The myth of Thailand’s bureaucratic state | New Mandala

The myth of Thailand’s bureaucratic state | New Mandala

KHEMTHONG TONSAKULRUNGRUANG, 

30 JUNE 2015

Prayuth’s leadership hasn’t put a smile on everyone’s face.

Thailand’s latest coup was meant to replace greedy, inept politicians with benevolent bureaucrats better able to lead the country. Nothing could be further from the truth. 

It is no secret that Thailand has never been short of bad policies.

The administration has often produced policies devastating to people’s livelihoods and natural resources. One of the most popular explanations among supporters of the latest coup is the narrative of greedy and incompetent politicians. As uneducated local mafias, politicians are short-sighted because they are too concerned with the next election. That same concern forces politicians to support the wishes of their financial patrons, mostly business corporations, over those of the public.

The effect of this explanation is two-fold. First, it justifies anti-democratic sentiment because it claims that elections are the source of Thailand’s administrative failures. Second, it gives rise to the bureaucratic state because this explanation blames all mistakes on politicians while giving legitimacy to bureaucrats. Thai bureaucrats then portray themselves as benevolent experts who have to succumb to the ill-wishes of their elected superiors. If the assumption that the cause of Thailand’s evil is simply politicians is correct, then the military government of General Prayuth Chan-ocha should have produced numerous smart policies that will help Thailand leap forward.

Prayuth removed elected politicians from the administration which is now being run by retired and active senior bureaucrats. The executive and the administrative agencies are speaking the same language. A year and a month after the coup, this is the time to review Prayuth’s performance and test the hypothesis.

Yingluck Shinawatra’s administration was no different from others. Several of her policies were criticised for not only being detrimental to people’s livelihood and the environment, but also economically un-feasible.  The example of dam construction in the northwest triggered public outcry and massive rallies. It seemed that she was driving the country into the ground. This perception help shatter her regime’s legitimacy. During the six-month protest that ended in the coup d’état, one high-profile bureaucrat publicly encouraged his colleagues and counterparts to “serve the people, not your politicians’ bosses”.

Yet since the coup  in May 2014, there has been no significant change in the government’s policy direction. Prayuth has copied many of Yingluck’s unfinished projects. Prayuth is signing deals with foreign investors to a build high-speed railway. He is also pushing for  Pak Bara Deepwater Seaport in the south as well as coal power plants.

To handle this year’s drought, he mentioned the idea of digging a giant tunnel to pump water from the Thai-Myanmar border to the central plain. But above all, he is carrying on the water management scheme. The scheme includes networks of dams and waterways all over the country and was Yingluck’s most controversial project. These policies focus intensively on stimulating national economic growth while ignoring the social, economic, and health impacts on locals.

It is obvious that bureaucratic Thailand is not performing well. Bureaucrats are neither knowledgeable nor public-minded. They have failed to produce smarter policies than those of Yingluck. It is even more violent and there is a total lack of accountability. Why does the administration without representation fail?

Politicians and bureaucrats often rely on different sources of legitimacy. While politicians claim themselves to be representatives of the people, bureaucrats portray themselves as experts. Because of their training and experience, they know best and can make better decisions.

Unfortunately this might not be true.

The obsolete Thai bureaucracy has weeded out talented and able individuals. Those remaining lack the vision to offer an alternative to Shinawatra-style policies. Besides, when policy-makers don’t rely  on the ballot box to assume power, they need not care about the public’s concern.

Reliance on expertise also means input from laypeople is not valued in the bureaucratic state. Public participation is only a mere rubberstamp that will be conducted in the least meaningful manner. Without elections, the term “people” is reduced to a small band of elites that these senior bureaucrats personally associate with. Thus, the saying that a civil servant should serve only the people, not politicians, is misleading.

This could explain why Prayuth’s policies still prioritise economic growth while overlooking the cost on the grass-root majority. It also explains why the current administration is willing to use force against protesters. An elected government would hesitate to order the use of force for fear of losing the next election. It could even reconsider a policy if it believes that its popularity is at stake.

For the bureaucrat-politicians, this concern is dismissible. The authoritarian characteristic of the government fuels this problem because agencies are aware that they will not be held accountable for following the junta’s order.

Fourteen students were recently arrested for protesting for democracy.

Prayuth’s personality only exacerbates the problem. He is paranoid. As he holds the positions of both coup leader and  Prime Minister, the distrustful general regards criticism of his policies as an objection to the coup. Thus, dissidents of all kinds are indiscriminately dealt with.

Consequently, the administration has become more brutal in dealing with conflicts. Demonstrations were strictly prohibited. Violators would be invited for a “talk” to readjust their attitude before signing a vow not to repeat their actions. Soldiers stopped and detained energy-reform activists  marching from the south to Bangkok.  They also stopped and detained land-reform activists  marching from the north to the capital.

The junta evacuated villagers from protected forest areas, despite the fact that many communities claimed the government had mistakenly demarcated the area on their original land. In Loey, where a gold mine company was accused of pollution and human rights violations, armed soldiers escorted the company’s men to transport ore out of the area. Uniformed men also came back to warn locals not to be defiant to the state.

To minimise dissent, the government now operates in secrecy and haste. Little information is given to the public. Controversial statutes such as the new national park bill and the new mining bill are being promulgated without public participation. Numerous mining concessions have been granted. Environmental impact studies for several projects were exempted. Construction contracts are given away without public scrutiny. Worst of all, given the overall atmosphere at present, it is unlikely that victims of Prayuth’s mistakes will be able to find recourse.

