Vietnam Jails Two Songwriters for Anti-state Lyrics | The Irrawaddy Magazine
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, October 31, 2012
HANOI, Vietnam—Two musicians in Vietnam whose topical songs are popular among overseas Vietnamese were sentenced to prison on Tuesday, prompting criticism from the United States and international rights groups.
Vo Minh Tri and Tran Vu Anh Binh were jailed for four and six years respectively on charges of spreading propaganda against the state, said Tri’s lawyer, Tran Vu Hai. They faced possible sentences of up to 20 years.
In a half-day trial, a court in Ho Chi Minh City accused the musicians of posting songs on a website operated by an overseas Vietnamese opposition group, Patriotic Youth, according to Hai. Communist Vietnam does not tolerate challenges to its one-party rule.
Tri, 34, known as Viet Khang, has composed songs criticizing the government for not taking a more aggressive position against China in the potentially resource-rich South China Sea, where Vietnam, China and other Asian nations have competing territorial claims. A video of his song “Where is My Vietnam?” (Viet Nam Toi Dau) has been viewed more than 700,000 times on YouTube.
Binh, 37, is credited with writing the music for “Courage in the Dark Prison” (Nguc Toi Hien Ngang), a song that encourages nonviolent protest and expresses support for imprisoned blogger Nguyen Van Hai.
The convictions come a month after Hai, known as Dieu Cay, and two other Vietnamese bloggers were sentenced to four to 12 years behind bars on the same charges.
Human Rights Watch condemned Tuesday’s trial and called for the songwriters’ immediate release.
“First critics, then bloggers, then poets, and now musicians!” Phil Robertson, deputy director at the New York-based group’s Asia division, said in a statement. “The international community can no longer stand by quietly as these free speech activists are picked off one by one by Vietnam’s security apparatus.”
Truc Ho, one of Tri’s US-based supporters, told The Associated Press in April that Patriotic Youth is a group of students, artists and young professionals who promote awareness of social justice and human rights issues in Vietnam.
After Tri was arrested in December, Truc Ho said he and some friends launched a campaign in the United States to press for the songwriter’s release. Their online petition to the White House gathered more than 150,000 signatures within a month, he said.
The US Embassy said it was deeply troubled by Tri’s sentencing.
“This conviction is the latest in a series of moves by Vietnamese authorities to restrict freedom of expression. The Vietnamese government should release this musician, all prisoners of conscience and adhere to its international obligations immediately,” embassy spokesman Christopher Hodges said in a statement.
Wednesday, October 31, 2012
Monday, October 29, 2012
Marcoses lose US appeal | Philippine Daily Inquirer
Marcoses lose US appeal
Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 29th, 2012
Victims of human rights violations during the Marcos dictatorship have scored a victory in their long quest to get compensation from the Marcos estate.
A US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld on Oct. 24 a contempt judgment against Sen. Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos Jr., his mother Imelda and the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos for violating an injunction that barred them from dissipating assets of the estate.
The judgment amounting to $353.6 million is believed to be the largest contempt award ever affirmed by an appellate court.
The judgment may be implemented against any US property owned by Imelda and Bongbong. However, the human rights victims need to ask the Philippine government for implementation of the judgment against the Marcoses’ personal property in the Philippines.
A Philippine law requires that all ill-gotten wealth recovered from the Marcoses should be spent on the government’s land reform program.
Robert Swift, lead counsel for the 10,000 Filipino human rights victims who obtained a judgment against the late dictator and his estate in 1995, said he was satisfied with the new judgment.
“The Marcoses have thumbed their noses at the United States court and Filipino human rights victims ever since the $2-billion judgment was entered in 1995,” Swift said in a statement.
Dynasty
The American lawyer said the Marcoses were caught trying to dissipate the estate’s assets to recapitalize the family’s political dynasty in the Philippines.
Bongbong began serving his six-year term as senator in 2010. Imelda is a representative of Ilocos Norte in Congress, while daughter Imee is the governor of the province. Both mother and daughter are running for reelection in midterm elections in May 2013.
Swift said the new judgment was against Imelda and her son personally for their misconduct.
“It broadens the possibilities for collection of money to the human rights victims. The victims can be assured they we will vigorously and aggressively seek to collect this sum,” the lawyer said.
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Chairperson Loretta Ann P. Rosales said Sunday night that the US court victory against the Marcoses was “payback” for the “shameless arrogance” of Bongbong and his mother, who have not apologized for the looting and the killings during the Marcos regime.
“If we can’t get their apology, at least we will force them to pay more and refresh the minds of a new generation of Filipinos on the atrocities committed by the family for close to two decades,” Rosales said in a phone interview.
“They (Bongbong and Imelda) are the face of their families and the Filipinos should continue to demand payment for the sins of their family.”
She said the $353.6 million awarded by the US court would be on top of the close to $2 billion awarded to martial law victims in 1995.
Barred in US
Rosales said she was told by lawyers that the contempt award meant that the Marcoses would not be allowed to set foot on any US territory.
“The contempt ruling means that the US courts are taking seriously the disrespect shown by the Marcoses. More than the heavy fines, this is a big embarrassment to the family who has shown no remorse for the deeds they made,” the CHR said.
Rosales said that the contempt charge was a “long shot” and that the US courts sided with the victims was a “pleasant surprise.”
“The senator’s refusal to apologize and own up to the sins of his father only shows the continuing arrogance of his family,” said Rosales, herself a victim of human rights violations during the Marcos regime.
The litigation against Marcos began in 1986 shortly after the dictator and his family fled to Hawaii following the people power revolution.
After Marcos died, Imelda fought the litigation. Following a historic trial, a Hawaiian jury awarded 9,539 Filipino human rights victims almost $2 billion.
The judgment was affirmed on appeal. While the jury was deliberating, the Marcoses entered into a secret deal with the Philippine government to make the Marcos estate judgment-proof.
When Swift learned of this, the human rights victims sought a contempt award against Imelda and her son, and the Marcos estate’s legal representatives, for violating the injunction that barred them from dissipating the estate’s assets.
Imelda and Bongbong were found to have agreed to the transfer from the United States to the Philippines artworks considered part of the estate, and to split the estate with the Philippine government, retaining 25 percent tax-free as their share.
After five hearings during which documents showing the Marcoses’ efforts to dissipate the assets were introduced, the court found the Marcoses in contempt and ordered them to pay the victims until they purged their contempt.
The Hawaii Court of First Instance imposed a daily fine of $100,000 from Feb. 3, 1995, to Feb. 3, 2005, when the contempt order expired, leaving a total fine of $353,600,000.
The appellate court last week wrote that the “$100,000 per day amount was necessary and appropriate because the Marcoses’ contumacious conduct” caused direct harm to the victims, by preventing them from collecting on their $2-billion judgment. With a report from Gil Cabacungan
Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 29th, 2012
Victims of human rights violations during the Marcos dictatorship have scored a victory in their long quest to get compensation from the Marcos estate.
A US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld on Oct. 24 a contempt judgment against Sen. Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos Jr., his mother Imelda and the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos for violating an injunction that barred them from dissipating assets of the estate.
The judgment amounting to $353.6 million is believed to be the largest contempt award ever affirmed by an appellate court.
The judgment may be implemented against any US property owned by Imelda and Bongbong. However, the human rights victims need to ask the Philippine government for implementation of the judgment against the Marcoses’ personal property in the Philippines.
A Philippine law requires that all ill-gotten wealth recovered from the Marcoses should be spent on the government’s land reform program.
Robert Swift, lead counsel for the 10,000 Filipino human rights victims who obtained a judgment against the late dictator and his estate in 1995, said he was satisfied with the new judgment.
“The Marcoses have thumbed their noses at the United States court and Filipino human rights victims ever since the $2-billion judgment was entered in 1995,” Swift said in a statement.
Dynasty
The American lawyer said the Marcoses were caught trying to dissipate the estate’s assets to recapitalize the family’s political dynasty in the Philippines.
Bongbong began serving his six-year term as senator in 2010. Imelda is a representative of Ilocos Norte in Congress, while daughter Imee is the governor of the province. Both mother and daughter are running for reelection in midterm elections in May 2013.
Swift said the new judgment was against Imelda and her son personally for their misconduct.
“It broadens the possibilities for collection of money to the human rights victims. The victims can be assured they we will vigorously and aggressively seek to collect this sum,” the lawyer said.
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Chairperson Loretta Ann P. Rosales said Sunday night that the US court victory against the Marcoses was “payback” for the “shameless arrogance” of Bongbong and his mother, who have not apologized for the looting and the killings during the Marcos regime.
“If we can’t get their apology, at least we will force them to pay more and refresh the minds of a new generation of Filipinos on the atrocities committed by the family for close to two decades,” Rosales said in a phone interview.
“They (Bongbong and Imelda) are the face of their families and the Filipinos should continue to demand payment for the sins of their family.”
She said the $353.6 million awarded by the US court would be on top of the close to $2 billion awarded to martial law victims in 1995.
Barred in US
Rosales said she was told by lawyers that the contempt award meant that the Marcoses would not be allowed to set foot on any US territory.
“The contempt ruling means that the US courts are taking seriously the disrespect shown by the Marcoses. More than the heavy fines, this is a big embarrassment to the family who has shown no remorse for the deeds they made,” the CHR said.
Rosales said that the contempt charge was a “long shot” and that the US courts sided with the victims was a “pleasant surprise.”
“The senator’s refusal to apologize and own up to the sins of his father only shows the continuing arrogance of his family,” said Rosales, herself a victim of human rights violations during the Marcos regime.
The litigation against Marcos began in 1986 shortly after the dictator and his family fled to Hawaii following the people power revolution.
After Marcos died, Imelda fought the litigation. Following a historic trial, a Hawaiian jury awarded 9,539 Filipino human rights victims almost $2 billion.
The judgment was affirmed on appeal. While the jury was deliberating, the Marcoses entered into a secret deal with the Philippine government to make the Marcos estate judgment-proof.
When Swift learned of this, the human rights victims sought a contempt award against Imelda and her son, and the Marcos estate’s legal representatives, for violating the injunction that barred them from dissipating the estate’s assets.
Imelda and Bongbong were found to have agreed to the transfer from the United States to the Philippines artworks considered part of the estate, and to split the estate with the Philippine government, retaining 25 percent tax-free as their share.
After five hearings during which documents showing the Marcoses’ efforts to dissipate the assets were introduced, the court found the Marcoses in contempt and ordered them to pay the victims until they purged their contempt.
The Hawaii Court of First Instance imposed a daily fine of $100,000 from Feb. 3, 1995, to Feb. 3, 2005, when the contempt order expired, leaving a total fine of $353,600,000.
The appellate court last week wrote that the “$100,000 per day amount was necessary and appropriate because the Marcoses’ contumacious conduct” caused direct harm to the victims, by preventing them from collecting on their $2-billion judgment. With a report from Gil Cabacungan
Sunday, October 28, 2012
Opinion: Vietnam's Difficult Road to Reform | asia sentinel
Opinion: Vietnam's Difficult Road to Reform | asia sentinel
Khanh Vu Du, 26 October 2012
If the recent intraparty dispute has proven anything, it is that the Communist Party, not its individual leaders, ultimately bears responsibility for Vietnam's failures
Reform, or what passes for reform in Vietnam, is not implausible. Democracy and individual rights are not foreign concepts to the Vietnamese. The arrest and detention of pro-democratic and human rights activists prove as much. The public outrage against the government’s economic mismanagement and corruption proves as much.
More often than not, reform is used as a catch-all solution for the failures of government. The problem is not the act of reform but the extent to which the government and political system is reformed. What is perhaps certain is that corruption, economic mismanagement and human rights abuses would have continued if the president and his faction had assumed power in the recent struggle between Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and President Truong Tan Sang.
In a country where power comes not from the people but the ruling (and only) party, merely replacing the individual at the top will do little, if nothing. What is required for real reform is a serious and concerted effort by the people and from those within the government to change the system. Of course, this is easier said than done, and the obstacles are many.
A Revolt of the Ruling Elite
The intraparty dispute between the Vietnamese prime minister and president was driven in part by Prime Minister Dung’s handling of the economy. While some blame can be assigned to the global recession, the corruption and mismanagement surrounding the prime minister could not be overlooked. The scandals at Asia Commercial Bank, Vinashin, Vinalines, in addition to a poorly performing economy had made Prime Minister Dung toxic.
Although President Sang and his supporters had a case for removing the prime minister, one should not mistake their desire to do so for the good of Vietnam. The struggle between the two factions was not one of protecting the people, but a struggle to protect and preserve their place in the party. This was not a revolt of the masses but of the ruling elite, And although Prime Minister Dung has retained his job, the “revolutionaries” are still in power, perhaps waiting, biding their time until the next opportune moment.
But another revolt by party members will achieve little. True, there exist the old communist hardliners, who view the liberalization of Vietnam’s economy as a betrayal of Ho Chi Minh’s principles. There are also those party members who have prospered in the new, open market Vietnam (oftentimes through patronage and perhaps even shady business dealings), and who are just as likely to invoke the spirit of Ho Chi Minh to defend the status quo.
Communism has failed in Vietnam, but the new, more economically liberalized country has also begun to show signs of stress. Vietnam, by its very political nature, has made it possible for the government to hide its failures and shield its party members from charges of corruption—that is until the situation becomes untenable, as was the case with Prime Minister Dung.
The Vietnamese people are not unaware of their government’s deficiencies, but for a long stretch of time it was easy for them to look the other way. Vietnam was once a booming economy with great promise in Southeast Asia. The people could see and experience the positive changes that had come about, and the government could take credit for the success. For a time, it was easy for the people to say, “Well, at least today is better than yesterday.”
Today, this sense of optimism has diminished.
The Party is the System
The public apology by Party Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong over the failures of the Communist Party in serving the people was in part a response to actual failures but also in part to shield and distance the party from Prime Minister Dung. As if the party secretary’s apology was surprising enough, even the prime minister was forced to issue an apology of his own in front of the National Assembly, pledging to reform state-owned corporations.
And here lies the greatest obstacle towards reform. It is not about purging the Communist Party of corrupt officials. The individuals themselves are not the problem but a side effect. The problem is not superficial but deeply rooted and structural in nature. Corruption, economic mismanagement, and human rights violations are merely symptoms of the problem: the political system.
Presently, the Vietnamese political system is the Communist Party. An independent oversight committee on governmental affairs does not exist. Had Prime Minister Dung been ousted and President Sang or someone else had taken his place, change would have only occurred at the leadership level. Of course, there might have been some movement in the rank and file, but none of these changes would have had any lasting effect on the average Vietnamese citizen.
Appointments and elections are held within the Communist Party. Investigations into corruption are initiated by the Communist Party. All of this is to repeat the obvious: the Communist Party is not simply the sole, ruling party but the government. It is the system. None of this is particularly revealing, but it is worth mentioning.
A Need for Structural Reform
The obvious and only solution for Vietnam is to reform and democratize. Of course, the nature of the Vietnamese government means change on this level must be initiated from within. Or, in a worst case scenario, the government somehow falls apart and a new one takes its place. Either way, the path to democracy will not prove to be easy.
Whatever the journey, the goal for the Vietnamese people is to reform the political infrastructure. The government and the institutions of government should be geared towards carrying Vietnam into the future. An obvious change is an increase in transparency. The present system merely provides the opportunity to propose band-aid solutions. Much like the party secretary’s apology, blame will be cast, action will be taken, and it will be business as usual.
