New Mandala’s 2015 in review (and Christmas dance)

New Mandala team, 24 DECEMBER 2015

We take our traditions pretty serious at New Mandala. This year some familiar faces are back to dance up a storm. Click through here to check out their moves.

It’s also time to do a recap of what was our busiest year yet.

2015 proved to be massive for Southeast Asia, with free and fair elections in Myanmar (the first in 25 years), as well as Singapore’s first vote in the post-Lee Kuan Yew era.The ballot in Myanmar saw long-time democracy campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi romp home in a ‘red wave’ that has also been seen as a repudiation of military rule in the country.

Elsewhere, 2014’s man of the moment, Indonesia President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, quickly went from hero to zero, blundering from one policy failure to another and seemingly unable to control his own cabinet, let alone a say in his own party; controlled by matriarch oligarch Megawati Sukarnoputri.

We saw a major scandal in Malaysia that nonetheless hasn’t knocked the PM from his perch (yet). Thousands of Rohingya from Myanmar and neighbouring Bangladeshwere left adrift at sea. And of course Thailand continued its downward spiral from fractious politics into farce; this year seeing a man charged with lese majeste due to a comment he made about the king’s dog.

With so much happening across the region, it’s no surprise that New Mandala also had a huge 12 months.

To date, we’ve published more than 460 articles and other posts (many republished in Australian and regional media), which have generated more than 3,600 comments (that we could actually approve; some of you were very naughty and probably shouldn’t expect a visit from Santa). And of course, we continued to attract many tens of thousands of weekly readers.

So what mattered to us, and more importantly what did our readers care about? Here’s our top 10 articles published in 2015.

In 10th is Singapore swing, Bridget Welsh’s post-ballot box wrap of Singapore’s general election in September, which saw the incumbent and long-ruling People’s Action Party win comfortably. With many arguing PAP would lose seats in this vote, the result proved to be the optimal pendulum swing says Welsh.

Gerhard Hoffstaetder’s snappy photo essay on Malaysia’s massive citizen march for clean politics in August comes in at ninth. Bersih 4.0 takes over Kuala Lumpur combines strong imagery and cogent analysis to beautifully set the scene for the major political rally. Unfortunately, this year’s trends paint a much worse picture for Malaysian politics in general, with people power maybe not enough to improve things.

Sticking with Malaysia, Bridget Welsh’s article on Prime Minster Najib Razak’s introduction of a goods and services tax in April, Najib’s taxing problem: The politics of Malaysia’s GST, takes out eighth. In addition to the excellent insight, the photo of his cat makes this article well worth re-reading (it’s a bit “one million dollars!”. See the video below.)

Good news for those who love bad news. Max Grömping’s article on electoral integrity in the region, Southeast Asian elections worst in the world, takes out seventh.

A meeting between Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Noam Chomsky proved to be popular coming in sixth. A conversation with Chomsky recounts the pow-wow with the well-known intellectual (take your pick which we’re referring to), in which they cover Thai politics, the monarchy and Thaksin.

In fifth is Llewellyn McCann’s look at the Thai monarchy, Political implications of Thailand’s royal succession. In it he looks at whether democracy will move forward with a change at the top, and the palpable fear people have about the current king’s inevitable departure.

Malaysia’s 1MDB scandal garnered worldwide attention this year and Tom Pepinsky’s examination of how it fits in with similar examples of corruption in the country’s past also proved hugely popular. Taking out fourth, Malaysia’s long history of financial scandals paints a sobering picture of how common this type of situation really is.

In the bronze medal position and a spot on the podium, third is Lee Jones’ Thai junta turning tragedy into farce. If you follow Jones on Twitter you will be familiar with his acerbic wit and hot takedowns. Casting his eye over the manner in which Thailand’s military leaders continued to fluff their lines when it came to the investigation of August’s Bangkok blast, this must-read piece is no different!

Bridget Welsh scoops silver with her third appearance in our 2015 top 10, taking outsecond for her article Lee Kuan Yew’s political legacy – a matter of trust. Her assessment of the LKY legacy was not only popular in the wake of the long-time leader’s death, but is sure to be a “go to” reference for future looks at how he helped shape Singapore.

Finally in first (and by some margin) is Michael Buehler’s exposé of dealings between mysterious representatives of the Indonesian government and lobbyists in the US. Waiting in the White House lobby recounts how a third-party paid some $80,000 to US lobbyists during President Jokowi’s less than impressive visit to Washington.

It caused a serious stir in Indonesia, leading to at least two press conferences by senior ministers and generating more than 400 articles in local and international press. (Indonesian media even reported on the fact that we changed the image accompanying the article.) It is an important contribution on politics in Indonesia and the region, and more than a worthy winner for 2015.