Blaming policy mistakes on elected politicians is partly true. Politicians do not always consider the best choice for the public. They are dictated by the concern about the next election. But a bureaucratic Thailand does not solve the problem. The myth should be debunked. An administration without popular representation is a ridiculous, and dangerous, idea.

The most crucial question is whether Thais will learn this lesson. In a country where Prayuth’s coup is the 13th, the answer is not promising at all.

Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang is a constitutional law scholar in Thailand.  

Will Australia be next to legalise same-sex marriage? | Asian Correspondent

Will Australia be next to legalise same-sex marriage? | Asian Correspondent
 Rowena Dela Rosa Yoon Jun 27, 2015 

Australia demands marriage equality (Image: change.org)
The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI) communities in Australia have welcomed the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling to legalise same-sex marriage in all its 50 states – bringing the total of countries worldwide that allow marriage equality to 24.
LGBTI communities in Australia are celebrating and now taking the opportunity to maintain the momentum.
Ashley Fowler, on her blog on Human Rights Campaign, said Australia will be “the next country with an opportunity to approve nationwide marriage equality”.
Noting an all-time high of 72 percent supporting same-sex marriage,  she said the Australian Government “will allow its members to vote their conscience on marriage”.
Australia’s marriage equality bills have been defeated many times in both houses of Australian Parliament. Prime Minister Tony Abbott, a devout Catholic, repeated his opposition to “radical changes” that could tear down old-time traditions, including gay and lesbian marriages. Abbott defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman. He came under fire in 2013 when he warned LGBTI supporters not to embark on “radical change based on the fashion of the moment”.
“Support for legalization of same-sex marriage has hit an all-time high of 72 percent among Australians.  Yet for the past six years, the decision to legalize same sex marriage has been held up in parliament for a variety of political reasons,” Fowler said.

The Human Rights Campaign supports Australian Marriage Equality with hashtags #TeamEqual and #LoveCantWait.
Abbott is unswayed
Despite the US court’s ruling, Abbott is unswayed. He told Australian media in Melbourne on Saturday he will not change his mind as the ruling is a matter for the US, not Australia. He added he is yet to read the court’s ruling and cannot comment any further.
The opposition Labor Party is expected to push back on the agenda when parliament resumes after the winter break. Labor leader Bill Shorten and deputy Tanya Plibersek issued in a joint statement backing calls for action. They said this is a joyous day in America and it is therefore right to make a call to action in Australia.
Shorten called on Abbott to grant a free vote to Liberal MPs on marriage equality and for a Liberal MP to move his marriage equality amendment bill which proposes replacing the words “man and women” with “two people” in defining who can be legally married. Shorten is rallying for the support of MPs to second, move, and have a free vote on his bill.

LGBTI rally in Australia. (Photo: AAP-Dean-Lewins)
Shorten said the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision would have implications similar to those that followed last month’s referendum in Ireland. He said the referendum prompted him to introduce his marriage equality bill.
Cabinet Minister Christopher Pyne described the U.S. court’s ruling as “fascinating” and said same-sex marriage will likely be back on the agenda when parliament resumes for voting.
The Australian Greens are happy with the U.S. ruling and said Australia needs to catch up. Senator Janet Rice said in a statement, “The Greens are committed to working with our cross-party colleagues to make sure this happens by the end of the year.”
Rice has been leading a separate campaign to support marriage equality:
Right around the world, marriage equality is becoming a reality for many LGBTI couples. The time has come for marriage equality in Australia. We have an exciting opportunity here – let’s work together and get marriage equality right.
The campaign aims to collect  3,000 signatures. So far “1849 people have showed support representing 61.63% of the goal,” she said.
All eyes on Australia
The Australian Marriage Equality (EMA) announced that with marriage equality achieved across the U.S., America’s largest marriage equality advocacy group, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) , has launched a campaign to focus world attention on the lack of marriage equality in Australia.
The campaign will raise the profile of the Australian marriage equality campaign, informing its supporters that “all eyes are now on Australia,” EMA National Director Rodney Croome said.
Croome said the HRC has notified millions of its supporters of the fact that “Australia is lagging behind the US and plans to work closely with Australian advocates over the coming weeks to help raise the global profile of the Australian marriage equality campaign.”
Croome said EMA welcomes the support to highlight how far Australia is falling behind. But “as marriage equality has been achieved in the U.S., all eyes will be on Australia with the hope we are next,” he said.
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Rakhine and Rohingya: hopes for a peaceful future? | New Mandala

Rakhine and Rohingya: hopes for a peaceful future? | New Mandala

 

JAMES GIGGACHER, 

18 JUNE 2015

A young Rohingya boy in a camp for the internally displaced. Photo by European Commission DG Echo on flickr https://www.flickr.com/photos/69583224@N05/

Politician delivers powerful testimony on plight of Rohingya in Myanmar, calls for international assistance.

One of the many highlights from the 2015 Myanmar/Burma Update at The Australian National University earlier this month was hearing from long-time Rohingya politician U Kyaw Min.

First elected in 1990 to the seat of Buthidaung in Rakhine State, he was sentenced to 55 years jail with four members of his family for political activities in 2005. Fortunately the Democracy and Human Rights Party member and his family were released by presidential amnesty in 2012.

