Alice in Juntaland and autocracy in Thailand | New Mandala

Alice in Juntaland and autocracy in Thailand | New Mandala
Dr James L Taylor,  1 APRIL 2016

Readers may have heard about a woman arrested and charged with sedition for holding a red bowl with Thaksin’s message on it for 2016 Songkran Day.

It gets worse in Thailand by the minute as the country is now under full military dictatorship and a chilling sign of things to come.

On 16 October 2008 I wrote a piece for New Mandala entitled “Whither Thai Democracy” saying that Thailand was becoming like Burma under its military rule, especially given the scenario of an imminent demise of the current monarch. I was lambasted by readers who thought I was exaggerating.

I also quoted Alice, the heroine of Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass, which made perfect sense (to me) at the time:

If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. Nothing would be what it is, because everything would be what it isn’t. And contrary wise, what is, it wouldn’t be. And what it wouldn’t be, it would. You see?

Now to get the record straight, the Thai junta and its bosses behind the National Council for Peace and Order (Kor Sor Chor) will no longer need to use the nice term “attitude adjustment” for political miscreants. It now has Article 44, a gazetted Order 13/2559 (29 March 2016 [2559], vol.133 Special Section).

A brief summary of the eleven points follows:

• Military officers above the rank of major will be able to suppress and arrest anyone at any time for any act (they) deem a threat to the (military) state; while all those military personnel below the rank of major can assist in this policing and suppression.
• No evidence is necessary for arrests and no arrest warrant is henceforth necessary.
• Any individual must report to the military and give any documents and information as requested. No justification is necessary.
• Military officers can arrest and detain anyone on the spot and can be involved in all aspects of the investigative and policing process.
• Military have the right to search any place at any time and detain anyone for seven days at any place other than a police station or a civil detention centre.
• Military officers can perform full policing and also the duties of civil administrators and they will not come under administrative law.
• All officers are legally protected in their duties under the emergency administrative act (2548 [2005]).

Readers can check this at the Ratchakitcha website (if accessible), or for a summary (in Thai) see Thai-enews. A new English version has also appeared (at the time of writing) in Khao Sod.

Orwell was right about a dystopic world, such as we see in today’s Thailand (no wonder his 1984 was banned).  The implications will be to create a further entrenched, divided and unjust autocratic system in Thailand, discrediting even further in the eyes of the masses what remains of the civil judiciary and even-handed policing.

It also opens the door to (further) wide scale corruption by the military, as democracy slides further into the recesses of a creeping new fascism.

Dr James L Taylor is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Anthropology & Development Studies at the University of Adelaide.

The trouble with Thailand’s new democracy | New Mandala

The trouble with Thailand’s new democracy | New Mandala
Jim Taylor, 28 JANUARY 2016

To restore democracy and topple an ‘ancien regime’, anti-junta activism needs to transform into broad-based, anti-fascist movement, writes Jim Taylor.

The “New Democracy” Movement (NDM, sometimes written in English as “Neo- Democracy”), are now at the forefront of spontaneous anti-fascist activities in Thailand.

The group was founded by a core group of 14 mostly students of working class backgrounds from Bangkok and Khon Kaen, whose families benefitted from former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s pro-poor policies.

NDM says it is committed to “fighting for freedom and democracy”. Tyrell Haberkorn’sarticle in Dissent magazine outlines the importance of this group as potential for new democratic leadership. She raises the notion of the NDM as being somehow outside Thailand’s colour code.

The group, declining coded associations, in any case, are not going to paint themselves into a corner; such a move would be dangerous when trying to win over the middle ground sentiment. In general, people do not know about the “red shirts” and if they want to find out more online try, as my students did, a Google search for “red shirts” – all dedicated sites have been infected with viruses!

Any colour sentiments since 2014 that are not “yellow” remain close to the heart, not the mouth. Let’s be clear – ideologically, “red shirts” of whatever orientations adhere to the following values:

• The right to a “one person, one vote” electoral system (and to be able to elect a government of one’s choice);
• The right to social and economic opportunity (especially for the poor: this is one value which really rankles the Thai bourgeoisie who rely on cheap labour);
• The right to freedom of expression and personal liberty; and
• The right to an equitable and fair justice system (ceasing “double standards”, palace commands, and having a more credible and moral judiciary).

