New Mandala’s 2015 in review (and Christmas dance)

New Mandala team, 24 DECEMBER 2015

We take our traditions pretty serious at New Mandala. This year some familiar faces are back to dance up a storm. Click through here to check out their moves.

It’s also time to do a recap of what was our busiest year yet.

2015 proved to be massive for Southeast Asia, with free and fair elections in Myanmar (the first in 25 years), as well as Singapore’s first vote in the post-Lee Kuan Yew era.The ballot in Myanmar saw long-time democracy campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi romp home in a ‘red wave’ that has also been seen as a repudiation of military rule in the country.

Elsewhere, 2014’s man of the moment, Indonesia President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, quickly went from hero to zero, blundering from one policy failure to another and seemingly unable to control his own cabinet, let alone a say in his own party; controlled by matriarch oligarch Megawati Sukarnoputri.

We saw a major scandal in Malaysia that nonetheless hasn’t knocked the PM from his perch (yet). Thousands of Rohingya from Myanmar and neighbouring Bangladeshwere left adrift at sea. And of course Thailand continued its downward spiral from fractious politics into farce; this year seeing a man charged with lese majeste due to a comment he made about the king’s dog.

With so much happening across the region, it’s no surprise that New Mandala also had a huge 12 months.

To date, we’ve published more than 460 articles and other posts (many republished in Australian and regional media), which have generated more than 3,600 comments (that we could actually approve; some of you were very naughty and probably shouldn’t expect a visit from Santa). And of course, we continued to attract many tens of thousands of weekly readers.

So what mattered to us, and more importantly what did our readers care about? Here’s our top 10 articles published in 2015.

In 10th is Singapore swing, Bridget Welsh’s post-ballot box wrap of Singapore’s general election in September, which saw the incumbent and long-ruling People’s Action Party win comfortably. With many arguing PAP would lose seats in this vote, the result proved to be the optimal pendulum swing says Welsh.

Gerhard Hoffstaetder’s snappy photo essay on Malaysia’s massive citizen march for clean politics in August comes in at ninth. Bersih 4.0 takes over Kuala Lumpur combines strong imagery and cogent analysis to beautifully set the scene for the major political rally. Unfortunately, this year’s trends paint a much worse picture for Malaysian politics in general, with people power maybe not enough to improve things.

Sticking with Malaysia, Bridget Welsh’s article on Prime Minster Najib Razak’s introduction of a goods and services tax in April, Najib’s taxing problem: The politics of Malaysia’s GST, takes out eighth. In addition to the excellent insight, the photo of his cat makes this article well worth re-reading (it’s a bit “one million dollars!”. See the video below.)

Good news for those who love bad news. Max Grömping’s article on electoral integrity in the region, Southeast Asian elections worst in the world, takes out seventh.

A meeting between Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Noam Chomsky proved to be popular coming in sixth. A conversation with Chomsky recounts the pow-wow with the well-known intellectual (take your pick which we’re referring to), in which they cover Thai politics, the monarchy and Thaksin.

In fifth is Llewellyn McCann’s look at the Thai monarchy, Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession. In it he looks at whether democracy will move forward with a change at the top, and the palpable fear people have about the current king’s inevitable departure.

Malaysia’s 1MDB scandal garnered worldwide attention this year and Tom Pepinsky’s examination of how it fits in with similar examples of corruption in the country’s past also proved hugely popular. Taking out fourth, Malaysia’s long history of financial scandals paints a sobering picture of how common this type of situation really is.

In the bronze medal position and a spot on the podium, third is Lee Jones’ Thai junta turning tragedy into farce. If you follow Jones on Twitter you will be familiar with his acerbic wit and hot takedowns. Casting his eye over the manner in which Thailand’s military leaders continued to fluff their lines when it came to the investigation of August’s Bangkok blast, this must-read piece is no different!

Bridget Welsh scoops silver with her third appearance in our 2015 top 10, taking outsecond for her article Lee Kuan Yew’s political legacy – a matter of trust. Her assessment of the LKY legacy was not only popular in the wake of the long-time leader’s death, but is sure to be a “go to” reference for future looks at how he helped shape Singapore.