An honourable mention must be made of an article that only missed the top 10 by a couple of reads. In 11th, Clive Kessler’s essay on modern Islam and terrorism, A rage against history, examines whether Islam is a religion of peace today. One reader labelled it “deeply unsatisfying, both intellectually and emotionally.” It certainly got people talking – and will continue to do so.

Lastly, we want to say thanks to all our readers, contributors and commenters — you are the lifeblood of the website. See you all in 2016, which, for those keeping score, marks our 10th anniversary. It will be big. In the meantime, be good to each other and yourselves.

The New Mandala team: James Giggacher, Mish Khan, Nicholas Farrelly and Andrew Walker.  

Thailand - A state of madness | New Mandala

Dr James L Taylor, 18 DECEMBER 2015

The insidious creep of fascism in contemporary Thailand.

Tim Frewer’s New Mandala article from March 2015, “Fascist Assemblages in Cambodia and Myanmar”, is an interesting Deleuze and Guattari inspired piece on Thailand’s neighbours. Yet, no mention of the situation in Thailand is made.

Most academics and commentators are reluctant to use the descriptive term “fascism” for Thailand under military dictatorship and its authoritarian ultra-nationalist ideology. Labels are often misleading and ambiguous, especially a term that carries such emotive historical context.

The lack of democracy in Thailand, the repression by state apparatuses (under a compact among civil and military elites) and the annihilation of opposition to authoritarian rule, the use of an ultra-nationalist discourse, and the de facto support by royalist elites for its parastatal armed forces (from pro-palace sanctioned thugs such as the ‘garbage collection organisation to the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, or PDRC) have eerie resonances with aspects of the early 20th century Spanish fascists known as Falange Española Tradicionalista or falangistas.

Falangism is taken from the name of the right-wing Spanish movement that imitated elements of pre-war German and Italian fascism under the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. The movement was opposed the Republicans and supported General Franco’s Nationalist coup of 1936, but only as a minor element. It momentarily reappeared later in European history in the post-war years until the mid-1970s.

As self-exiled pro-democracy leader Surachai “Sae Dan” Danwattananusorn told me in 2011, while fascism” may be seen as a defining historical moment, we are now seeing new forms in a desperate push by the ruling elites/aristocracy (amaat) to hold back democracy for their own interests, whatever the social, economic, and political cost to the nation.

For instance we can hark back to Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat’s 1958 coup d’état,supported by the royalist/amaat regime wanting to regain its influence and power through the monarchy. Nothing has changed since then, only intensified as we near the end of the ninth reign. Nothing it seems is above personal interests and power under an authoritarian national leadership inspired by notions of an organic, hierarchical regal state.

Yet, Thais do not have a word for fascist or fascism.

Instead, Thai uses (though rarely) the foreign loan word latthi-fasit. Historian and expert on European fascism Stanley Payne sees this ideology as “a form revolutionary ultranationalism for national rebirth…” structured on “extreme elitism” and mass mobilisation in a “vitalist” philosophy that does not shirk at the notion of violence, intimidation and a repertoire of coercive tactics to achieve its ends.  (See A short history of fascism, 1914-45, p 14).

Prayuth Chan-ocha, the new Thai Fuhrerprinzip, was enforced through absolute idiosyncratic authority and emplaced by the amaat in 2014 for their own ends.  Indeed, the political climate under authoritarianism in Thailand masked by a perverse nationalist democratic rhetoric (Thai democracy”?) is characterised by extreme ethnic chauvinism, embellished monarchical patriotism, and an ultra-nationalism articulated (poorly at that) from the likes of orchestrated street movements such as People’s Alliance for Democracy or PDRC.

The similarities between falangism and the current Thai experience are a less ideological (“softer”) but no less insidious form of contemporary fascism. Examples are plentiful, including:

• an internal organic corporatism;
• ethnic (Thai)-based ultra-nationalism;
• conservative anti-democratic trade unionism;
• conservative modes of state Buddhism (through elements in the administrative royalist line of the Thammayut nikai that frowns on democratic state sangha governance);
• a dislike for separatism of any kind; anti-communism, anti-anarchism, and anti-(new) capitalism (where this is seen as working outside amaat networks);
• anti-democratic sentiments and control of all media, emplaced through editorial committees with royalist lackeys);
• paternalistic pastoral values (communal ethnic-Thai’ism and the hypocrisy inscribed in elite visions of the poor in a discourse of “self -sufficiency”);
• dislike of welfare-based neo-liberal economic (efficient) management (as in the case of Thaksin’s neo-liberal Populist government);
• and as a union of non-competitive, traditional conservative units seeking to maintain their monopolies and ensuing privilege through nationalistsyndicated consensus.

