Showing posts with label Pavin Chachavalpongpun. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pavin Chachavalpongpun. Show all posts

Thursday, December 24, 2015

New Mandala’s 2015 in review (and Christmas dance)

New Mandala team, 24 DECEMBER 2015

Screen Shot 2015-12-24 at 11.17.55 am
We take our traditions pretty serious at New Mandala. This year some familiar faces are back to dance up a storm. Click through here to check out their moves.
It’s also time to do a recap of what was our busiest year yet.
2015 proved to be massive for Southeast Asia, with free and fair elections in Myanmar (the first in 25 years), as well as Singapore’s first vote in the post-Lee Kuan Yew era.The ballot in Myanmar saw long-time democracy campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi romp home in a ‘red wave’ that has also been seen as a repudiation of military rule in the country.
Elsewhere, 2014’s man of the moment, Indonesia President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, quickly went from hero to zero, blundering from one policy failure to another and seemingly unable to control his own cabinet, let alone a say in his own party; controlled by matriarch oligarch Megawati Sukarnoputri.
We saw a major scandal in Malaysia that nonetheless hasn’t knocked the PM from his perch (yet). Thousands of Rohingya from Myanmar and neighbouring Bangladeshwere left adrift at sea. And of course Thailand continued its downward spiral from fractious politics into farce; this year seeing a man charged with lese majeste due to a comment he made about the king’s dog.
With so much happening across the region, it’s no surprise that New Mandala also had a huge 12 months.
To date, we’ve published more than 460 articles and other posts (many republished in Australian and regional media), which have generated more than 3,600 comments (that we could actually approve; some of you were very naughty and probably shouldn’t expect a visit from Santa). And of course, we continued to attract many tens of thousands of weekly readers.
So what mattered to us, and more importantly what did our readers care about? Here’s our top 10 articles published in 2015.
In 10th is Singapore swing, Bridget Welsh’s post-ballot box wrap of Singapore’s general election in September, which saw the incumbent and long-ruling People’s Action Party win comfortably. With many arguing PAP would lose seats in this vote, the result proved to be the optimal pendulum swing says Welsh.
Gerhard Hoffstaetder’s snappy photo essay on Malaysia’s massive citizen march for clean politics in August comes in at ninth. Bersih 4.0 takes over Kuala Lumpur combines strong imagery and cogent analysis to beautifully set the scene for the major political rally. Unfortunately, this year’s trends paint a much worse picture for Malaysian politics in general, with people power maybe not enough to improve things.
Sticking with Malaysia, Bridget Welsh’s article on Prime Minster Najib Razak’s introduction of a goods and services tax in April, Najib’s taxing problem: The politics of Malaysia’s GSTtakes out eighth. In addition to the excellent insight, the photo of his cat makes this article well worth re-reading (it’s a bit “one million dollars!”. See the video below.)
Good news for those who love bad news. Max Grömping’s article on electoral integrity in the region, Southeast Asian elections worst in the world, takes out seventh.

A meeting between Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Noam Chomsky proved to be popular coming in sixthA conversation with Chomsky recounts the pow-wow with the well-known intellectual (take your pick which we’re referring to), in which they cover Thai politics, the monarchy and Thaksin.
In fifth is Llewellyn McCann’s look at the Thai monarchy, Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession. In it he looks at whether democracy will move forward with a change at the top, and the palpable fear people have about the current king’s inevitable departure.
Malaysia’s 1MDB scandal garnered worldwide attention this year and Tom Pepinsky’s examination of how it fits in with similar examples of corruption in the country’s past also proved hugely popular. Taking out fourth, Malaysia’s long history of financial scandals paints a sobering picture of how common this type of situation really is.
In the bronze medal position and a spot on the podium, third is Lee Jones’ Thai junta turning tragedy into farceIf you follow Jones on Twitter you will be familiar with his acerbic wit and hot takedowns. Casting his eye over the manner in which Thailand’s military leaders continued to fluff their lines when it came to the investigation of August’s Bangkok blast, this must-read piece is no different!
Bridget Welsh scoops silver with her third appearance in our 2015 top 10, taking outsecond for her article Lee Kuan Yew’s political legacy – a matter of trust. Her assessment of the LKY legacy was not only popular in the wake of the long-time leader’s death, but is sure to be a “go to” reference for future looks at how he helped shape Singapore.
Finally in first (and by some margin) is Michael Buehler’s exposé of dealings between mysterious representatives of the Indonesian government and lobbyists in the US. Waiting in the White House lobby recounts how a third-party paid some $80,000 to US lobbyists during President Jokowi’s less than impressive visit to Washington.
It caused a serious stir in Indonesia, leading to at least two press conferences by senior ministers and generating more than 400 articles in local and international press. (Indonesian media even reported on the fact that we changed the image accompanying the article.) It is an important contribution on politics in Indonesia and the region, and more than a worthy winner for 2015.
An honourable mention must be made of an article that only missed the top 10 by a couple of reads. In 11th, Clive Kessler’s essay on modern Islam and terrorism, A rage against history, examines whether Islam is a religion of peace today. One reader labelled it “deeply unsatisfying, both intellectually and emotionally.” It certainly got people talking – and will continue to do so.
Lastly, we want to say thanks to all our readers, contributors and commenters — you are the lifeblood of the website. See you all in 2016, which, for those keeping score, marks our 10th anniversary. It will be big. In the meantime, be good to each other and yourselves.

