Consolidating control in cyberspace | New Mandala

Consolidating control in cyberspace | New Mandala
Aim Sinpeng and Gennie Gebhart - 27 OCTOBER 2015

The ‘great firewall of Thailand’ has met with a growing online backlash. But the battle over information control is far from over.

“The Great Firewall of Thailand would make us just like China,” complains a critic on a popular Thai web board, Pantip. Although the Thai government’s grand plan to ramp up state control of the Internet has suffered a recent setback following a growing online backlash, the battle over information control is far from over.

The military-backed government, which came to power via a putsch last year, is determined to exert significant ‘monitoring power’ over Thai cyberspace. The control of information going in and out of Thailand is crucial to the stability of this regime, whose legitimacy relies on its ability to neutralise and suppress dissent. As Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha reportedly stated in a cabinet meeting, the single gateway measure would curb “access to inappropriate websites and flows of news and information from overseas.”

The government has not been shy about its intention to consolidate information control through its proposed plan – the single Internet gateway. Currently, Thailand has to connect to multiple gateways to get to the World Wide Web, but with this plan, there will only be one. Indeed, the Southeast Asian country used to have a single channel when the Internet was at its infancy in the late 1990s, but it has since expanded to accommodate growth in Internet access demand.

With this new plan, all the traffic going out and coming into Thai cyberspace could be “better monitored” via the state-owned telecom enterprise, CAT. The government would be able to block content faster, and more effectively intercept encrypted information. Although surveillance was the main impetus for consolidating the gateways, strengthening the state capacity to exercise information control is part of the broader cybersecurity strategy that aims to limit privacy and individual freedoms for the sake of national security.

In statements reminiscent of the Chinese government’s rationale for information controls, Thai government officials have characterised this single gateway campaign as an effort to fight digital crime and pornography.

The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has even gone as far as to call the single gateway a part of Thailand’s ironically award-winning plan to incorporate ICTs into sustainable economic development and transform the country’s economy into a “digital economy” and regional “data hub.”

The broader objective to control information and the narrative that emerges from it, however, is clear, and not without precedent. Thailand is no stranger to cyber controls. In fact, every successive government since the 2006 coup, elected or not, has believed in filtering cyberspace.

The passage of the Computer Crimes Act of 2007 may have set in motion the beginning of a real, concerted effort to curb civil liberties online, and Internetcrackdowns have not slowed down since. Freedom House has ranked the state of Thai cyberspace as “Not Free” since 2014, and indeed the general trend of press freedom has been on a decline, nearly consistently, over the past 10 years, according to Reporters without Borders.

Tension comes as Thai citizens– or, as Internet users, “netizens”– become increasingly savvy and difficult to control. Thai Internet users’ reaction to the single gateway announcement was no exception to this trend.

Their unsurprisingly negative reception of the single gateway proposal has highlighted various concerns like user privacy and security; possible impacts on network speed, stability, and vulnerability; and questions about what a single gateway might do to Thailand’s relationship with international investors and partners.

If the government had thought it could get away with the plan quietly, authorities had underestimated the agency of Thai web users.

In a gamer-led, social media-organised show of civil disobedience on 30 September, users launched an old-fashioned distributed denial of service (or DDoS) attack against several government websites. This attack didn’t entail sophisticated technical techniques, but a critical mass of users sabotaging a specific server by repeatedly refreshing a webpage and overloading it with requests. Kong Rithee has called this an “F5 rebellion” for the simple and powerful role of the “refresh” button, while Arthit Suriyawongkul of the Thai Netizen Network has perhaps most accurately characterized it as a “virtual sit-in.”

Whatever it was, it was successful in bringing down several government websites, including those of the Ministry of ICT, the Ministry of Defence, the Government House, the Internal Security Operation Command, the Democrat Party, and state-owned telecommunication providers TOT and CAT Telecom.

The swift response to the notion of a single gateway has prompted some to declare that the proposal has already failed. Others, however, see this as just the beginning; experts at a recent Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand panel (video here) in Bangkok stated that some aspects of the single gateway are already being implemented.

Since the DDoS attack, however, the government has insisted that the project remains at the feasibility study stage, and has even asked the media to refrain from using the term “single gateway” until the study progresses.

Regardless of governmental capacity to implement a single gateway or its progress thus far, the government has additional mechanisms at its disposal to indiscriminately filter, monitor, and criminalise online behaviour. The government could return to more covert forms of surveillance, for example, in an effort to circumvent further public backlash. The controversial Cyber Law bills, which have not yet even passed, would make it easier to do just that.

In the meantime, the government’s contradictory performance of single gateway implementation reveals anew the heart of what is critical for the current regime’s stability: control over national narrative and the various forms of media and communication that create it.