Power must ultimately be transferred away from those who create laws and into the hands of the people. Reform is not simply replacing the party leaders. It is not simply replacing members of the Politburo. Reform is not lip service paid to constitutional changes.
Reform in the case of Vietnam is the complete and thorough renovation of its political system. It is the democratization of Vietnam, because anything less than that will simply be incomplete and ineffective. Anything less than the distribution of power and improvement in government transparency is to invite the same old thing.
When the communist policies of old failed, the Vietnamese government changed: it modified its economic policies. The result of these changes was an increase in living standard and invitation for foreign investment. But now there is a new problem, and that problem is not its economic policies but the political system. If the Vietnamese government serves the people, as it purports to do so, then it must accept the need for real change.
While none of this can occur without support from within the existing government, none of this will occur without pressure from the public.
Change is not easy. Change in an authoritarian government, in particular, is not bloodless. As we have witnessed throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa, beginning in Tunisia and now being fought in Syria, change is often violent. But the Middle East and Northern Africa is not Vietnam. However, it is guaranteed that reform will be hard fought.
This is not to say that the Vietnamese people should take to the streets and risk their safety and future, but at some point the people must ask themselves, “Is this the country I deserve?”
(Khanh Vu Duc is a Canadian lawyer who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel)
Khanh Vu Du, 26 October 2012
If the recent intraparty dispute has proven anything, it is that the Communist Party, not its individual leaders, ultimately bears responsibility for Vietnam's failures
Reform, or what passes for reform in Vietnam, is not implausible. Democracy and individual rights are not foreign concepts to the Vietnamese. The arrest and detention of pro-democratic and human rights activists prove as much. The public outrage against the government’s economic mismanagement and corruption proves as much.
More often than not, reform is used as a catch-all solution for the failures of government. The problem is not the act of reform but the extent to which the government and political system is reformed. What is perhaps certain is that corruption, economic mismanagement and human rights abuses would have continued if the president and his faction had assumed power in the recent struggle between Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and President Truong Tan Sang.
In a country where power comes not from the people but the ruling (and only) party, merely replacing the individual at the top will do little, if nothing. What is required for real reform is a serious and concerted effort by the people and from those within the government to change the system. Of course, this is easier said than done, and the obstacles are many.
A Revolt of the Ruling Elite
The intraparty dispute between the Vietnamese prime minister and president was driven in part by Prime Minister Dung’s handling of the economy. While some blame can be assigned to the global recession, the corruption and mismanagement surrounding the prime minister could not be overlooked. The scandals at Asia Commercial Bank, Vinashin, Vinalines, in addition to a poorly performing economy had made Prime Minister Dung toxic.
Although President Sang and his supporters had a case for removing the prime minister, one should not mistake their desire to do so for the good of Vietnam. The struggle between the two factions was not one of protecting the people, but a struggle to protect and preserve their place in the party. This was not a revolt of the masses but of the ruling elite, And although Prime Minister Dung has retained his job, the “revolutionaries” are still in power, perhaps waiting, biding their time until the next opportune moment.
But another revolt by party members will achieve little. True, there exist the old communist hardliners, who view the liberalization of Vietnam’s economy as a betrayal of Ho Chi Minh’s principles. There are also those party members who have prospered in the new, open market Vietnam (oftentimes through patronage and perhaps even shady business dealings), and who are just as likely to invoke the spirit of Ho Chi Minh to defend the status quo.
Communism has failed in Vietnam, but the new, more economically liberalized country has also begun to show signs of stress. Vietnam, by its very political nature, has made it possible for the government to hide its failures and shield its party members from charges of corruption—that is until the situation becomes untenable, as was the case with Prime Minister Dung.
The Vietnamese people are not unaware of their government’s deficiencies, but for a long stretch of time it was easy for them to look the other way. Vietnam was once a booming economy with great promise in Southeast Asia. The people could see and experience the positive changes that had come about, and the government could take credit for the success. For a time, it was easy for the people to say, “Well, at least today is better than yesterday.”
Today, this sense of optimism has diminished.
The Party is the System
The public apology by Party Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong over the failures of the Communist Party in serving the people was in part a response to actual failures but also in part to shield and distance the party from Prime Minister Dung. As if the party secretary’s apology was surprising enough, even the prime minister was forced to issue an apology of his own in front of the National Assembly, pledging to reform state-owned corporations.
And here lies the greatest obstacle towards reform. It is not about purging the Communist Party of corrupt officials. The individuals themselves are not the problem but a side effect. The problem is not superficial but deeply rooted and structural in nature. Corruption, economic mismanagement, and human rights violations are merely symptoms of the problem: the political system.
Presently, the Vietnamese political system is the Communist Party. An independent oversight committee on governmental affairs does not exist. Had Prime Minister Dung been ousted and President Sang or someone else had taken his place, change would have only occurred at the leadership level. Of course, there might have been some movement in the rank and file, but none of these changes would have had any lasting effect on the average Vietnamese citizen.
Appointments and elections are held within the Communist Party. Investigations into corruption are initiated by the Communist Party. All of this is to repeat the obvious: the Communist Party is not simply the sole, ruling party but the government. It is the system. None of this is particularly revealing, but it is worth mentioning.
A Need for Structural Reform
The obvious and only solution for Vietnam is to reform and democratize. Of course, the nature of the Vietnamese government means change on this level must be initiated from within. Or, in a worst case scenario, the government somehow falls apart and a new one takes its place. Either way, the path to democracy will not prove to be easy.
Whatever the journey, the goal for the Vietnamese people is to reform the political infrastructure. The government and the institutions of government should be geared towards carrying Vietnam into the future. An obvious change is an increase in transparency. The present system merely provides the opportunity to propose band-aid solutions. Much like the party secretary’s apology, blame will be cast, action will be taken, and it will be business as usual.
Power must ultimately be transferred away from those who create laws and into the hands of the people. Reform is not simply replacing the party leaders. It is not simply replacing members of the Politburo. Reform is not lip service paid to constitutional changes.
Reform in the case of Vietnam is the complete and thorough renovation of its political system. It is the democratization of Vietnam, because anything less than that will simply be incomplete and ineffective. Anything less than the distribution of power and improvement in government transparency is to invite the same old thing.
When the communist policies of old failed, the Vietnamese government changed: it modified its economic policies. The result of these changes was an increase in living standard and invitation for foreign investment. But now there is a new problem, and that problem is not its economic policies but the political system. If the Vietnamese government serves the people, as it purports to do so, then it must accept the need for real change.
While none of this can occur without support from within the existing government, none of this will occur without pressure from the public.
Change is not easy. Change in an authoritarian government, in particular, is not bloodless. As we have witnessed throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa, beginning in Tunisia and now being fought in Syria, change is often violent. But the Middle East and Northern Africa is not Vietnam. However, it is guaranteed that reform will be hard fought.
This is not to say that the Vietnamese people should take to the streets and risk their safety and future, but at some point the people must ask themselves, “Is this the country I deserve?”
(Khanh Vu Duc is a Canadian lawyer who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel)
Saturday, October 27, 2012
Ethnic violence Escalates in Burma's Arakan State | asia sentinel
Ethnic violence Escalates in Burma's Arakan State | asia sentinel
26 October 2012
Rohingya, Rakhine minorities clash
Violence against ethnic Rohingya villagers in Burma’s Arakan province is increasingly out of control, according to the National Democratic Party for Human Rights, a Rohingya defender organization which has sent numerous pleas for outside help over the past week.
On Wednesday, a spokesman said the fishing village of Kyaukpyu Town had been attacked by thousands of Buddhist-majority ethnic Rakhine, also known as Arakanese, armed with guns, knives and machetes, alleging the attackers had the backing of the Burmese government.
As many as 50,000 Muslim villagers are now without shelter, the spokesman said, although the region is largely cut off from outside communication, and the figures and the violence cannot be verified independently. Later reports said the mobs had moved to other villages, burning and looting. Rohongyas apparently fought back in the Taungbwe village of Kyauktaw town, killing 15 ethnic Rakhine. Two Rohingya said, the spokesman said.
The organization pleaded for United Nations help to stop the violence, saying marauding gangs attacked villages this week, burning Rohingya houses and killing at least two people. Villagers have gone into hiding from the violence. Native Rakhine have blamed the Rohingyas, with some alleging the violence is being fomented from Islamic militants in Bangladesh. That also cannot be verified.
In Washington, DC, the US government reacted by urging all parties including the Burmese government to take immediate steps to halt the violence. At the same time, the UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon in New York described the latest outbreak of communal violence in Northern Arakan as deeply troubling.
“The widening mistrust between the communities is being exploited by militant and criminal elements to cause large-scale loss of human lives, material destruction, displaced families as well as fear, humiliation and hatred affecting the people from all walks of life,” a spokesman for Ban said.
“The United States is deeply concerned about reports this week of increasing ethnic and sectarian violence in Burma’s Rakhine [Arakan] State, and urges parties to exercise restraint and immediately halt all attacks,” the US State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, told reporters at her daily news conference. “We join the international community and call on authorities within the country, including the government, civil and religious leaders, to take immediate action to halt the ongoing violence, to grant full humanitarian access to the affected areas, and to begin a dialogue towards a peaceful resolution, ensuring expeditious and transparent investigations into these and previous incidents,” she said.
The predominantly Muslim Rohingya have lived for decades in the Rakhine corner on the western coast of Burma, a long, relatively narrow region on the Andaman Sea that is blocked off from the rest of the country by the 3,000-meter Arakan Mountains. Population pressures have moved them east from Bangladesh, with tensions rising. However, the campaign against them began to intensify in November 2011 with escalating violence that impelled many of them to attempt to escape, taking boats down the long coast to Thailand where the Thais attempted to push many of them back into the sea.
As Asia Sentinel reported in July, Burmans have temporarily faded into a common “Buddhist Burmese” identity vis-à-vis the Rohingya, with senior opposition leaders from Aung San Suu Kyi’s party including Tin Oo, Nyan Win and Win Tin speaking out against the Rohingya. Well-known celebrities, scholars and well-respected writers agreed. Even Aung San Suu Kyi has remained largely silent on the issue.
Responding to questions, Nuland said the violence has been on the agenda in all of the conversations that the US has had with the Burmese, including last week’s Human Rights dialogue. US officials have made five visits down to northern Arakan State since the outbreak of the violence in June, she noted.
“That, in and of itself, is remarkable if you consider where Burma was a year ago, that they are allowing not only us, but they are allowing other international observers and UN organizations to try to assist them in getting a handle on this. It’s obviously a very difficult problem, and we are working with them on various ways to address it,” she said.
The US in October announced an additional contribution of US$2.73 million for displaced people in Rakhine, of which US$2 million was to be routed through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees with another US$730,000 to go through UNICEF for water, sanitation, hygiene, and nutritional support.
Nuland said the root of the problem can be traced to the extreme poverty and lack of opportunity that plagues both communities in Rakhine state. She refrained from responding to questions about whether the events play a role in the further lifting of sanctions on Burma. “I’m not going to get ahead of where we are, which is to try to work with Burmese authorities on ways to address both the short-term issues and the longer-term issues. As we have said, there are communal issues on both sides; there are issues of poverty on both sides. So these have to be worked out over time. But I’m not going to make any predictions about where this is going to go,” Nuland said.
26 October 2012
Rohingya, Rakhine minorities clash
Violence against ethnic Rohingya villagers in Burma’s Arakan province is increasingly out of control, according to the National Democratic Party for Human Rights, a Rohingya defender organization which has sent numerous pleas for outside help over the past week.
On Wednesday, a spokesman said the fishing village of Kyaukpyu Town had been attacked by thousands of Buddhist-majority ethnic Rakhine, also known as Arakanese, armed with guns, knives and machetes, alleging the attackers had the backing of the Burmese government.
As many as 50,000 Muslim villagers are now without shelter, the spokesman said, although the region is largely cut off from outside communication, and the figures and the violence cannot be verified independently. Later reports said the mobs had moved to other villages, burning and looting. Rohongyas apparently fought back in the Taungbwe village of Kyauktaw town, killing 15 ethnic Rakhine. Two Rohingya said, the spokesman said.
The organization pleaded for United Nations help to stop the violence, saying marauding gangs attacked villages this week, burning Rohingya houses and killing at least two people. Villagers have gone into hiding from the violence. Native Rakhine have blamed the Rohingyas, with some alleging the violence is being fomented from Islamic militants in Bangladesh. That also cannot be verified.
In Washington, DC, the US government reacted by urging all parties including the Burmese government to take immediate steps to halt the violence. At the same time, the UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon in New York described the latest outbreak of communal violence in Northern Arakan as deeply troubling.
“The widening mistrust between the communities is being exploited by militant and criminal elements to cause large-scale loss of human lives, material destruction, displaced families as well as fear, humiliation and hatred affecting the people from all walks of life,” a spokesman for Ban said.
“The United States is deeply concerned about reports this week of increasing ethnic and sectarian violence in Burma’s Rakhine [Arakan] State, and urges parties to exercise restraint and immediately halt all attacks,” the US State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, told reporters at her daily news conference. “We join the international community and call on authorities within the country, including the government, civil and religious leaders, to take immediate action to halt the ongoing violence, to grant full humanitarian access to the affected areas, and to begin a dialogue towards a peaceful resolution, ensuring expeditious and transparent investigations into these and previous incidents,” she said.
The predominantly Muslim Rohingya have lived for decades in the Rakhine corner on the western coast of Burma, a long, relatively narrow region on the Andaman Sea that is blocked off from the rest of the country by the 3,000-meter Arakan Mountains. Population pressures have moved them east from Bangladesh, with tensions rising. However, the campaign against them began to intensify in November 2011 with escalating violence that impelled many of them to attempt to escape, taking boats down the long coast to Thailand where the Thais attempted to push many of them back into the sea.
As Asia Sentinel reported in July, Burmans have temporarily faded into a common “Buddhist Burmese” identity vis-à-vis the Rohingya, with senior opposition leaders from Aung San Suu Kyi’s party including Tin Oo, Nyan Win and Win Tin speaking out against the Rohingya. Well-known celebrities, scholars and well-respected writers agreed. Even Aung San Suu Kyi has remained largely silent on the issue.
Responding to questions, Nuland said the violence has been on the agenda in all of the conversations that the US has had with the Burmese, including last week’s Human Rights dialogue. US officials have made five visits down to northern Arakan State since the outbreak of the violence in June, she noted.
“That, in and of itself, is remarkable if you consider where Burma was a year ago, that they are allowing not only us, but they are allowing other international observers and UN organizations to try to assist them in getting a handle on this. It’s obviously a very difficult problem, and we are working with them on various ways to address it,” she said.
The US in October announced an additional contribution of US$2.73 million for displaced people in Rakhine, of which US$2 million was to be routed through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees with another US$730,000 to go through UNICEF for water, sanitation, hygiene, and nutritional support.
Nuland said the root of the problem can be traced to the extreme poverty and lack of opportunity that plagues both communities in Rakhine state. She refrained from responding to questions about whether the events play a role in the further lifting of sanctions on Burma. “I’m not going to get ahead of where we are, which is to try to work with Burmese authorities on ways to address both the short-term issues and the longer-term issues. As we have said, there are communal issues on both sides; there are issues of poverty on both sides. So these have to be worked out over time. But I’m not going to make any predictions about where this is going to go,” Nuland said.
