapha, Pakorn Areekul, and Pornchai Yuanyee.

The scholars, writers, and citizens wrote individual letters, took photographs, wrote poems, shared poems by others, drew pictures, and sent short messages of support. The messages included the expression of solidarity, the linking of the Thai struggle for democracy to other struggles globally, and the enduring power of liberty, dignity, and freedom.

Following is a selection of the messages. You can see all the messages over at Prachatai’s English website.

Signs of solidarity

Many people sent the students letters. For example, Ariel Dorfman, noted thinker and writer who was forced to flee Chile when General Pinochet launched a coup against democratically-elected Salvador Allende in 1973, came to power, called on the government to cease its persecution of the students:

As someone who has himself suffered repression in Latin America and witnessed it around the world, I urge the government to stop persecuting the fourteen students who want nothing more than the human rights and democracy which are part of the heritage of the whole Thai people.

I write not only as a human rights activist, a distinguished professor at Duke University and a writer, but as someone who has established in the past, through my work, a relationship with Thailand. My play, Death and the Maiden, has been staged there – and an award winning film, Prisoners in Time, starring John Hurt, was filmed there, after I spent a compelling week in Thailand, interviewing people and scouting locations, discovering the deep gentleness and profound wisdom of so many citizens who are now subjected to the worst sort of harassment. If teachers and students are not free to express themselves, to think and act upon their thoughts, the future for Thailand will be bleak.

Other scholars, writers, and citizens wrote poems. Michelle Tan, from the Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University, wrote:

What will it take to prove to you, who rule at the barrel of a gun, that we…

are not slaves of Thaksin

are not living in a “beautiful world’

are not slaves of Caucasian white-skinned foreigners

are not evil capitalists

but we

are fighting for a stable, peaceful future

which requires the rule of law, not the rule of any individual

are trying to allow for free expression

which will help prevent the pent-up frustration that leads to radicalisation and violence

are willing to listen to you and everyone in this country

are advocating a stable system of checks and balances

are fighting against corruption, regardless of who commits it

are all human???

If there is no “third side”, no neutral space free of double standards, then there is no hope.

Others sent in works of art, like Tessa Morris-Suzuki, a Fukuoka Peace Prize winner and professor at the Australian National University.

May Adadol Ingawanij, teacher, University of Westminster, offered the message that, “You’ll never walk alone,” as well as this short clip.

Chris Baker asked, “Who breaks a butterfly upon a wheel?”

A friend from Hong Kong sent in a visual message of support:

Tyrell Haberkorn from the Australian National University shared part of Adrienne Rich’s poem, Integrity:

Aim Sinpeng from the University of Sydney summed it all up with this clear and sharp message:

See all the messages over at Prachatai’s English website.

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat - Thailand’s thieves in uniform | New Mandala

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat, 7 July 2015

The ties between the military and monarchy are robbing the country of freedom and democracy.

With all the turmoil in Thailand today, it is interesting to observe that one so-called ‘revered’ institution, the monarchy, has not come out to stop the chaos.

Thai royalists and the royal household often surreptitiously inform the local and foreign media that the King has no political power. But a quick glance at the current constitution reveals the opposite is true.

Junta chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha stated last May, after he successfully seized power from a democratically-elected government, that the constitution was abrogated; that is except all the articles relating to the monarch and the lese majeste law.

That is to say, the laws concerning the power of the king, his welfare and his protection were left intact and enforceable. These are wide-ranging.

For example section three of the constitution states that:

The sovereign power belongs to the Thai people. The King as Head of State shall exercise such power through the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Courts in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

But this is like saying the car belongs to the people but only the king can drive it. Or, the people own the gun but only the king can pull the trigger. In both cases, the people have to perform the maintenance and upkeep of the car and gun.

Section eight of the constitution states that:

The King shall be enthroned in a position of revered worship and shall not be violated. No person shall expose the King to any sort of accusation or action.

This section means the Thai King is like God and no one can speak against the King even if he commits robbery, blatant lies, mayhem or murder.

Section 10 places the King as the Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed Forces, while section 11 gives the King the right to create titles and confer decorations.

This all goes some way to explain why today in Thailand we do not have just one dictator, but two.

There is a symbiotic relationship between the monarchy and the military, which has been going on for the past six decades. Every time there is a coup, while the generals may change, the monarchy always remained intact. Because of this we can only blame Thailand’s current ongoing troubles on the very top; the monarchy. This is the main characteristic of Thai society and politics which never changes.

On Friday, 19 June, Thai police arrested 14 students who had been protesting against the ruling junta, in defiance of a ban on public gatherings. These are young university students who are brave and full of democratic spirit. They want nothing except the right to express themselves freely on issues affecting their lives and future. They are now confined to a filthy and crowded jail in Bangkok.

The students took part in peaceful rallies calling for an end to military rule under the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). The army commander-in-chief, General Udomdej Seetabutr, publicly accused the 14 student activists of being backed by anti-government groups and claimed their actions could lead to disturbances and violence.

Additionally, General Udomdej Seetabutr, indicated that a charge of lese majeste may be leveled against them, because these students may have received support from anti-monarchy elements as well.

It is against the international norm that the Thai Army is designed to protect only the monarchy as opposed to protecting the country and the people. It is now becoming clearer and clearer that Thailand is being governed by two types of thieves in uniforms.

The first, the King, wears his uniform with pride. As head of state, he often wears decorative pins and trappings, occasionally also donning uniforms similar to characters in an ancient Ramayana play, with ceremonial headgear to top it all off.

The first thief is only concerned about their stability and vast wealth, under the control of secretive investment arm, Crown Property Bureau. They intend to prolong their continued status quo and privileges and entitlement for generations to come.

The second thieves in uniform are the generals, who benefit from their collusion with the monarchy. Each top general has benefited from the yearly military budget and allocations for arms purchases. The top brass stands to benefit millions and millions of dollars or bahts in terms of commission.

And now the generals are joined by the rank and file. Under ‘Article 44’, which gives unlimited power to the junta, the military can do just about anything they please, from searching anyone’s house or person without a warrant, to jailing anyone on any minor charge.

Many lower-ranking soldiers are behaving like hooligans extorting money from street vendors and retailers in open daylight with impunity.

Unless the Thai people unite and demand the reorganisation of these two institutions from the ground up, the chance of realising a true democracy, is next to nothing. And if something doesn’t happen soon, the people and Thailand will forever remain robbed.

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat is based in London. She was charged with lese majeste by the Thai military junta in July 2014. For previous New Mandala coverage of her situation see this post.

EDITOR’S UPDATE: The Military Court on Tuesday ruled that the students should be released from jail. However, they still face trial and a possible seven-year sentence for their peaceful protest against the ruling junta.