Aim Sinpeng is a Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations. She teaches digital politics, social movements and comparative politics. Her current project examines political opposition online in Southeast Asia.

Gennie Gebhart is a graduate student in Library and Information Science at the University of Washington Information School, and was a 2013-2014 Henry Luce Scholar in Thailand and Laos. Her ongoing thesis looks at users’ perceptions of and experiences with Internet filtering in Thailand in an attempt to extract more meaning from technical measures of censorship as well as provide security design recommendations tailored to Thai Internet users’ challenges and needs.

This article is published as a collaboration between New Mandala and Policy Forum, Asia and the Pacific’s platform for analysis and discussion on public policy.

Truth the latest victim in Bangkok blast | New Mandala

Truth the latest victim in Bangkok blast | New Mandala

Zachary Abuza, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

22 OCTOBER 2015

Somyot Pumpanmuang, speaks to reporters about the Bangkok blast investigation in front of a popular go-go bar “Suckers” . Photo: Royal Thai Police

Thai investigators have declared case closed in the Bangkok bombing; but it shouldn’t be.

On 28 September, Thailand’s chief of police Somyot Poompunmuang announced that the case of the 17 August bombing in central Bangkok that killed 20 and wounded more than 120 others had been “solved” despite the fact that 15 suspects remained at large and that they were ready to prosecute the only two suspects it had in custody.

The police then gave themselves some $84,000 in reward money. It was a most unconvincing conclusion to an investigation that had been riddled with incompetence, conflicting press statements, lack of follow through, and political meddling, in which the facts had to comport with the military junta’s worldview.

Despite rivalries between the police and army, Somyot was hand selected by the junta following their May 2014 coup d’etat and was trusted to do their bidding. He did not disappoint. Although the fact that the bombing took place only blocks away from the Royal Thai Police headquarters, the initial investigation and forensic evidence collection was remarkably shoddy.

The bombing confounded security analysts as it fit the modus operendi of no group. Groups that had the capabilities had no motive, and vice versa.  The lack of any claim of responsibility added to the confusion.

The military junta immediately denied that it was the work of international terroristsand tried to pin the attack on radical “Red Shirts.” But the attack was well beyond the technical capacity or interests of even the most rabid opponents of the military regime.

After 12 days of missteps, Thai police made their first arrest on 29 August, an ethnic Uighur carrying an obviously forged Turkish passport, who was found with a large cache of explosive materials in his apartment.  Three days later, the Thai army arrested a second suspect, also a Uighur carrying a Chinese passport, who had likely been handed over by Cambodian officials.  Authorities detained an ethnic Malay in Thailand’s Deep South days later in connection with the bombing.

The government issued 14 more warrants, but all remain at large, and no government – in particular the Turkish government, which has been highly critical of both China and Thailand – seems all that helpful. To date, no formal extradition requests have been received by the Turkish government, despite the fact that at least three of the top suspects were tracked there.

There were some really strong parts of the investigation, in particular on the financial side, where both police and anti-money laundering officials displayed professionalism.  Yet too many other aspects of the investigation were amateurishly handled or forced to comport to the junta’s conclusions to instill any sense of confidence in Thai law enforcement.

For example, Thai police completely dropped the ball when Malaysia detained three suspects, including two Malaysians and a Pakistani. Senior Thai police officials stated that there was actually no need to go and interview them, let alone begin extradition proceedings. Days later, it leaked out, the deputy police chief had traveled to Malaysia without the approval of his superiors, to at the very least follow up on theMalaysian investigation.

By early-September the role of Uighurs and radical Turkish nationalists was beyond doubt.  But it was not until 15 September that the government officially made the connection.  And even still, Thai authorities continued to insist that this was not an act of international terrorism, but instead an act of “vengeance” by human traffickers angered by Bangkok’s crackdown.

On 19 October the government announced that the two suspects would not be charged with terrorism, but instead with murder. Indictments are forthcoming.

Why is the junta so fixated on this?

First, there is palpable fear that if they call the bombing “terrorism,” it will impact the lucrative tourist industry, some 25 million visitors annually accounting for 10 per cent of GDP.  Since the May 2014 coup, the junta’s economic mismanagement has led to sharp downturns in economic growth, including tourism; they just can’t afford any further setbacks.

Second, in July 2015, Thailand once again received Tier 3 status, the lowest rating by the US Government in its annual Trafficking in Persons report. Thailand is under intense international pressure to stop the pervasive trafficking that goes on within its borders, which includes the complicity of very high ranking members of the security forces.  So their assertion that this was a human trafficking ring’s way of responding to the government’s crackdown has a diplomatic imperative.