Friday, October 26, 2012
Sectarian violence in Rakhine State becomes a new challenge for Burma | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Sectarian violence in Rakhine State becomes a new challenge for Burma | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Zin Linn Oct 26, 2012
In order to bring back immediate peace and stability, the Rakhine State government issued Article 144 of the Criminal Code of Law in some townships in Rakhine State. The president also declared a state of emergency by issuing ordinance in agreement with the constitution, the statement said. Moreover, the government in cooperation with local people as well as police and army personnel took measures to restore the rule of law, the president’s office says in its statement (1/2012). According to the statement, the state of emergency was declared under the law with the approval of the Union Parliament.
Zin Linn Oct 26, 2012
As a result of riots and crimes in May and June 2012, sectarian violence in western Burma has continued; riots and arson between groups of raging peoples, killing 50, wounding 54 and burning down 2230 houses and 14 religious buildings till 14 June, the president’s office says in its statement (1/2012) dated 25 October 2012. The incident also left 61,462 people homeless forcing victims to take shelter at relief camps, the statement says via The New Light of Myanmar newspaper.
As said by the statement, the government of Burma has been facing criticism over the affair – described as an abuse of human rights by some international organizations – and the case has been taken to the United Nations. The government of Burma (Myanmar) has to defend against those criticisms through every possible means, the statement says. Concurrently, the statement (1/2012) said that the government had to make efforts to get humanitarian aid for temporary shelter, provision of food and health care and rehabilitation of victims.
According to the government press statement, riots erupted in Kyaukpyu, Minbya, Myebon and Mrauk-U townships all of a sudden in Rakhine State, leaving 12 dead, 50 wounded, 1948 houses and eight religious buildings in ashes with substantial numbers of homeless people till 24 October, 2012. However, The Associated Press said that at least 56 people have been killed and 1,900 homes destroyed in renewed ethnic violence in western Myanmar as the government warned perpetrators and the international community appealed for calm.
Burma (Myanmar) has achieved the support and international recognition of its drive for smooth transition in the democratization process within a short period of time, the statement underlines. While the international community is watching the ongoing progress in the country with interest, current riots and violence have a great impact on the national integrity and interest.
Hence, it says that effective measures will be taken for the rule of law and community peace and tranquility with the collaborative efforts of the police, army and local inhabitants. The government declares through its statement that there are persons and organizations who are manipulating the incidents in Rakhine State from behind the scenes. As a result, the statement calls for the manipulators to be exposed and legal action taken against them.
On the same day, the spokesperson for U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement Thursday. It says, “The most recent outbreak of communal violence in five townships in Northern Rakhine is deeply troubling. The widening mistrust between the communities is being exploited by militant and criminal elements to cause large-scale loss of human lives, material destruction, displaced families as well as fear, humiliation and hatred affecting the people from all walks of life.”
The U.N. Secretary-General also calls on “the authorities to take urgent and effective action to bring under control all cases of lawlessness. The vigilante attacks, targeted threats and extremist rhetoric must be stopped. If this is not done, the fabric of social order could be irreparably damaged and the reform and opening up process being currently pursued by the government is likely to be jeopardized.”
According to AP, the U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland says the U.S. is deeply concerned about the violence in Rakhine state and is urging authorities to grant full humanitarian access. The U.S. last week held what it viewed as a successful human rights dialogue with Myanmar. Nuland says U.S. officials have visited Rakhine state five times since June and are in constant conversation with Myanmar authorities.
The ongoing sectarian violence in western Burma also looks as if a threat to destabilize the current reforms endorsed by the President Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government.
Thursday, October 25, 2012
Southern Thailand's Islamic Business Revolution | Asia Sentinel
Southern Thailand's Islamic Business Revolution | Asia Sentinel
Murray Hunter, 24 October 2012
Necessity drives innovation – a tale of two countries
There is a revolution going on in Southern Thailand and it is not the long-running Islamic insurgency, which has taken the lives of an estimated 5,500 people on either side since the conflict began to escalate in 2004.
Cities like the notorious Hat Yai, a sexual playground for Malaysian tourists, are being transformed into vibrant Islamic business centers. This rapid transformation has been spurred by the migration of Muslims from the three troubled provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat to Songkhla Province in order to get away from the trouble
One of the results of this exodus from the troubled areas is a growing cluster of young Thai Malay entrepreneurs who are finding innovative ways to develop new business models based upon Islamic principles.
This avant-garde young business group has seen the potential of integrating their beliefs into what they do businesswise. It is paying off as Thailand’s Muslim population is in excess of 6 million people, many cashed up from bumper rubber prices over the last few years. In addition the appeal of the products and services produced by these businesses isn’t just restricted to the Muslim population.
If one travels around the South of Thailand today there are halal (permissible under Islamic law) restaurants, boutiques, travel agents, tour companies, insurance, and consumer products all produced and operated by companies that aspire to comply with Islamic principles. Some larger projects like halal hotels and condominiums for Muslim retirees from Malaysia and Singapore are being currently constructed. What one can feel talking to these entrepreneurs and seeing the results of their work is an air of excitement, innovation and expectation that this strategy will lead to growth and success.
This is in stark contrast to south of the border in Malaysia where over the last 50 years an institutionalized mindset of dependence upon government contracts, favors and grants has severely inhibited innovation. Symbolically, this can be seen through the individualized Islamic fashion worn by Southern Thai Muslim women verses the stereotyped fashion worn by Malaysian Malay women. Even the night markets in Southern Thailand are full of innovative Halal foods like dim sum and sushi with stalls decorated in colorful banners in contrast to the drab night markets across the border.
This tale of two cities along the border of Malaysia and Thailand probably reflects the vastly different approaches to development by the two countries. Thai development has been much more ad hoc than Malaysia, where ideas tend to be generated by individuals who do something about them using their own resources. If and when they are successful, others follow and build upon this base with complementary rather than competitive businesses. Soon after government agencies provide channels and assistance through their community industry and marketing programs. Later, universities like Chulalongkorn set up fully accredited Halal testing labs to support the growing business cluster. These clusters start and grow almost naturally and this is occurring along the Islamic business front now.
In contrast, Malaysian development comes from top-down planning. Much fanfare is given to new infrastructure projects with grand objectives. The participants attending launches and involved in implementation are bureaucrats and agency officials with very little participation by the private sector. Where opportunities are identified, an agency may set up a government linked company as a vehicle to exploit it, actually stifling out private enterprise growth rather than promoting it. The end result is an attempt to build a cluster with little private enterprise support, that doesn't have any natural growth or momentum, continually requiring funds to prop it up.
This story tends to support what the creativity pundits say. Creativity and innovation come from adversity and hardship rather than a comfortable and complacent environment. The Muslim entrepreneurs in Southern Thailand have had to make it on their own and not rely upon favors from a structure of cronies who can dish out contracts and funds. In addition this trend toward Islamic principled business shows that future wealth will come from innovation rather than connections, which is very important if substantiated and real economic development is going to occur. It's not brick and mortar that will bring development, but new ideas and practices connecting hinterland, culture and entrepreneur to new market possibilities.
The Malay entrepreneurs of Southern Thailand as well aware that almost 25 percent of the world population are Muslims and that an Islamic approach to the market is sure to provide a regional source of competitive advantage in the international market arena within the not too distant future. Culture and religion can be a strong and powerful economic resource.
Their gung-ho attitude is to develop the market in Southern Thailand today and extend out to the region tomorrow. One can see through the Halal supply chain system developed by the Halal Research Center at Chulalongkorn that this is not just a dream. Some of the world's major food manufacturers like Nestlé have already adopted it.
And finally what could this mean for the restless south of Thailand? Will growing economic prosperity and wealth be the best long term weapon against any insurgency? Can the people solve this themselves without any outside assistance? If this hypothesis is true, then the growing Islamic business cluster in Southern Thailand could marginalize the insurgency movement. However this doesn't mean that the violence would end. When a movement is being marginalized it may seek attention through further high profile acts of violence. That's the sad part of the story.
(Murray Hunter is an associate professor at University Malaysia Perlis and author of a number of books on agriculture, economics, and entrepreneurship.)
Murray Hunter, 24 October 2012
Necessity drives innovation – a tale of two countries
There is a revolution going on in Southern Thailand and it is not the long-running Islamic insurgency, which has taken the lives of an estimated 5,500 people on either side since the conflict began to escalate in 2004.
Cities like the notorious Hat Yai, a sexual playground for Malaysian tourists, are being transformed into vibrant Islamic business centers. This rapid transformation has been spurred by the migration of Muslims from the three troubled provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat to Songkhla Province in order to get away from the trouble
One of the results of this exodus from the troubled areas is a growing cluster of young Thai Malay entrepreneurs who are finding innovative ways to develop new business models based upon Islamic principles.
This avant-garde young business group has seen the potential of integrating their beliefs into what they do businesswise. It is paying off as Thailand’s Muslim population is in excess of 6 million people, many cashed up from bumper rubber prices over the last few years. In addition the appeal of the products and services produced by these businesses isn’t just restricted to the Muslim population.
If one travels around the South of Thailand today there are halal (permissible under Islamic law) restaurants, boutiques, travel agents, tour companies, insurance, and consumer products all produced and operated by companies that aspire to comply with Islamic principles. Some larger projects like halal hotels and condominiums for Muslim retirees from Malaysia and Singapore are being currently constructed. What one can feel talking to these entrepreneurs and seeing the results of their work is an air of excitement, innovation and expectation that this strategy will lead to growth and success.
This is in stark contrast to south of the border in Malaysia where over the last 50 years an institutionalized mindset of dependence upon government contracts, favors and grants has severely inhibited innovation. Symbolically, this can be seen through the individualized Islamic fashion worn by Southern Thai Muslim women verses the stereotyped fashion worn by Malaysian Malay women. Even the night markets in Southern Thailand are full of innovative Halal foods like dim sum and sushi with stalls decorated in colorful banners in contrast to the drab night markets across the border.
This tale of two cities along the border of Malaysia and Thailand probably reflects the vastly different approaches to development by the two countries. Thai development has been much more ad hoc than Malaysia, where ideas tend to be generated by individuals who do something about them using their own resources. If and when they are successful, others follow and build upon this base with complementary rather than competitive businesses. Soon after government agencies provide channels and assistance through their community industry and marketing programs. Later, universities like Chulalongkorn set up fully accredited Halal testing labs to support the growing business cluster. These clusters start and grow almost naturally and this is occurring along the Islamic business front now.
In contrast, Malaysian development comes from top-down planning. Much fanfare is given to new infrastructure projects with grand objectives. The participants attending launches and involved in implementation are bureaucrats and agency officials with very little participation by the private sector. Where opportunities are identified, an agency may set up a government linked company as a vehicle to exploit it, actually stifling out private enterprise growth rather than promoting it. The end result is an attempt to build a cluster with little private enterprise support, that doesn't have any natural growth or momentum, continually requiring funds to prop it up.
This story tends to support what the creativity pundits say. Creativity and innovation come from adversity and hardship rather than a comfortable and complacent environment. The Muslim entrepreneurs in Southern Thailand have had to make it on their own and not rely upon favors from a structure of cronies who can dish out contracts and funds. In addition this trend toward Islamic principled business shows that future wealth will come from innovation rather than connections, which is very important if substantiated and real economic development is going to occur. It's not brick and mortar that will bring development, but new ideas and practices connecting hinterland, culture and entrepreneur to new market possibilities.
The Malay entrepreneurs of Southern Thailand as well aware that almost 25 percent of the world population are Muslims and that an Islamic approach to the market is sure to provide a regional source of competitive advantage in the international market arena within the not too distant future. Culture and religion can be a strong and powerful economic resource.
Their gung-ho attitude is to develop the market in Southern Thailand today and extend out to the region tomorrow. One can see through the Halal supply chain system developed by the Halal Research Center at Chulalongkorn that this is not just a dream. Some of the world's major food manufacturers like Nestlé have already adopted it.
And finally what could this mean for the restless south of Thailand? Will growing economic prosperity and wealth be the best long term weapon against any insurgency? Can the people solve this themselves without any outside assistance? If this hypothesis is true, then the growing Islamic business cluster in Southern Thailand could marginalize the insurgency movement. However this doesn't mean that the violence would end. When a movement is being marginalized it may seek attention through further high profile acts of violence. That's the sad part of the story.
(Murray Hunter is an associate professor at University Malaysia Perlis and author of a number of books on agriculture, economics, and entrepreneurship.)
Thailand's Ill-conceived Rice Subsidy | Asia Sentinel
Thailand's Ill-conceived Rice Subsidy | Asia Sentinel
Asia Sentinel's Correspondent, 24 October 2012
Bulging government warehouses must be emptied for new crop
Although Thailand appears to be veering closer to a major economic dilemma with its rice subsidy program, it appears likely the government will extend it at least through the current harvest season, with substantial consequences for the global rice market.
By fulfilling a campaign promise by the Pheu Thai Party to pay roughly 50 percent over global prices to rice farmers, the government now has somewhere between 11 million and 15 million tonnes of rice moldering in rice millers’ warehouses, and nowhere to sell it on global markets except at a big loss. With the arrival of the rice harvest season in November and December, the government must now clear warehouses of 4 million to 5 million tonnes by selling off the stored rice below cost.
“They have to sell it a low price, they can’t keep stocking it,” said Samerendu Mohanty, senior economist at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)in the Philippines. “They have to make space for the new crop. They have got themselves in quite a fix, they might have to sell four to five million tonnes to make space for incoming rice.”
The Pheu Thai government, whose rural constituency encompasses the country’s 3.7 million rice farming families, made the promise to pay well over global prices during the 2011 election that brought the party to power. However, as many Asian countries have learned to their sorrow, instituting a subsidy means climbing onto the tiger’s back.
Once put in place, subsidies are difficult if not virtually impossible to discontinue, as the Yudhoyono government learned earlier this year in Indonesia when it sought to discontinue fuel subsidies and reaped riots. Attempts to cease fuel subsidies played a part, along with discontent over corruption and other issues, in electoral losses for the government of former Premier Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in Malaysia. Badawi was driven from power after a revolt in his own party.
There are also questions how much the program benefits the farmers, other sources say. Although famers do undeniably benefit from higher prices, it is the middlemen who make out the most in the long run.
If the government puts the surplus onto world markets even at a loss, which is expected to be as much as US$200 per tonne, that is likely to drive down global rice prices, to the benefit of Indonesia and the Philippines, which are net purchasers, as well as several African countries, Mohanty told Asia Sentinel in a telephone interview.
Research-Works, a Shanghai-based financial research firm that specializes in commodities, said in its latest Commodities Monitor, which is delivered to private clients, that “The outlook for rice prices now seems more bearish given that Indian exports received the green light for 2012-2013. Thai government rice inventories continue to rise, up to 14.5 million tonnes of milled equivalent as of 17 October. Additional funding has been approved to purchase a further 1.39 million tonnes, taking the total 2012-2013 purchase target to 14.7mn tonnes. We are not sure when the saga will come to an end although 2013 now looks more likely. Watch this space closely.”