I would suggest that these are the core values for democracy in Thailand. It would be hard to see a “colourless” position possible due to intense decades’ long ultra-royalist institutionalised propaganda which has washed away any compromise position.

The salim (สลิ่ม), or “yellow-shirts” as they are called (re-coding themselves since 2006 under various royal colours) have appropriated what remains of the middle ground through sheer political cunning and semantics. This includes the use of terms such as “Reform”, “People’s” (implying a “mass” movement), and “Democracy”, used by fascistic street movements firstly PAD and then PDRC when their collective aspirations were far from “democratic”.  They have effectively pulled the rug from under the pro-democracy red-shirt movement.

Needless to say, declaring oneself “red” in the current fascistic environment is courting (no pun intended) retribution. There is little space of resistance above the ground for these pro-democracy activists. Around 30-40 academics in Thailand have also been active since 2015 and under constant intimidation. At many universities, the army makes regular incursions on campus during lectures and seminars.

Pheu Thai Party (PTP) and United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) leaders are pinned to the ground, in some cases individual bank accounts were frozen, individuals incarcerated for flippant reasons or under constant surveillance.  This is why the NDM have an important role to play on the front stage and as students, the media and international human rights organisations tend to watch over their wellbeing and whereabouts.

The NDM have been in the limelight since demonstrations on the one-year anniversary of the 22 May 2014 coup and in calling for an investigation into corruption allegations surrounding Rajabhakti Park in January 2016.

In a smart move, the regime has since renamed the park’s notorious foundation and placed it under royal patronage to silence critics under Article 112. The military court arrest warrants for six are among the 11 activists accused of breaching the military junta’s National Council for Peace and Order, Directive No. 3/2015 on “political gatherings”.

General Prayuth Chan-ocha’s junta and its royalist media lapdogs have been trying to link NDM leader Sirawith “Ja New” Seritiwat with backing from PTP and Thaksin. The fourth-year political science student lives hand to mouth most days, except for some occasional part-time work.  Sirawith, as readers may know, was recently abducted by eight soldiers attached, it seems, to 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment (King’s Guard) ostensibly under Section 44 of the interim constitution.

He was bundled into a vehicle without licence plates to be later dropped at a police station. He had been blindfolded, sworn at, beaten, taken to the bush area and threatened with a gun to his head as he heard the clicking sound of the trigger. This intimidation method is frequently used by Thai fascists.

Interestingly, the army abductors demanded to know why he did not call for an investigation into ousted prime minister Yingluck Shiawatra’s (highly popular) rice subsidy program, rather than drawing attention to army corruption and abuse of power! The five core activists (Sirawith Seritiwat, Chonticha Jaeng-rew, Chanoknan Ruamsap, Korakoch Saengyenpan, and Abhisit Sapnaphapan) have declared the junta’s actions to silence them as “illegitimate”. Among the group, 29-year-old activist Abhisit S needs special watching as he is no longer a student and will be taken before a military court.

Another student activist, Chakraphon Phonla-o “Kankan” was abducted from his home on 25 January and taken to Nawamintharachini Army Base in Chonburi Province. He was freed later in the day. Another example of the increasing abuse of power by the junta. We need to observe events closely in the coming days and weeks, as indeed are some international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are already doing.

To have any impact on a well-armed, cunning and well-financed ancien régime there needs to be a shift in focus (if not ideology) among informal segmentary student groups such as NDM towards the creation of a sustainable broad-based (anti-fascist) social democratic movement.

“Anti-junta” small group protests are a means to achieving some media attention, but they are readily crushed and the consequence of actions are short-lived. Behind this military junta, there will always be another military junta, similarly tied to royalist apron-strings.

Most silenced red shirts, sickened and hardened by events in 2010, lacking weapons, money and logistics, wait for the inevitable outcome at the palace, or the consequence of a spontaneous battle between two establishment military factions and their respective royal sides.

All the masses can do in the interim is to seemingly wait and endure the social, political and economic consequences of this high-level connivance. Any uprising, should this happen, will be spontaneous in nature.