In addition, the link between the palace network and its vast financial interests and the many large national/global Thai corporations such as the Charoen Pokphand Group, Thai Beverage, and so on is self-evident. Many of these Falangist corporations provided financial support to the anti-democratic street movements leading up to the last two coups (PAD and then PDRC).

Indeed, another characteristic of the Thai falange also includes the agencies of state security and forms of para-militarism such as the ideological arm of the summit-state, the Yellow Shirts (and its pink and blue variants in the past decade). These share similarities with the European Falangist Blue Shirt street brigade.

This complex social and political arrangement in Thailand is controlled by an alliance of central bureaucratic elites, political representatives of the middle class, reactionary (pro-Prem Tinsulanond) elements in civil society, traditional network mafias, and ultra-conservative military factions with close ties to the royalist establishment.

The Thai amaat are opportunistic; every time a new structure of governance was put in place (three times since 2006) they ruthlessly crushed it using a complicit media and propaganda campaign with the use of street thugs to create destabilisation.

The synchronisation and multi-layered scheming for the last two coups involving so many elements of the monarchy network was impressive, if immoral and unscrupulous. The real fear among Thai falange is an election in which they have no control of the outcome and a real democracy which is engendered at the grass-roots.

In summary, the immense power of persisting propaganda and control of information in the hands of extreme right-wing pro-monarchists has been particularly worrying.

They generated and maintained a well-orchestrated vilification of Thaksin, Thailand’s first popularly elected prime minister; in fact they could have been saying “Thaksin is Jewish!” The hatred created and perpetuated is the same as in pre-war fascist Europe.

Fascists need to vilify in order to mobilise their support, particularly among the petty bourgeoisie and urban middle classes. The control of information, censorship and the immense reach of the monarchy network into all layers of society (like a computer virus or worm) have been factors in regulating society and the economy under new fascism.

There is no middle ground remaining in Thailand, no platform for dialogue or impartiality. Following the fascist dictate, the Thai regime created disorder on the streets and insecurity before every coup in order to recreate a semblance of their own constructed and self-interested order.

The radical royalists, including the military, established a compact with corrupt social elements – the Rajabhakti Park scandal is the tip of iceberg — all the while using Article 112 (the infamous lese majeste law) to silence and intimidate opposition.

If all of this is not new fascism in Thailand, then what other name?

Dr James L Taylor is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Anthropology & Development Studies at the University of Adelaide.

Turning the tide on Thailand’s human trafficking | New Mandala

Turning the tide on Thailand’s human trafficking | New Mandala
Dr Rachael M Rudolph,  2 DECEMBER 2015

Will reform initiatives be able to stop a dangerous trade?

Thailand is a major source, destination, and transit country for men, women and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking. The problem is serious enough that it was kept at Tier 3 level in the 2015 TIP Report – the United States Trafficking in Persons Report.

Under the TIP ranking system, Tier 3 refers to countries whose governments do not comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) minimum requirements, and are not making significant efforts to do so.

While the report noted Thailand had taken some steps to improve trafficking related laws and coordination between agencies combatting trafficking, it said it had not done enough, during the April 2014 – March 2015 reporting period, for “tangible progress on its formidable human trafficking problem.”

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Thai military does not believe the report adequately reflects the efforts undertaken. And indeed, my recent study examining the reporting period showed that while human trafficking is still an undoubted and considerable problem, the military government had in fact made significant attempts to address the issue at all levels.

The military government’s strategy to combat human trafficking in the reporting period is broken into three phases. Phase one begins in June 2014 and ends in November 2014. The transition from phase one to two began in November. Phase two began in December and ended in February. Finally, phase began in March. It was still in swing when the 2015 US TIP reporting period came to an end.

Phase one was primarily labour intensive. Labour, illegal migration, corruption and human trafficking are interrelated issues, and the goals were to re-regulate illegal migrant workers, which entailed their registration, and the establishment of a new labour management policy.

The objectives were to identify and understand the roles of the actors involved in the trafficking process; to learn about the migrants and the causes of migration; to solicit input from key government, business and civil society figures on solutions to the problems; and, finally, to develop solutions that overlap the three issue areas — labour, trafficking and corruption.

Actions undertaken included inter-agency cooperation in investigations and inspection of the labour sector and, in particular, the fishing industry; coordination and cooperation with the International Labor Organization (ILO) for the development and adoption of good labour practices; and, the implementation of the pilot labour management policy in Samut Sakhon and Ranong provinces.

Public meetings were held on trafficking; political and security personnel under investigation for involvement in it were transferred; and, raids and arrests were carried out by law enforcement. The Royal Thai Police also began its review of the law enforcement strategy, which was implemented in the second phase.

Further initiatives included bilateral and regional discussions on trafficking and illegal migration, the creation of the Special Economic Zones to address the underlying causes of trafficking, and border security.

