Michele Penna Nov 11, 2014
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting seemingly worked its magic: Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe finally shook hands on Oct. 10, after two years of suspended high level visits and of deteriorating relations.
The graphic was remarkably unconvincing: against the flowery choreography of the Great Hall of People, a wary Mr. Abe looks at cameras with a barely visible smirk, while Mr. Xi seems to make no attempt to smile at all (see for yourself in the video above). But shake hands they did, and that is what everyone was waiting for.
Besides, by the time the widely expected meeting took place the real big news had already been out for a while. Last Friday, the two countries agreed to disagree on the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, stating that they are willing to set up a crisis management system in order to prevent confrontations from escalating.
The dispute has been poisoning mutual relations between the two countries since 2012, when the Japanese government decided to nationalize the islands, which used to be property of a private family. Beijing argued that such a decision was an infringement on its territorial integrity and a crisis ensued, preventing the two leaders from holding meetings and causing some serious damage to business relations.
The agreement reached by China’s State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Japan’s National Security Advisor Shotaro Yachi – here is the version translated by Xinhua – includes four points. Two are fairly vague: the first affirms that Beijing and Tokyo will “continue to develop the China-Japan strategic relationship of mutual benefit,” while the second points out that “the two sides have reached some agreement on overcoming political obstacles in the bilateral relations.”
The really interesting stuff comes with the third, according to which, “The two sides have acknowledged that different positions exist between them regarding the tensions which have emerged in recent years over the Diaoyu Islands and some waters in the East China Sea, and agreed to prevent the situation from aggravating through dialogue and consultation and establish crisis management mechanisms to avoid contingencies.” The fourth, finally, states that “The two sides have agreed to gradually resume political, diplomatic and security dialogue through various multilateral and bilateral channels and to make efforts to build political mutual trust.”
“I think it’s monumentally important,” said William Choong, Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow International Institute for Strategic Studies, in a phone interview with the Asian Correspondent. “They are the second and third largest economies in the world: because of their different opinions, the bilateral relationship has been bad and that has affected the whole strategic triangle between China, Japan and the United States. Besides, they have also affected Asia’s emerging security architecture.”
According to Dr. Choong, the institution of a mechanism to prevent crises from reaching dangerous levels – essentially a hotline to be used for direct contact in case of incidents – is an important bit of the deal. “What happened in the past – vessels being arrested, naval confrontations, etc. – all these incidents would be avoided with a crisis management system,” said Dr. Choong.
The APEC meeting might have provided a good excuse for the two statesmen to get together, but it would be simplistic to think that what was a fraught relationship yesterday was healed yesterday just for the benefit of the cameras.
According to Jim Nolt, Adjunct Professor of U.S.-China relations at New York University and Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute, economic headaches might go a long way in explaining why this limited agreement has been reached now rather than earlier. “I think it is partly based on the fact that there is bad economic news in both China and Japan. They need to continue to do trade and business, it would be bad for both if that did not do so. Besides, the agreement would help restore confidence and benefit their respective countries,” he said in an interview with the Asian Correspondent.
It should be noted that China recorded a five-year low growth of 7.3 percent in the third quarter, raising doubts whether the government’s 7.5 percent yearly target can be met. In Japan, Abeconomics – the set of measures used by the Abe administration to kick-start the Japanese economy – has not stood up to the expectations it had raised. Against such background, warm economic ties would come as a relief. As Prof. Nolt put it, the two Asian nations “realize they cannot afford a dispute.”
It will be interesting to see what the two countries’ respective nationalists will make of the deal. According to analysts not much, as both parties can somehow claim victory: China has finally got Japan to agree that there is a dispute (even though the Japanese side reportedly said they merely acknowledge that Beijing has a different point of view.) Tokyo can also claim that it has managed to mend ties while not giving up territory.
Matthew Funaiole, a research associate with the Foreign Policy Centre, told us in an email interview that the agreement may in fact indicate that both sides are becoming increasingly attentive to nationalist movements. “In Japan, nationalists and conservatives (many of whom support Prime Minister Abe) may interpret the agreement as evidence of China backing down from its territorial claims,” Dr. Funaiole said. In China, “the agreement may afford the CCP the opportunity to reaffirm its legitimacy to the international community, in light of the recent crackdown on protestors in Hong Kong.”
Good as it may be, the handshake will hardly be the end of tensions. First of all, the ‘agreement to disagree’ does not per se rule out incidents, which could still aggravate the situation. Furthermore, no direct mention was made of the other significant irritant in Sino-Japanese relations: the Yasukuni Shrine, where the spirits of rank-and-file Japanese soldiers sleep next to those of World War II criminals. In 2013, a visit by Mr. Abe provided fuel to nationalistic debates in China and apparently supported the theory that Japan has not yet fully come to terms with its imperialistic past.
An end to official visits to the shrine – along with the recognition that a territorial dispute exists – were the preconditions set by China for meeting with Japanese leaders. Beijing must have shown some flexibility in that regard, because little appears to have changed: all that has been said, it seems, is that Japan “must look at history squarely and move towards the future.”
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