Dr Jim Taylor is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Anthropology & Development Studies at the University of Adelaide.

Thai democracy’s waiting game | New Mandala

Thai democracy’s waiting game | New Mandala

SARAWUT METHAROM, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

9 JULY 2015

An anti-coup protestor demonstrates in Bangkok on 24 May, 2014. Photo by AFP.

To heal current political wounds should Thailand wait five years for free and fair elections?
On any given day, if you are driving between Bangkok and the suburbs, you are likely to encounter traffic jams in the most unusual of places. Most often than not, it will be the police controlling the traffic.

Thai police have the tendency to alternatively block one side of the road to let the traffic flow faster for a while and vice versa. But any traffic engineer will tell you that it is continual flow which is more important, whether fast or slow. Selectively switching the flow on or off actually induces a traffic jam.

This is typical of Thailand.

The country is once again stuck now that a military coup has led to traffic flow for one side of politics, but jammed progress for the rest of the country.

After the coup, one side believed that there would be uprising and democracy would be restored. The other side believed that the economy would roar back and the flow of money to peoples’ pockets would silence any opposition.

But both have not happened.

To make matters worse, the current myriad of actors have no credibility and whatever they achieve will hardly be accepted by their own supporters, let alone the masses.

In the case of both stark choices the country now faces – continuous military rule or elections and the formation of a new government – the outcome is also highly uncertain.

Thailand is in a typically switched off mode. For its citizens, facing so much uncertainty, not knowing if any immediate outcome will solve such an intractable problem, it is easy to enter this phase.

Thais are aware of what they have been deprived of by both this and previous governments. But in a situation so confusing, when one doesn’t know who is their friend and who is their enemy, people withdraw. This is the most dangerous situation a country can descend into.

People don’t just withdraw from politics but economic activities as well. The reason why the Thai economy has stalled is because of this.

An example is neighbouring Myanmar, which stagnated for 50 years. It is only starting to catch up to its past levels of economic development today. Remember, in the 1950s, Myanmar was considered to be the rising star of Asia.

Countries do not become underdeveloped overnight. It is a process which happens slowly when growth stalls for one country while others move forward. Thailand started stalling intermittently in 2005 and is now in full blown decay. The effect is apparent in many spheres.

Physical infrastructure is slowly deteriorating, the education system in tatters, and the economy is uncompetitive and is therefore trying to force down wages. The country also faces a huge ageing problem including an ageing workforce.

Most of these require urgent action and attention, but as the country is not able to come together politically it is suffering economically. Parties which are fighting now will be left with a crippled country. It is like parents fighting over a child and not feeding it, to only later realise that whoever has won is left with a lifeless child.

I don’t want to point fingers. Most of the long-term problems crept into the country long ago and political troubles have only caused crippling inaction. But the question remains; how can Thailand get out of this quagmire? What can trigger progress?

First let us accept that the basic problem is political. Political problems are solved either by confrontation, where one side is often annihilated, or by compromise. As confrontation has resulted in the current untenable situation, it seems to me that compromise is essential.

Who will be the architects of this compromise? We always hear about some backroom dialogue between Thaksin and the elites, but will any agreement between them work in the larger context? Thailand has moved beyond factions and beyond rallies; people have their own ideas and they should be respected.

I think there are some vital steps needed to take the country out of this current mess. There should be grand bargain between current rulers and the people. All current reforms, including the drafting of a new constitution should be disbanded. Instead, the 1997 constitution should be adopted.

The interim administration led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha should only be made up of technocrats and run by decree. These technocrats should be neutral or be chosen by each side. In order to modernise, the country needs to change key systems, including education and the judiciary. Thailand should also improve its criminal justice. And, we must reduce the influence of religious institutions in public life.

Finally, Thailand must aim for a sustainable democratic system within five years. This is because it is not just democracy but the long-term health of the country that is at stake.

After five years Thailand must hold free and fair elections, giving the elected legislature the option to nullify/modify any decree within a year, or else it becomes law. In addition, constitutional change should only be allowed with a two-thirds majority of votes form the lower house and senate.