Thailand has been the world’s biggest rice exporter for nearly five decades, with export volumes increasing steadily from 1 million tonnes in 1974-75 to more than 10 million in 2010-11. Its share of the global market peaked at 43 percent in 1988-89, according to IRRI, and has since fluctuated by 25-30 as the global rice trade has tripled, from 11 to 33 million tonnes in the wake of trade liberalization.
Although Thailand remains the world’s premier producer, it’s questionable if they can remain that way, IRRI’s Mohanty said. Thai rice has traditionally been the world’s high-quality standard. But as Thai farmers figure out that the government will buy all the rice they can grow, the farmers can be expected to drive up yields any way they can, which risks damaging quality.
In the meantime, other countries are catching up to Thailand. Vietnam and India are both major producers and exporters. Myanmar may not be far behind. Prior to the country’s disastrous six-decade experiment with socialism and self-sufficiency, Burma, as it was then known, was known as the breadbasket of Asia. If it can get its act together, it could return to that position. The Philippines, which has spent decades as the world’s biggest rice buyer, has introduced programs to improve rural infrastructure and provide other aid to rice farmers, cutting substantially into the amount of rice the country must buy.
“If Thailand persists with the program, the emergence of new players in the export market will surely accelerate,” IRRI said in a report earlier this year. “The country may be displaced eventually as the largest exporter in the world. But, in the end, it all depends on how fast the global rice trade expands. If global rice trade volume follows the trend of the past two decades, it is possible to have enough maneuvering space for all exporters, including the new entrants. Hence, Thailand will continue to hold on to the top position.”
Asia Sentinel's Correspondent, 24 October 2012
Bulging government warehouses must be emptied for new crop
Although Thailand appears to be veering closer to a major economic dilemma with its rice subsidy program, it appears likely the government will extend it at least through the current harvest season, with substantial consequences for the global rice market.
By fulfilling a campaign promise by the Pheu Thai Party to pay roughly 50 percent over global prices to rice farmers, the government now has somewhere between 11 million and 15 million tonnes of rice moldering in rice millers’ warehouses, and nowhere to sell it on global markets except at a big loss. With the arrival of the rice harvest season in November and December, the government must now clear warehouses of 4 million to 5 million tonnes by selling off the stored rice below cost.
“They have to sell it a low price, they can’t keep stocking it,” said Samerendu Mohanty, senior economist at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)in the Philippines. “They have to make space for the new crop. They have got themselves in quite a fix, they might have to sell four to five million tonnes to make space for incoming rice.”
The Pheu Thai government, whose rural constituency encompasses the country’s 3.7 million rice farming families, made the promise to pay well over global prices during the 2011 election that brought the party to power. However, as many Asian countries have learned to their sorrow, instituting a subsidy means climbing onto the tiger’s back.
Once put in place, subsidies are difficult if not virtually impossible to discontinue, as the Yudhoyono government learned earlier this year in Indonesia when it sought to discontinue fuel subsidies and reaped riots. Attempts to cease fuel subsidies played a part, along with discontent over corruption and other issues, in electoral losses for the government of former Premier Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in Malaysia. Badawi was driven from power after a revolt in his own party.
There are also questions how much the program benefits the farmers, other sources say. Although famers do undeniably benefit from higher prices, it is the middlemen who make out the most in the long run.
If the government puts the surplus onto world markets even at a loss, which is expected to be as much as US$200 per tonne, that is likely to drive down global rice prices, to the benefit of Indonesia and the Philippines, which are net purchasers, as well as several African countries, Mohanty told Asia Sentinel in a telephone interview.
Research-Works, a Shanghai-based financial research firm that specializes in commodities, said in its latest Commodities Monitor, which is delivered to private clients, that “The outlook for rice prices now seems more bearish given that Indian exports received the green light for 2012-2013. Thai government rice inventories continue to rise, up to 14.5 million tonnes of milled equivalent as of 17 October. Additional funding has been approved to purchase a further 1.39 million tonnes, taking the total 2012-2013 purchase target to 14.7mn tonnes. We are not sure when the saga will come to an end although 2013 now looks more likely. Watch this space closely.”
Thailand has been the world’s biggest rice exporter for nearly five decades, with export volumes increasing steadily from 1 million tonnes in 1974-75 to more than 10 million in 2010-11. Its share of the global market peaked at 43 percent in 1988-89, according to IRRI, and has since fluctuated by 25-30 as the global rice trade has tripled, from 11 to 33 million tonnes in the wake of trade liberalization.
Although Thailand remains the world’s premier producer, it’s questionable if they can remain that way, IRRI’s Mohanty said. Thai rice has traditionally been the world’s high-quality standard. But as Thai farmers figure out that the government will buy all the rice they can grow, the farmers can be expected to drive up yields any way they can, which risks damaging quality.
In the meantime, other countries are catching up to Thailand. Vietnam and India are both major producers and exporters. Myanmar may not be far behind. Prior to the country’s disastrous six-decade experiment with socialism and self-sufficiency, Burma, as it was then known, was known as the breadbasket of Asia. If it can get its act together, it could return to that position. The Philippines, which has spent decades as the world’s biggest rice buyer, has introduced programs to improve rural infrastructure and provide other aid to rice farmers, cutting substantially into the amount of rice the country must buy.
“If Thailand persists with the program, the emergence of new players in the export market will surely accelerate,” IRRI said in a report earlier this year. “The country may be displaced eventually as the largest exporter in the world. But, in the end, it all depends on how fast the global rice trade expands. If global rice trade volume follows the trend of the past two decades, it is possible to have enough maneuvering space for all exporters, including the new entrants. Hence, Thailand will continue to hold on to the top position.”
Tuesday, October 23, 2012
Protests in South China highlight growth vs people conflict | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Protests in South China highlight growth vs people conflict | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Graham Land, Oct 23, 2012
More people power protests are under way in China against environmental degradation and human health risks. This time it’s on the beautiful tropical island of Hainan, the smallest province in the PRC.
The people of Hainan are no strangers to environmental controversy. I recently posted about award-winning citizen journalist and environmental activist Liu Futang going on trial, ostensibly for illegal publishing, but evidently for his writings exposing illegal forest clearing on Hainan.
Recently thousands of protestors have been demonstrating against a coal-fired power plant which is under construction in the town of Yinggehai. Police have been firing tear gas on protestors, injuring dozens. The protests became violent when a woman was injured, prompting the townsmen to retaliate with bricks and stones, according to media sources. Some of the injured have then been removed from hospitals by police. The town is basically on lock down.
From Radio Free Asia:
If the Chinese government has anything to learn from these protests its that they should start acting like their name suggests, the People’s Republic. You don’t force ugly, dangerous pollution in the name of economic growth and development on a fishing village located on a tropical island desperately hanging on to its environmental riches despite the impacts of tourism, pollution and deforestation. Besides, China is very new media savvy these days and any such people power protest and subsequent use of force by the police will echo throughout the country and beyond.
Perhaps the protests will succeed like those which occurred against a copper plant in Sichuan Province back in July.
From the Washington Post:
Graham Land, Oct 23, 2012
More people power protests are under way in China against environmental degradation and human health risks. This time it’s on the beautiful tropical island of Hainan, the smallest province in the PRC.
The people of Hainan are no strangers to environmental controversy. I recently posted about award-winning citizen journalist and environmental activist Liu Futang going on trial, ostensibly for illegal publishing, but evidently for his writings exposing illegal forest clearing on Hainan.
Recently thousands of protestors have been demonstrating against a coal-fired power plant which is under construction in the town of Yinggehai. Police have been firing tear gas on protestors, injuring dozens. The protests became violent when a woman was injured, prompting the townsmen to retaliate with bricks and stones, according to media sources. Some of the injured have then been removed from hospitals by police. The town is basically on lock down.
From Radio Free Asia:
Right now there are police guarding all of the main streets, and they are stopping any vehicles from driving in the direction of the township government buildings. Local residents are being allowed into the town, but are being prevented from leaving. All of the shops have been shut since last Thursday, when the armed police arrived.–Yinggehai resident “Liu”
Back in March Yinggehai suffered a serious garbage problem on its beaches. Compare this picture from the People’s Daily Online with any Google Image search of Hainan beaches.
If the Chinese government has anything to learn from these protests its that they should start acting like their name suggests, the People’s Republic. You don’t force ugly, dangerous pollution in the name of economic growth and development on a fishing village located on a tropical island desperately hanging on to its environmental riches despite the impacts of tourism, pollution and deforestation. Besides, China is very new media savvy these days and any such people power protest and subsequent use of force by the police will echo throughout the country and beyond.
Perhaps the protests will succeed like those which occurred against a copper plant in Sichuan Province back in July.
From the Washington Post:
In recent months, at least two other large-scale environmental protests have forced local authorities to back down and, at least temporarily, suspend planned projects. But as the country’s ruling Communist Party approaches a sensitive and rare transition of leadership, officials are increasingly worried about such mass demonstrations.
Saturday, October 20, 2012
A North Korean Rebel | asia sentinel
A North Korean Rebel | asia sentinel
Christopher Green, 19 October 201
Kim Jong-il's liberal grandson wishes for peace. Fat chance.
With phrases like “economic improvement measure” swirling around Kim Il-sung Square and as short skirts in Pyongyang inspire whispered talk of greater freedom for the masses, 2012 has turned into a year of hope for the DPRK.
In such circumstances, it is no surprise that the talk of the town this week is an unusually frank, open interview given to former Finnish Minister of Defense Elisabeth Rehn by a suave young man named Kim Han-sol.
Any Han-sol interview was always going to be a point of interest for the international community. As Kim Jong-il’s grandson, he’s nominally close to the center of the family and, as the interview reveals, speaks English like a native. The interview content doesn’t disappoint, either; holed up in an international college in the Bosnian city of Mostar, the young man speaks of a Libyan roommate thrilled by the overthrow of Colonel Qaddafi, of interaction with South Korean friends, of his father’s disinterest in politics, and of his sadness at never “being sought out” by his grandfather.
It is intriguing, and it is also certainly enough to earn the young man the label “reformist element” and/or “new diplomatic channel to Pyongyang” in certain quarters. However, such talk is misguided; this was clearly not a political message sent from Pyongyang.
With the Kim Jong-un regime throwing out positive cultural and diplomatic signals left and right, it would of course be easy to cast the Han-sol interview in a such a political light. His eloquently expressed desire for peace and reconciliation with South Korea is pleasant, and fits in nicely with trends emerging from the DPRK itself: the short skirts, high heels, Rocky theme music and Disney characters of the Moranbong Band’s debut concert on July 6th; the appearance in public life of Ri Sol-joo as the charming and homely wife of Kim Jong-un; and the leader’s apparent reconciliation with Fujimoto Kenji, the former sushi chef to Kim Jong-il who left the country a decade ago amidst rumors of espionage.
However, adding Han-sol to this list is just wishful thinking. The Kim dynasty has always worked on very clear principles, and one of them is that anybody who represents a threat to the leader is to be kept as far away from Pyongyang as possible. As a hereditary dynasty, nowhere is this more important than inside the Kim family itself. First it happened to Kim Il-sung’s younger brother Kim Yong-ju, who was cast into exile in Jagang Province in 1975 as Kim Jong-il worked to “pluck out the roots” of his sole competitor’s power base, and later to Kim Pyong-il, Kim Il-sung’s son with former secretary Kim Song-ae and a man who has now been a wandering DPRK ambassador to assorted European countries for 33 years and counting.
Han-sol’s father Kim Jong-nam is just the most recent of these “branches” of the Kim family to be cut off and cast into the ether. Exiled in East Asia, Jong-nam occasionally emerges to give brief interviews to Japanese news crews, ordinarily in airports or on quiet city streets. A portly and jovial fellow, he espouses a reformist agenda and has come out against the very notion of dynastic succession, but never discusses family politics and claims never to have felt in danger despite giving voice to controversial views.
Note that women are not subject to the same rules: Kim Jong Il’s sister, the ailing Kim Kyung Hee, is one member of the elite leading group in Pyongyang, as is his fourth and final wife Kim Ok and his youngest daughter, Kim Jong-un’s sister Kim Yeo-jung. But this means nothing. North Korea is a male-dominated culture to the very core, and its women are no danger to anyone or anything.
Conversely, it is extremely telling that neither Jong-nam nor Pyong-il appeared at Kim Jong-il’s funeral in Pyongyang last December. Much like the oligarchs of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the reality is that as long as people like Han-sol don’t get involved in central government politics too deeply or too often, they can do whatever they want, and that includes giving interviews to former Finnish government ministers. All Han-sol needs to remember is that if he fails to play by the rules laid out in Pyongyang then the results are sure to be painful. T to put it in terms that the young man can relate to, he could end up like Kim Jong-il’s other nephew Ri Il-nam, who was gunned down on a South Korean city street in 1997.
It is unquestionably the case that an interview for Finnish television in which a member of the Kim clan declares a desire for world peace is to the advantage of the government in Pyongyang, for it gives the DPRK a humane face and lends weight to notions of pragmatism in the Kim bloodline. But that does not mean that Pyongyang was behind the interview itself, or that it was intended to convey a political message to the wider global audience. Kim Han-sol is just what he appears to be; his own man.
(Christopher Green is the Manager of International Affairs for Daily NK, a North Korea news website based in Seoul, and an editor for Sino NK, which analyzes issues involving North Korea's northern border. He is also a PhD candidate at Cambridge University.)
Christopher Green, 19 October 201
Kim Jong-il's liberal grandson wishes for peace. Fat chance.
With phrases like “economic improvement measure” swirling around Kim Il-sung Square and as short skirts in Pyongyang inspire whispered talk of greater freedom for the masses, 2012 has turned into a year of hope for the DPRK.
In such circumstances, it is no surprise that the talk of the town this week is an unusually frank, open interview given to former Finnish Minister of Defense Elisabeth Rehn by a suave young man named Kim Han-sol.
Any Han-sol interview was always going to be a point of interest for the international community. As Kim Jong-il’s grandson, he’s nominally close to the center of the family and, as the interview reveals, speaks English like a native. The interview content doesn’t disappoint, either; holed up in an international college in the Bosnian city of Mostar, the young man speaks of a Libyan roommate thrilled by the overthrow of Colonel Qaddafi, of interaction with South Korean friends, of his father’s disinterest in politics, and of his sadness at never “being sought out” by his grandfather.
It is intriguing, and it is also certainly enough to earn the young man the label “reformist element” and/or “new diplomatic channel to Pyongyang” in certain quarters. However, such talk is misguided; this was clearly not a political message sent from Pyongyang.
With the Kim Jong-un regime throwing out positive cultural and diplomatic signals left and right, it would of course be easy to cast the Han-sol interview in a such a political light. His eloquently expressed desire for peace and reconciliation with South Korea is pleasant, and fits in nicely with trends emerging from the DPRK itself: the short skirts, high heels, Rocky theme music and Disney characters of the Moranbong Band’s debut concert on July 6th; the appearance in public life of Ri Sol-joo as the charming and homely wife of Kim Jong-un; and the leader’s apparent reconciliation with Fujimoto Kenji, the former sushi chef to Kim Jong-il who left the country a decade ago amidst rumors of espionage.
