The trouble with Thailand’s new democracy | New Mandala

The trouble with Thailand’s new democracy | New Mandala
Jim Taylor, 28 JANUARY 2016

To restore democracy and topple an ‘ancien regime’, anti-junta activism needs to transform into broad-based, anti-fascist movement, writes Jim Taylor.

The “New Democracy” Movement (NDM, sometimes written in English as “Neo- Democracy”), are now at the forefront of spontaneous anti-fascist activities in Thailand.

The group was founded by a core group of 14 mostly students of working class backgrounds from Bangkok and Khon Kaen, whose families benefitted from former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s pro-poor policies.

NDM says it is committed to “fighting for freedom and democracy”. Tyrell Haberkorn’sarticle in Dissent magazine outlines the importance of this group as potential for new democratic leadership. She raises the notion of the NDM as being somehow outside Thailand’s colour code.

The group, declining coded associations, in any case, are not going to paint themselves into a corner; such a move would be dangerous when trying to win over the middle ground sentiment. In general, people do not know about the “red shirts” and if they want to find out more online try, as my students did, a Google search for “red shirts” – all dedicated sites have been infected with viruses!

Any colour sentiments since 2014 that are not “yellow” remain close to the heart, not the mouth. Let’s be clear – ideologically, “red shirts” of whatever orientations adhere to the following values:

• The right to a “one person, one vote” electoral system (and to be able to elect a government of one’s choice);
• The right to social and economic opportunity (especially for the poor: this is one value which really rankles the Thai bourgeoisie who rely on cheap labour);
• The right to freedom of expression and personal liberty; and
• The right to an equitable and fair justice system (ceasing “double standards”, palace commands, and having a more credible and moral judiciary).

I would suggest that these are the core values for democracy in Thailand. It would be hard to see a “colourless” position possible due to intense decades’ long ultra-royalist institutionalised propaganda which has washed away any compromise position.

The salim (สลิ่ม), or “yellow-shirts” as they are called (re-coding themselves since 2006 under various royal colours) have appropriated what remains of the middle ground through sheer political cunning and semantics. This includes the use of terms such as “Reform”, “People’s” (implying a “mass” movement), and “Democracy”, used by fascistic street movements firstly PAD and then PDRC when their collective aspirations were far from “democratic”.  They have effectively pulled the rug from under the pro-democracy red-shirt movement.

Needless to say, declaring oneself “red” in the current fascistic environment is courting (no pun intended) retribution. There is little space of resistance above the ground for these pro-democracy activists. Around 30-40 academics in Thailand have also been active since 2015 and under constant intimidation. At many universities, the army makes regular incursions on campus during lectures and seminars.

Pheu Thai Party (PTP) and United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) leaders are pinned to the ground, in some cases individual bank accounts were frozen, individuals incarcerated for flippant reasons or under constant surveillance.  This is why the NDM have an important role to play on the front stage and as students, the media and international human rights organisations tend to watch over their wellbeing and whereabouts.

The NDM have been in the limelight since demonstrations on the one-year anniversary of the 22 May 2014 coup and in calling for an investigation into corruption allegations surrounding Rajabhakti Park in January 2016.

In a smart move, the regime has since renamed the park’s notorious foundation and placed it under royal patronage to silence critics under Article 112. The military court arrest warrants for six are among the 11 activists accused of breaching the military junta’s National Council for Peace and Order, Directive No. 3/2015 on “political gatherings”.

General Prayuth Chan-ocha’s junta and its royalist media lapdogs have been trying to link NDM leader Sirawith “Ja New” Seritiwat with backing from PTP and Thaksin. The fourth-year political science student lives hand to mouth most days, except for some occasional part-time work.  Sirawith, as readers may know, was recently abducted by eight soldiers attached, it seems, to 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment (King’s Guard) ostensibly under Section 44 of the interim constitution.

He was bundled into a vehicle without licence plates to be later dropped at a police station. He had been blindfolded, sworn at, beaten, taken to the bush area and threatened with a gun to his head as he heard the clicking sound of the trigger. This intimidation method is frequently used by Thai fascists.