The 
New Mandala team: James Giggacher, Mish Khan
Nicholas Farrelly and Andrew Walker.  









Thursday, October 1, 2015

A conversation with Chomsky | New Mandala


1 OCTOBER 2015


Pavin Chachavalpongpun (left) and Noam Chomsky. Photo supplied.
Pavin Chachavalpongpun (left) and Noam Chomsky. Photo supplied.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun discusses Thai politics, the monarchy, authoritarian rule and Thaksin with world-renowned public intellectual. 
Since the Thai coup of 22 May 2014, my life has been turned upside down.
The Thai junta summoned me twice for being critical of its intervention in politics. When I rejected the summons simply because I did not accept the legitimacy of the coup-makers, they issued a warrant for my arrest and revoked my passport. This forced me to apply for refugee status in Japan.
Throughout this tumultuous period, Professor Noam Chomsky – one of the world’s most renowned academics, political commentators and social-justice activists – offered his encouragement and support in the process of applying for my refugee status.
He helped appeal to the Japanese government to seriously consider my case, while at the same time condemning the Thai junta for its harassment against my basic human rights.
I had never met Chomsky prior to the coup in Thailand. Therefore, his sympathy towards my struggle was unexpected and much appreciated. So when I was invited to speak at the Thai Studies Program at Harvard University on 25 September, I dropped a note to Chomsky to see if he would be available to meet me. He said yes.
Our meeting took place on the same day at his office inside the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where we had a private conversation. As soon as I was invited to sit down, Chomsky fired off many hard-hitting questions. He was interested in three issues: the military, the monarchy, and Thaksin Shinawatra.
First, he asked if I could describe the performance of the current military government led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha. He was curious to know how the military government has been coping with both domestic and international pressure. At the same time, I was requested to give an update on the state of human rights inside Thailand.
Chomsky offered his view on authoritarian rule in today’s world and how it works against the tide of democratisation. He told me that any regime not supported by the people, in this century, should not last long. But in the Thai case, he admitted that there were factors contributory to the longevity of military rule. One of them is the monarchy.
He asked me to what extent the Thai monarchy has interfered in politics. I replied by referring to the shifting strategy of the monarchy and its involvement in politics.
The royal institution has broken its past modus operandi of pulling the strings behind the political scene, and is now playing politics in the open. This is particularly so after the 2006 coup, with the Queen attending the funeral of a yellow shirt and Princess Chulabhorn overtly supporting the anti-government protest led by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC).
Chomsky responded by asserting that royal political involvement explained why Thai politics has become muddled and complicated. The global trend shows that monarchies of the world are shrinking. Working against the tide of democracy would only accelerate that shrinking process.
But he was also surprised by the fact that the Thai public has become tolerable to political interference by both the monarchy and the military, particularly among the politically marginalised. This discussion led us to focus on the surge in cases involving lèse-majesté charges.
He told me that he remembered signing a petition many years ago calling for a reform of lèse-majesté law in Thailand. But he also said, his effort was futile. He believed that without an immediate reform of the law, the monarchy would find it even more difficult to coexist with democracy.
Chomsky seemed to also be very fascinated by the fact that former Prime Minister Thaksin has still commanded love and respect from a number of red shirts in Thailand. He was curious about Thaksin’s effective populist policy which seemed to have “hypnotised” Thais to continue to vote for his political proxies.
But Chomsky was also suspicious of Thaksin’s competitive political script, which was greatly different from that of the “network monarchy”. He raised the pertinent question of how Thaksin’s political idea could really shift Thailand’s political landscape toward more democratisation.
Chomsky also asked why Thaksin’s political opponents, be they opposition parties or enemies in the old establishment, had failed to initiate better and more commercialised policies designed to win the hearts and minds of Thai villagers. I could only say that they were not interested in empowering the people, as such empowerment could challenge their own powerful position in the political and economic spheres.
Chomsky posed some other questions on the negative aspects of Thaksin’s populism but at the same time came to understand the reason why his populist tactics functioned well in the country where marginalised people are still struggling to gain access to political and economic resources.
This brought us to the last topic of discussion, the Thai economy. Chomsky was inquisitive about the economic consequences of the coup, the changing domestic socio-economic conditions, and the implications on foreign investors in Thailand. Again, I could only provide him with a pessimistic outlook. Chomsky lamented that it was unfortunate for Thailand to have fallen into its own political trap.
Aside from his inquisitiveness about the Thai political crisis, Chomsky asked me about my future plans, now that I have become a refugee fleeing my own country. What would I do from now on?
I assured him that my status in Japan was guaranteed and that I was just waiting to witness changes during this transitional period in Thailand. Should I need any assistance from him, he said, he would be willing to help as much as he could.
I then asked him a final question; how would he like to see Thailand in the future? Chomsky quickly replied, “A democratic state without interventions from non-elected institutions.”
Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies and currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Walter H Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.