In light of May’s Asian migrant crisis, which saw thousands of Rohingya bounced back and forth between Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, U Kyaw Min’s talk during the conference’s session on communal violence provided powerful and timely testimony.

Highlighting a lack of citizenship and the 1.5 million internally displaced Rohingya living in camps “no better than concentration camps” in Rakhine State as critical challenges, U Kyaw Min said the Myanmar government was not interested in addressing the issue.

“Persecution, distortion, arrest. This is what the Rohingya face. Desperate and stripped of their rights, the Rohingya, who can’t enter Myanmar proper, flee,” he said. “Smugglers have taken advantage of this. What was a small-scale business is now large.

“The Myanmar government says the Rohingya are an internal issue. It is their right to solve it their way. But what is happening is real genocide.”

U Kyaw Min also called on foreign governments, including Australia, to do more to help the Rohingya.

“International governments must take action to combat this injustice. We want to live peacefully, we have lived peacefully.

“Up until recently the different groups in Rakhine State have been living peacefully side-by-side. Without one group the other group cannot survive. But since 2012 there has been no cooperation.

“There is no business, the economy is suffering. The people are suffering. And the Rohingya cannot leave.

“I hope we can dream together, Rakhine and Rohingya. I hope for a peaceful and proper future together.”

Have a listen to U Kyaw Min’s speech here or in the player below. And let us know what you think.

My take is that whatever you think of the Rohingya issue, U Kyaw Min’s testimony compels you to think some more.

Malaysia’s opposition coalition is dead | New Mandala

Malaysia’s opposition coalition is dead | New Mandala

TOM PEPINSKY, 

18 JUNE 2015

Members of Malaysia’s Pakatan Rakyat in happier times.

What’s next for Malaysia’s opposition movement?

Seven years after it was formed, Malaysia’s most successful three-party opposition coalition, the Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Pact), is officially dead.

This is a blow for the many Malaysians who support an alternative to the Barisan Nasional regime that has ruled Malaysia in one form or another since 1957.

The final blow came from Democratic Action Party Secretary General Lim Guan Eng, who announced two days ago that the PR “ceased to exist.” The proximate cause of that, in turn, was a recent decision by the general assembly (muktamar) of the Pan-Malaysian IslamicPa rty (PAS) to stop collaborating with DAP. This followed what Bridget Welsh has called a “purge of the progressives” during the muktamar, in which conservatives from the “ulama wing” grabbed all of the party’s important leadership posts.

Those final details are important, but the roots of the PAS-DAP split are structural in nature. PAS is an Islamic party, overwhelmingly supported by ethnic Malays. DAP is a social democratic party, overwhelmingly supported by ethnic Chinese. As I wrote in 2007,

In many ways, each opposition party has more in common with the BN than it does with other opposition parties.

And in 2013, after the results of the 2013 General Election came in and remarking upon Anwar Ibrahim promise to step down, I observed that

Without the pluralist PKR and Anwar’s dynamic leadership, it is unclear how a largely Chinese social democratic party and an Islamist party can remain in the same coalition.

Back in 2007, writing in the wake of the split of the Barisan Alternatif, I was sceptical about the possibility of cross-ethnic cooperation in the near future. That was wrong: cooperation did work from 2008 until 2015, and generated a majority of votes going to PR instead of the BN in 2013.

We now face the possibility that PAS will cooperate more formally with UMNO and BN. Such cooperation would align Islamic and Malay-nationalist agendas (which have quite a bit in common anyway) while further sidelining non-Malay and non-Muslim voices in this diverse multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. This makes sense from UMNO’s perspective given that UMNO now dominates BN to an unprecedented extent, and no longer has a parliamentary supermajority.

So what’s next? There are four important places now to watch.

First, Persatuan Ummah Sejahtera Malaysia (PasMa), which translates to something like the “Union of the Faithful for a Prosperous Malaysia.” PasMa describes itself as a “watchdog” group to ensure that PAS does not cooperate with BN, and represents (after a fashion) those progressives who have been purged from PAS. And its chief Datuk Phahrolrazi Zawawi is now calling for a new Islamic party to participate in a new opposition coalition. Can PasMa be that party? Only time will tell.

Second, PKR, the People’s Justice Party. Its stance is firming up as I write this: PKR has already echoed Lim Guan Eng in declaring PR dead. Quo vadis PKR? It is not yet clear.

Third, the BN’s component parties. If PAS moves to cooperate more formally with UMNO, then UMNO and the non-Malay parties face an interesting choice. The non-Malay parties will almost certainly resist bringing PAS into the coalition, for that dilutes their voice even further and threatens their core interests as well. Yet I would not rule out a formal alliance between UMNO and PAS in the near future, even if the non-Malay parties quit in protest. If so—and believe me this is a hypothetical—this would signify the most significant party system change in Malaysian history.

And fourth, state-level PR governments. Yes, PR is dead, but PR-based coalitions still rule in important states such as Selangor, Penang, and Kelantan. Selangor is the critical case: here, unlike in Penang or Kelantan, PAS must remain in alliance with PKR and DAP for the government to stay together. Will it? Selangor is a relatively prosperous, multi-ethnic, “suburban” state near Kuala Lumpur, not a rural northern Malay heartland state.

It is also the site of the infamous Selangor crisis. PAS members there almost certainly differ from party members in the Malay heartland.

This may be where to look to see where Malaysian party politics is heading. Selangor Backbenchers Club chairman Ng Suee Lim recently said that the government would remain in power so long as the three parties “could still agree on certain common issues and be respectful to each other”.