Interestingly, the army abductors demanded to know why he did not call for an investigation into ousted prime minister Yingluck Shiawatra’s (highly popular) rice subsidy program, rather than drawing attention to army corruption and abuse of power! The five core activists (Sirawith Seritiwat, Chonticha Jaeng-rew, Chanoknan Ruamsap, Korakoch Saengyenpan, and Abhisit Sapnaphapan) have declared the junta’s actions to silence them as “illegitimate”. Among the group, 29-year-old activist Abhisit S needs special watching as he is no longer a student and will be taken before a military court.

Another student activist, Chakraphon Phonla-o “Kankan” was abducted from his home on 25 January and taken to Nawamintharachini Army Base in Chonburi Province. He was freed later in the day. Another example of the increasing abuse of power by the junta. We need to observe events closely in the coming days and weeks, as indeed are some international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are already doing.

To have any impact on a well-armed, cunning and well-financed ancien régime there needs to be a shift in focus (if not ideology) among informal segmentary student groups such as NDM towards the creation of a sustainable broad-based (anti-fascist) social democratic movement.

“Anti-junta” small group protests are a means to achieving some media attention, but they are readily crushed and the consequence of actions are short-lived. Behind this military junta, there will always be another military junta, similarly tied to royalist apron-strings.

Most silenced red shirts, sickened and hardened by events in 2010, lacking weapons, money and logistics, wait for the inevitable outcome at the palace, or the consequence of a spontaneous battle between two establishment military factions and their respective royal sides.

All the masses can do in the interim is to seemingly wait and endure the social, political and economic consequences of this high-level connivance. Any uprising, should this happen, will be spontaneous in nature.

Dr Jim Taylor is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Anthropology & Development Studies at the University of Adelaide.

Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path | New Mandala

Buddhist politics and Thailand’s dangerous path | New Mandala
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, 15 JANUARY 2016

As the religion finds it harder to compete in today’s world, its becoming more hardline and seeks greater state power.

The Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) has finally confirmed that it will not recognise Buddhism as Thailand’s official religion. The decision brought relief to many and anger to others.

The rejection proved that, no matter how radical and conservative the CDC has been, it is still neutral in the relationship between the state and religion (as its predecessors were in 1997, 2007, and 2014). The committee realises the possible danger of alienation and sectarian disunity, and, once again, withstood pressure from Buddhist fundamentalists and to escape further controversy.

However, with each new drafting of the constitution, the call for Buddhism as Thailand’s official religion has grown louder, and the CDC’s chances of escape are getting slimmer.

The movement has played the nationalism card, citing the historical and cultural contribution of Buddhism to ‘Thainess’. It’s an effective tactic. Debates about Buddhism as a national religion have very quickly turned sensational and emotional. Even when the CDC countered this demand by referring to the King’s speech discouraging the idea, extremists were able to find another where Bhumipol admitted that Buddhism was Thailand’s official religion.

After learning that the CDC have rejected their demand, several Buddhists are campaigning to vote against the draft in the coming referendum. This is bad news for the junta as it jeopardises the government’s dwindling support.

For many Thais, the recognition of Buddhism as Thailand’s official religion would be a crucial element of making a good constitution. Buddhist morals would help the country out of the ongoing political turmoil, which they have simplified into a crisis caused by a lack of ethical politicians. With official status, the state would be obliged to promote Buddhism. Monks and followers agree that Buddhism must receive better safeguards, subsidies, and prominence in Thailand’s public life.

But historically Buddhism has been well protected in Thailand’s constitutions, and references to the religion and its ideals abound in such documents, notwithstanding its unofficial status. Since 1997, Thai constitutions have always mentioned the state’s duty to protect and promote Buddhism and other religions.

The King must also profess Buddhism. In 2007, when debating between the termsnitirat and nititharm for the rule of law, the latter was chosen for it more closely resembled Dhamma in Buddhism. The failed draft of 2014 explicitly emphasised the importance of selecting ethical persons for public positions and harsh punishment for the absence of good morals.