Phase two went further, to include the nature and process of human trafficking and the role of the security sector. The goals were to address the lack of enforcement of existing laws; to pass and implement the laws needed for labour, immigration and security sector reforms; and to articulate and implement a new law enforcement strategy.

Army General Manas Kongpan (right), one of 88 suspects recently arrested on charges of human trafficking in Thailand. Photo: AP

The objectives were to pass and implement legislation needed for labour sector reform, and included educating employers about trafficking. In an effort to ensure compliance, investigations and inspections of the labour sector would continue and amendments would be made to the 2008 Human Trafficking Prevention and Suppression Act so that informants, witnesses and victims are protected.

To add a further deterrent, the penalties for involvement in the trafficking process would increase. Finally, the national action plan would be implemented, and efforts made to facilitate coordination and cooperation among the security bodies.

This phase saw the successful passage of legislation pertaining to the labour sector and human trafficking; the announcement of a new national action plan by the Royal Thai police; arrests, inspections and raids; and, the establishment of the Transnational Crime Coordination Center (TCCC).

The national action plan and the establishment of the TCCC (in cooperation with Australia) are significant developments. In the action plan, security bodies were assigned responsibility for the targeted areas. The Immigration Police Bureau was tasked with forced labor and illegal migration; the Central Investigation Bureau was tasked with sexual exploitation; the Metropolitan Police was tasked with organised begging; and, the Anti-Trafficking Division was tasked with human trafficking.  Each one was paired with border and checkpoint security units at the transit routes.

In the final phase, a systematic approach was adopted, to address the root causes of human trafficking.

This, in combination with the measures in the previous phases, seeks to create a climate for coordination and cooperation among the police, prosecutors and the courts; to provide specific timelines for investigation and prosecution of cases; to establish special courts; and, to develop a computerised human trafficking database, which also links the police, prosecutors and courts.

This can be seen as a sincere effort to combat the problem in a ‘big picture’ manner, and seen as a whole, it can certainly be argued that Thailand has improved and continued its efforts to combat trafficking, illegal migration, and corruption. The United States Government has recognised this and it is likely these and further measures will be noted in the 2016 US TIP Report.

Human trafficking is a significant and serious problem, and in Thailand the exploitation of desperate and vulnerable people has filtered into many levels of society. To successfully combat it, continued vigilance and the participation of all actors, from the government to civil society, are needed – and it has taken other countries years before they were upgraded.

For Thailand, it should not take years with will, commitment, passion, and faith in the belief that the changes made today will ensure a more humane society for tomorrow’s generation.

Dr Rachael M Rudolph is a lecturer and researcher at Webster University, Thailand.

This article is published as a collaboration between New Mandala and Policy Forum, Asia and the Pacific’s platform for analysis and discussion on public policy.

Still better than Thaksin? | New Mandala

Still better than Thaksin? | New Mandala
Prasit Wongtibun, 26 NOVEMBER 2015

As the latest corruption scandal shows, the Thai junta hasn’t rid the country of dodgy politicians; it’s simply taken their place.

Anti-corruption has been a poster child of anti-democratic groups in Thailand since 2005.

The People’s Alliance for Democracy (2005-2008), the Council for National Security (2006-2007), the People’s Democratic Reform Council (2013-2014), and the National Council of Peace and Order (2014–present) have all used it to drive their agenda.

Now, as the Thai economy crumbles and dissent grows, an anti-corruption campaign is the only lifeline for the ruling NCPO. Supposedly, it confirms the junta’s superior moral standard when compared to elected politicians.

Since the May 2014 coup, the NCPO has adopted harsh measures to eradicate corruption, and General Prayuth Chan-ocha, NCPO head, constantly repeats his intention to fight against dishonesty in public office.

Unsurprisingly, the main target of the NCPO’s anti-corruption campaign has been former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra.

After being overthrown by a constitutional court ruling before the coup, Yingluck was retroactively impeached by the junta-appointed National Legislative Assembly (NLA) in August for suspicion of corruption in a rice-subsidy scheme she oversaw as PM. The scheme operated at a loss and cost the state several million baht.

A criminal case against her was filed with the Supreme Court, and she now faces a possible 10 years in jail. For civil compensation, the NCPO avoided a lengthy judicial process by commissioning an ad hoc tribunal under the Government Tort Act. Under this, a large part of Yingluck’s assets could be confiscated – an outcome that could cripple the future political ambitions of both her, and her brother Thaksin Shinawatra.

But the NCPO’s anti-corruption campaign has gone further than holding Yingluck to account.

After coming to power, Prayuth was given instant impunity from section 44 of the Interim Constitution, allowing him to overrule any law and regulation at his will. In addition, the NCPO, upon receiving a list of suspected civil servants and local officials from the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), invoked its dictatorial power to immediately remove or suspend these suspects from active posts.