Third, in July 2015, Thailand acquiesced to Beijing’s demand that it render some 109 Uighurs who had fled China and were en route to Turkey, which has been highly critical of China’s policies towards its Turkic minority.  Since the May 2014 coup, the junta has been widely ostracised by the West, and the United States has repeatedly called for the return to democratic rule.

China has swooped into the void, with regular senior-leader engagements, increased military exchanges and exercises, and the potential of a US$1 billion submarine sale.  The returned Uighurs were shown hooded, bound, with guards on either side during their return to China – ostensibly to “prevent a hijacking.”

Since their return they have been detained without charge for “re-education.”  The junta cannot afford to alienate China due to the fact that it has no other allies.  If it labeled the attack as terrorism in response to Thai government policy, then they open the regime to challenges to its policies.

Finally, if this was indeed an act of international terrorism, then it would put pressure on the Thai government to divert resources away from internal security, which has been the sole priority of the military government since seizing power in May 2014.

The junta equates regime survival with national security and has diverted the vast majority of manpower and resources – which have been dramatically increased – towards opponents of the regime.  Why shift resources towards meaningful threats to Thailand or its economy, when they can be focused on more spurious Article 112 lese majeste investigations for defaming the monarchy.

Indeed, on 28 September, the police chief also linked the bombing to a radical Red Shirt, calling it “politically motivated,” offering only the most tenuous evidence. Yet, the Department of Special Investigations – a bureaucratic rival to the police that is part of the Ministry of Justice – completely dismissed such that finding.

And yet, there is no evidence that this was simply a human trafficking ring.  They were definitely part of a group that was moving Uighurs to Turkey, but this was not a criminal trafficking ring. Moreover, it defies all logic: if this was a for profit smuggling organisation, what would they stand to gain by targeting a lucrative sector of the Thai economy and bringing intense investigative scrutiny on their actions?

The two suspects are likely to stand trial in a military court, though for murder, not terrorism. And with 14 suspects still at large, there are many outstanding questions.

But as they point to conclusions that are inconvenient for the junta, it seems that the case is now closed.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College where he focuses on Southeast Asian politics and security issues.

Amnesty warns of new Asian refugee crisis as monsoon season ends | Asian Correspondent

Amnesty warns of new Asian refugee crisis as monsoon season ends | Asian Correspondent
 Michele Penna Oct 23, 2015 


Newly arrived migrants gather at Kuala Langsa Port in Langsa, Aceh province, Indonesia earlier this year. Pic: AP.

As a controversial election approaches in Burma (Myanmar), a new report by Amnesty International this week put the spotlight on human rights abuses in the country. Entitled “Deadly Journeys” and largely based on interviews recorded in the Indonesian province of Aceh, the document dwells at length on the refugee crisis that engulfed Southeast Asia last spring and warns that a new humanitarian disaster may ensue with the end of the monsoon season.

That people are trafficked in Southeast Asia is no secret – quoting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Amnesty writes that about 63,000 people were smuggled through the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea in 2014 alone – but in 2015 things took a turn for the worse.

The crisis began early this year, when Thai authorities cracked down on bases used by traffickers. Deprived of their safe havens, the latter abandoned thousands of people to their fate at sea (up to 10,000 people were affected in the Andaman Sea as of May this year, wrote the International Organization for Migration.)

Some were probably lost forever in the ocean, while others reached the shores of neighboring countries, where initially they were met with indifference. The first instinct of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand was to push them back – something that contravenes international laws, says Amnesty – before eventually providing some support.

The reason why all this concerns Burma is that many of those who put their life at risk are Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State, the country’s western province where this small Muslim minority has suffered discrimination for decades.

The Rohingyas were stripped of their citizenship in 1982 by a citizen law which did not include them in the list of 135 officially recognized minorities – thus effectively turning them into unrecognized foreigners – and their recent history is marred by violence.

A sick migrant is helped by friends to board a truck that is taking them to a local hospital upon arrival in Simpang Tiga, Aceh province, Indonesia. Pic: AP.

Severe clashes with Rakhine’s Buddhist majority took place in 2012, when communal tensions flared. A 2013 report by Human Rights Watch found that the violence had displaced “125,000 Rohingya and other Muslims, as well as a smaller number of Arakanese”.

According to UN estimates quoted by Amnesty, about 416,600 people are currently affected by inter-communal violence and in serious need of humanitarian assistance. Many have no choice but to escape to sea, where they become prey to smugglers who get them on board – by hook or crook, it seems – and then ask their families for ransom.

“Virtually every Rohingya – women, men and children – who spoke with Amnesty International said that they had either been beaten by the boat crews or had witnessed other passengers being beaten,” states the research, citing victims who said that the beatings were sometimes repeated and extremely methodical. Some passengers were reportedly murdered after failing to pay the smugglers or died from dehydration.