Finally in first (and by some margin) is Michael Buehler’s exposé of dealings between mysterious representatives of the Indonesian government and lobbyists in the US. Waiting in the White House lobby recounts how a third-party paid some $80,000 to US lobbyists during President Jokowi’s less than impressive visit to Washington.

It caused a serious stir in Indonesia, leading to at least two press conferences by senior ministers and generating more than 400 articles in local and international press. (Indonesian media even reported on the fact that we changed the image accompanying the article.) It is an important contribution on politics in Indonesia and the region, and more than a worthy winner for 2015.

An honourable mention must be made of an article that only missed the top 10 by a couple of reads. In 11th, Clive Kessler’s essay on modern Islam and terrorism, A rage against history, examines whether Islam is a religion of peace today. One reader labelled it “deeply unsatisfying, both intellectually and emotionally.” It certainly got people talking – and will continue to do so.

Lastly, we want to say thanks to all our readers, contributors and commenters — you are the lifeblood of the website. See you all in 2016, which, for those keeping score, marks our 10th anniversary. It will be big. In the meantime, be good to each other and yourselves.

The New Mandala team: James Giggacher, Mish Khan, Nicholas Farrelly and Andrew Walker.  

Thailand - A state of madness | New Mandala

Dr James L Taylor, 18 DECEMBER 2015

The insidious creep of fascism in contemporary Thailand.

Tim Frewer’s New Mandala article from March 2015, “Fascist Assemblages in Cambodia and Myanmar”, is an interesting Deleuze and Guattari inspired piece on Thailand’s neighbours. Yet, no mention of the situation in Thailand is made.

Most academics and commentators are reluctant to use the descriptive term “fascism” for Thailand under military dictatorship and its authoritarian ultra-nationalist ideology. Labels are often misleading and ambiguous, especially a term that carries such emotive historical context.

The lack of democracy in Thailand, the repression by state apparatuses (under a compact among civil and military elites) and the annihilation of opposition to authoritarian rule, the use of an ultra-nationalist discourse, and the de facto support by royalist elites for its parastatal armed forces (from pro-palace sanctioned thugs such as the ‘garbage collection organisation to the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, or PDRC) have eerie resonances with aspects of the early 20th century Spanish fascists known as Falange Española Tradicionalista or falangistas.

Falangism is taken from the name of the right-wing Spanish movement that imitated elements of pre-war German and Italian fascism under the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. The movement was opposed the Republicans and supported General Franco’s Nationalist coup of 1936, but only as a minor element. It momentarily reappeared later in European history in the post-war years until the mid-1970s.

As self-exiled pro-democracy leader Surachai “Sae Dan” Danwattananusorn told me in 2011, while fascism” may be seen as a defining historical moment, we are now seeing new forms in a desperate push by the ruling elites/aristocracy (amaat) to hold back democracy for their own interests, whatever the social, economic, and political cost to the nation.

For instance we can hark back to Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat’s 1958 coup d’état,supported by the royalist/amaat regime wanting to regain its influence and power through the monarchy. Nothing has changed since then, only intensified as we near the end of the ninth reign. Nothing it seems is above personal interests and power under an authoritarian national leadership inspired by notions of an organic, hierarchical regal state.

Yet, Thais do not have a word for fascist or fascism.

Instead, Thai uses (though rarely) the foreign loan word latthi-fasit. Historian and expert on European fascism Stanley Payne sees this ideology as “a form revolutionary ultranationalism for national rebirth…” structured on “extreme elitism” and mass mobilisation in a “vitalist” philosophy that does not shirk at the notion of violence, intimidation and a repertoire of coercive tactics to achieve its ends.  (See A short history of fascism, 1914-45, p 14).

Prayuth Chan-ocha, the new Thai Fuhrerprinzip, was enforced through absolute idiosyncratic authority and emplaced by the amaat in 2014 for their own ends.  Indeed, the political climate under authoritarianism in Thailand masked by a perverse nationalist democratic rhetoric (Thai democracy”?) is characterised by extreme ethnic chauvinism, embellished monarchical patriotism, and an ultra-nationalism articulated (poorly at that) from the likes of orchestrated street movements such as People’s Alliance for Democracy or PDRC.