Furthermore, the NLA amended the anti-corruption law, adding the death penalty to the charge. The upcoming constitution will probably contain more chapters on public morals as well as severe punishment for unethical politicians.

These aggressive measures appeal to the junta’s supporters who believe that such powers will quickly rid the country of corrupt politicians.

They might reluctantly admit that Prayuth’s personality is rogue and erratic. That the NCPO’s policies might resemble the Thaksinomics once so widely derided. That people’s rights and liberties are almost absent. And that the country has been humiliated in the international arena.

But still, they insist, this is better than former PM Thaksin’s administration because Prayuth is rescuing Thailand from corruption.

Yet is Thailand becoming less corrupt? Has the NCPO’s aggressive campaign transformed Thailand into a country where the rule of law and transparency reign? The reality points to the opposite. The country is as corrupt as before, or even worse.

For example, the business sector has reported that “commissions” for government projects has risen to 30 or 50 per cent of the total project value. Local mafias on the street were replaced by men in uniform to whom vendors still pay protection.

The NCPO has also appointed their relatives to the administration. Prayuth’s brother was appointed into the NLA and the NCPO. National Reform Council members appointed their spouses and offspring as assistants.

Asset disclosure revealed unjustifiable wealth in many NLA members’ accounts. Prayuth’s cabinet was also accused of procuring extraordinarily expensive microphone sets that prompted public outcry.

Despite these allegations, the NCPO’s supporters argue that while corruption persists, it is of a smaller scale than before. They conclude that Thais have to tolerate the lesser evil to eliminate the greater one. Such pragmatism is in great contrast to the ultra-moralistic standard they applied to previous cabinets.

Such claims are naïve for two reasons.

First, corruption within the Thai army is not at all small. Fraud can be found at many levels. Officers enjoy bribes from Thai men who want to avoid compulsory conscription. Once within a barracks, officers can take a portion of conscripts’ salary. Later, these conscripts can be allocated to generals’ houses as servants, gardeners, and drivers.

The army has also triggered many multi-million baht scandals involving weapon and equipment procurements; armored vehicles, fighter jets, bomb detectors, even aerial surveillance balloons. This corruption is so systemised that people tend to forget that it exists.

Second, the solution to corruption is far more complicated than exercising authoritative power, punishing the accused and hoping that this brutality intimidates others.

Corruption thrives in Thailand because its culture suits the practice so well that a few transfers or even imprisonments will never correct the ill practice.

Thailand is known for its deference to seniority, its hierarchical social structure, and face-saving, all of which allows corruption to flourish. No one offends the powerful senior by accusing him of wrongful conduct, even when it is obvious. Whistle-blowers are often condemned for causing shame to an organisation.

In order to change these attitudes, Thailand needs to instill a sense of equality and openness. Dissent must be encouraged. Misconduct should be reported without fear of revenge. Unfortunately, the junta could never offer such values, for it is one of the most hierarchical and opaque institutions in Thailand.

Section 44 is not the magic tool many expect it to be. Corruption is the symptom of a deficit in the rule of law, particularly when people cheat the system for personal gain. In this light, the NCPO’s exercise of section 44 deepens the culture of cheating, confirming for the public that the end justifies the means.

Since corruption is ingrained within society, any anti-corruption campaign has to plan for a long-term and systematic operation. Consistency and fairness are two important keys.

But Prayuth’s attention span is short. Prosecution has been sporadic. Moreover, his anti-corruption campaign has only seemed to hit only the Shinwatra family while many other cases involving the NCPO’s allies remain untouched.

By not acting even-handedly, the public has seen Prayuth’s anti-corruption campaign for what it really is; rhetoric to harass his personal enemies.

This unfair approach will not teach people to stop being corrupt;  it simply encourages them to choose the right side of politics, so they can continue to commit bad deeds.

Thailand’s latest corruption scandal – Rajabhakti ParkIn its supposed quest to rid Thailand of corruption, the NCPO’s biggest challenge has recently emerged.

In early November, the junta made high-profile arrests of a famous fortune-teller and two policemen for lese majeste. These arrests led to more warrants for army officers who fled the country and were later dismissed without honours.

The case continued with the mysterious deaths in detention of some of the accused. It also emerged that these men were involved in alleged corruption in the construction of Thailand’s newest major landmark, Rajabhakti Park.

Rajabhakti Park is located on the southwest coast of Thailand. It displays huge bronze statutes of seven great ancient Thai kings in order to commemorate their reigns and inspire loyalty to the current monarchy.

The park is the masterpiece of former Army Chief, Udomdej Sitabutr, who boasted about raising hundreds of millions of baht through donations and finishing the construction in only a few months.