We will have to see if that will be possible.

Tom Pepinsky is Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University. You can read more of his writing at his blog.

More bad news for Malaysia’s democracy | New Mandala

More bad news for Malaysia’s democracy | New Mandala

TOM PEPINSKY, 

18 JUNE 2015

Without Anwar Ibrahim Malaysia’s opposition quickly unravelled. Photo by Pix Firdaus Latif/ Wikimedia commons.

Collapse of opposition another blow for Malaysia’s democratic prospects.

Back in February, just after Anwar Ibrahim lost his appeal against sodomy charges and was given a harsh five-year jail sentence, New Mandala spoke to Malaysia politics expert John Funston.

He said that without Anwar around to unite the conflicting policies and personalities, maintaining the opposition alliance would be “extremely difficult”.

He was spot on.

A mere four months after Anwar’s jailing and the seven-year-old People’s Alliance, or Pakatan Rakyat, has called it a day, declaring Wednesday that it no longer “functions formally”.

It brings an end to Malaysia’s most successful opposition movement; one which won the majority of votes in 2013’s general election to almost unseat the six-decade ruling coalition Barisan Nasional. Only gerrymandering of seats saw Barisan Nasional maintain power.

The collapse of the coalition comes about after attempts by the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) to enforce the controversial Islamic law, hudud. The Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP) objected to the move and now the two parties have severed ties.

Which raises the question; what does this mean for the already slim hopes of democracy in Malaysia?

The first thing to keep in mind is that while Pakatan Rakyat showed great promise as a possible alternative to the ruling Barisan Nasional, it was never a cohesive alliance.

“The collapse came about for the same reason the parties split after the 1999 election – because a group within PAS has sought to press for an extreme version of its Islamic ideology,” says Funston.

“This time the pro-Ulama group are even stronger – after a bitter campaign they won a clean sweep of all top positions in the party’s general assembly earlier this month.”

Another key difference is that the pro-Ulama group is now looking to work with Prime Minister Najib Razak’s UMNO party to achieve its goals – in particular the implementation of the extreme hudud law in PAS-run Kelantan.

But as Funston points out, as too Tom Pepinsky here, it might not be the end of collaboration between the former alliance parties.

“In the absence of a formal coalition some cooperation still seems likely, in particular for the Selangor state administration where the three parties have similar representation,” says Funston. “But this will not make for a unified administration, and further efforts by PAS to implement hudud might imperil even this.”

With elections due in 2018, the demise of the alliance will significantly reduce the opposition’s prospects of successfully challenging the government. And if PAS does end up building an alliance with UMNO, this also does not bode well for Malaysia’s non-Malay parties.

“Some opposition members have mooted a grand alliance against the ruling coalition, drawing on support from moderate Malay NGOs, and perhaps headed by UMNO veteran Tengku Razaleigh,” says Funston.

“Such a realignment would be difficult to accomplish, though some movement in this direction is possible if the PAS professionals align more closely with DAP and PKM, and other Malay moderates continue to join these two parties.”

Meanwhile Barisan Nasional are going through their own potential divorce, with an ongoing clash between former prime minister Dr Mahathir and Najib sending the ruling party to the brink (read this New York Times piece for a good overview of the back story involving the PM’s wife’s spending sprees and the murder of a Mongolian model).

The upshot is that Mahathir has called time on Razak, saying his many failures, including that of sovereign wealth fund 1MDB, means he must go.

“The 90-year-old Mahathir is relentless, and has an outstanding record of bringing opponents down,” says Funston. “He may well continue until he succeeds in this case.

“Najib has responded vigorously, and benefits from the fact that there is no obvious successor. But he has not mounted a plausible defence against Mahathir’s charges, and momentum could move against him quickly if party leaders come to accept Mahathir’s claim that UMNO will not win the next election while Najib remains in charge.”

With three years until elections, the drama is only set to build.

James Giggacher is editor of New Mandala.

The Great Game Over Burma | The Irrawaddy

The Great Game Over Burma | The Irrawaddy
 AUNG ZAW / The Irrawaddy, June 10, 2015

China’s President Xi Jinping, right, and Burmese President Thein Sein attend an official welcoming ceremony as Thein Sein arrives for the Boao Forum, in Sanya, Hainan province, on April 5, 2013. (Photo: Reuters)Burma’s opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi began a five-day visit to China on Wednesday, the first time the National League for Democracy chairwoman has made an official trip to Burma’s northern neighbor.

In this April 11, 2013 story, The Irrawaddy looks at the changing dynamics of Burma’s relationship with China, and the wider world.

The recent political opening in Burma surprised many neighboring countries, including China. The government’s reforms have no doubt received welcome applause, but for Burma’s traditional friends and foes, they have also created room for new competition in the country. The rules of the game have changed quickly in Burma, and the world is watching to see how international relations, particularly with China, shift in turn.

Since Burma regained independence from the British in 1948, leaders and diplomats at the Foreign Affairs Ministry have devoted most of their time, energy and resources to improving ties with China. We have seen rocky relations as well as honeymoon periods between both countries.

In the past, China had openly supported Burma’s banned Communist Party. At points, the East Asian superpower even dispatched troops to the northern territory of Kachin State—forcing Burma to set rounds of border demarcation meetings in the 1950s and 1960s. Burma also saw anti-China riots in 1967, as Beijing stirred up disturbances by encouraging Chinese agents to support Communist cells in the country during the Cultural Revolution period.