It may seem distasteful for any liberal commentator to consider not having elections and continuing with an administration led by a prime minister ruling by decree for the next five years. I fully agree with this sentiment.

However, Thailand today is not only stuck in traffic; it is a wounded runner. One side is prodding the country to run while the other side wants to amputate the leg to get rid of the injury.

As hard as it may be, the solution is to let the wound heal.

Sarawut Metharom is a pseudonym. The author is a long-time resident of Thailand.

The making of pseudo-democracy | New Mandala

The making of pseudo-democracy | New Mandala

 

KHEMTHONG TONSAKULRUNGRUANG, 

16 DECEMBER 2014

The further the constitution drafting goes, the uglier the expected outcome becomes. Under the guidance of the military government, the drafting is far from being democratic or fair. The Interim Charter allows General Prayuth Chan-Ocha, the Chief of the National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO), something like total control over the appointment of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC). The pro-military CDC then designs the constitution that does not respect the majority’s will and discourages the public from participating in the drafting process. This only confirms the public’s fear that the NCPO, who seized power in May, lacks either understanding or sincerity in restoring peace and democracy to the country as claimed.

Can those who once sabotaged democracy restore it? The Interim Charter designates the Constitution Drafting Committee to prepare the draft constitution under the supervision of and recommendation from the NCPO, the National Reform Council (NRC), and the general public. The CDC has 36 members. The NRC nominated a chairman and twenty other members. Five each were nominated from the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), the NCPO, and the cabinet. Since many were veteran legal and political science scholars, no one doubts the CDC’s expertise. But their political motivation remains questionable. Because the NCPO is serving as the cabinet and Prayuth appointed the NLA and the NRC, only coup d’état supporters were chosen to the committee. Most CDC members appear ultra-conservative and moralistic. The CDC Chairman, Professor Borwornsak Uwanno, for example, despite his fame from drafting the 1997 Constitution, one of the most democratic constitutions in Thailand, has been criticized lately for his emphasis on rule by ethical persons and his distrust of majority rule. He had served in the National Legislative Assembly after the 2006 coup d’état and might even have helped draft the 2006 Interim Charter for the junta. Other CDC members are known for close associations with the elite faction, notably the military and the People’s Democratic Reform Council who  staged the anarchic demonstration last year to pave way for military intervention. From the composition of the CDC, one could foresee the anti-democratic vibe will flow into the upcoming constitution.

According to the Interim Charter, the basic framework of the upcoming constitution is that, first and foremost, the constitution must design a democracy “compatible with the Thai context.” This mandate puzzles and alarms the public at the same time. What and who defines this Thai context? This clause will probably give leeway for the CDC not to adhere to the universal standard of democracy. Prayuth, the NCPO leader and the Prime Minister, has already reflected  that Thais, in their orientation towards democracy, learn too much about liberties and too little about duty. He wished Thais stopped asking for individual’s rights and sacrifices and worked more for the “greater interest of the nation.” His conclusion undermines the significance of rights and liberties, essential elements of democracy.

Other frameworks provided in the Interim Charter include creating effective anti-corruption mechanisms, strengthening the rule of law and ethics, building a fair and sustainable economy, avoiding populist policies, and upholding fundamental principles of the new constitution. These vague objectives share a common goal to entrench the elite minority’s control and prevent elected politicians, particularly the Shinawatra network, from regaining power.

Hypocrisy has never been more obvious. In the past six months, Prayuth has spent almost 300,000 million Baht to “stimulate the retracting economy and relieve the poor’s problems.” This spending was identical to Yingluck’s, but economists kept silent. It seems that populism is in the eyes of the beholder. Only Thaksin’s initiatives are evil and shall be avoided.

The fight against corruption is also similar. The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) has been hunting Yingluck and her peers relentlessly. But cases indicting the Democrat party, the elitist party, sit idle for years. Not only did the NACC refuse to investigate any claims related to the NCPO, but it also defended the junta despite several corruption scandals. Thus, together with the call from the anti-Thaksin faction to permanently ban politicians convicted of corruption, the anti-corruption mandate is only a pretext to prohibit the elite’s enemy from re-entering politics. The NACC’s favoritism will neither eradicate corruption nor strengthen the rule of law.

