Opinion: Vietnam's Difficult Road to Reform | asia sentinel

Opinion: Vietnam's Difficult Road to Reform | asia sentinel
Khanh Vu Du, 26 October 2012

If the recent intraparty dispute has proven anything, it is that the Communist Party, not its individual leaders, ultimately bears responsibility for Vietnam's failures

Reform, or what passes for reform in Vietnam, is not implausible. Democracy and individual rights are not foreign concepts to the Vietnamese. The arrest and detention of pro-democratic and human rights activists prove as much. The public outrage against the government’s economic mismanagement and corruption proves as much.

More often than not, reform is used as a catch-all solution for the failures of government. The problem is not the act of reform but the extent to which the government and political system is reformed. What is perhaps certain is that corruption, economic mismanagement and human rights abuses would have continued if the president and his faction had assumed power in the recent struggle between Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and President Truong Tan Sang.

In a country where power comes not from the people but the ruling (and only) party, merely replacing the individual at the top will do little, if nothing. What is required for real reform is a serious and concerted effort by the people and from those within the government to change the system. Of course, this is easier said than done, and the obstacles are many.


A Revolt of the Ruling Elite

The intraparty dispute between the Vietnamese prime minister and president was driven in part by Prime Minister Dung’s handling of the economy. While some blame can be assigned to the global recession, the corruption and mismanagement surrounding the prime minister could not be overlooked. The scandals at Asia Commercial Bank, Vinashin, Vinalines, in addition to a poorly performing economy had made Prime Minister Dung toxic.

Although President Sang and his supporters had a case for removing the prime minister, one should not mistake their desire to do so for the good of Vietnam. The struggle between the two factions was not one of protecting the people, but a struggle to protect and preserve their place in the party. This was not a revolt of the masses but of the ruling elite, And although Prime Minister Dung has retained his job, the “revolutionaries” are still in power, perhaps waiting, biding their time until the next opportune moment.

But another revolt by party members will achieve little. True, there exist the old communist hardliners, who view the liberalization of Vietnam’s economy as a betrayal of Ho Chi Minh’s principles. There are also those party members who have prospered in the new, open market Vietnam (oftentimes through patronage and perhaps even shady business dealings), and who are just as likely to invoke the spirit of Ho Chi Minh to defend the status quo.

Communism has failed in Vietnam, but the new, more economically liberalized country has also begun to show signs of stress. Vietnam, by its very political nature, has made it possible for the government to hide its failures and shield its party members from charges of corruption—that is until the situation becomes untenable, as was the case with Prime Minister Dung.

The Vietnamese people are not unaware of their government’s deficiencies, but for a long stretch of time it was easy for them to look the other way. Vietnam was once a booming economy with great promise in Southeast Asia. The people could see and experience the positive changes that had come about, and the government could take credit for the success. For a time, it was easy for the people to say, “Well, at least today is better than yesterday.”

Today, this sense of optimism has diminished.



The Party is the System

The public apology by Party Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong over the failures of the Communist Party in serving the people was in part a response to actual failures but also in part to shield and distance the party from Prime Minister Dung. As if the party secretary’s apology was surprising enough, even the prime minister was forced to issue an apology of his own in front of the National Assembly, pledging to reform state-owned corporations.

And here lies the greatest obstacle towards reform. It is not about purging the Communist Party of corrupt officials. The individuals themselves are not the problem but a side effect. The problem is not superficial but deeply rooted and structural in nature. Corruption, economic mismanagement, and human rights violations are merely symptoms of the problem: the political system.

Presently, the Vietnamese political system is the Communist Party. An independent oversight committee on governmental affairs does not exist. Had Prime Minister Dung been ousted and President Sang or someone else had taken his place, change would have only occurred at the leadership level. Of course, there might have been some movement in the rank and file, but none of these changes would have had any lasting effect on the average Vietnamese citizen.

Appointments and elections are held within the Communist Party. Investigations into corruption are initiated by the Communist Party. All of this is to repeat the obvious: the Communist Party is not simply the sole, ruling party but the government. It is the system. None of this is particularly revealing, but it is worth mentioning.