Sunday, June 22, 2014

Hyper-Royalists Infect Thai Society | Asia Sentinel

Hyper-Royalists Infect Thai Society | Asia Sentinel
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, June 19, 2014

Rose’s war with the monarchists

Following the May 22 coup in Thailand, as the political crisis has deepened, so has the degree of hyper-royalism, which has proliferated out of control. This time, the battlefield is no longer confined within the Thai borders. Thai hyper-royalism has gone global.

An example of this in fascinating microcosm involves an anti-monarchist named Chatwadee ‘Rose’ Amornpat, a London-based hairdresser, who for months has been in open war with the Thai royal family. Born a Thai, Rose settled in England, marrying and giving birth to two children. She later separated from her husband and moved out of their shared house. Recently she has become a YouTube sensation by posting numerous video clips blaspheming the much-revered monarchy. Her action has outraged royalists.

Many have condemned Rose for attacking the monarchy on a personal level, employing extremely vile language to reflect her radical anti-monarchic attitude. But Rose has done something beyond anyone’s imagination—violating the most guarded Thai taboo of cursing the monarchy. She has broken all the barriers when it comes to speaking out. Rose has set a new standard, for good or bad.

Because she is now a British citizen, Rose has also challenged the draconian lèse-majesté law which states that defamatory or insulting comments about the king, queen, heir apparent and officers of the royal court incur three to 15 years in jail. Obviously, Rose has violated the law and is now being hunted by the junta, which instructed the Thai Foreign Ministry to seek cooperation from the British government to extradite Rose to Thailand. But because the UK has no lèse-majesté law, Rose will not be deported.

After legal means became futile, hyper-royalists apparently decided to take the matter into their hands. Last week a Thai woman named Kae Kanyarat arrived at Rose’s residence with a dozen eggs. She rang the bell several times, but nobody answered the front door. Rose was nowhere to be seen. The woman then began to shout loudly, knocking at the doors of Rose’s neighbors as well, asking about her whereabouts. When the neighbors did not cooperate, she threw eggs at them before taking off in her vehicle, apparently with a British friend as the driver.

A few days later, a young Thai known as DJ Ken also turned up at Rose’s home, vandalizing the front door by painting a Thai flag on it and flashing a supposed fake gun in an apparent attempt to threaten the woman. In both cases, the assailants filmed their own acts and posted them online. The video clips have gone viral. Rose announced that she would file complaints with the British police. Back in Bangkok, hyper-royalists offered their moral support to the “brave” two Thais who harassed Rose. They became national heroes.

For several years, hyper-royalism has emerged as a dominant ideology designed to identify potential enemies of the monarchy and give the practitioners the legitimacy to punish them. This has built a protective wall around the monarchy, encapsulated within the concept of the monarchy being the most sacred, untouchable and inviolable institution in a country where democratic institutions have been treated with disdain.

The need to defend the monarchy at all cost has come to rule the Thai consciousness. Those who fail to display love and respect, let alone insult it, will be hit with stiff social sanctions and prosecution. As the end of the current reign nears, with King Bhumibol Adulyadej increasingly frail, royalists have become anxious about the uncertainty ahead. After more than six decades of the king’s rule, Thailand is now confronting a new reality in which the future of the monarchy will face numerous challenges. This sense of extreme anxiety has resulted in the proliferation of hyper-royalism.

This unhealthy phenomenon has taken root and proliferated everywhere – in politics, the media and throughout society. There is no space for non-royalists today, either in Thailand or even in foreign lands, as Rose can attest. Many hyper-royalists would be willing to expel their fellow Thais to leave the country should they not express their love for the King.

Such a discourse, of a country exclusively for monarchists, has become popular and authoritative. It is repeatedly referred to by defenders of the monarchy to justify their actions and policies against their opponents, even when those actions and policies are incompatible with democratic principles.

Army Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the leader of the coup, has meanwhile continued to exploit the monarchy to justify his intervention in politics. Using lèse-majesté as a weapon, he has instructed the army to arrest critics of the coup and possibly charge them with lèse-majesté. A climate of fear has been created.

The social alienation of those with different political opinions and attitudes has indeed divorced the King from his a growing number of his subjects and intensified a sense of resentment which now represents a source of anti-monarchy sentiment both domestically and among Thais living overseas. Since the coup of 2006, the debate over whether the monarchy should readjust itself for the sake of its own survival in a new climate of political openness has become more vigorous as well as divisive.

Some hyper-royalists never hide their aspiration to take Thailand back to the old days under absolute monarchy, as Sondhi Limthongkul, a core leader of the People’s Alliance for Democracy, which worked furiously worked to bring down elected governments, famously said: “Let’s return power to the King. His Majesty is a Dhammaraja King. This is the only way we can prevent Thailand from falling into becoming a failed state.”

But in another reality in rural areas, most residents who lent their support to both former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the Red Shirts have become more aware of the political involvement of the monarchy. Rose is an example of how forced affection of the monarchy has failed. Monarchists are the ones breeding anti-monarchists in Thailand.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Centre for Southeast Asian Studies. A warrant has been filed by the Thai government for his arrest.