At this moment, the highlight of the drafting process is the design of the new political system. Election is compulsory, but the CDC, the NRC, and the NCPO  are trying their best to ensure that civilian politicians shall not stray from their wishes. Ideas spring up daily. Many will be rejected but some might be adopted.

Wisanu Krue-ngarm, the Deputy Prime Minister, recommended establishing a body of constitution experts to help the government interpret the constitution before a conflict arises. On the electoral system, the NRC asked the CDC to eliminate the party list system and reduce the number of members of parliament. Moreover, Thais should separately elect MPs, the prime minister, and the cabinet. The CDC itself suggested that the constitution creates the Ethics Council to recruit “ethical persons” into public posts and establishes a new court to review public spending.

These proposals would leave post-coup Thailand with a smaller legislative and a chaotic executive. Infighting within the cabinet would prevent the prime minister from creating the solidarity required to run the country. The government may collapse at any time under the constant threat from several independent auditing bodies. These bodies, the so-called fourth branch of power, will weaken the majority while empowering the minority because they act as a haven for the anti-democracy faction to control the country under the disguise of expertise and ethical conduct. Meanwhile, the heart of Thailand’s crisis is still being ignored. The CDC is oblivious to the fact that elected politicians are subject to a disproportionate amount of scrutiny from unelected officials who are subject to no accountability at all.

Public participation also sparks contentious debate. The Interim Charter requires the CDC to engage the public in the drafting process. The CDC realizes that public participation could boost the much-needed legitimacy of the upcoming constitution. Thus, it plans to hold several small forums to solicit public opinions, but on an invitation-only basis. It cannot promise a referendum over the constitution, claiming that voting would cost more money and delay the general election.

The junta might just try to avoid public embarrassment if the vote is against its favor. In the aftermath of the 2006 coup, approximately 42 per cent voted no to the military-backed 2007 Constitution. Ironically, although the 2007 Constitution had never required a referendum for its amendment, the Constitution Court once struck down Yingluck’s attempt to amend the constitution partly because the government failed to hold a referendum.

But the greatest obstacle to public participation is on-going suppression by the government. As  martial law is still in effect, participation appears limited and coercive. Those who refuse to join the reforms were summoned and forced to publicly pledge that they would cooperate in whatever activities the government requested. But when one activist spoke at the public forum held by the Election Commission, the observing army officers arrested him immediately. He was later charged with lèse majesté. The rule seems to be that citizens must speak when they are asked to and at the designated forum. Moreover, to maintain peaceful atmosphere, criticism or disagreement is not welcomed. This military-style participation renders the whole process a meaningless ritual.

So far, the behavior of the CDC and the government has raised more questions about the new constitution than they have answered. Why is the drafting process so slow? Five months have passed before the CDC held its first convention. The actual drafting commences after the New Year. Prayuth predicted that the election would not be held earlier than February of 2016. This statement disappointed many Thais. For comparison, Burkina Faso army seized power in October 2014 but agreed to reinstate democracy by 2015. The CDC also contemplates passing an amnesty to those who had involved in protests and riots. What will amnesty look like in the constitution? Will it prohibit the revolving door practice so that the NCPO, the NRC, the CDC could not run in the next election or take offices in those independent agencies they help create?

The constitution drafting process has suffered from several setbacks and will suffer more. The CDC is neither impartial nor sufficiently inclusive to create trust. The framework is vague and ambiguous. Proposals are radical. The most important law of the country will be drafted without input from its citizens. At best, this new constitution can only create a pseudo-democracy where elected representatives of the people find themselves paralyzed under the oppressive scrutiny of the network of experts, councils, and courts. The future cabinet will not be able to function unless they abide by the prepared guidance.

Since the Shinawatra party is likely to win an election as soon as democracy resumes, this sets the stage for a standoff, and later a political deadlock, and hence more anarchic demonstrations and military interventions. The vicious circle will not end. If the CDC is not willing to take into consideration the interests of all stakeholders, this new political order will never reconcile the nation and restore peace, let alone support democracy.

Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang is a constitutional law scholar in Thailand and a regular contributor to New Mandala.