A Need for Structural Reform

The obvious and only solution for Vietnam is to reform and democratize. Of course, the nature of the Vietnamese government means change on this level must be initiated from within. Or, in a worst case scenario, the government somehow falls apart and a new one takes its place. Either way, the path to democracy will not prove to be easy.

Whatever the journey, the goal for the Vietnamese people is to reform the political infrastructure. The government and the institutions of government should be geared towards carrying Vietnam into the future. An obvious change is an increase in transparency. The present system merely provides the opportunity to propose band-aid solutions. Much like the party secretary’s apology, blame will be cast, action will be taken, and it will be business as usual.

Power must ultimately be transferred away from those who create laws and into the hands of the people. Reform is not simply replacing the party leaders. It is not simply replacing members of the Politburo. Reform is not lip service paid to constitutional changes.

Reform in the case of Vietnam is the complete and thorough renovation of its political system. It is the democratization of Vietnam, because anything less than that will simply be incomplete and ineffective. Anything less than the distribution of power and improvement in government transparency is to invite the same old thing.

When the communist policies of old failed, the Vietnamese government changed: it modified its economic policies. The result of these changes was an increase in living standard and invitation for foreign investment. But now there is a new problem, and that problem is not its economic policies but the political system. If the Vietnamese government serves the people, as it purports to do so, then it must accept the need for real change.

While none of this can occur without support from within the existing government, none of this will occur without pressure from the public.

Change is not easy. Change in an authoritarian government, in particular, is not bloodless. As we have witnessed throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa, beginning in Tunisia and now being fought in Syria, change is often violent. But the Middle East and Northern Africa is not Vietnam. However, it is guaranteed that reform will be hard fought.

This is not to say that the Vietnamese people should take to the streets and risk their safety and future, but at some point the people must ask themselves, “Is this the country I deserve?”

(Khanh Vu Duc is a Canadian lawyer who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel)

Vietnamese Disarray: Two Leaders and a Nation | Asia Sentinel

Vietnamese Disarray: Two Leaders and a Nation | Asia Sentinel
Khanh Vu Duc, 19 September 2012

The economic deterioration of Vietnam provides the perfect setting for regime change, with a scandal-ridden prime minister seeking to hold onto his position

The economic nightmare that has befallen Vietnam has resulted in much finger-pointing, with President Truong Tan Sang and his supporters putting Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in the crosshairs.

Over the past decade, Vietnam benefited greatly from economic reforms and a wealth of foreign investment. During the heyday, it was all too easy for the country’s leadership and the Communist Party to hide the waste and corruption behind skyrocketing economic growth.

Today, however, all of that is over. The waste, corruption, and poor management that have been the norm are now the target of government crackdowns, if only to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people. A power struggle between the prime minister and president, state enterprises deep in the red over senseless business endeavors and the arrests of banking officials have all signaled to the Vietnamese people that these are uncertain times.

The path for two leaders

If Prime Minister Dung can survive a challenge to his leadership, one could expect the prime minister to consolidate and strengthen his position within the party by marginalizing President Sang and weeding out his supporters. Rather than taking this challenge as an impetus to change, the prime minister will likely use it as an excuse to double down and stay the path. Now more than ever, Vietnam cannot risk instability, which President Sang would be accused of bringing about. For better or worse, Prime Minister Dung’s vision will serve as the vision for Vietnam.

Should Sang succeed in ousting the prime minister, Dung’s allies would be purged from public office and replaced with the president’s people. Whether the prime minister’s allies would be arrested or simply exiled from public service is unknown; however, the arrest of the prime minister would prove to be a bold move on the president’s part in demonstrating to the people his intent to rid the government of corruption.

On the other hand, should there be a settlement between the two leaders, one could expect more power sharing and more input in government from President Sang and his supporters, all under the guise of increased accountability. Prime Minister Dung’s position within the government and party would be severely weakened, as the president would undoubtedly demand concessions, lest the prime minister face a political coup d’état. The Communist Party, in attempt to maintain control over the country, would sooner throw the prime minister under the bus than endure the black eye that would result from a public intraparty war.