Although the 2014 CDC did not specifically mention Buddhist ethics, it was widely understood to embody them. At ground level, the state always allocates the largest slice of spending to Buddhism compared to other religions. Buddhism is practiced and taught in public schools across the country. Buddhist values provide justification for the state’s public positions on alcohol, abortion, and censorship. During political demonstrations, monks led the Dhamma troop and broke several laws without liability. Indeed, Thailand is a de facto Buddhist state.

But a large proportion of Thais are not satisfied; they believe that there will never be enough protection for Buddhism unless it becomes Thailand’s official state religion. Among many possible causes is the fear of losing its leading status among the country’s younger generations.

Because Thailand’s Buddhism has never been modernised and rationalised, it cannot provide solutions appropriate for contemporary Thailand. Interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching is deemed absolute, and yet by dismissing challenges to its doctrine, Buddhist philosophy has become outdated. Criticism is also growing about the Sangha’s weakness, evident in abbots’ wealth and their misbehaviour. Buddhism has failed to appeal to the younger and more critical generations of Thailand.

In addition to internal problems, Buddhists perceive threats from outside as well. The insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South has seen monks slain by Muslim fighters. Thailand’s accommodation of Islam, possibly in response to the Southern unrest, is seen by Buddhist extremists as dangerous tolerance.

The growing popularity of Christianity among the population is another possible danger. These tensions have led to erratic behaviour from the Sangha, including the prohibition of a Muslim girl from wearing a hijab at her Buddhist school, a call for creating a “Buddhist Bank” to compete with the government-backed Islamic Bank, a suggestion to burn a mosque in retaliation for a the killing of a monk, and a demand to confiscate books and advertisements funded by a Christian charity.

Thai Buddhism’s weakness and its ambition for power are symptoms of years of state entanglement. Buddhism has become so spoiled that it is too weak to compete in a more diverse world. It has turned to state power as the final solution. Although this hardline plan might turn moderates away, it still draws support from many.

Unfortunately, Buddhist politics is leading Thailand down a dangerous path.

Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang is a Thai constitutional law scholar.

Review of Unequal Thailand | New Mandala

Review of Unequal Thailand | New Mandala
T.F. Rhoden, 12 JANUARY 2016

Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, editors, Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth and Power, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016) 

Reviewed by T.F. Rhoden

Does Thailand have an oligarchy? If so, how do we define it? And most importantly for this collection of essays, what is the proof of its existence in contemporary Thailand?

These are some of the main questions that pervade Unequal Thailand: Aspects of Income, Wealth and Power, edited by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. Translated and reworked from a Thai-language edition,Su sangkom thai samoe na [Towards a More Equitable Thailand] published in 2014 by Matichon, this volume is a timely and useful review of some of the political economy issues facing Thailand today.

With nine chapters by Thai scholars and technocrats, the aim of the book is to provide up-to-date data and analysis on those material foundations that have fostered a growth in inequality and a strengthening of oligarchy in recent years. Some chapters do this better than others, but all provide insight into these issues.

In terms of raw empirical analysis, all of the research essays are a success, particularly the second chapter on land distribution as an indicator of both inequality and oligarchy. For those interested in the possible material foundations of recent turmoil in Thai political society, this volume is an absolute gem and is more than worth adding to one’s library.

Theoretically speaking, the introductory chapter by the editors utilises very recent publications on inequality and oligarchy to frame the research-based chapters that follow. Noteworthy out of this list are Thomas Piketty’s bestselling Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) and Jeffery Winters’ comparative political economy treatise Oligarchy (2011).

Those familiar with either of Piketty’s or Winters’ thinking on these topics will find evidence for both within the volume. Regarding the latter’s theory of oligarchy, however, the editors seem to have undervalued the analytic nuance of Winters’ repositioning toward the term’s original Aristotelian meaning—one that highlights the unique power position of material wealth without falling into the structural (or teleological) constraints of Marxist historical materialism.