The crisis died out toward June, as the monsoon swept across the region, making travel by boats dangerous. Fears are now growing that as the monsoon dwindles to an end, the smugglers will go back to their occupation and a new crisis may begin.

“There is a serious risk of another humanitarian disaster unfolding at sea in late 2015,” writes Amnesty.

This is why, according to the humanitarian organization, Southeast Asian countries should work on a better response in case a new crisis erupts, providing refugees with material help and avoiding sending them back to Burma, where they are likely to be abused.

As for Burma, Amnesty merely prescribes an old medicine which nearly all humanitarian agencies operating in the area urge Naypyidaw to take: ending the discrimination against Rohingyas and integrating them into society.

Whether this will happen is very much in doubt. Authorities have always refused to acknowledge the problem and the issue has become a no-go zone for political leaders, including for Aung San Suu Kyi and the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), whose candidates have shown little willingness to address the problem – fearing, some argue, an electoral backlash from the country’s Buddhist majority.

Thailand: World’s largest canned tuna company linked to slavery | Asian Correspondent

Thailand: World’s largest canned tuna company linked to slavery | Asian Correspondent
 Graham Land Oct 20, 2015

Environmentally destructive, unregulated and guilty of shocking human rights abuses, the tuna industry is a dirty business. The biggest tuna company in the world, Thai Union Group, has become a target of a global campaign by environmental activist organization, Greenpeace, in the hope that exposure and pressure will result in some positive changes from the Thailand-based seafood firm.
Thai Union Group has processing plants in Southeast Asia, Europe, Africa and the United States. It encompasses several leading seafood companies under its brand umbrella, including Chicken of the Sea (USA); John West (UK) Petit Navire and Parmentier (France); Mareblu (Italy); as well as top Thai brands Sealect, Fisho and Bellotta.
Greenpeace has already had success pressuring companies in Australia and the UK to clean up their tuna supply chains and wants the world’s largest tuna firm to improve behavior in terms of overfishing, labor abuse, impact on local communities, destructive fishing practices, and using “transshipping” to hide illegal fishing practices.
Thai Union Group linked to slavery at sea
In July a New York Times exposé revealed how fishing boats that supplied catch to Thai Union Group-owned canneries used kidnapped and enslaved migrant workers, mainly from Cambodia and Myanmar (Burma).
Thai Union has come under increased scrutiny since the New York Times piece, as well as a lawsuit against Nestle. Though Thai Union wasn’t the company being sued, the case was predicated on Nestle’s purchasing of fish from a known user of slave labor (TUG) for its Fancy Feast cat food brand.
Here is an extract from the lawsuit (via Undercurrent News):
Instead of true employment, men and boys are sold as slaves by brokers and smugglers to fishing captains in Thai ports in need of labor. Once sold, these men and boys… enter a modern form of indentured servitude where they are required to work to pay off the price the captains paid to purchase them.
Not just tuna, not just people, but dogs and cats too
Greenpeace’s campaign against environmental and human rights abuses in the global tuna industry is named “Not just tuna”, in order to highlight that the issue is not simply one of ecological degradation due to overfishing, but also of health and human rights.
Furthermore, it is not just people who are consuming vast amounts of unethical tuna. Some of the US’s top pet food brands — including Meow Mix, Fancy Feast (Nestle) and Iams — have bought some 28 million pounds of seafood-based cat and dog food from Thai Union Group. The ships it contracts supply forage fish for pet food and agricultural feed for pigs, chickens and farmed fish in the United States.
The U.S. is the largest customer of Thai fish with a large and rapidly growing portion of it destined for the pet food industry. In fact, the average cat in the U.S. eats twice as much food as the average human — around 30 pounds per year.
Greenpeace demands real change, not just polished cans




While Thai Union has launched a shiny new PR campaign to improve its image, Greenpeace would like to see concrete changes in industry practices, particularly transparency in order that consumers can be aware of where their product is coming from and how it is sourced.
Thai Union Group’s British John West brand claims on its packaging that its tuna is 100 percent traceable, yet Greenpeace has revealed that, as of now, this is simply not true. Last month 14 brands of canned tuna on the Thai market failed Greenpeace’s tests for sustainability, traceability and equity.