Although both countries signed a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression based on five principles of peaceful coexistence, China has sometimes breached these core principles to test the so-called paukphaw relationship, while Burma has avoided antagonizing its northern neighbor.

Though many Burmese political observers dislike Gen. Ne Win, who came to power through a coup in 1962 and ruled Burma with an iron fist until his regime was ousted in 1988, some give him credit for playing a “neutral” foreign policy during the Cold War, which they say saved Burma from becoming the puppet of any giant power in the region or the West. For the Chinese Communist Party, Burma served as a buffer zone to deter proxies of the West along with India and the Soviet Union.

Certainly, however, in the back of their minds, Burma’s leaders have always feared China. Burma’s late Prime Minister U Nu, who held numerous meetings with Chinese leaders to settle several disputes, once publicly expressed this fear in a statement after the Chinese Communist Party assumed power in 1949. “Our tiny nation cannot have the effrontery to quarrel with any power,” he said. “And least among these, could Burma afford to quarrel with new China?”

But the situation is changing now. Last weekend, Burma’s President Thein Sein visited China, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. During his three-day visit for the Boao Forum, a summit of government and business leaders, Thein Sein played relatively safe but firmly stressed that Burma would practice an independent and active foreign policy while still adhering to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. He said Burma would focus more on developing ties with other countries in the Southeast Asian region. He also urged China to invest responsibly in Burma and to earn the trust of local Burmese people.

As Burma’s leaders continue to forge closer relations with the West and other Southeast Asian nations, the Chinese, like everyone else, are preparing to adapt.

Recently, the outgoing Chinese ambassador publicly met democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyidaw. Chinese diplomats have acknowledged previous meetings between them. To handle Burma going forward, China has appointed a veteran diplomat in Asian affairs, Yang Houlan, who served in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. His appointment is reminiscent of the past. In 1963, a year after Ne Win took power, China appointed Geng Biao as vice foreign minister to Burma. Geng Biao was a senior diplomat who had served missions in Europe soon after the formation of the People’s Republic of China.

In the face of rising Western influence, it is likely that China will employ “soft power” to win back the hearts and minds of the Burmese people. During a previous visit, Thein Sein confessed a fondness for Chinese television dramas. “Since childhood, I’ve been watching Chinese television,” the president told China Radio International.

On the political front, Yang Houlan’s appointment as ambassador and China’s involvement in ceasefire talks between Kachin rebels and the Burmese government are signs that Beijing is serious about settling Burma’s lingering ethnic conflicts, which have threatened border stability as well as Chinese gas pipelines and a railway project in the country. Kachin military leader Gen. Gun Maw, who is now involved in ceasefire dialogues with the Burmese government, told The Irrawaddy that Kachin leaders asked international observers including the United States, the United Kingdom and the United Nations to observe the peace talks, but that the Chinese did not want any outsiders (i.e. Westerners) getting involved. Instead, China invited the Burmese government and Kachin leaders to hold a series of meetings on Chinese soil.

A stable and prosperous Burma will no doubt benefit everyone. However, Burma’s improved relations with the West, and particularly with the United States, will complicate relations with China. The more Burma improves ties with the West, the more Western influence in the country is expected to rise.

Burma has seen growing anti-China sentiment at home. Most ordinary people in the country were repulsed by Beijing’s support for the previous brutal regime, and many continue to protest against China’s extraction of natural resources with little regard for the environment and local populations. Some critics say China has only given its support to exploit Burma’s natural resources and gain strategic access to the Indian Ocean.

China is Burma’s largest investor, channeling between US$14 billion and $20 billion into the country since 1988. Energy-hungry China has poured money into hydropower projects in the country’s ethnic regions, and its three major oil corporations have a strong foothold. Many Burmese worry that Chinese investments and aid programs are like a Trojan horse. However, given the government’s suspension of the China-funded Myitsone dam project and public protests over the controversial Letpadaung copper mine, it seems likely that civil society groups will target many more Chinese-backed projects in the future and that these investments will become political time bombs.

The fact is that Burma no longer needs to hide behind China. Nevertheless, pundits argue that Beijing will not let go easily. When former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Burma for the first time in November 2011, Chinese leaders played it coy. The Global Times newspaper, a mouthpiece for the Chinese government, wrote during Clinton’s visit that China did not resist Burma’s attempts to improve relations with the West but would not accept “seeing its interests stomped on.” The message was clear: China would not tolerate Burma becoming an ally of the United States.

In October 2011, Burma announced its decision to suspend construction of the Myitsone dam in Kachin State, a project that had provoked strong public opposition. China was bewildered by the announcement, which came just five months after Thein Sein’s first official visit to Beijing, where he signed nine cooperation agreements including a $765 million credit package and a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.

But the question remained, would Burma turn against China? The answer is simple: no. Burma doesn’t yet have that luxury.

It will be interesting to watch how Burma handles the delicate balancing act between China and the rest of the world, maintaining its old alliance while proving it is not a satellite state. Burma’s generals are well versed in the art of pitting international powers against one another. But if Burma falters at the game this time, the country’s leaders will no doubt face accusations of playing with fire.

Just before her trip to Burma in 2011, Clinton, who announced the US policy of a pivot toward Asia, received a counterbalancing message from Naypyidaw: Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, commander in chief of Burma’s armed forces, flew to China to meet with then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. The military chief signed a defense cooperation agreement, and the two sides talked of enhancing their comprehensive strategic partnership.