However, adding Han-sol to this list is just wishful thinking. The Kim dynasty has always worked on very clear principles, and one of them is that anybody who represents a threat to the leader is to be kept as far away from Pyongyang as possible. As a hereditary dynasty, nowhere is this more important than inside the Kim family itself. First it happened to Kim Il-sung’s younger brother Kim Yong-ju, who was cast into exile in Jagang Province in 1975 as Kim Jong-il worked to “pluck out the roots” of his sole competitor’s power base, and later to Kim Pyong-il, Kim Il-sung’s son with former secretary Kim Song-ae and a man who has now been a wandering DPRK ambassador to assorted European countries for 33 years and counting.
Han-sol’s father Kim Jong-nam is just the most recent of these “branches” of the Kim family to be cut off and cast into the ether. Exiled in East Asia, Jong-nam occasionally emerges to give brief interviews to Japanese news crews, ordinarily in airports or on quiet city streets. A portly and jovial fellow, he espouses a reformist agenda and has come out against the very notion of dynastic succession, but never discusses family politics and claims never to have felt in danger despite giving voice to controversial views.
Note that women are not subject to the same rules: Kim Jong Il’s sister, the ailing Kim Kyung Hee, is one member of the elite leading group in Pyongyang, as is his fourth and final wife Kim Ok and his youngest daughter, Kim Jong-un’s sister Kim Yeo-jung. But this means nothing. North Korea is a male-dominated culture to the very core, and its women are no danger to anyone or anything.
Conversely, it is extremely telling that neither Jong-nam nor Pyong-il appeared at Kim Jong-il’s funeral in Pyongyang last December. Much like the oligarchs of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the reality is that as long as people like Han-sol don’t get involved in central government politics too deeply or too often, they can do whatever they want, and that includes giving interviews to former Finnish government ministers. All Han-sol needs to remember is that if he fails to play by the rules laid out in Pyongyang then the results are sure to be painful. T to put it in terms that the young man can relate to, he could end up like Kim Jong-il’s other nephew Ri Il-nam, who was gunned down on a South Korean city street in 1997.
It is unquestionably the case that an interview for Finnish television in which a member of the Kim clan declares a desire for world peace is to the advantage of the government in Pyongyang, for it gives the DPRK a humane face and lends weight to notions of pragmatism in the Kim bloodline. But that does not mean that Pyongyang was behind the interview itself, or that it was intended to convey a political message to the wider global audience. Kim Han-sol is just what he appears to be; his own man.
(Christopher Green is the Manager of International Affairs for Daily NK, a North Korea news website based in Seoul, and an editor for Sino NK, which analyzes issues involving North Korea's northern border. He is also a PhD candidate at Cambridge University.)
Friday, October 19, 2012
Despite war against ethnic Kachin, the US invites Burma to observe Cobra Gold | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Despite war against ethnic Kachin, the US invites Burma to observe Cobra Gold | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Zin Linn, Oct 19, 2012
Zin Linn, Oct 19, 2012
The ethnic Kachin people of Burma yearn for a ceasefire so as to avoid war crimes in their regions. They are calling for a meaningful political dialogue among the stakeholders to reinstate peace in the war-torn state. The government’s armed forces are still committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. The human rights violations of Burmese soldiers in Kachin State, involving rape, forced labour, torture, the killings of civilians, and religious persecution are grave breaches of international laws.
In such a time of inhumane war in Kachin state, many people are not so happy hearing about the news of Burma military’s observer status with the US’s Cobra Gold, a US-Thai joint military exercise.
The United States will invite Burma (Myanmar) to observe Cobra Gold, which brings together more than 10,000 American and Thai military personnel and participants from other Asian countries for joint annual maneuvers quoting officials from countries participating in the exercises Reuters News said Friday.
Burma’s notorious military has robbed 25 per cent of the parliamentary seats by using undemocratic 2008 constitution drawn by itself. Without retreating from the Parliaments, such kind of military did not deserve any reward by the democratic states.
When President Thein Sein of Burma met national races affairs ministers from regions and states in Nay-Pyi-Taw in September, he said that national races live in the country have the basic rights of citizens stated in the constitution.
However, Thein Sein also admitted that ethnic regions still failed to sustain development on education, health, transportation, and the economy due to the long-lasting armed conflicts. There is no rule of law in the conflict ethnic areas, he acknowledged.
Thein Sein highlighted that there has been progress in making peace with the ethnic armed-groups, with the exception of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
“Currently, peace negotiations are going on at two levels, the first at region/state concerned. The process at region/state level would be smoother with the participation of all local national races including national races affairs ministers,” the President told the state-run New Light of Myanmar newspaper.
“At the final stage, discussion and decisions would be made at the Parliament,” he added.
The government’s three-step peace plan says that first to make ceasefire at state level talks, second to establish a Kachin ethnic political party and third the ethnic party has to put forward the ethnic questions to the parliamentary assembly where the problems have to solved out in line with the 2008 constitution.
However, KIO prefers its own three-step process — the first step would be an agreement on the distribution of troops and their locations; the second step would be an all-inclusive discussion similar to the Panglong Conference in order to work out long-standing political disagreements; the third and final stage would be to enforce the agreement in whatever structure is fitting.
Up to now, armed clashes between the government and the KIA have continued mostly in eastern and central Kachin State. Fighting goes on fatally all through Kachin State in the face of government peacemaking pledge to the United States and the EU. The KIO targets to cut the supply lines of the government troops in southern Kachin state.
The current clashes are taking place in the Kachin state’s western jade rich Hpakant district where the Kachin resistance has claimed major victory over the past few weeks. The government’s control of the Hpakant jade-land has reportedly earned billions in revenue since the early 1990s when the KIO gave up control of most of the area.
According to KIO’s spokesperson and Deputy General Secretary-2, Salang Kaba Lah Nan, the government army has been gearing up for a major military offensive against the KIO using massive military strength of over 80 battalions.
A 17-year-old truce between the Burmese Government and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) collapsed on June 9, 2011, sending many thousands Kachin war-refugees fleeing toward the Sino-Burma border with no sufficient international humanitarian assistance.
According to recent figures released by the IDPs and Refugees Relief Committee (IRRC), based in Laiza, a large town in Kachin State, there are currently nine official Kachin refugee camps in China housing 7,097 people. Another 3,000 Kachin civilians are staying with relatives or in unofficial temporary settlements near the Chinese border, the IRRC says.
This is in addition to the more than 62,000 people displaced within Myanmar, including 24,000 in government-controlled areas, and close to 40,000 in KIA-controlled areas, the UN estimates.
KIO has persistently asked the government to withdraw its troops toward the line agreed upon in the 1994 ceasefire agreement to show its peace proposal is sincere and genuine. The most recent battles took place in the KIO’s territories acknowledged during the 1994-2011 ceasefire period.
If Burma Army refused to withdraw from the KIO’s territories of 1994 truce, the United States should not invite Burma to observe Cobra Gold maneuver.
Wednesday, October 17, 2012
Red-shirt woman and UDD guard jailed for alleged offences against soldiers in 2009 | Prachatai English
Red-shirt woman and UDD guard jailed for alleged offences against soldiers in 2009 | Prachatai English
prachatai, October 16, 2012
A woman and a guard for the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship have been sentenced to prison for detaining and attacking soldiers during red-shirt rallies in 2009.
On 15 Oct, the Criminal Court found Naruemon Warunrungroj and Kittisak Chinkhajon guilty of forcing with arms, detaining, and assaulting others during red-shirt rallies on 25 Feb 2009.
The two were the third and fourth defendants in the case who appeared in court, while the first two, Sonchai Sidi and Prachuap Bunsantia, are at large.
Naruemon was sentenced to one year in prison under Section 295 of the Criminal Code, and Kittisak three years under Section 309 (2) of the same law.
After the verdict was read, both defendants were immediately held in custody and sent to prison.
Their lawyer Suphap Phetsi requested their release on bail, placing 300,000 baht and 100,000 baht as cash guarantees for Kittisak and Naruemon, respectively. However, the court sent the bail petitions to the Appeals Court for consideration, which will take about 3 days.
According the indictment, on the night of 25 Feb 2009, the four defendants forced and threatened Sgt Amnuay Thongrin and Pvt Watchara Saensikaew, who had been assigned to observe the red-shirt rallies. The defendants locked them in a steel barricade near the rally stage, and physically assaulted them. Naruemon was alleged to have used a 2-foot wooden stick to hit Sgt Amnuay, causing his head to bleed.
In a separate case, Naruemon, 50, had previously been accused of firing at a military helicopter on 10 April 2010, and been detained for one year, 4 months and two days, without bail, before being acquitted by the court.
prachatai, October 16, 2012
A woman and a guard for the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship have been sentenced to prison for detaining and attacking soldiers during red-shirt rallies in 2009.
On 15 Oct, the Criminal Court found Naruemon Warunrungroj and Kittisak Chinkhajon guilty of forcing with arms, detaining, and assaulting others during red-shirt rallies on 25 Feb 2009.
The two were the third and fourth defendants in the case who appeared in court, while the first two, Sonchai Sidi and Prachuap Bunsantia, are at large.
Naruemon was sentenced to one year in prison under Section 295 of the Criminal Code, and Kittisak three years under Section 309 (2) of the same law.
After the verdict was read, both defendants were immediately held in custody and sent to prison.
Their lawyer Suphap Phetsi requested their release on bail, placing 300,000 baht and 100,000 baht as cash guarantees for Kittisak and Naruemon, respectively. However, the court sent the bail petitions to the Appeals Court for consideration, which will take about 3 days.
According the indictment, on the night of 25 Feb 2009, the four defendants forced and threatened Sgt Amnuay Thongrin and Pvt Watchara Saensikaew, who had been assigned to observe the red-shirt rallies. The defendants locked them in a steel barricade near the rally stage, and physically assaulted them. Naruemon was alleged to have used a 2-foot wooden stick to hit Sgt Amnuay, causing his head to bleed.
In a separate case, Naruemon, 50, had previously been accused of firing at a military helicopter on 10 April 2010, and been detained for one year, 4 months and two days, without bail, before being acquitted by the court.
Thai citizens do live beyond the boundary of the City of Angels: Some commentaries of the complete TRCT report | Prachatai English
Thai citizens do live beyond the boundary of the City of Angels: Some commentaries of the complete TRCT report | Prachatai English
Saowanee T. Alexande, October 16, 2012
On behalf of the volunteers who collected information on the impact of 2010 April-May crackdown in Ubon Ratchathani, I would like to make the following observations regarding the complete Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand (TRCT) report as follows.
The report centers around what transpired in Bangkok. Although there are some mentions of parallel rallies leading up to the violence in provinces, it gives little value to the lives of stakeholders in the incidents including the accused and affected individuals. In Ubon Ratchathani alone, 418 warrants were issued for which 88 civilians were taken in custody1. Twenty-one individuals were held in custody without bail from the day they were arrested to the day the verdict was handed down. A typical reason given by the court for not allowing bail was the claim that the individuals were a flight risk because the offenses they were charged with were serious. Most of these suspects were male adults with families to care for. Many of them were arrested soon after the May crackdown, leaving their families to suffer from the lack of financial support ever since. It took months for the TRCT staff to start their fieldwork to collect information about the families and those affected. In the entire report, there are only 11 references to the city of Ubon Ratchathani. Of those 11 mentions, four have to do with the City Hall incident with little information as far as specifics of the incident and related demonstrations are concerned. No case study is discussed. Nor is there any example of individuals who they call “victims” as appeared on page 332. It is worth-noting that the TRCT has created several subcommittees to carry out specific tasks for “truth-finding” purposes concerning individual incidents. Also created was the Fifth Subcommittee whose responsibility involved fact-finding about the Ubon Ratchathani City Hall incident. With the vast budget and human resources to collect field data, the TRCT should have reported their findings to the public in order to make it aware of the impacts of this political conflict. Instead, after 2 years of study, the report presents nothing but general, vague recommendations for reconciliation--something which can be found in a textbook or a theory-based academic paper. Missing are any recorded accounts and reports of facts regarding the events including prior incidents, the aftermath, as well as its consequences. This missing information would have earned the report a status of an academically-oriented source of knowledge instead of a collection of invalidated claims and the like.
Anonymization of Individuals
The report is not faithful to the spirit of “truth-finding”. Rather, it focuses on “reconciliation” although it is not clear what parties would reconcile as a result of this report. As they are, the recommendations in the report are not grounded on the principles of truth-finding--a prerequisite for a reconciliation process. Apparently, the absence of individuals’ names, which can be seen as an attempt to avoid further divide, backfires as it put these individuals in the background while the word “the City Hall arson” takes center stage. The report’s anonymization of these affected civilians makes them “nonexistent” in the public discourse. Severely affected individuals such as Mr. Tanoosilp Tanootong, Mr. Kamploy Namee, Mr. Ubon Saentaweesook, and Ms. Sininaat Chompoosapate and their stories do not earn a single reference in the report. Consider the tone of the following excerpt:
Although the language in the excerpt is ambiguous as to who was responsible for the arsons, juxtaposition of words in it could possibly lead the reader to believe that the protesters set the halls on fire. If the report had focused on the facts regarding the matter, the reader would have seen a picture of something other than the scorching flames rising from the burning state-owned buildings, a sight which affect laypeople’s sensibilities—laypeople who had no clue how all this had come about. Rather, the reader would have learned more details about what transpired that day. For instance, the reader would have been given an opportunity to put things in perspective, had it been mentioned in the report that someone took a photo of Mr. Namee as the incident was unfolding. This photo was later used to charge him with an involvement in the arson attack. As for Mr. Tanootong, he was arrested later. He claimed that he was working in his cassava plantation in a different district along with his wife when it took place. He later made repeated statements to the court that he was in the plantation about 100 kilometers away from the city of Ubon Ratchathani. Let us turn to Ms. Chompoosapate, she had a gunshot wound on her leg from a bullet reportedly coming from the direction of the second floor of the City Hall building.
These people now walk free. Ms. Chompoosapate carries with her a scar from that gunshot, which will later be discussed, and memories from being imprisoned in the state prison while her small children were left with relatives. Financial compensation from the Ministry of Human Resources does not erase the event from her memory. Mr. Namee has become permanently blind and hemiplegic due to a rupture of a brain aneurysm while he was being held in prison without bail during the long trial process; his prior attempts to post bail to seek proper medical treatment failed miserably. Mr Tanootong was eventually acquitted after being held, again without bail, for over a year. No one is taking responsibility for his time and part of his life lost in the prison. Mr. Saentaweesuk is currently taking medications for psychiatric problems—the condition he had before the incident which became aggravated while he was kept behind bars. With these problems he cannot take a normal job to earn a living. These individuals are only some of many who were severely affected by the incident. Presentation of broad, unbacked claims about protesters’ “likely” involvement in the problem without verification and depiction of resulting civilians’ plight not only underscores the report’s superficial take on alleged claims against the people, but it also reflects the report’s lack of efficiency in reporting facts regardless of whether the facts are for reconciliation or any other purpose.
Citing the above excerpt from the report, it is clear that the report misses information regarding the role of local state authorities in provinces with serious incidents. There is no mention of how state agencies, be they the police, military, or governing bodies, treated or responded to the civilian protesters. For instance, the report does not state that gunshots were reportedly fired at the protesters from the direction of the City Hall building before the place was set on fire. One of the shots wounded Ms. Chompoosapate’s leg. The woman received hospital treatment, was later arrested despite her compromised health, charged, and detained in the Ubon Ratchathani prison for several months. Questions remain unanswered. Why was no fire engine sent to distinguish the fire? Where were state officials when the fire just started? This is such in stark contrast with footage televised both domestically and internationally of an aggressive army strike at the Ratchaprasong rally site.