But investigations have revealed that a large portion of the donations were diverted into people’s pockets. Sculptors admitted that they were paid much lower than the official price. Palm trees, quoted at 300,000 baht each, were actually donated for free.

The Rajabhakti Park scandal has caused serious damage for the NCPO. The scale of corruption is large with possibly hundreds of millions of baht embezzled. Moreover, it challenges the army’s notion of loyalty.

The army was caught benefitting illegally from the monarchy’s revered status, an act that brought disgrace to the palace. Finally, in addition to several mid-ranked officers, evidence ultimately pointed to Udomdej.

Although Udomdej retired in October, he is still an active member of the NCPO, and is deputy defence minister. He failed to clear himself of accusations of corruption when he gave an interview on the topic. He admitted that there was corruption but all money has since been returned as a donation to the project.

The army is not used to purging its own personnel. If it does, it will be in a kangaroo court, not through a normal judicial process. Usually, only a few low-ranked officers are held accountable; the big fish get away.

But the NCPO is now a political body in the public spotlight. The Rajabhakti Park case posed a dilemma for them. If the NCPO punished Udomdej, it would be breaking the long-held tradition of unity within the military and also upset the regime.

But if the NCPO spared him, it would not seem any better than former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was tainted with corruption, disloyalty, and favouritism. After a brief internal probe, the current Army Commander-in-Chief, Theerachai Nakvanich, announced that the commission found no corruption.

He then lost his temper when one female correspondent asked for a financial statement. He ranted that he could not understand why people wanted to punish those with good intentions. The lame press conference did more harm than good to the NCPO’s reputation. It made it seem they chose to cover up the crime of its cronies, just as any politician would have done.

The press continues to investigate the story and the National Anti-Corruption Commission have finally accepted the case. These latest developments prove how incompetent the army is in tackling corruption and how unrealistic the pragmatic hope of choosing the lesser evil over a supposed bigger evil is.

Meanwhile, the “still better than Thaksin” mantra, has lost much of its charm.

While the most ardent supporters of the NCPO insist that this scandal was Thaksin’s plan to sabotage the government, many finally woke up to reality and grieved that their sacrifice during the Bangkok Shutdown campaign of 2014 had been wasted.

But what can one do against a corrupt junta? No courts will try the case and the public cannot recall the previous government. Hopefully, Thais will learn that only a good ‘checks-and-balances’ system and a democratic culture can make Thailand transparent; not a benevolent dictator.

They should push for more democracy, not less. But at present, Thais can only wait for the NCPO’s mercy to step down.

Prasit Wongtibun is a pen name. The author is an observer of Thai politics and law.

Academics face unjust detention in Thailand | New Mandala

Academics face unjust detention in Thailand | New Mandala

 

ROBERT DAYLEY, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR

 – 22 NOVEMBER 2015

Academic freedom is under grave threat in Thailand.

Since the May 2014 Coup, scholars at Thailand’s institutions of higher learning have faced ongoing harassment and intimidation. Military presence on campus has now been coupled with new rules and restrictions on everyday instruction and standard university activities.

The intellectual and pedagogical environment for Thai professors is increasingly suffocating with no end in sight. Out of frustration, Thai historian Dr Attachak Sattayanurak (Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai University) and seven colleagues held a news conference on 31 October to request that the military reduce its involvement in university life.

Following this news conference, the involved professors were charged for violatingNCPO Order 7/2014, for gathering in a group larger than five people for political purposes. Most have been summoned to appear individually to police in relation to these charges beginning Tuesday 24 November. Imprisonment up to one year plus additional fines are possible. Out of principle, Dr Attachak has pledged to refuse bail if detained.

In response to these events, Dr Anusorn Unno (Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Thammasat University) drafted the following statement in his capacity as Coordinator of the Academic Network for Detained Students (ANDS).

ANDS is currently collecting signatures in support of the letter from scholars in Thailand and abroad. Dr Anusorn plans to submit the letter to Prime Minister Prayuth on Monday, 23 November. Timely support is thus needed.

As a friend and research colleague of Dr Attachak, and in support of the other unfairly charged professors, I add my name in support of Dr Anusorn’s letter.

If any New Mandala readers would like to pledge your signature to this letter, please send ANDS a short email with your name, professional title, and your institutional affiliation (to: anusorn.unno@gmail.com); please write “Support Academic Freedom” in the subject box.

Dr Attachak and colleagues extend their deepest appreciation for your support of academic freedom in Thailand.