At home, Thein Sein told Clinton that Burma would continue its relationship with China while strengthening ties with other countries. He pointedly called Beijing a strong, geopolitically important partner that had encouraged Burma to improve relations with the West. Ironically, China secretly hosted a rare meeting between Burma and US officials in Beijing just four years earlier, in 2007.

In September 2012, before making his first official visit to the United States, Thein Sein traveled to China. Ne Win, the former dictator, likewise received Chinese leaders in Rangoon before making trips to the West, and they urged him not to make political commitments to the United States.

Washington is also being careful not to upset China. During his historic visit to Burma in November last year, President Barack Obama said in a speech that the United States welcomed China’s peaceful rise. And when asked whether US policies in Burma centered on relations with China, US Ambassador Derek Mitchell told The Irrawaddy that his country’s increasing engagement was “about Burma.”

“It’s always been about Burma,” he said. “There’s a misunderstanding in China, and even among some commentators, that everything we do in Asia is about containing China or encircling China, but that’s simply not the case. Our policy toward Burma has been about Burma for 20 years, 25 years, before China was so-called rising or re-emerging. Our policy toward Burma is evolving because Burma itself is evolving.”

Burma and the United States both understand they must not agitate China. But almost everyone else in Burma, except for those embedded with the Chinese, seem more than ready to welcome the West. They know it is the best way to counter Chinese influence.

Though it has sparked ongoing debate in Naypyidaw among top leaders and opposition members, Burma’s bid to escape China’s shadow is obvious. Last year, Min Aung Hlaing visited China’s historical adversary Vietnam before going to Beijing. In addition to visiting China soon after his appointment to the presidency, Thein Sein went to India, indicating a desire to diversify Burma’s portfolio of strategic partners in the region. His former boss Snr-Gen Than Shwe did the same, making two state visits—to China and India—before leaving his throne.

Burma also seeks to expand defense ties with its neighbors. In the past, Burmese leaders allegedly allowed China’s listening posts and a radar facility on Burma’s Great Coco Island, reportedly to monitor regional military activities, especially air and naval movements in the Bay of Bengal, and to conduct surveillance of India’s strategically important tri-service facilities at Port Blair o n South Andaman Island. But in March, Burma and India conducted joint naval exercises and patrols in the Bay of Bengal, while India also reportedly ran a training program for Burma’s armed forces, including exercises for pilots of the Russian-built Mi-35 helicopter gunships.

In February, Burma also sent its two frigates, UMS 561 and UMS 562, to the Thai island of Phuket for the first time in 18 years. Thanasak Patimaprakorn, supreme commander of the Thai armed forces, said in Bangkok that the visit of the Burmese ships was intended to celebrate 65 years of diplomatic ties between both countries, with expectations for closer military ties going forward.

Since improving relations with the West, Burma has been invited by the United States to observe the annual Cobra Gold military exercise in Thailand. In the near future, the United States will likely provide non-lethal training to Burma’s army officers. And last month, Australia announced it was lifting restrictions on military engagement with Burma in recognition of the country’s democratic reforms.

Burma will probably bolster relations with Japan as well. Ties between both countries date back to the World War II era, and Japan’s interests run deep in Burma. Not wanting to miss the train now, Tokyo recently decided to resume aid in Burma, and more Japanese companies and NGOs will soon play a counterbalancing role against Chinese influence.

As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), Burma could also assume a proactive role in the regional grouping, as it did during the golden days of the 1950s. Ironically, Asean allowed Burma to join in 1997 because it wanted to pull the pariah state from China’s sphere of influence, but Burma’s reliance on its northern neighbor deepened. Now 15 years later, Burma must act with urgency to develop a foreign relations strategy for the world—not just China—as it integrates more with Asean, India and the rest of Asia.

Of course, Burma must get its house in order first, paying serious attention on the domestic front to its northern territory, where the national government has never been able to establish its law and order. (In 2010, Burma could not hold elections in the Wa region, and soon afterward fierce fighting broke out in Kachin State.)

But as the country continues opening up, Burma will test its independent and active foreign policy when it hosts Asean foreign ministers in 2014 at a summit in the country. Everyone will watch to see how the former pariah state exerts its emerging international status to placate neighbors and new friends from the West.

The Thai junta’s doublespeak | New Mandala

The Thai junta’s doublespeak | New Mandala

 

THONGCHAI WINICHAKUL & TYRELL HABERKORN, GUEST CONTRIBUTORS, 

8 JUNE 2015

Thailand’s rulers have made doublespeak a central strategy of its rule and turned it into an art of absurdity.

During the first year following the coup by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) on May 22, 2014, the junta in Thailand summoned at least 751 people, including a large number of intellectuals, leaders of local political networks, and those whom the junta considered opponents. These people were variously detained, interrogated, intimidated, or simply warned to cease their opposition to the coup. Some were subsequently charged, but most were released after signing a document that they would not engage in any political activities against the junta.

The junta told the Thai public that the purpose of the summons was “attitude adjustment”.

During the first year under the junta, domestic criticism has been swiftly and, often publicly, punished. Academic and public forums on politics are disrupted or cancelled, or at the very least subject to surveillance. Highly-politicised prosecutions against those accused of lèse majesté and politicians associated with the previous government take place with little attention to due process. Resource grabs across the country at the expense of rural citizens’ land and livelihood are widespread. All of this takes place in the name of “reconciliation”.