Fukushima and the media: Sensationalism or silence? | Asian Correspondent

Fukushima and the media: Sensationalism or silence? | Asian Correspondent
Graham Land Oct 16, 2015 

Pic: AP.
It’s been roughly 4.5 years since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster and news about how the situation is progressing keeps trickling in. But what do we really know about the current state of the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl? And what questions should we still be asking?
It was the largest-ever accidental oceanic release of radioactive contaminants.
However, both the Japanese government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are apparently failing to gather important data on radiation and coastal populations that may be at risk. The United States Environmental Protection Agency stopped its emergency monitoring just two months after the disaster took place.
From the Ecologist:
UK research shows that such mechanisms can occur at least 200km (by sea) distant from the point source of radioactivity, and that populations living in such areas are exposed to terrestrial food stuffs which can deliver a higher marine radioactivity (dietary) dose than do locally harvested sea foods.
Analysis of this research has shown that coastal populations ‘distant’ from a discharge point of ‘liquid’ radioactive wastes, may receive higher doses of marine radioactivity through their local terrestrial diet, than populations living adjacent to liquid radioactive waste point sources receive through their local sea foods.
While some experts have downplayed the risks of oceanic cesium drifting from Fukushima,others take issue with their methodology.
Fukushima is still leaking radiation.
More and more radioactive material has leaked into the ocean, something that wentunreported for 10 months by TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Co.), the utilities company in charge of the running of the Fukushima Daiichi plant. TEPCO has been further criticized for poorly monitoring periodic radiation leaks, which still occur in the event of heavy rains.
While overflow from drainage systems can carry radiation from the plant into the ocean, the same radiation can also re-enter land, contaminating coastal shores many miles down the coast

Fukushima temporary waste storage. Pic: Ricardo Herrgott/Global 2000 (Flickr CC)
Has the disaster boosted cancer rates around Fukushima?
Some research has linked elevated thyroid cancer rates among local children to the 2011 meltdowns. Japanese officials have claimed increased screening has resulted in more positive test results, while other researchers have pointed to studies showing no significant differences between children from areas exposed to the disaster and those from other parts of Fukushima prefecture.
A return to normalcy?
In a spot of positive news, the town of Naraha in Fukushima prefecture, located some nine miles south of the nuclear plant and epicenter of the disaster, has been declared safe after a major government cleanup. Naraha is the first town to have its evacuation order 100 percent lifted. So far only around 200 of the original 7,800 residents have returned. Baby steps.
79-year-old Naraha returnee Kohei Yamauchi is quoted in the Guardian:
We’re too old to be worried about getting cancer from radiation exposure. I expect a lot of older people will return, but not their children or grandchildren. It’s going to be difficult to raise children here.
As these photos of abandoned locations in Fukushima attest, there is a long way to go before things go back to “normal”.

A doll sits on the balcony of a house in an abandoned town just outside the nuclear exclusion zone surrounding the crippled Fukushima plant in Japan. Pic: AP.
Silence = death
For those who don’t share certain residents’ sense of resigned stoicism, including those living outside Fukushima — or anywhere around the world, for that matter — worry and skepticism are understandable reactions in a story that continues to develop. Official statements come too late or are contradicted by experts, scientific studies contradict one another, information is even hidden.
It is no wonder that there is paranoia and mistrust regarding the nuclear industry. While it is never helpful to sensationalize, exaggerate or fuel panic, nor is it constructive to be silent, ignore information or downplay risk.
In a hyper-mediated world where “compassion fatigue” — or in this case concern fatigue — is normal, we must be careful not to become bored by bad news. This is especially important when it is in the interests of those who would continue with business as usual — i.e. large corporations like TEPCO or BP — that we lose interest and allow such disasters to carry on unabated.

Ethics and elections in Myanmar | New Mandala

Ethics and elections in Myanmar 
Trevor Wilson  – 14 OCTOBER 2015

A woman votes in Myanmar’s 2012 by-election. Photo from Wikimedia commons.

A ground-breaking conference on the sensitive topic of ethics and elections was held in Myanmar’s new capital Naypyitaw at the end of September.

The conference was jointly sponsored by Myanmar’s Union Election Commission (UEC), and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a German based organisation that has been working at promoting democracy in Myanmar for several years.

The conference aimed to expose politicians, party officers, and media representatives from Myanmar to some of the more challenging issues confronting the nation in its scheduled 8 November 2015 simultaneous elections for two houses of the national parliament and fourteen regional assemblies.

In all, some 150 people attended with the head of the UEC, U Tin Aye, a retired Lieutenant General, giving the opening address.

Participation in the conference was impressively broad. Representatives from 27 different political parties attended, along with representatives from other ethnic and political groups, from civil society organisations, and from the Myanmar media.

Both major parties (the National League for Democracy and the Union Solidarity and Development Party) were present. Participants were drawn from across the whole country, except Rakhine and Tanintharyi regions. The Arakan National Party from Rakhine was invited, but was unable to attend.