In its place, the editors create the moniker “flexible oligarchy”, to mean any group of elites (whether they be military, political, bureaucratic, royal, business or so on) that network to “rule” the nation. This is frustrating, as insights on how wealth is defended, why oligarchs fight, and what this means for a political society are consequently lost.

At best oligarchy then means any “network” of individuals that are somehow more powerful or more influential than the average Thai person. There are networks in Thailand, but to ignore the difference between an oligarch and an elite is to misunderstand the challenge that inequality and oligarchy in Thailand pose.

Misgivings regarding theory aside, all of the follow-up chapters present new and crucial research.

The most startling for the volume is the initial analysis by Duangmanee Laovakul in the second chapter on land title documents (chanot) provided by the Land Department. This has never been done before in a private publication. Traditionally, the Land Department does not publish this information for those outside of government.

The results are as fascinating as they are somewhat depressing. Gini Index numbers for Thailand for yearly income, hovering around 0.50 for the last decade, pale in comparison to the Gini Index number of 0.89 for inequality in nationwide titled land distribution.

The landholding analysis is also broken down by region via Thai rai (14.4 million hectares) and by MPs via declared value. In the past, the best resource a researcher had for measuring a Thai oligarch’s net worth were the annual Forbes “Thailand 50 Richest” articles.

With the addition of landholding data, a more detailed picture of the distribution of assets beyond that of just publically traded companies is presented. The greatest strength of this analysis—and the reason it was likely trusted to the scholar in the first place—is also its greatest weakness: the landholding data are completely anonymous.

Granted, one can make educated guesses about who some of these owners are, but for a political economy analysis in a nation where over a third of the population work in agriculture, knowing who owns what parcel of land is of utmost importance. I am still waiting for a day when one can see a map of Thailand, or at least of Bangkok, delimiting who owns what exactly.

Factor into this the complication of how much land the Crown Property Bureau of the Thai monarch does or does not own and these seemingly economic issues of inequality take on a decidedly more political tone of oligarchy. Hence, the importance of a theoretically robust theory of oligarchy beyond that of just “network” becomes even more significant.

Another compelling research article from this important volume is the fifth chapter by Nualnoi Treerat and Parkpume Vanichaka on elite networking via special executive courses.

The interviews with course attendees are of great value for understanding how it is that specific policies benefiting the oligarchy come to fruition. The inclusion of members of “billion families” into the courses brings to light some of the behind-the-scene mechanics of how an oligarch can connect with those in the parliament, military, bureaucracy, university sector, or the media.

Public-sector courses have been offered by the National Security Academy for Government and Private Sector (Po Ro Or), the Office of the Judiciary, the King Prajadhipok Institute, and the Election Commission. Two private-sector courses include the Capital Market Academy by the Stock Exchange of Thailand one by the Chamber of Commerce. In a political society where scholars have argued there is limited social capital, these executive courses take on a greater meaning. As in other chapters in this volume, the authors deepen the theoretical discussion begun by the editors in the introductory chapter.

Overall, this is an engaging and well-crafted volume that delivers much-needed new empirical research on the challenges of inequality and oligarchy in Thailand. This book represents some of the best minds from Thailand on the state of the country’s current political economy.

This volume will be of interest to scholars and students of Southeast Asian political economy as well as researchers examining how inequality and oligarchy can vary across the globe.

T.F. Rhoden is a PhD Candidate at Northern Illinois University. His most recent peer-reviewed publication is “Oligarchy in Thailand?”, in the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, vol. 34, no. 1 (2015).

Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala

Democratic contraction in Southeast Asia | New Mandala
Bridget Welsh,  5 JANUARY 2016

2015 was the year authoritarian governments struck back against democratic pressures.

The story of 2015 in Southeast Asia was Myanmar’s November election. In giving the National League for Democracy and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi a landslide, Myanmar citizens signaled their strong support for democratic change and better governance.

These calls have been loud in recent years — in Malaysia’s 2008 and 2013 elections, in Thailand’s repeated electoral victories for a non-military aligned government, in Cambodia’s 2013 and Singapore’s 2011 polls as well as strong electoral support for democracy in the Philippines and Indonesia. Democratic pressures on Southeast Asian governments have been increasing, and are not likely to recede in the near future.