“Reform” is another keyword used by the regime to describe the changes enacted via junta order or envisioned in the draft constitution. But rather than improvement, these measures amount to winding the clock back 30 years with respect to democracy, decentralisation, and the role of the military in politics.

This “reform” is pushed ahead under the slogan “Marching Forward Thailand” in order to “Give Happiness Back to People” despite ongoing suppression, injustice and gloomy economic news.

For the NCPO, reconciliation means the elimination of apparent social or political conflict. Attitude adjustment means accepting indoctrination by the junta obediently. Reform means going back to a time before democracy. Orwellian doublespeak is rampant in the NCPO’s Thailand.

Doublespeak is neither new nor specific to Thailand. In 2010, the government under Abhisit Vejjajiva ordered a violent suppression of red shirt demonstrations in central Bangkok and referred to the crackdown as “taking back the space”. During the ‘New Order’ regime in Indonesia between 1965-1998, tens of thousands were sent to prison islands under the “Humanitarian Project”. Then, as now, eloquent words do not mask the violence behind the need to obfuscate.

The current Thai junta’s doublespeak differs from earlier versions in several ways.

First, the junta’s doublespeak is effective primarily because their supporters, the powerful and wealthier sectors of Thai society, share similar understandings of these key concepts. To the junta and its supporters, democracy means rule by uncorrupt and virtuous people who can bring “harmony,” another ubiquitous term in Thailand. They believe in the uniqueness of “Thai-style democracy” with governance by “good people” ruling in the name of the benevolent monarchy. The means by which this kind of rule is achieved is less important than its moral integrity. They contrast this with Western democracy, which they argue results in the election of corrupt politicians by ignorant people.

This is the legacy of age-old Buddhist Dharma politics. After all, “good governance” in Thai is translated literally as “governance by Dharma,” or governance by divine law. “Harmony” which means the maintenance of social order and the absence of serious conflict, is the hallmark of governance by Dharma. Within this framework, reconciliation does not involve truth or justice, but rather the appearance of harmony with dissent swept neatly under the rug.

Second, there is a huge gap in the understanding of these keywords between the junta’s domestic supporters on the one hand, and its domestic dissidents and the international community on the other. The junta knows that a large sector of population opposes their rule and is not fooled by doublespeak, not even for a moment.

The junta is aware of this failure, but continues to employ doublespeak to consolidate its domestic supporters. The junta thus must deal with the gap between their supporters and opponents, particularly the international community. Domestic critics face intimidation, arrest, and detention. In response to criticism from the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and democratic governments around the world, the junta flatly denies carrying out human right violations, restricting liberty and tampering with democracy. Heavy suppression domestically and the disregard of criticism by the international community serve the same purpose to reaffirm and strengthen domestic support.

Third, and most important, the repetition and extension of doublespeak over time, combined with the criminalisation of criticism of the junta, denies the truth and produces impunity for state violence. When the current regime misnames detention and torture as “attitude adjustment,” they are following a well-worn path. There have been many previous incidents in which the Thai state suppressed its citizens, including killing them, without any concern of being held to account.

Most recently, when a historic process meant that Abhisit Vejjajiva and company were charged in late 2013 in the criminal court with premeditated murder for their role in the 2010 bloodshed, they maintained that they did not order a crackdown, but aimed to “take back the space” occupied by the protestors. Under legal conditions that remain murky, the charges against them were dismissed following the most recent coup.

The current junta continues to insist that they are reformers working tirelessly for reconciliation in order to return happiness to people, not dictators. They know well that the judiciary is either firmly on their side or at their disposal to legalise their doublespeak and to absolve their wrongdoings.

But as opposition grows, most recently the peaceful protests on the one-year anniversary of the coup that led to the arrest and detention of more than 50 students, cracks are appearing in the façade of normalcy created by the junta’s doublespeak. Although they were released without charges being pressed at the time, the delayedsummoning of at least 11 students to hear charges against them on 8 June is another example of doublespeak in action. The junta may hope that they can ride out the discontent. They may hope that the history of impunity will ensure that time is on their side.

The current junta has made doublespeak a central strategy of its rule and turned it into an art of absurdity. It is incumbent upon all of us who are concerned about the Thai people to name “Thai-style democracy” by the more correct name of old-fashioned dictatorship.

Thongchai Winichakul is a Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Tyrell Haberkorn is a Fellow in the Department of Political and Social Change at the Australian National University’s Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs.

Myanmar’s future lies in reconciling the present with the past | New Mandala

Myanmar’s future lies in reconciling the present with the past | New Mandala

JAMES GIGGACHER, 

5 JUNE 2015

U Khin Myint Aung. Photo by Stuart Hay/ANU media.

In this exclusive to New Mandala, HE U Khin Myint Aung, Speaker of the Upper House, Myanmar Parliament, outlines the path for political reform in his home nation.

As a Myanmar citizen I am deeply satisfied with international interest into what some Western media have called “the Myanmar Spring” – which is our democratic transformation.

If we analyse the civil war we will see two root causes. These were the ideological root and the ‘ethnic’ root. Because we could not find a political solution to these two roots we slid over the brink into civil war. As the flow of world politics has changed the danger of the ideological problem has receded, but the ethnic problem is still a sensitive one to this very day.

In 1962 the Tatmadaw took over the nation’s responsibilities and turned its back on parliamentary democracy and moved in the direction of socialism. In the beginning it had some successes and popular support, but in the long run it moved towards a worse outcome. The worst result was that the Tatmadaw, born of the people and trusted by them, now began to see the trust between itself and the people erode.