Speakers came from the leading international organisations who are providing extensive capacity building training for the elections, as well as Myanmar NGOs. Their presentations confirmed that, technically at least, Myanmar is well prepared for this major election event.

Various aspects of risks for a free, fair and credible election were openly discussed. Unusually, the Myanmar political context was described comprehensively by Professor Dr Thuzar Myint from the Department of International Relations at Yangon University.

The importance of ensuring elections are as politically inclusive as possible was also considered. International scholars offered valuable insights into how different religious groups and minorities are effectively engaged in elections held in countries such as Turkey, the Philippines, and Malaysia. These comparisons were of interest to conference participants.

The valuable role played by free media in helping ensure free and fair election practices and procedures was also emphasised. I myself spoke about Australia’s experiences trying to avoid problems such as vote rigging, and bribery, and ensuring truth in election advertising and appropriate candidate behaviour.

Trevor Wilson is a former Australian ambassador to Myanmar and a visiting fellow in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University.

Why I speak out against the Thai Monarchy | New Mandala

Why I speak out against the Thai Monarchy | New Mandala
Chatwadee Rose Amornpat, 12 OCTOBER 2015

I was brought up in a royalist family in Thailand. My roots are also intertwined with the monarchy.

My grandparents worked for the royals and my family back home is a staunch supporter of the yellow cause. We always watched the nightly royal news (more like propaganda to me now) every night at 8pm, just like the rest of the population.

We adored the royals and their ostentatious outfits and lavish caravans of cars. They all looked like gods, untouchable and to be feared.

I first became disenchanted with the Thai monarchy during my last two visits to Thailand and prior to my lese majeste charge.

While visiting what I once called home, I often walked the streets and mingled with the locals, eating noodle soup on the streets. I talked with the street vendors and found that they all have a very hard life to say the least.

I remember one vendor so clearly; an elderly man, in his late 60s having to get up at 4am every day in order to prepare for another long shift selling noodles to passers-by from dawn till dust in order to make ends meet.

He said he would be lucky, after expenses, to make around 500 baht (approx $US 15). He and his family of four lived in a slum area of Klong Toie. He had worked at his stand for about 15 years and little had changed for him in that time. In contrast, as we talked I noticed several expensive Mercedes Benz zooming by. Some even stopped to pick up am order “to go.”

On other occasions, I rode in a taxis across Bangkok.  Again, the drivers expressed their sense of hopelessness for the future; destined to driving the smoggy streets, simply not knowing what else to do.

One driver told me that after paying his taxi-rental fee, food and gasoline, and after driving some 10-hours, if he is lucky his take-home pay was about 500 baht; the same as the noodle vendor.

While visiting Thailand, I also talked to many manual labourers and found that life is also very hard for them and their families. Most of them get paid a minimum wage of 300 baht per day, while about 30 per cent earn between 150-200 baht working 10-hour shifts.  These are the under aged workers in restaurants, factories, and the sex industry and parlours.

Such is life for Thailand’s majority, which basically drives the nation’s economy; what is known to foreigners as Thailand’s cheap labour.

Owners of such establishments are all royalists following the footstep of King Bhumibol who promotes his ‘Sufficient Economy’ everywhere. And each evening when I was at home with my parents watching TV, there would be the so-called ‘promotional’ ads proclaiming the greatness of the royals every hour.

Since the military takeover of May 2014 the propaganda peddling has gotten worse. As The New York Times’ Thomas Fuller has reported, coup leader General Prayuth Chan is spending $US 540 million on a promotional campaign with the ever so subtle moniker ‘Worship, protect and uphold the monarchy’.

“The campaign includes television commercials, seminars in schools and prisons, singing contests and competitions to write novels and make short films praising the king,” writes Fuller.

This money could have been better used for the poor. The fact is, Thailand is still a very poor country after almost 70 years of rule by King Bhumibol. Meanwhile, the king’s Crown Property Bureau prospers exponentially every year and is worth at least $US 43 .8 billion dollars (with some experts claiming this estimate is too low).

It controls 15 per cent of the country’s GDP and owns businesses throughout Thailand and the world. But because Thai people are passive in nature, they don’t complain.

What disturbs me so much is the fact that according to Forbes magazine, the Thai king is considered the richest monarch in the world. Yet, he continues to receive a yearly royal budget from Thai taxpayers potentially worth some $US 500 million dollars without feeling guilt or shame. I don’t know how he can justify his Sufficient Economy when it comes to his own self-interest.

All the while, Thailand’s poor continue to pay the price of his long reign. When you count the cost, it’s enough to make anyone scream and shout, let alone speak out.

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat is based in London. She was charged with lese majeste by the Thai military junta in July 2014. 