Respectfully,
Robert Dayley, PhD
Professor
The College of Idaho

The ANDS letter to be submitted to Prime Minister Prayuth  on Monday 23 November:

Academic Network for Detained Students

Statement no. 6

Universities are not barracks

Thailand is not a concentration camp

On 31 October 2015, a group of academics which call themselves “Network of University Academics” issued a statement “Universities are not barracks” which reaffirms the liberty to pursue knowledge for our teachings. However some members of the network were summoned by the police and charged with “having a political gathering of five persons or more in violation of the order of the head of the National Council for Peace and Order” (NCPO), a crime which carries a sentence of up to 1 year in prison or a fine of up to 20,000 Baht or both.

The Academic Network for Detained Students (ANDS) views such a charge against the academics to be in violation of our rights and liberties, aiming at threatening those who express opinions in contrary to the position of the NCPO. The threat was made despite the fact that the academics openly expressed their opinion in good faith and with good intention in accordance with their academic duty to share ideas and knowledge with the public. Other academics who called for the release of the students from detention and expressed their views are still threatened and the students are banned from and pressured against organizing political activities. Meanwhile, the NCPO has ordered an inclusion of university teaching materials saluting the military, which completely contravenes the principle of academic rights and liberty.

We reaffirm that “universities are not barracks”. Universities are places to pursue knowledge, to have free discussions and debates on the basis of facts and rationale, bringing about new knowledge and the growth in wisdom as the world is changing and new solutions are required for Thailand’s problems. The liberties to pursue knowledge and to express views are therefore the founding elements of universities and the society.

We reaffirm that “Thailand is not a concentration camp”. The Thai people enjoy diverse political views and beliefs. The path towards a peaceful society requires the liberty to believe and to express views based on facts and rationale. However, the Thai people are being treated as if we are detainees in concentration camps; we are being instilled with a singular ideal or belief in order to have the society fallen under a power structure controlled by a certain groups of individuals. This is done by shutting our ears and eyes, imposing force, threats and aggression using legal power that is unjust towards those holding differing opinions. This will bring about further conflicts while equality, liberty, democracy, fairness and peace will not be achieved in the Thai society.

ANDS members whose names appear following this statement therefore demand the following from the NCPO:

1. End all threats and aggressions against academics who expressed their political views in good faith;
2. End all bans on political activities and end all threats and aggressions against the students and citizens who wish to organize them; and
3. End all interventions to make university teachings comply with the guidelines or substance preferred by the NCPO.

Should the NCPO ignore these demands, the ANDS shall consider the next level of actions on the matter.

With our faith in rights, liberties, and equality

Academic Network for Detained Students

23 November 2015

The crisis behind ‘A Kingdom in Crisis’ | New Mandala

The crisis behind ‘A Kingdom in Crisis’ | New Mandala
Mish Khan and Nicholas Farrelly, 20 NOVEMBER 2015

A fortnight ago, academic e-sparing about Thailand livened up the Twittersphere. A recap is in order.

This episode started with a review by Serhat Ünaldi of Andrew MacGregor Marshall’s 2014 book, A Kingdom in Crisis.

In his lengthy critique, “A Kingdom in Crisis – What’s All the Fuss About?”, Ünaldi argues that Marshall’s book is an “important contribution” particularly as “it informs a wide audience about the damaging political role of the monarchy.”

In his book, Marshall, a former Reuters journalist and occasional New Mandalacommentator, boldly attempts to chart Thailand’s complicated royal history. He concludes that succession politics will play a pivotal in shaping Thailand’s future trajectory.

For its analysis, A Kingdom in Crisis has received many accolades, including: “…promises to permanently change the conversation,” “…lays bare what the Thai elite has tried to keep hidden for decades” and “finally someone says the unsayable.”

Marshall claims that he goes where others fear to tread. In his words:

Journalists and academics tend to tiptoe around the subject of the monarchy, confining their attentions to less controversial topics or simply repeating the traditional fables.

This is where things get interesting. Ünaldi is concerned that Marshall does not give sufficient credit to other voices that have been writing and saying similar things for many years.

More specifically, Ünaldi suggests that “Marshall is a journalist who did extensive research, but is not a scholar… to write a book on the monarchy without quoting the works of experts like Hewison, Pavin or Ji is careless, to say the least.”

Exiled Thai-British academic Ji Ungkaporn has also lashed out at Marshall, arguing “Andrew MacGregor Marshall’s book is misnamed because it has nothing to do with Thailand’s struggle for democracy.

“It will be a book which offers much entertainment to those who enjoy reading Hello!magazine. Marshall ignores progressive Thai writers… yet Lady Gaga gets a place in his bibliography!”

At the end of the day, this brawling doesn’t look like it will diminish the book’s wider reception. Reviews on Amazon and Goodreads suggest Marshall’s work is a popular and accessible introduction to Thailand’s political turmoil, especially for those only vaguely familiar with its intricacies.

What do New Mandala readers think?