2015 was the year authoritarian governments in the region struck back. Behind the Myanmar headlines there is a worrying trend of a significant democratic contraction taking place. The use of the authoritarian arsenal by Southeast Asian governments are not new, but in the course of the year regional governments expanded their use of incumbency and control of institutions to shore up their positions.

The most obvious trend has been the increased use of repression, especially targeted toward opposition politicians and critics. In Malaysia, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was jailed in February. In Thailand, a trial began against ousted PM Yingluck Shinawarta as she was denied the right to travel. In Cambodia, opposition politicians were physically attacked. The leader of the opposition Sam Rainsy has delayed his return to Cambodia from November as a result of jail threat. Malaysia has the highest number of opposition politicians facing various charges from sedition to violations of banking finance regulations.

The threats opposition members across the region face in calling for change extend from being physically attacked on the campaign trial (as occurred for Myanmar’s Naing Ngan Lin NLD candidate who was slashed by a machete) to potential bankruptcy.

The use of the law for political ends moves beyond opposition members. Journalists and bloggers remain targeted. Radio reporter Jose Bernardo was shot dead at a restaurant in Manila in November. He joins the other 77 journalists who have been killed in the Philippines since 1992, making this country one of the most dangerous places for media professionals in the world.

Myanmar tops the region’s list with the most number of journalists jailed, pipping Vietnam this year who released some of its bloggers. Notably, blogger Ta Phong Tan was released after 10 years in jail. The situation for bloggers in Vietnam remains serious, with a number of incidents where bloggers and associates were beaten up in mysterious circumstances rather than jailed. In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong won his defamation case against a blogger critic Roy Ngerng, who was asked to pay PM Lee S $150,000. Lee joins Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak as the second current leader in the region who filed charges for public criticism.

The crackdowns on freedom of expression extend to ordinary citizens, from artists and academics to taxi drivers.

Young Chaw Sandi Tun was sentenced to six months jail for insulting Myanmar’s army in her Facebook post noting the similarity in color between the Tatmadaw’s uniform and the opposition leader’s clothing. In Thailand, the cases involving lese majeste have extended the boundaries to include insults to the king’s dog. Thanakorn faces up to 15 years in jail for this reference, and joins a long list of cases that have involved jailing of university students for a play, taxi cab conversations, novelists and more.

A mother of two was sentenced to 28 years for her Facebook comments, while a hotel employee received 56 years for his posts in August as part of the lese majeste unending prosecutions. Cartoonist Zunar in Malaysia faces up to 43 years for his satirical art work. These developments have had chilling effects on public discourse. Even in more open Indonesia, discussion of the 1965 attacks on communists were shut down.

As power has been used to quiet alternative voices, the rule of law itself has faced erosion. In some cases the law is not being implemented. In July, the co-Investigating International judge Mark Harmon of the Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia resigned his position after the tribunal declined to arrest two former Khmer Rouge leaders for whom the court had issued warrants.

Despite having the technology to find the daughter separated from her mother Indira Gandhi for seven years by a husband who is abusing religion in a personal vendetta against his ex-wife, the Malaysian police have proven to be unwilling to use its tools to follow the court order to return the daughter to the mother.

In other cases, constitutional frameworks protecting rights have been by-passed through the introduction of military courts – as has been the case in Thailand and called for in Malaysia – and new measures that empower leaders to declare ‘security areas’ without checks on their authority, as occurred with the hurried passage of the National Security Council law in Malaysia. This law is being seen as a measure that will allow unpopular Prime Minister Najib to stay in office if he loses an election. In Myanmar, there are potential laws being considered that may give military impunity for alleged past crimes.

The area where the laws are under real scrutiny continues to be corruption. 2015 showcased some shocking scandals.