Thailand’s constitution conundrum | New Mandala

Thailand’s constitution conundrum | New Mandala

 

KHEMTHONG TONSAKULRUNGRUANG, 

1 OCTOBER 2015

A Thai soldier stands guard in front of the Democracy Monument. Photo: AP Photo/Sakchai Lalit

To draft an acceptable constitution for Thailand the junta must learn key lessons from past failure. 

In September, Thailand’s National Reform Council (NRC), rejected a controversial draft constitution prepared by the Constitution Drafting Commission (CDC).

The decision came after directions from the ruling National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), which took control of the country in the aftermath of last May’s coup. It has further delayed elections.

The NCPO is now recruiting a new CDC to draft another constitution. But this next draft is also destined to fail. Only a miracle will save the new CDC from the shame and humiliation suffered by former CDC head, Borwornsak Uwanno, and his team.

This constitution will not be a document of unity and prosperity as claimed by the junta. Those opposed to the NCPO will reject it, regardless of its content. Those who are pro-junta will embrace it without even glancing at what is has to say.

Thus, it is crucial that the CDC appeal to Thailand’s silent majority. The draft may then be accepted and drafters dismissed with grace, while possibly ensuring somewhat better governance than the current regime.

However, if a miracle is to happen, lessons must be learnt and the following advice should be taken seriously.

First and foremost, the drafters matter and the team must be well balanced.

Having conservatives in the CDC is not a problem as long as there are liberals too. The more problematic figures are those who actively appeared on the People’s Democratic Reform Committee stage during the ‘Bangkok shutdown’ of January 2014. Or those making contemptuous remarks publicly about the “uneducated lower class.” These radicals will see the drafting’s demise.

The opposite problem is that of deadwood; those who look for fame but contribute nothing to the task at hand. This excess baggage, mostly military generals out of touch with the world, is an obstacle to the drafting process. If they must be appointed for political reasons, it is better to “hide” them in the reform council where their incompetence is better concealed.

Second, be careful with spending. While former CDC members publically aired grievances about their terrible assignment, they forgot to mention that they were paid exorbitantly well.

Upon first meeting, the former CDC approved an allowance of 6,000 to 9,000 baht for each time they met. This was in addition to their salary at the cabinet, the NRC, or the National Assembly, which was also in addition to their regular full-time pay.

Why should a man with three income sources mope? Many of them bagged a lot of cash serving the junta. Combined with the news of the junta’s wasteful spending, the former CDC was criticised for getting too highly paid in exchange for mediocre service. When the draft was rejected, critics suggested they should return these gains.

By drafting the constitution, the drafters often claim they are “serving the country.” But, if you volunteer to serve the nation, you must keep your monetary reward to the minimum. It should not turn into a for-profit enterprise.

Third, keep the draft simple and democratic.

Inventing non-democratic mechanisms is a sure way of getting the draft rejected. Thai constitutions are getting lengthier, more complicated, and less functional. The CDC should avoid discussing a third-party prime minister or the powerful crisis panel – the 23-member panel to take over government during a “national emergency”.

Anything undemocratic should not be bluntly replaced with the tag “Thai-style” or “Thailand only.” These tags are only pretext for arbitrariness and the people know it.

Fourth, be transparent. The former CDC drafted what was to be the supreme law of the land but the people knew nothing about its making. Often, the press was not allowed to observe the constitutional debate.

The only source of information came from the CDC spokesperson and sounded like propaganda, rather than the beginning of a dialogue. Secrecy entails that the wisdom of the Thai majority cannot be trusted. It outright insults Thais’ intelligence.

Finally, involve the public. Meaningful participation is vital for the legitimacy of the CDC and the draft constitution.

The CDC boasted that it conducted public hearings throughout the country, and was blessed by several groups of well-wishers. The CDC must stop fooling itself that the school children, college students, and civil servants who came to give support to the CDC signified genuine public acceptance.

The few formal public hearings never worked because they were too brief and came too late. These meetings simply served as rubber-stamping processes. The CDC should listen more to its critics, who, due to the junta’s suppression, communicate via less formal means such as social media.

Will the miracle happen?

The junta has already put forward some names with doubtful credentials. Certainly, the CDC will not be able to act independently from the NCPO, and it is likely to honor the junta’s wishes. That implies many undemocratic features that should be avoided in any constitution draft.

The junta will not relax its grip on Thailand anytime soon and unfortunately the oppressive atmosphere will only cloud the drafting. The fear of attitude re-adjustment programs renders any attempt to bring in sincere participation fruitless.

Let us wish the new CDC luck; they are really going to need it in the six months ahead.

Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang is a Thai constitutional law scholar.