Mish Khan is Associate Editor of New Mandala and Nicholas Farrelly is the co-founder of New Mandala.

Read New Mandala’s reviews of A Kingdom in Crisis here. 

Thailand’s rocky road to democracy | New Mandala

Thailand’s rocky road to democracy | New Mandala
Paul Sanderson, 18 NOVEMBER 2015

On average Thailand rewrites its constitution every four years. The next is likely to tilt more towards dictatorship than democracy.

There are few countries where being a constitution writer results in regular employment, but Thailand is one of them. There is even a long-running gag in which a student wanders around lost in the parliamentary library while trying to find a copy of the constitution. “Oh, it’s among the periodicals,” a librarian says. “There’s a new one every year.”

The reality is a little slower: a 21-member committee was installed in September to draft the nation’s 20th charter since the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932, putting the average at more than four years.

Thailand’s cycle of coups and ripping up constitutions is well-documented, and the 2013 film Paradoxocracy does a decent job at exploring the difficulties democracy has faced and explaining the template the military usually follows when it takes power.

The most recent attempt at drafting a constitution failed on September 6, ultimately for political reasons: the junta ordered military members of the rubber-stamp National Reform Council to vote the draft down after it became obvious there was no support for a proposed crisis panel that would effectively legalise future coups.

With the country’s two largest political parties finding themselves in the strange position of being united in opposition to the draft, there was little to no chance of it passing a referendum.

There was no downside for the administration of General Prayut Chan-o-cha in going back to the drawing board, apart from having to tell the world the “roadmap to democracy” was set back 20 months to mid-2017.

There was, however, the advantage of maintaining power longer as the king languishes in hospital.  It is widely thought the military wants to be in control during the succession, or at least have a constitutional structure in place that limits the influence any civilian government can have.

The painfully obvious symbolism of the generals lining up behind the unpopular Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn for a national bike ride for the ailing queen on April 16 was lost on no one.

Constitution writers will no doubt have the potentially troublesome consequences of his coronation, or the potentially worse consequences of overlooking the playboy prince in favour of his more well-regarded sister, in mind when charting the path ahead.

As for the committee itself, it was a case of out with the old and in with the older.

Borwornsak Uwanno, 61, a veteran of the 1992 and 1997 constitution-drafting processes, was replaced as chairman by Meechai Ruchupan, 77, who has been aligned with military governments since the 1980s and has written undemocratic charters in the past.

His interim charter after the 1991 coup was the framework under which the snap poll of March 1992 was held, and contained a loophole that allowed parliament to appoint Gen Suchinda Kraprayoon as an unelected prime minister.

This in turn led to street protests and the “Black May” crackdown in which 52 people were killed, many more disappeared and thousands were arrested. Gen Suchinda’s deception may have directly sparked the protests, but Mr Meechai was his enabler.

Mr Meechai was not involved in 1997’s “People’s constitution”, which was far and away the country’s most democratic. The legal expert returned to the fore in 2006, creating the post-coup interim charter that served as a template for the much more conservative 2007 constitution, which he approved and submitted for royal endorsement as then-president of the National Legislative Assembly.

This all indicates the 20th Thai constitution will more likely err towards dictatorship rather than democracy. Not only can we infer Mr Meechai’s disdain for popular rule from his history of siding with ultra-conservative regimes, he has said as much. Elections are “not always necessary” for the Senate, he told the Bangkok Post in October. Indeed, he would work to ensure the Senate was not an echo of the House of Representatives.

In places like Australia and the United States, this might mean a Senate where states have equal representation, in Thailand this typically means a significant proportion of the seats will be reserved for establishment figures. Appointed senators have typically included retired judges, bureaucrats and military figures: so-called “good people”. Expect to see a significant number of appointed senators in the next Meechai charter, with perhaps one elected senator from each of the 77 provinces.

Mr Meechai has also reopened the idea of an outsider prime minister, despite this leading to disaster in 1992.

Under his current thinking, the non-elected prime minister would be appointed by MPs and this would be democratic enough. Anyone charged with corruption – not found guilty of, mind – would also be banned from politics. This is all clearly designed to keep anyone with the surname Shinawatra from ever being prime minister again, which will appeal to a significant and noisy minority.

The best way to prevent abuses by those elected to power is to strengthen democratic institutions, foster a free press and hold consistent elections where the people can vote corrupt politicians out.

History has shown Mr Meechai and those around him have always taken the opposite approach, and we are likely to see more of the same with the next constitution and next election, if and when it happens in mid-2017.

Paul Sanderson is a pen name. The author is an independent writer and consultant based in and around Southeast Asia.

This article is published as a collaboration between New Mandala and Policy Forum, Asia and the Pacific’s platform for analysis and discussion on public policy.