The similarities between falangism and the current Thai experience are a less ideological (“softer”) but no less insidious form of contemporary fascism. Examples are plentiful, including:

• an internal organic corporatism;
• ethnic (Thai)-based ultra-nationalism;
• conservative anti-democratic trade unionism;
• conservative modes of state Buddhism (through elements in the administrative royalist line of the Thammayut nikai that frowns on democratic state sangha governance);
• a dislike for separatism of any kind; anti-communism, anti-anarchism, and anti-(new) capitalism (where this is seen as working outside amaat networks);
• anti-democratic sentiments and control of all media, emplaced through editorial committees with royalist lackeys);
• paternalistic pastoral values (communal ethnic-Thai’ism and the hypocrisy inscribed in elite visions of the poor in a discourse of “self -sufficiency”);
• dislike of welfare-based neo-liberal economic (efficient) management (as in the case of Thaksin’s neo-liberal Populist government);
• and as a union of non-competitive, traditional conservative units seeking to maintain their monopolies and ensuing privilege through nationalistsyndicated consensus.

In addition, the link between the palace network and its vast financial interests and the many large national/global Thai corporations such as the Charoen Pokphand Group, Thai Beverage, and so on is self-evident. Many of these Falangist corporations provided financial support to the anti-democratic street movements leading up to the last two coups (PAD and then PDRC).

Indeed, another characteristic of the Thai falange also includes the agencies of state security and forms of para-militarism such as the ideological arm of the summit-state, the Yellow Shirts (and its pink and blue variants in the past decade). These share similarities with the European Falangist Blue Shirt street brigade.

This complex social and political arrangement in Thailand is controlled by an alliance of central bureaucratic elites, political representatives of the middle class, reactionary (pro-Prem Tinsulanond) elements in civil society, traditional network mafias, and ultra-conservative military factions with close ties to the royalist establishment.

The Thai amaat are opportunistic; every time a new structure of governance was put in place (three times since 2006) they ruthlessly crushed it using a complicit media and propaganda campaign with the use of street thugs to create destabilisation.

The synchronisation and multi-layered scheming for the last two coups involving so many elements of the monarchy network was impressive, if immoral and unscrupulous. The real fear among Thai falange is an election in which they have no control of the outcome and a real democracy which is engendered at the grass-roots.

In summary, the immense power of persisting propaganda and control of information in the hands of extreme right-wing pro-monarchists has been particularly worrying.

They generated and maintained a well-orchestrated vilification of Thaksin, Thailand’s first popularly elected prime minister; in fact they could have been saying “Thaksin is Jewish!” The hatred created and perpetuated is the same as in pre-war fascist Europe.

Fascists need to vilify in order to mobilise their support, particularly among the petty bourgeoisie and urban middle classes. The control of information, censorship and the immense reach of the monarchy network into all layers of society (like a computer virus or worm) have been factors in regulating society and the economy under new fascism.

There is no middle ground remaining in Thailand, no platform for dialogue or impartiality. Following the fascist dictate, the Thai regime created disorder on the streets and insecurity before every coup in order to recreate a semblance of their own constructed and self-interested order.

The radical royalists, including the military, established a compact with corrupt social elements – the Rajabhakti Park scandal is the tip of iceberg — all the while using Article 112 (the infamous lese majeste law) to silence and intimidate opposition.

If all of this is not new fascism in Thailand, then what other name?

Dr James L Taylor is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Anthropology & Development Studies at the University of Adelaide.

Turning the tide on Thailand’s human trafficking | New Mandala

Turning the tide on Thailand’s human trafficking | New Mandala
Dr Rachael M Rudolph,  2 DECEMBER 2015

Will reform initiatives be able to stop a dangerous trade?

Thailand is a major source, destination, and transit country for men, women and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking. The problem is serious enough that it was kept at Tier 3 level in the 2015 TIP Report – the United States Trafficking in Persons Report.

Under the TIP ranking system, Tier 3 refers to countries whose governments do not comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum requirements, and are not making significant efforts to do so.

While the report noted Thailand had taken some steps to improve trafficking related laws and coordination between agencies combatting trafficking, it said it had not done enough, during the April 2014 – March 2015 reporting period, for “tangible progress on its formidable human trafficking problem.”

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Thai military does not believe the report adequately reflects the efforts undertaken. And indeed, my recent study examining the reporting period showed that while human trafficking is still an undoubted and considerable problem, the military government had in fact made significant attempts to address the issue at all levels.