There is nowhere in the report any mention of the government’s continual suppression in the aftermath. Also unmentioned are challenges with which the accused civilians had to face in the judicial process, both in principle and practice. The report leaves the impression that the City Hall arsons occurred as an isolating event, leaving no consequences.
As of October 13, 2012, of the original 21 civilians charged with cases related to the Ubon City Hall arson and related incidents, four individuals have been detained without bail, namely, Ms. Pattama Moonmin, Mr. Sanon Ketsuwan, Mr. Somsak Prasansap, and Mr. Teerawat Sajjasuwan. They were accused of setting the fire to the Hall and sentenced to life imprisonment. (Their) punishment was reduced to 33 years and 12 months (exactly how it is phrased). Nine who were acquitted and set free on August 24, 2011 are struggling to move on with their shattered lives. Some are still fighting other charges. Two questions: 1) Does this report show any attempt to seek the truth involving the arson? and 2) How can this report support a path to reconciliation as it both anonymizes affected civilians and fosters civilians’ image as perpetrators.
...............
Note:
1 Summary of Arrest Warrants and Status Updates as of August 24, 2010.
2 As indicated in the TRCT announcements of members of case-specific truth-finding committees.
3 On page 33 of the complete TRCT report.
Saowanee T. Alexander is a lecturer at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Ubon Ratchathani University
Saowanee T. Alexande, October 16, 2012
On behalf of the volunteers who collected information on the impact of 2010 April-May crackdown in Ubon Ratchathani, I would like to make the following observations regarding the complete Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand (TRCT) report as follows.
Truth-finding
The report centers around what transpired in Bangkok. Although there are some mentions of parallel rallies leading up to the violence in provinces, it gives little value to the lives of stakeholders in the incidents including the accused and affected individuals. In Ubon Ratchathani alone, 418 warrants were issued for which 88 civilians were taken in custody1. Twenty-one individuals were held in custody without bail from the day they were arrested to the day the verdict was handed down. A typical reason given by the court for not allowing bail was the claim that the individuals were a flight risk because the offenses they were charged with were serious. Most of these suspects were male adults with families to care for. Many of them were arrested soon after the May crackdown, leaving their families to suffer from the lack of financial support ever since. It took months for the TRCT staff to start their fieldwork to collect information about the families and those affected. In the entire report, there are only 11 references to the city of Ubon Ratchathani. Of those 11 mentions, four have to do with the City Hall incident with little information as far as specifics of the incident and related demonstrations are concerned. No case study is discussed. Nor is there any example of individuals who they call “victims” as appeared on page 332. It is worth-noting that the TRCT has created several subcommittees to carry out specific tasks for “truth-finding” purposes concerning individual incidents. Also created was the Fifth Subcommittee whose responsibility involved fact-finding about the Ubon Ratchathani City Hall incident. With the vast budget and human resources to collect field data, the TRCT should have reported their findings to the public in order to make it aware of the impacts of this political conflict. Instead, after 2 years of study, the report presents nothing but general, vague recommendations for reconciliation--something which can be found in a textbook or a theory-based academic paper. Missing are any recorded accounts and reports of facts regarding the events including prior incidents, the aftermath, as well as its consequences. This missing information would have earned the report a status of an academically-oriented source of knowledge instead of a collection of invalidated claims and the like.
For Reconciliation
The report is not faithful to the spirit of “truth-finding”. Rather, it focuses on “reconciliation” although it is not clear what parties would reconcile as a result of this report. As they are, the recommendations in the report are not grounded on the principles of truth-finding--a prerequisite for a reconciliation process. Apparently, the absence of individuals’ names, which can be seen as an attempt to avoid further divide, backfires as it put these individuals in the background while the word “the City Hall arson” takes center stage. The report’s anonymization of these affected civilians makes them “nonexistent” in the public discourse. Severely affected individuals such as Mr. Tanoosilp Tanootong, Mr. Kamploy Namee, Mr. Ubon Saentaweesook, and Ms. Sininaat Chompoosapate and their stories do not earn a single reference in the report. Consider the tone of the following excerpt:
“there were rallies for more
protesters and reports of the situation in Bangkok through pro-UDD local
radio stations in provinces. It was found that there were UDD
demonstrations in Bangkok and provinces along with Thaksin’s speeches
via video link, which were characterized as provocative, and demanding
the protesters to congregate at city halls should there be a crackdown
on the Bangkok protest. On May 19, 2010 it was found that UDD protesters
gathered on the city hall compounds in many provinces, and city hall
arsons took place in Khon Kaen, Udon Thani, Ubon Ratchathani, and
Mookdahan.”3
Although the language in the excerpt is ambiguous as to who was responsible for the arsons, juxtaposition of words in it could possibly lead the reader to believe that the protesters set the halls on fire. If the report had focused on the facts regarding the matter, the reader would have seen a picture of something other than the scorching flames rising from the burning state-owned buildings, a sight which affect laypeople’s sensibilities—laypeople who had no clue how all this had come about. Rather, the reader would have learned more details about what transpired that day. For instance, the reader would have been given an opportunity to put things in perspective, had it been mentioned in the report that someone took a photo of Mr. Namee as the incident was unfolding. This photo was later used to charge him with an involvement in the arson attack. As for Mr. Tanootong, he was arrested later. He claimed that he was working in his cassava plantation in a different district along with his wife when it took place. He later made repeated statements to the court that he was in the plantation about 100 kilometers away from the city of Ubon Ratchathani. Let us turn to Ms. Chompoosapate, she had a gunshot wound on her leg from a bullet reportedly coming from the direction of the second floor of the City Hall building.
These people now walk free. Ms. Chompoosapate carries with her a scar from that gunshot, which will later be discussed, and memories from being imprisoned in the state prison while her small children were left with relatives. Financial compensation from the Ministry of Human Resources does not erase the event from her memory. Mr. Namee has become permanently blind and hemiplegic due to a rupture of a brain aneurysm while he was being held in prison without bail during the long trial process; his prior attempts to post bail to seek proper medical treatment failed miserably. Mr Tanootong was eventually acquitted after being held, again without bail, for over a year. No one is taking responsibility for his time and part of his life lost in the prison. Mr. Saentaweesuk is currently taking medications for psychiatric problems—the condition he had before the incident which became aggravated while he was kept behind bars. With these problems he cannot take a normal job to earn a living. These individuals are only some of many who were severely affected by the incident. Presentation of broad, unbacked claims about protesters’ “likely” involvement in the problem without verification and depiction of resulting civilians’ plight not only underscores the report’s superficial take on alleged claims against the people, but it also reflects the report’s lack of efficiency in reporting facts regardless of whether the facts are for reconciliation or any other purpose.
Absence of the Role of Authorities
Citing the above excerpt from the report, it is clear that the report misses information regarding the role of local state authorities in provinces with serious incidents. There is no mention of how state agencies, be they the police, military, or governing bodies, treated or responded to the civilian protesters. For instance, the report does not state that gunshots were reportedly fired at the protesters from the direction of the City Hall building before the place was set on fire. One of the shots wounded Ms. Chompoosapate’s leg. The woman received hospital treatment, was later arrested despite her compromised health, charged, and detained in the Ubon Ratchathani prison for several months. Questions remain unanswered. Why was no fire engine sent to distinguish the fire? Where were state officials when the fire just started? This is such in stark contrast with footage televised both domestically and internationally of an aggressive army strike at the Ratchaprasong rally site.
There is nowhere in the report any mention of the government’s continual suppression in the aftermath. Also unmentioned are challenges with which the accused civilians had to face in the judicial process, both in principle and practice. The report leaves the impression that the City Hall arsons occurred as an isolating event, leaving no consequences.
Concluding Remark: Truth-finding “for” Reconciliation
As of October 13, 2012, of the original 21 civilians charged with cases related to the Ubon City Hall arson and related incidents, four individuals have been detained without bail, namely, Ms. Pattama Moonmin, Mr. Sanon Ketsuwan, Mr. Somsak Prasansap, and Mr. Teerawat Sajjasuwan. They were accused of setting the fire to the Hall and sentenced to life imprisonment. (Their) punishment was reduced to 33 years and 12 months (exactly how it is phrased). Nine who were acquitted and set free on August 24, 2011 are struggling to move on with their shattered lives. Some are still fighting other charges. Two questions: 1) Does this report show any attempt to seek the truth involving the arson? and 2) How can this report support a path to reconciliation as it both anonymizes affected civilians and fosters civilians’ image as perpetrators.
...............
Note:
1 Summary of Arrest Warrants and Status Updates as of August 24, 2010.
2 As indicated in the TRCT announcements of members of case-specific truth-finding committees.
3 On page 33 of the complete TRCT report.
Saowanee T. Alexander is a lecturer at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Ubon Ratchathani University
“We think the same”: A Letter from Thanthawut, lese majeste prisoner | Prachatai English
“We think the same”: A Letter from Thanthawut, lese majeste prisoner | Prachatai English
Tyrell Haberkor, October 10, 2012
Thanthawut Taweewarodomkul (also known as “Num” and “Num Red Non”) is a 40-year-old father currently serving a 13-year sentence for alleged violations of Article 112 and the 2007 Computer Crimes Act. In September 2012, he withdrew his appeal petition as part of the process of applying for a pardon. Shortly thereafter, he wrote this letter to his lawyer, Anon Numpa, who then posted it on the website of the Ratsadornprasong Legal Institute. Thanthawut’s recognition that those who are imprisoned are no different than those people who remain outside is an urgent and important one.
The “Droplet Email Project” (โครงการอิเมล์หยดน้ำ) that Thanthawut mentions is a project he initiated to send emails to political prisoners. More information can be found about the project here, which notes that the name came from a comment Thanthawut made that emails, postcards, and visits to political prisoners function as “droplets of encouragement” for them to keep fighting and struggling. Like droplets of water to someone who is thirsty, encouragement is necessary.
Thanthawut Taweewarodomkul – Zone 1
33 Bangkok Special Remand Prison, Ngam Wongwan Road
Lad Yao, Chatuchak, Bangkok 10900
Email: BK_REMAND@HOTMAIL.COM; FREEDOM4PP@GMAIL.COM (Droplet Email Project)
No. 131-2555/36A
SAT, SEP 15, 2012
Hello Khun Anon,
And just like that, after waiting a long time, I am now a No. Cho. (1) Thank you very much for all of your help and the true solidarity from all of the friends who showed up to offer me encouragement on that day, even though it was to withdraw my appeal. I believe, however, that friends outside will understand my decision. I did not make this decision for myself. I made it for the future of Nong Web, my son. And I wrote a letter to tell my little one. Even though I do not know when I will be freed, this was one more step to get to the point of freedom. It is my hope that nothing will delay or derail it in the final stage.
In the year and a half since my case was decided, I have not been in the world outside the prison. The day [of withdrawing my appeal] was the first time that I have been out in the open air. I glimpsed ordinary outside life, life like my own before I entered prison. I watched and smiled with happiness. I daydreamed and in my imagination I could see a car. I was driving and Nong Web was sitting close to me. We were going on a trip. Oh! Simply thinking about this brought me happiness.
I have received encouraging emails urging me to continue on from the “Droplet Email” Project. I want to thank those who have sent emails and those who have visited me here too. I am trying to find a way to send replies to those who wrote, who include Khun Som, Khun Thanet, Khun Nucharee, Khun Karnt, Ajarn Yukti, Khun Lee, Khun Jum Jim, Khun Thiraphong, Khun Plaen, Khun Tee, Khun Joehawaii, Khun Pravitchayo, Khun Pornpit, Nong Leng, Khun Tuan, and Khun Art Chiang Mai. I hope there will be an opportunity to hear more news from them through the Droplet Email Project. I want to ask people to please send encouragement to friends at Laksi Prison also (2). Even though some of us there are high-level people, those of us who are there are important people, their feelings are not any different. Through the Project, I myself send encouragement to friends who are there.
One younger friend came to visit and told me that Ajarn Somsak Jeamteerasakul spoke about me and sent his wishes to me. I want to thank Ajarn Somsak for considering and thinking about an unimportant person like me. For certain, within the group of people charged under Article 112, the majority of people only know about P’Somyos and Ajarn Surachai. It is also true that the majority of people know more about Jatuporn Prompan, Jeng Dokchik, etc., than about ordinary people like us who are imprisoned. We must persevere and struggle with greater hardship, many times over, than famous people do. I myself am lucky, because I have Khun Anon, Khun Pla and the Prachatai team. They help provide a channel for unimportant prisoners to express ourselves. By now, people outside the prison have plenty of information about us, but the results have been spare. I want to tell Ajarn Somsak and everyone else that “Perhaps I would not have to do the duty of helping our friends, if our side [outside] sympathized with us more.”
Another thing that made me feel very warm is that today, P’Suchart Nakbangsai [or Warawut Thanangkorn, his real name], or, as I called him, P’Chart, my older brother whose ideals are very close to mine, came to see me. He has already been released and made good on his promise that “I will not forget you.” He has passed through the exit door of the prison, made it out. To put it simply, he has done what is difficult for some of us (one more … me … ee-ee). In short, please tell P’Suchart that I am very comforted by what he has done, and what he promised to do. One day, if I have the opportunity, I am going to do the same things that P’Suchart has done. Because we are ‘the people.’ As far as finding me a wife, no need for him to do it. By the time I get out, I will be too old. Hee hee.
Something else that I and other friends in the 112 family feel very good about is the comeback of a friend who shared our same fate, someone I knew only from the pages of the newspaper, Khun Suwicha Thakor. [Suwicha has recently been seen active again on some internet forums.] The day that I was arrested was close to the day that Khun Suwicha was released. My sense is that I think that because Khun Suwicha is also the father of a small child, he can well understand my situation. Up until today, I still clearly remember the picture of Khun Suwicha and his children in the Bangkok Post. I used to wonder what happened to Khun Suwicha after he was released from prison. Today I have the answer. I consider him another important force to help people in Thailand and the world understand the nefariousness of this law. What matters is that I realize that Khun Suwicha, P’Chart, and I, share the same thinking [ideas or feelings]: that is, feeling grateful to the people, the compatriots and our friends around the world, as well as losing faith in politicians in this country. I offer thanks [to them] on behalf of all 112 friends for their caring and for being an example to the people who share their fate, like me to have faith and come together and act justly in the future.
The inspiration for this came from what P’Chart said to me. Khun Anon, please transcribe the recording and give me the transcript to read. This would be a tremendous gift.
Faithful and steadfast,
Num Daeng Non (Red Non)
Father of Nong Web
P.S., Your new haircut is very handsome!
Tyrell Haberkor, October 10, 2012
Thanthawut Taweewarodomkul (also known as “Num” and “Num Red Non”) is a 40-year-old father currently serving a 13-year sentence for alleged violations of Article 112 and the 2007 Computer Crimes Act. In September 2012, he withdrew his appeal petition as part of the process of applying for a pardon. Shortly thereafter, he wrote this letter to his lawyer, Anon Numpa, who then posted it on the website of the Ratsadornprasong Legal Institute. Thanthawut’s recognition that those who are imprisoned are no different than those people who remain outside is an urgent and important one.