In Malaysia the 1MDB $700 million ‘donation’ into Najib’s personal accounts remains inadequately explained, as the rule of law has not been properly applied to the premier and impunity appears to have allowed the premier to hold onto office even with his personal reputation in shatters. Efforts to undermine Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the recent demands for payments from Freeport to politicians to conduct business have showcased that persistent problem of bribery, lack of transparency and abuse of position.

From corruption concerns tied to the Aquino administration in the Philippines to persistent effects of corruption trails associated with Vietnam’s elite, there lacks effective leadership in tackling the region’s most serious governance problem. The end effect is that leaders at the top are seen to engage in graft, reinforcing a system where office is used for personal wealth rather than public service.

Control over resources and alliances with cronies remains a dominant feature of Southeast Asia’s political economy. Four countries in the region – Malaysia (3), Singapore (5), Philippines (6), Indonesia (10) – were in The Economist’s crony capitalist list, which measures the favoritism of wealth toward tycoons and politically-affiliated business interests.

Measures to enhance this favoritism expanded in 2015 through the introduction of consumption taxes in Malaysia and Myanmar, regulations that facilitated more burning rather than less in the haze-affected region in Indonesia and service fees in areas such as tolls to crony-companies. The region’s most vulnerable populations are feeling the economic pain, with depreciating currencies and a slowdown in growth in the region as a whole. These conditions have contributed to conditions where the use of state resources through populist policies have boosted incumbent governments, a factor that contributed to the People’s Action Party’s September 2015 electoral victory.

Those on the margins are being particularly impacted, with serious implications for rights. Southeast Asia was not immune from the global refugee crisis affecting over 60 million people worldwide. Conditions affecting the livelihoods of the Rohingyas in Myanmar remain severe, with conditions in camps across the region not much better. The shocking findings of death camps in Thailand and Malaysia involving torture, rape and human and organ trafficking in May have yet to be properly accounted for.

One reason for this lack of accountability lies with the upgrade the Obama administration gave Malaysia on its human trafficking assessment in the wake of the discovery of the gruesome murders. The Obama administration’s sell out of human rights principles was especially acute in 2015, where interests associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership overrode other concerns.

From questions tied to the trial of Burmese migrant workers in killing British backpackers Thailand to the persistent practice of ‘sea slaves’ with citizens hauled onto fishing boats, those that are vulnerable remain so at the end of the year, which limited measures to point to strengthening protections.

Vulnerability in 2015 extended to religious and ethnic minorities as well. Bogor was labeled Indonesia’s most intolerant city when it declared a ban of the Shia faith in the city. Hate speech toward Muslims persists in Myanmar, in spite of the electoral victory signaling greater inclusiveness. Churches were burned in Aceh. Christmas celebrations were banned in Brunei. Rights of religious minorities were curbed in Malaysia in cases involving child custody and worship.

Measures to forge peace with minorities fell apart, as the Philippines’ Bansamoro Basic Law did not pass the legislatures. In other places such as Myanmar, Protection Race and Religion Bills denying rights to marriage and religious freedom were introduced, as protections for rights were in fact eroded.

There were nevertheless bright spots in greater freedom across the region – a gender rights bill in Thailand, the end of the persecution of a book seller and academic by religious authorities in Malaysia, the reinstatement of direct local elections in Indonesia and the subsequent peaceful elections in December, to name but a few.

Southeast Asians continue to fight for their freedoms valiantly, over cyberspace, in courtrooms and in communities. The climate however has not been conducive to greater freedoms as those in office continue to use their offices to hold on to power.

As we look ahead, with a slowing economy and persistent insecurities by incumbents, the prospects for expanding rights does not appear promising in 2016. Last year has shown us however that we can expect the unexpected, with the military’s acceptance of the Myanmar’s electoral results as an example.

As ASEAN formally announced its community on 31 December 2015, many hold only to potentially a different ‘imagined community,’ where the ideas of brilliant scholar Benedict Anderson of shared belonging, human dignity and decency live on.

Bridget Welsh is Professor of Political Science at Ipek University, Senior Research Associate at the Center for East Asian Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University, Senior Associate Fellow of The Habibie Center, and University Fellow of Charles Darwin University.