As such, I believe that there are two fundamental issues in Myanmar politics which still have not yet been resolved. First, is the issue between the central government and ethnic minorities. This conflict is now in its 65th year.

Second, is the relationship between the people and various successive governments. All governments of Myanmar since 1962 have been, in one way or another, influenced by the military. This conflict is now in its 53rd year.

The first issue caused Myanmar’s civil war. As long as this issue persists, it will be extremely difficult to end the civil war. The other issue is the result of long-term ruling of military-linked government, and it is the core of our democratic cause.

Still, both these issues are issues between brothers of the same blood, and therefore are not deadly enmities. They are issues which can be resolved by friendly persuasion. But since these issues are long-festering ones, we cannot expect them to be solved quickly. We need time, and patience.

In solving these two issues there are also some unavoidable background historical legacies. Because these have become entrenched from our long history, we may also call them ‘political culture’. These include an obsession with norms, which weakens pragmatism.

There is also an obsession with radicalism. Myanmar politics has a tendency to radical solutions that would like to uproot everything and a strong fascination with militant politics. We must solve this tendency through negotiation and slowly change this attitude. This can be an obstacle to Myanmar’s democratic cause.

There’s also an obsession with faction, and when we need national unity, overcoming this obsession is also a challenge. Finally there is a worship of personality and this desire for a ‘political saviour’ is an obstacle for the institutionalisation of democracy.

The first attempt at creating the democratic transformation that we see today in Myanmar was the 1988 democracy upheaval. To be honest, even then the government in power – the Burma Socialist Program Party – knew it had to change in accordance with the trends of the times. However it appeared that they were thinking of economic reforms first and political reforms later. The people’s patience could not last that long.

The military government tried to practically implement economic reforms, especially in the building of basic economic infrastructure. But because of the international economic blockade, the results did not match the efforts.

This time around, a hasty political-transition was not attempted. Taking a note of deep caution from the events of 1988, time was taken to create a gentle and smooth transition. And in this way we held multi-party democratic elections in 2010. We may call this the second attempt at democratic transformation.

The distinguishing mark of this type of transition is that it was unlike other types of democratic transition. It was not a transformation boiling up from street protests, but one which the government itself began the task of opening up.

Unlike the 1988 “bottom-up” transformation, this was a “top-down” transformation. Preparations were made in advance to deal with the adverse effects of change which would appear as soon as the opening for that change took place. The 2008 Constitution was designed as such. Those who drew up that Constitution designed it so that it could create a transition which all political forces in the country, including the Tatmadaw, could follow and agree to.

The government has had to struggle with not just one but three reforms, any one of which would need a tremendous effort to successfully carry out. These are the political and economic reforms, and the peace process.

Of the three reforms the one which has had the highest acceptance both internally and internationally, and which has the greatest momentum, is political reform. This was begun under the slogan of ‘National Reconciliation’.

The aim of economic reform was to change from a closed, command-style economy towards an open-door, free-market economy. This aim was not as successfully achieved as that of political reform. But some important achievements were made.

The aim of the peace process is achieving internal peace and national reconciliation from the current situation of national disunity and civil war. This aim, as with the aim of political reform, is being carried out at an accelerating pace. In a very short period of time we have managed to achieve ceasefire agreements with 11 armed ethnic groups. Only one main ethnic group, the Kachin Independence Army, remains.

However, even while we were trying to achieve the goal of a national ceasefire, the number of armed groups actually increased instead of decreased. The government’s Peace Committee is patiently negotiating a National Ceasefire Accord with the National Ceasefire Coordinating Team which includes 16 armed ethnic groups.

Now there are only a few months left of the five-year Myanmar democratic reform. At this point we can look at the Arab Spring which happened at about the same time as our reform, and see chaos and a situation full of sorrows. If we compare ourselves to those countries we can find much to console ourselves with. I would like to say that ensuring and guiding the situation so that the Myanmar Spring does not reverse itself, and bog down into chaos, is in itself an achievement of no small magnitude.

If we can cap this with a free and fair election we will have done our historical duty in our first five-year term. This is not to say that we have won a complete and full victory. The two fundamental issues that I have mentioned before are still not resolved. The fact that these two deeply rooted diseases of over half a century’s duration cannot be resolved in only five years is natural.

I fully agree with Stanford University Professor Larry Diamond’s analysis that the greatest weakness in Myanmar democracy is the lack of a fundamental political agreement between Myanmar’s political forces. We will have to work to create the fundamental political agreement

In order to achieve this, I argue that we need to carry out three bold steps. They are: to hold a free and fair election by the end of 2015 at the latest; to have stability before and after the elections; and

to have a smooth and orderly transfer of power to the New Parliament and Government after the elections.

As for ourselves, we are ready to join hands with whichever party or organisation which has won the election to strive for the future of Myanmar’s democratic transformation. This change will be more complicated and subtle than anticipated, and can take longer than expected. It will be one which will not succeed at once, and one which will gradually be implemented step-by-step.

The President of Myanmar, the Speakers of our Parliaments, including our colleague Daw Aung San Suu Kyi have done their best in laying democratic foundation for the future generations.

This is an edited extract of the keynote address delivered by HE U Khin Aung Myint, Speaker of Myanmar’s Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House) during the 2015 Myanmar/Burma Update at The Australian National University’s Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Friday 5 June.