The “Droplet Email Project” (โครงการอิเมล์หยดน้ำ) that Thanthawut mentions is a project he initiated to send emails to political prisoners. More information can be found about the project here, which notes that the name came from a comment Thanthawut made that emails, postcards, and visits to political prisoners function as “droplets of encouragement” for them to keep fighting and struggling. Like droplets of water to someone who is thirsty, encouragement is necessary.
*
Thanthawut Taweewarodomkul – Zone 1
33 Bangkok Special Remand Prison, Ngam Wongwan Road
Lad Yao, Chatuchak, Bangkok 10900
Email: BK_REMAND@HOTMAIL.COM; FREEDOM4PP@GMAIL.COM (Droplet Email Project)
No. 131-2555/36A
SAT, SEP 15, 2012
Hello Khun Anon,
And just like that, after waiting a long time, I am now a No. Cho. (1) Thank you very much for all of your help and the true solidarity from all of the friends who showed up to offer me encouragement on that day, even though it was to withdraw my appeal. I believe, however, that friends outside will understand my decision. I did not make this decision for myself. I made it for the future of Nong Web, my son. And I wrote a letter to tell my little one. Even though I do not know when I will be freed, this was one more step to get to the point of freedom. It is my hope that nothing will delay or derail it in the final stage.
In the year and a half since my case was decided, I have not been in the world outside the prison. The day [of withdrawing my appeal] was the first time that I have been out in the open air. I glimpsed ordinary outside life, life like my own before I entered prison. I watched and smiled with happiness. I daydreamed and in my imagination I could see a car. I was driving and Nong Web was sitting close to me. We were going on a trip. Oh! Simply thinking about this brought me happiness.
I have received encouraging emails urging me to continue on from the “Droplet Email” Project. I want to thank those who have sent emails and those who have visited me here too. I am trying to find a way to send replies to those who wrote, who include Khun Som, Khun Thanet, Khun Nucharee, Khun Karnt, Ajarn Yukti, Khun Lee, Khun Jum Jim, Khun Thiraphong, Khun Plaen, Khun Tee, Khun Joehawaii, Khun Pravitchayo, Khun Pornpit, Nong Leng, Khun Tuan, and Khun Art Chiang Mai. I hope there will be an opportunity to hear more news from them through the Droplet Email Project. I want to ask people to please send encouragement to friends at Laksi Prison also (2). Even though some of us there are high-level people, those of us who are there are important people, their feelings are not any different. Through the Project, I myself send encouragement to friends who are there.
One younger friend came to visit and told me that Ajarn Somsak Jeamteerasakul spoke about me and sent his wishes to me. I want to thank Ajarn Somsak for considering and thinking about an unimportant person like me. For certain, within the group of people charged under Article 112, the majority of people only know about P’Somyos and Ajarn Surachai. It is also true that the majority of people know more about Jatuporn Prompan, Jeng Dokchik, etc., than about ordinary people like us who are imprisoned. We must persevere and struggle with greater hardship, many times over, than famous people do. I myself am lucky, because I have Khun Anon, Khun Pla and the Prachatai team. They help provide a channel for unimportant prisoners to express ourselves. By now, people outside the prison have plenty of information about us, but the results have been spare. I want to tell Ajarn Somsak and everyone else that “Perhaps I would not have to do the duty of helping our friends, if our side [outside] sympathized with us more.”
Another thing that made me feel very warm is that today, P’Suchart Nakbangsai [or Warawut Thanangkorn, his real name], or, as I called him, P’Chart, my older brother whose ideals are very close to mine, came to see me. He has already been released and made good on his promise that “I will not forget you.” He has passed through the exit door of the prison, made it out. To put it simply, he has done what is difficult for some of us (one more … me … ee-ee). In short, please tell P’Suchart that I am very comforted by what he has done, and what he promised to do. One day, if I have the opportunity, I am going to do the same things that P’Suchart has done. Because we are ‘the people.’ As far as finding me a wife, no need for him to do it. By the time I get out, I will be too old. Hee hee.
Something else that I and other friends in the 112 family feel very good about is the comeback of a friend who shared our same fate, someone I knew only from the pages of the newspaper, Khun Suwicha Thakor. [Suwicha has recently been seen active again on some internet forums.] The day that I was arrested was close to the day that Khun Suwicha was released. My sense is that I think that because Khun Suwicha is also the father of a small child, he can well understand my situation. Up until today, I still clearly remember the picture of Khun Suwicha and his children in the Bangkok Post. I used to wonder what happened to Khun Suwicha after he was released from prison. Today I have the answer. I consider him another important force to help people in Thailand and the world understand the nefariousness of this law. What matters is that I realize that Khun Suwicha, P’Chart, and I, share the same thinking [ideas or feelings]: that is, feeling grateful to the people, the compatriots and our friends around the world, as well as losing faith in politicians in this country. I offer thanks [to them] on behalf of all 112 friends for their caring and for being an example to the people who share their fate, like me to have faith and come together and act justly in the future.
The inspiration for this came from what P’Chart said to me. Khun Anon, please transcribe the recording and give me the transcript to read. This would be a tremendous gift.
Faithful and steadfast,
Num Daeng Non (Red Non)
Father of Nong Web
P.S., Your new haircut is very handsome!
Tuesday, October 16, 2012
Racism in Singapore: Our own problem | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Racism in Singapore: Our own problem | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Kirsten Han, Oct 15, 2012
Last week Amy Cheong’s Facebook rant against Malay void deck weddings sparked an outrage amongst Singaporeans. She was swiftly fired from her position of Assistant Director by the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), and a police report was lodged. The righteous (self-righteous?) indignation of many Singaporeans continued to rage online even after Ms. Cheong issued apologies on various social media platforms. Some described the whole episode as a witch hunt – they weren’t far off the mark.
Then it emerged that Ms. Cheong was not a Singaporean citizen after all, but a Permanent Resident with Australian citizenship. Suddenly the issue became, once again, one of local versus foreigner. What can be done to educate immigrants about Singapore’s multi-racial, multi-religious society? How can we teach these foreigners the respect that they should have?
Of course, the assumption that comes with these questions is one of Singaporeans somehow knowing better. It’s a deeply-held belief that since the racial riots of the 1960s, Singaporeans have learnt their lesson and morphed into respectful, understanding, cosmopolitan non-racists, and that the few bad apples amongst us are aberrations rather than indications of systemic racialism in our nation.
But how true is that, really?
If you really think about it, Singapore is a nation preoccupied with racial lines. From the insistence upon listing race on our identification cards (we’re so attached to the system that we’d rather have parents choose to double-barrel their children’s races rather than get rid of the practice altogether) to the way we hold the racial riots up as a bogeyman to scare schoolchildren into embracing “racial harmony,” much of Singapore’s structure is built upon race-tinted values and beliefs.
Unfortunately, the existence of laws like the Sedition Act have done well in ensuring that issues surrounding race and religion remain taboo in Singaporean society, lest we be reported to the authorities and charged. Although this has for the most part been justified as a way to keep the (apparently) tenuous peace between the races, the restrictions have also served to silence any mature discussion surrounding race and culture.
This can also be clearly seen in the recent banning of the film Sex.Violence.FamilyValues. Although it originally received an M18 rating, a last-minute panel chose to ban the film due to racial content, because of a character who made fun of Indians. However, the makers emphasised that the film had been satirical.
The banning of a film just because of certain scenes (which had been meant satirically) once more highlights the authorities’ uptight, stuffy attitude towards anything remotely related to race or religion in our society. But if these issues are not allowed to be given voice and space in public discourse, how will we then be able to challenge, discuss and evaluate systematic racism in our country?
Due to our unwillingness to see the official rhetoric of “racial harmony” for what it really is – hollow words masking a stifling of public discourse – we continue to fool ourselves into thinking that Singaporeans are enlightened, accepting global citizens, much more “respectful” of difference than foreigners like Ms. Cheong. We then worry about the lack of avenues to “educate the foreigners,” forgetting about the fact that for the most part we have neglected to educate ourselves.
The reaction to Ms. Cheong being Australian appeared to come with a sense of relief: “Thank goodness, she’s a foreigner! Singaporeans aren’t racist after all!” But the sad truth is that even if we don’t manifest our racism in violent or hurtful ways, Singaporean society has been highly racialised, with or without the foreigners on our shores. The effort to change this is up not to the authorities (through lodging police reports every time someone says something bigoted) or immigrants (through programmes to get them to integrate), but to ourselves.
Kirsten Han, Oct 15, 2012
Last week Amy Cheong’s Facebook rant against Malay void deck weddings sparked an outrage amongst Singaporeans. She was swiftly fired from her position of Assistant Director by the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), and a police report was lodged. The righteous (self-righteous?) indignation of many Singaporeans continued to rage online even after Ms. Cheong issued apologies on various social media platforms. Some described the whole episode as a witch hunt – they weren’t far off the mark.
Then it emerged that Ms. Cheong was not a Singaporean citizen after all, but a Permanent Resident with Australian citizenship. Suddenly the issue became, once again, one of local versus foreigner. What can be done to educate immigrants about Singapore’s multi-racial, multi-religious society? How can we teach these foreigners the respect that they should have?
Of course, the assumption that comes with these questions is one of Singaporeans somehow knowing better. It’s a deeply-held belief that since the racial riots of the 1960s, Singaporeans have learnt their lesson and morphed into respectful, understanding, cosmopolitan non-racists, and that the few bad apples amongst us are aberrations rather than indications of systemic racialism in our nation.
But how true is that, really?
If you really think about it, Singapore is a nation preoccupied with racial lines. From the insistence upon listing race on our identification cards (we’re so attached to the system that we’d rather have parents choose to double-barrel their children’s races rather than get rid of the practice altogether) to the way we hold the racial riots up as a bogeyman to scare schoolchildren into embracing “racial harmony,” much of Singapore’s structure is built upon race-tinted values and beliefs.
Unfortunately, the existence of laws like the Sedition Act have done well in ensuring that issues surrounding race and religion remain taboo in Singaporean society, lest we be reported to the authorities and charged. Although this has for the most part been justified as a way to keep the (apparently) tenuous peace between the races, the restrictions have also served to silence any mature discussion surrounding race and culture.
This can also be clearly seen in the recent banning of the film Sex.Violence.FamilyValues. Although it originally received an M18 rating, a last-minute panel chose to ban the film due to racial content, because of a character who made fun of Indians. However, the makers emphasised that the film had been satirical.
The banning of a film just because of certain scenes (which had been meant satirically) once more highlights the authorities’ uptight, stuffy attitude towards anything remotely related to race or religion in our society. But if these issues are not allowed to be given voice and space in public discourse, how will we then be able to challenge, discuss and evaluate systematic racism in our country?
Due to our unwillingness to see the official rhetoric of “racial harmony” for what it really is – hollow words masking a stifling of public discourse – we continue to fool ourselves into thinking that Singaporeans are enlightened, accepting global citizens, much more “respectful” of difference than foreigners like Ms. Cheong. We then worry about the lack of avenues to “educate the foreigners,” forgetting about the fact that for the most part we have neglected to educate ourselves.
The reaction to Ms. Cheong being Australian appeared to come with a sense of relief: “Thank goodness, she’s a foreigner! Singaporeans aren’t racist after all!” But the sad truth is that even if we don’t manifest our racism in violent or hurtful ways, Singaporean society has been highly racialised, with or without the foreigners on our shores. The effort to change this is up not to the authorities (through lodging police reports every time someone says something bigoted) or immigrants (through programmes to get them to integrate), but to ourselves.
Peace is within reach—Malaysian PM | Philippine Daily Inquirer
Peace is within reach—Malaysian PM | Philippine Daily Inquirer
Michael Lim Ubac, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Tuesday, October 16th, 2012
“This is the sound of peace,” a smiling Murad Ebrahim, chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), said as he tapped a miniature model of a Muslim gong that he gave to President Benigno Aquino during their meeting in Malacañang Monday morning.
In return, the President gave Murad a miniature bahay kubo (nipa hut), symbolizing the open house welcome that Filipinos extend to homecoming relatives.
They shook hands, ushering in what Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak described as “a new beginning for the people of Mindanao.”
After four decades of conflict, “peace is within reach,” Najib said.
And the government and the Moro rebels, overcoming 40 years of hostilities, took their first step toward ending the insurgency in Mindanao that had cost the lives of more than 150,000 people and reduced the resource-rich island into the poorest region of the Philippines.
The government and the MILF signed a framework agreement to end the war and build a new autonomous region in Mindanao, to be called Bangsamoro, in the Palace yesterday afternoon.
President Aquino, Murad and Najib, whose country brokered the peace talks between the Aquino administration and the MILF, looked on as chief government peace negotiator Marvic Leonen and his counterpart from the MILF, Mohagher Iqbal, signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.
On hand to signify the Islamic world’s acceptance of the agreement was Ekmeleddin Ishanoglu, secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the world’s second largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations.
The ceremony held at Malacañang’s Rizal Hall was attended by about 200 MILF fighters, government officials, diplomats and representatives of countries that made up the International Contact Group, the International Monitoring Group, and aid organizations that encouraged the peace negotiations between the government and the Muslim rebels.
President Aquino, in his keynote speech, said the agreement sealed “genuine, lasting peace in Mindanao,” which the government hoped to achieve before the end of his term in 2016.
“In full view of the Filipino people, and witnessed even by our friends from different parts of the world, we commit to peace—a peace that will be sustained through democratic ideals; a peace that heals and empowers; a peace that recognizes the many narratives of the Filipino people, and weaves them into a single, national aspiration for equitable progress,” Mr. Aquino said.
Prime Minister Najib said the agreement would “protect the rights of the Bangsamoro people and preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines.”
“We are men and leaders who want to make a difference and we have decided that the time has come for us to choose the moral high ground,” Najib said.
The agreement “does not solve all the problems, rather it sets the parameters in which peace can be found,” he said.
‘I come in peace’
Murad, who spoke ahead of the President, pledged the MILF’s determination to silence the guns to allow peace and development to come to Mindanao after 40 years.
“I come in peace,” Murad said, admitting that it was his first time to set foot in Malacañang, the seat of power in the Philippines.
“We have inked the most important document in the chapter of our history—a landmark document that restores to our people their Bangsamoro identity and their homeland, their right to govern themselves, and the power to forge their destiny and future with [their own hands],” Murad said.
“Today we are here to celebrate the victory of the Bangsamoro people and the Filipino nation that is shared by the international community and the Muslim world, the victory earned not by war but by a collective desire to restore justice and peace to a troubled land,” he said.
Murad then extended “the hand of friendship and partnership to the President and the Filipino people as we join to embark on the historic journey to rebuild our home, institute justice and [end the] reign of violence and restore normalcy to the lives of the masses of our people in Mindanao and Sulu with the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.”
The accord
The framework agreement, also called a road map to a final peace settlement that is expected by 2016, grants Muslims in Mindanao broad autonomy in exchange for ending their four-decade insurgency, which would bring peace and stability and eventually development to the region.
The 13-page document outlines general agreements on major issues, including the extent of power, revenues and territory granted for Bangsamoro, the new Muslim administrative region.
It calls for the establishment of a 15-member Transition Commission to draft a law creating Bangsamoro. The draft law will be submitted to Congress for adoption, then submitted to the people of Mindanao for approval in a plebiscite.