The military government’s strategy to combat human trafficking in the reporting period is broken into three phases. Phase one begins in June 2014 and ends in November 2014. The transition from phase one to two began in November. Phase two began in December and ended in February. Finally, phase began in March. It was still in swing when the 2015 US TIP reporting period came to an end.

Phase one was primarily labour intensive. Labour, illegal migration, corruption and human trafficking are interrelated issues, and the goals were to re-regulate illegal migrant workers, which entailed their registration, and the establishment of a new labour management policy.

The objectives were to identify and understand the roles of the actors involved in the trafficking process; to learn about the migrants and the causes of migration; to solicit input from key government, business and civil society figures on solutions to the problems; and, finally, to develop solutions that overlap the three issue areas — labour, trafficking and corruption.

Actions undertaken included inter-agency cooperation in investigations and inspection of the labour sector and, in particular, the fishing industry; coordination and cooperation with the International Labor Organization (ILO) for the development and adoption of good labour practices; and, the implementation of the pilot labour management policy in Samut Sakhon and Ranong provinces.

Public meetings were held on trafficking; political and security personnel under investigation for involvement in it were transferred; and, raids and arrests were carried out by law enforcement. The Royal Thai Police also began its review of the law enforcement strategy, which was implemented in the second phase.

Further initiatives included bilateral and regional discussions on trafficking and illegal migration, the creation of the Special Economic Zones to address the underlying causes of trafficking, and border security.

Phase two went further, to include the nature and process of human trafficking and the role of the security sector. The goals were to address the lack of enforcement of existing laws; to pass and implement the laws needed for labour, immigration and security sector reforms; and to articulate and implement a new law enforcement strategy.

Army General Manas Kongpan (right), one of 88 suspects recently arrested on charges of human trafficking in Thailand. Photo: AP

The objectives were to pass and implement legislation needed for labour sector reform, and included educating employers about trafficking. In an effort to ensure compliance, investigations and inspections of the labour sector would continue and amendments would be made to the 2008 Human Trafficking Prevention and Suppression Act so that informants, witnesses and victims are protected.

To add a further deterrent, the penalties for involvement in the trafficking process would increase. Finally, the national action plan would be implemented, and efforts made to facilitate coordination and cooperation among the security bodies.

This phase saw the successful passage of legislation pertaining to the labour sector and human trafficking; the announcement of a new national action plan by the Royal Thai police; arrests, inspections and raids; and, the establishment of the Transnational Crime Coordination Center (TCCC).

The national action plan and the establishment of the TCCC (in cooperation with Australia) are significant developments. In the action plan, security bodies were assigned responsibility for the targeted areas. The Immigration Police Bureau was tasked with forced labor and illegal migration; the Central Investigation Bureau was tasked with sexual exploitation; the Metropolitan Police was tasked with organised begging; and, the Anti-Trafficking Division was tasked with human trafficking.  Each one was paired with border and checkpoint security units at the transit routes.

In the final phase, a systematic approach was adopted, to address the root causes of human trafficking.

This, in combination with the measures in the previous phases, seeks to create a climate for coordination and cooperation among the police, prosecutors and the courts; to provide specific timelines for investigation and prosecution of cases; to establish special courts; and, to develop a computerised human trafficking database, which also links the police, prosecutors and courts.

This can be seen as a sincere effort to combat the problem in a ‘big picture’ manner, and seen as a whole, it can certainly be argued that Thailand has improved and continued its efforts to combat trafficking, illegal migration, and corruption. The United States Government has recognised this and it is likely these and further measures will be noted in the 2016 US TIP Report.

Human trafficking is a significant and serious problem, and in Thailand the exploitation of desperate and vulnerable people has filtered into many levels of society. To successfully combat it, continued vigilance and the participation of all actors, from the government to civil society, are needed – and it has taken other countries years before they were upgraded.

For Thailand, it should not take years with will, commitment, passion, and faith in the belief that the changes made today will ensure a more humane society for tomorrow’s generation.

Dr Rachael M Rudolph is a lecturer and researcher at Webster University, Thailand.

This article is published as a collaboration between New Mandala and Policy Forum, Asia and the Pacific’s platform for analysis and discussion on public policy.