An institutional problem

Regardless of the outcome, what is certain is that this so-called struggle for accountability will do little to aid the Vietnamese people, whose fortunes are unlikely to change. The power struggle is simply that--a power struggle, not one born out of a desperate need to reform Vietnam. This struggle is not one that will benefit the masses but the family and friends of those individuals in power. This is ultimately a struggle of the ruling class, not the proletariat; and when the dust finally settles, it will be business as usual.

It is not the individuals that need changing but the institution itself. Although the Communist Party today remains communist in name only, the organization is notorious for its lack of transparency, which has led Vietnam down this path of financial disaster. Corruption and poor management remain hidden from view until it is too late, at which point the wealthy few can hide while the working majority are left holding the bag labeled “debt.” A patronage system allows family and friends to reap the benefits of having people in high places, rather than having the best person for the job.

A change in leadership would do little to fix the problems that plague Vietnam today. Corruption and poor management is not the cause of Vietnam’s ailments; it is a symptom. The cause has been and remains the Communist Party itself and its ability to operate with impunity. A change in leadership must follow with a change in government and government policy.

A second look

For almost four decades, the Communist Party of Vietnam has provided stability, whether in poverty or prosperity. During the early days when ideology governed the country’s affairs, the people were poor and hungry. However, because they were poor and hungry, they were too distracted to challenge the party. When the country boomed, the people experienced an awakening of sorts--with a little bit of luck and a little bit of hard work, they could be rich, or at least better off than they were yesterday.

The party assumed credit for this success and impressed upon the people its work in helping the nation. The party was good for Vietnam. Whatever else the party had done or was involved in on the side, properly or improperly, the party had led the country out from poverty to prosperity. No one would complain as long as the country continued to prosper. But now, as the economy slows and foreign investment dwindles, the people are fed just enough, rich just enough, to look at their leaders with a critical eye.

Although the economic downturn and power struggle have provided an opening for the people to demand real change in government, the party remains too intertwined in Vietnamese society for it to simply roll over and die. In all likelihood, change will first come from within the party rather than from without, but whether said change will benefit the people remains questionable.

With more than 60 percent of the Vietnamese population born after the Vietnam War, these are people born into families whose greatest difficulties at time were putting food on the table. Now, these same people, many of whom have families of their own, face an entirely different set of challenges--climbing the social ladder, a climb that cannot be achieved in a struggling economy. They have seen the light at the end of the tunnel but are now seeing that light fade away due to the government’s mismanagement.

Much like weeds, cutting the head will achieve nothing; one must remove the roots. Maybe it is time for the Communist Party to step aside.

(Khanh Vu Duc is a Vietnamese Canadian lawyer in Ottawa who researches on international relations and international law. He is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel.)

Vietnamese president urges military to study modern warfare | Vietnam News

Vietnamese president urges military to study modern warfare | Vietnam News
Vietnam News, September, 18 2012

HA NOI (VNS)— President Truong Tan Sang asked the National Defence Academy to study global military science, especially modern and hi-tech warfare issues, to advise the Party, State and the army and benefit its training.

He made this request when speaking at a ceremony to start the new academic year at the Academy in Ha Noi yesterday.

While congratulating the academy's staff and soldier and officer students on beginning a new school year, Sang also praised the academy for helping thousands of senior officials of the Party and State further improve their knowledge of defence and security matters.

As a dynamically developing region, Southeast Asia is encountering factors that cause instability, especially sea disputes between several regional countries, said the President.

He mentioned the hostile forces' acceleration of the "peaceful evolution" strategy, riots, "self-evolution", "self-transformation" and their use of the issues of democracy, human rights, nation and religion to sabotage national independence and socialism in Viet Nam.

The State leader said that as the country's and the army's leading defence training and military science research centre, the Academy needed to further improve the quality of education and scientific research to produce regular, proficient and sharp-thinking officers for the country.

Sang also said he believes that the academy will continue to make more contributions to national defence in the future. — VNS