The 12,000-strong MILF armed forces will be deactivated gradually “beyond use,” the agreement says, without specifying a timetable.
Failed experiment
The agreement says Bangsamoro will replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which President Aquino described as “failed experiment.”
The ARMM was created by a 1996 peace agreement the government signed with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), but Mr. Aquino considered it a failure because it did not end the conflict, the rebels did not disarm and it did not improve the lives of Muslims.
Corruption, political violence and crimes such as kidnappings and extortion persisted, and the MILF continued to fight for self-rule.
Another preliminary accord was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2008 as unconstitutional because it would create a separate state.
Western governments have long worried over the presence of small numbers of al-Qaeda-linked militants from the Middle East and Southeast Asia seeking combat training and collaboration with the Filipino insurgents.
One of those extremist groups, the Abu Sayyaf, is not part of any negotiations, but the hope is that the peace agreement will isolate its militants and deny them sanctuary and logistical support they had previously received from rebel commanders.
One of those hardline commanders, Ameril Umra Kato, broke off from the MILF last year. Kato’s forces attacked the Army in August, prompting an offensive that killed more than 50 fighters in the 200-strong rebel faction.
Kato rejects accord
Abu Misri Mammah, a spokesperson for Kato’s forces, on Sunday said that his group did not recognize the peace accord.
“That’s a surrender,” he said. “We won’t waver from our armed struggle and continue to aspire for a separate Muslim homeland that won’t be a creation of politicians.”
President Aquino acknowledged that much work remained to be done after the signing of the agreement.
“The devil is in the details,” he said, but added that the government is committed to peace and development in Mindanao.
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Teresita Quintos-Deles said the government and the MILF would encounter challenges as they proceed to implement the framework agreement.
“So many challenges await us, but the bridge of trust that spans this room is strong enough to withstand the trials ahead, however difficult they may be,” Deles said.
Staying the course
In his speech, Murad reminded everyone of the roots of the Moro rebellion.
“Never in my wildest dream since I was a child, or when I joined the Bangsamoro struggle more than 40 years ago, that one day I will see the interior of this building [Malacañang] that once housed the Spanish and American governors general, and now the Presidents of the Philippines,” Murad said.
“Today . . . we have stayed the course. Our perseverance has prevailed over those whose position is to perpetuate war and conflict in Mindanao and Sulu for personal aggrandizement,” he said.
Culture of impunity
Mr. Aquino said that many had resorted to “the path of vengeance and violence,” but he promised to dismantle the culture of impunity in the country.
“I myself lost my father to an oppressive system,” he said. “I myself thirsted for justice, and was deprived of it then by the dictatorship. I empathize with our Bangsamoro brothers and sisters, and can only vow to work as hard as I can to see that the culture of impunity is dismantled, and that the foundations of righteousness and cooperation are laid.”
And he gave a promise to the Muslims of Mindanao: “We will give our people what is truly due them: A chance to direct their lives toward advancement in a democratic, peaceful and safe society.” With reports from Nikko Dizon, AP and AFP
Michael Lim Ubac, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Tuesday, October 16th, 2012
“This is the sound of peace,” a smiling Murad Ebrahim, chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), said as he tapped a miniature model of a Muslim gong that he gave to President Benigno Aquino during their meeting in Malacañang Monday morning.
In return, the President gave Murad a miniature bahay kubo (nipa hut), symbolizing the open house welcome that Filipinos extend to homecoming relatives.
They shook hands, ushering in what Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak described as “a new beginning for the people of Mindanao.”
After four decades of conflict, “peace is within reach,” Najib said.
And the government and the Moro rebels, overcoming 40 years of hostilities, took their first step toward ending the insurgency in Mindanao that had cost the lives of more than 150,000 people and reduced the resource-rich island into the poorest region of the Philippines.
The government and the MILF signed a framework agreement to end the war and build a new autonomous region in Mindanao, to be called Bangsamoro, in the Palace yesterday afternoon.
President Aquino, Murad and Najib, whose country brokered the peace talks between the Aquino administration and the MILF, looked on as chief government peace negotiator Marvic Leonen and his counterpart from the MILF, Mohagher Iqbal, signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.
On hand to signify the Islamic world’s acceptance of the agreement was Ekmeleddin Ishanoglu, secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the world’s second largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations.
The ceremony held at Malacañang’s Rizal Hall was attended by about 200 MILF fighters, government officials, diplomats and representatives of countries that made up the International Contact Group, the International Monitoring Group, and aid organizations that encouraged the peace negotiations between the government and the Muslim rebels.
President Aquino, in his keynote speech, said the agreement sealed “genuine, lasting peace in Mindanao,” which the government hoped to achieve before the end of his term in 2016.
“In full view of the Filipino people, and witnessed even by our friends from different parts of the world, we commit to peace—a peace that will be sustained through democratic ideals; a peace that heals and empowers; a peace that recognizes the many narratives of the Filipino people, and weaves them into a single, national aspiration for equitable progress,” Mr. Aquino said.
Prime Minister Najib said the agreement would “protect the rights of the Bangsamoro people and preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines.”
“We are men and leaders who want to make a difference and we have decided that the time has come for us to choose the moral high ground,” Najib said.
The agreement “does not solve all the problems, rather it sets the parameters in which peace can be found,” he said.
‘I come in peace’
Murad, who spoke ahead of the President, pledged the MILF’s determination to silence the guns to allow peace and development to come to Mindanao after 40 years.
“I come in peace,” Murad said, admitting that it was his first time to set foot in Malacañang, the seat of power in the Philippines.
“We have inked the most important document in the chapter of our history—a landmark document that restores to our people their Bangsamoro identity and their homeland, their right to govern themselves, and the power to forge their destiny and future with [their own hands],” Murad said.
“Today we are here to celebrate the victory of the Bangsamoro people and the Filipino nation that is shared by the international community and the Muslim world, the victory earned not by war but by a collective desire to restore justice and peace to a troubled land,” he said.
Murad then extended “the hand of friendship and partnership to the President and the Filipino people as we join to embark on the historic journey to rebuild our home, institute justice and [end the] reign of violence and restore normalcy to the lives of the masses of our people in Mindanao and Sulu with the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.”
The accord
The framework agreement, also called a road map to a final peace settlement that is expected by 2016, grants Muslims in Mindanao broad autonomy in exchange for ending their four-decade insurgency, which would bring peace and stability and eventually development to the region.
The 13-page document outlines general agreements on major issues, including the extent of power, revenues and territory granted for Bangsamoro, the new Muslim administrative region.
It calls for the establishment of a 15-member Transition Commission to draft a law creating Bangsamoro. The draft law will be submitted to Congress for adoption, then submitted to the people of Mindanao for approval in a plebiscite.
The 12,000-strong MILF armed forces will be deactivated gradually “beyond use,” the agreement says, without specifying a timetable.
Failed experiment
The agreement says Bangsamoro will replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which President Aquino described as “failed experiment.”
The ARMM was created by a 1996 peace agreement the government signed with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), but Mr. Aquino considered it a failure because it did not end the conflict, the rebels did not disarm and it did not improve the lives of Muslims.
Corruption, political violence and crimes such as kidnappings and extortion persisted, and the MILF continued to fight for self-rule.
Another preliminary accord was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2008 as unconstitutional because it would create a separate state.
Western governments have long worried over the presence of small numbers of al-Qaeda-linked militants from the Middle East and Southeast Asia seeking combat training and collaboration with the Filipino insurgents.
One of those extremist groups, the Abu Sayyaf, is not part of any negotiations, but the hope is that the peace agreement will isolate its militants and deny them sanctuary and logistical support they had previously received from rebel commanders.
One of those hardline commanders, Ameril Umra Kato, broke off from the MILF last year. Kato’s forces attacked the Army in August, prompting an offensive that killed more than 50 fighters in the 200-strong rebel faction.
Kato rejects accord
Abu Misri Mammah, a spokesperson for Kato’s forces, on Sunday said that his group did not recognize the peace accord.
“That’s a surrender,” he said. “We won’t waver from our armed struggle and continue to aspire for a separate Muslim homeland that won’t be a creation of politicians.”
President Aquino acknowledged that much work remained to be done after the signing of the agreement.
“The devil is in the details,” he said, but added that the government is committed to peace and development in Mindanao.
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Teresita Quintos-Deles said the government and the MILF would encounter challenges as they proceed to implement the framework agreement.
“So many challenges await us, but the bridge of trust that spans this room is strong enough to withstand the trials ahead, however difficult they may be,” Deles said.
Staying the course
In his speech, Murad reminded everyone of the roots of the Moro rebellion.
“Never in my wildest dream since I was a child, or when I joined the Bangsamoro struggle more than 40 years ago, that one day I will see the interior of this building [Malacañang] that once housed the Spanish and American governors general, and now the Presidents of the Philippines,” Murad said.
“Today . . . we have stayed the course. Our perseverance has prevailed over those whose position is to perpetuate war and conflict in Mindanao and Sulu for personal aggrandizement,” he said.
Culture of impunity
Mr. Aquino said that many had resorted to “the path of vengeance and violence,” but he promised to dismantle the culture of impunity in the country.
“I myself lost my father to an oppressive system,” he said. “I myself thirsted for justice, and was deprived of it then by the dictatorship. I empathize with our Bangsamoro brothers and sisters, and can only vow to work as hard as I can to see that the culture of impunity is dismantled, and that the foundations of righteousness and cooperation are laid.”
And he gave a promise to the Muslims of Mindanao: “We will give our people what is truly due them: A chance to direct their lives toward advancement in a democratic, peaceful and safe society.” With reports from Nikko Dizon, AP and AFP
Norway Peace Initiative Chief’s Ongoing UN Role Scrutinized | The Irrawaddy Magazine
Norway Peace Initiative Chief’s Ongoing UN Role Scrutinized | The Irrawaddy Magazine
SEAMUS MARTOV / THE IRRAWADDY, October 16, 2012
The head of the Norwegian government-funded peace initiative for Burma’s ethnic areas, Charles Petrie, is facing scrutiny after it was revealed last week that he is simultaneously working on an unrelated United Nation’s review panel looking into the Sri Lankan civil war.
An article posted on the Inner City Press news site last Friday suggests that Petrie’s involvement with the ambitious Norwegian project may run afoul of UN rules forbidding staff from being employed or under the influence of the governments of UN member states.
Petrie, a long-time senior UN diplomat who previously served as the highest-ranking UN official in Burma, has been the head of the Norwegian project, formally known as the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI), since it was launched in January of this year.
In April, Petrie, who formally retired from the UN in November 2010, was appointed to serve as the chief of a panel convened by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to examine the UN’s own actions during the final months of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009. The panel was created following heavy criticism of the way Ban and his then envoy to Sri Lanka,Vijay Namibar, responded to a massive humanitarian crisis that unfolded as the Sri Lankan military launched a major offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that killed thousands of unarmed Tamil civilians in the process.
Petrie’s working for the Norwegian government while at the same time working for the UN panel could be in conflict with the UN Charter depending on how it is interpreted.
Article 100 of the Charter states: “In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.”
Reached for comment, Petrie told The Irrawaddy via email that he is working for the UN on a temporary “when actually employed” basis.
“I am leading a team of three other UN officials to conduct the internal review on UN actions in Sri Lanka during the final stages of the conflict and its aftermath,” he said. It remains unclear when exactly the Sri Lanka panel will finish its work, as both Petrie and and the office of Ban’s spokesperson declined to give an end date.
As for Petrie’s work with the MPSI, “My work in Myanmar has nothing to do with the UN and I am also doing it on a part-time basis (between 10 days to two weeks a month). I am not directly employed by the government of Norway,” he told The Irrawaddy.
Petrie previously served as the UN’s resident coordinator in Burma until November 2007 when he was ordered out of the country by the then military regime following the brutal crushing of the monk-led Saffron Revolution. The apparent direct cause of Petrie’s abrupt expulsion was an October 2007 statement his office sent out that warned of a “deteriorating humanitarian situation” in the country.
Since the Norwegian initiative began this year Petrie and the MPSI have endured heavy criticism from community-based organizations and refugee advocates who warn that the project is rushing ahead without adequate consultation with the war-affected ethnic Karen and Shan populations of eastern Burma.
The MPSI and officials from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have done little to allay concerns about a lack of community participation, say the project’s critics.
Despite a request that key documents outlining the project and its goals be translated into ethnic languages, the MPSI has so far only translated these documents into Burmese. This remains a major sticking point as many ethnic people, including the senior members of some of Burma’s most powerful armed rebel groups, are not fluent in Burmese.
SEAMUS MARTOV / THE IRRAWADDY, October 16, 2012
The head of the Norwegian government-funded peace initiative for Burma’s ethnic areas, Charles Petrie, is facing scrutiny after it was revealed last week that he is simultaneously working on an unrelated United Nation’s review panel looking into the Sri Lankan civil war.
An article posted on the Inner City Press news site last Friday suggests that Petrie’s involvement with the ambitious Norwegian project may run afoul of UN rules forbidding staff from being employed or under the influence of the governments of UN member states.
Petrie, a long-time senior UN diplomat who previously served as the highest-ranking UN official in Burma, has been the head of the Norwegian project, formally known as the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI), since it was launched in January of this year.
In April, Petrie, who formally retired from the UN in November 2010, was appointed to serve as the chief of a panel convened by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to examine the UN’s own actions during the final months of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009. The panel was created following heavy criticism of the way Ban and his then envoy to Sri Lanka,Vijay Namibar, responded to a massive humanitarian crisis that unfolded as the Sri Lankan military launched a major offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that killed thousands of unarmed Tamil civilians in the process.
Petrie’s working for the Norwegian government while at the same time working for the UN panel could be in conflict with the UN Charter depending on how it is interpreted.
Article 100 of the Charter states: “In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.”
Reached for comment, Petrie told The Irrawaddy via email that he is working for the UN on a temporary “when actually employed” basis.
“I am leading a team of three other UN officials to conduct the internal review on UN actions in Sri Lanka during the final stages of the conflict and its aftermath,” he said. It remains unclear when exactly the Sri Lanka panel will finish its work, as both Petrie and and the office of Ban’s spokesperson declined to give an end date.
As for Petrie’s work with the MPSI, “My work in Myanmar has nothing to do with the UN and I am also doing it on a part-time basis (between 10 days to two weeks a month). I am not directly employed by the government of Norway,” he told The Irrawaddy.
Petrie previously served as the UN’s resident coordinator in Burma until November 2007 when he was ordered out of the country by the then military regime following the brutal crushing of the monk-led Saffron Revolution. The apparent direct cause of Petrie’s abrupt expulsion was an October 2007 statement his office sent out that warned of a “deteriorating humanitarian situation” in the country.
Since the Norwegian initiative began this year Petrie and the MPSI have endured heavy criticism from community-based organizations and refugee advocates who warn that the project is rushing ahead without adequate consultation with the war-affected ethnic Karen and Shan populations of eastern Burma.
The MPSI and officials from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have done little to allay concerns about a lack of community participation, say the project’s critics.
Despite a request that key documents outlining the project and its goals be translated into ethnic languages, the MPSI has so far only translated these documents into Burmese. This remains a major sticking point as many ethnic people, including the senior members of some of Burma’s most powerful armed rebel groups, are not fluent in Burmese.
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