A conversation with Chomsky | New Mandala

A conversation with Chomsky | New Mandala

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

1 OCTOBER 2015

Pavin Chachavalpongpun (left) and Noam Chomsky. Photo supplied.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun discusses Thai politics, the monarchy, authoritarian rule and Thaksin with world-renowned public intellectual. 

Since the Thai coup of 22 May 2014, my life has been turned upside down.

The Thai junta summoned me twice for being critical of its intervention in politics. When I rejected the summons simply because I did not accept the legitimacy of the coup-makers, they issued a warrant for my arrest and revoked my passport. This forced me to apply for refugee status in Japan.

Throughout this tumultuous period, Professor Noam Chomsky – one of the world’s most renowned academics, political commentators and social-justice activists – offered his encouragement and support in the process of applying for my refugee status.

He helped appeal to the Japanese government to seriously consider my case, while at the same time condemning the Thai junta for its harassment against my basic human rights.

I had never met Chomsky prior to the coup in Thailand. Therefore, his sympathy towards my struggle was unexpected and much appreciated. So when I was invited to speak at the Thai Studies Program at Harvard University on 25 September, I dropped a note to Chomsky to see if he would be available to meet me. He said yes.

Our meeting took place on the same day at his office inside the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where we had a private conversation. As soon as I was invited to sit down, Chomsky fired off many hard-hitting questions. He was interested in three issues: the military, the monarchy, and Thaksin Shinawatra.

First, he asked if I could describe the performance of the current military government led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha. He was curious to know how the military government has been coping with both domestic and international pressure. At the same time, I was requested to give an update on the state of human rights inside Thailand.

Chomsky offered his view on authoritarian rule in today’s world and how it works against the tide of democratisation. He told me that any regime not supported by the people, in this century, should not last long. But in the Thai case, he admitted that there were factors contributory to the longevity of military rule. One of them is the monarchy.

He asked me to what extent the Thai monarchy has interfered in politics. I replied by referring to the shifting strategy of the monarchy and its involvement in politics.

The royal institution has broken its past modus operandi of pulling the strings behind the political scene, and is now playing politics in the open. This is particularly so after the 2006 coup, with the Queen attending the funeral of a yellow shirt and Princess Chulabhorn overtly supporting the anti-government protest led by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC).

Chomsky responded by asserting that royal political involvement explained why Thai politics has become muddled and complicated. The global trend shows that monarchies of the world are shrinking. Working against the tide of democracy would only accelerate that shrinking process.

But he was also surprised by the fact that the Thai public has become tolerable to political interference by both the monarchy and the military, particularly among the politically marginalised. This discussion led us to focus on the surge in cases involving lèse-majesté charges.

He told me that he remembered signing a petition many years ago calling for a reform of lèse-majesté law in Thailand. But he also said, his effort was futile. He believed that without an immediate reform of the law, the monarchy would find it even more difficult to coexist with democracy.

Chomsky seemed to also be very fascinated by the fact that former Prime Minister Thaksin has still commanded love and respect from a number of red shirts in Thailand. He was curious about Thaksin’s effective populist policy which seemed to have “hypnotised” Thais to continue to vote for his political proxies.

But Chomsky was also suspicious of Thaksin’s competitive political script, which was greatly different from that of the “network monarchy”. He raised the pertinent question of how Thaksin’s political idea could really shift Thailand’s political landscape toward more democratisation.

Chomsky also asked why Thaksin’s political opponents, be they opposition parties or enemies in the old establishment, had failed to initiate better and more commercialised policies designed to win the hearts and minds of Thai villagers. I could only say that they were not interested in empowering the people, as such empowerment could challenge their own powerful position in the political and economic spheres.

Chomsky posed some other questions on the negative aspects of Thaksin’s populism but at the same time came to understand the reason why his populist tactics functioned well in the country where marginalised people are still struggling to gain access to political and economic resources.

This brought us to the last topic of discussion, the Thai economy. Chomsky was inquisitive about the economic consequences of the coup, the changing domestic socio-economic conditions, and the implications on foreign investors in Thailand. Again, I could only provide him with a pessimistic outlook. Chomsky lamented that it was unfortunate for Thailand to have fallen into its own political trap.

Aside from his inquisitiveness about the Thai political crisis, Chomsky asked me about my future plans, now that I have become a refugee fleeing my own country. What would I do from now on?

I assured him that my status in Japan was guaranteed and that I was just waiting to witness changes during this transitional period in Thailand. Should I need any assistance from him, he said, he would be willing to help as much as he could.

I then asked him a final question; how would he like to see Thailand in the future? Chomsky quickly replied, “A democratic state without interventions from non-elected institutions.”

Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies and currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Walter H Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.