With Pragmatists in Control, What’s Next for the KNU? | The Irrawaddy Magazine
SAW YAN NAING / THE IRRAWADDY, December 27, 2012
Pragmatic leaders who won the Karen National Union’s (KNU) recent elections are expected to accelerate peace talks with the government and business development projects, but some Karen observers are urging caution to ensure benefits for local communities and not just the ethnic group’s leaders.
Three policy makers with close ties won key positions in the elections, which closed on Tuesday after a nearly month-long congress to choose new leaders.
Mutu Say Poe, the KNU’s former military chief, is now the organization’s chairman, while Gen Saw Johnny, a pragmatic commander, was elected as the military chief. The new general secretary is Kwe Htoo Win, who is known for being practical, friendly to ethnic alliances and knowledgeable about international affairs.
The three leaders are believed to have good relations with members of the government’s peace team, who are negotiating with the KNU after decades of war between the government’s army and ethnic Karen rebels fighting for greater autonomy and basic rights. The two sides signed a ceasefire in January.
In addition to speeding up the peace process, the KNU’s new leaders are expected to accelerate development projects in the region, including efforts to clear away land mines and resettle internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
But some observers say the KNU should proceed cautiously in the coming months.
Thierry Falise, a veteran Bangkok-based journalist and author who has covered Burma for more than 25 years, said that although the new leaders may want a quicker peace process, they should take time to guarantee the safety of civilians, the repositioning of government troops in rebel-controlled territory, and the implementation of the organization’s code of conduct.
After speaking with several KNU leaders and Karen civil society organization, Falise, who travels frequently in Karen State, said the code of conduct was seen as crucial for attempts to negotiate with the government peace team.
The KNU and government peace negotiators led by Aung Min, a minister of the President’s Office, signed the code of conduct in the Karen State capital Pa-an on Sept. 4 this year.
The code comprised 11 chapters and 34 detailed points which also consider the safety of civilians.
According to the agreement, the KNU and government must obey the code to cement a permanent ceasefire.
Saw Htoo Klei, secretary of the Karen Office of Relief and Development, a Karen relief organization that provides assistance to IDPs in KNU-controlled areas, said he was optimistic about the new leaders because they offered a range of experience in military, political and international affairs.
But some concerns have also surfaced that the KNU leaders will focus more on economic development than politics, as they are believed to have close ties with businessmen such as Ko Ko Maung, the managing director of Dawei Princess Company, a Burmese partner in the Dawei deep-sea port project led by Thailand’s largest construction company Italian-Thai Development.
The KNU’s former peace negotiator, David Taw, who passed away recently, was reportedly well connected to Hla Maung Shwe, a Burmese peace broker and vice chairman of Myanmar Egress, a leading Rangoon-based NGO.
Hla Maung Shwe is also vice chairman of the Myanmar Fishery Federation and an executive of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
David Taw, who was close to KNU chairman Mutu Say Poe, reportedly spoke with Hla Maung Shwe on the telephone after almost every peace talk. Some Karen sources speculate the discussions focused on development, businesses and NGO projects.
Karen sources also say that as peace talks continue, land has been purchased and seized on a large scale by Karen and Burmese businesspeople in southern Karen State, especially in Pa-an and Tenasserim Division, where the Dawei port is being built.
The multi-billion-dollar port project includes an overland route connecting it to Thailand that passes through territory controlled by a brigade of the KNU’s armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and some local sources have speculated that KNLA leaders are eager to benefit.
Community-based organizations have complained that development projects and business investment are not transparent and lack the input of concerned civilians. As these projects continue, they point out, government troops remain in KNU-controlled territories and Karen civilians do not feel safe enough to return to their abandoned homes.
But if KNU leaders push forward quickly with these projects, one newly elected leader, Lt-Gen Baw Kyaw Heh, may present some resistance.
As the KNLA’s new deputy military chief, Lt-Gen Baw Kyaw Heh leads a group of 1,500 well-trained fighters and is known as more of a hardliner. Karen sources on the Thai-Burmese border said he would likely ignore KNU leaders if they tried to focus on development and business.
The KNU has dealt with internal divisions recently, with concerns that the group might split into two factions. Baw Kyaw Heh was reportedly ready to lead KNLA troops in northern Karen State and break away from the south, which was led by Gen Saw Johnny and Mutu Poe.
The leaders compromised, local sources say, for the “sake of the Karen people.”
Thursday, December 27, 2012
Wednesday, December 26, 2012
Philippine Reds still eye stalemate | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Philippine Reds still eye stalemate | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Edwin Espejo Dec 26, 2012
In 2008, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) boldly declared that it was aiming for a strategic stalemate in its guerrilla war with the Philippine government in five years.
In its statement to observe its 44th founding anniversary posted on its website Sunday but dated December 26, the CPP is saying “it is making substantial progress in carrying out the strategic plan to advance the people’s war from the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate.”
Today, however, its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), is still far away from that armed parity with the Philippine military.
“It currently operates in more than 100 guerrilla fronts and is striving to increase these to 180 within the next five years since 2010 or for a longer period if need be. There are efforts to assist regions that are lagging behind in order to keep them apace with the overall advance,” the CPP stated in reference to its 2008 target.
For the first time also, the CPP-NPA and its political umbrella, the National Democratic Front (NDF), is putting to rest military claims that the armed regulars of the communist have been reduced to a little over 4,000 from a high of 25,000 fully armed NPAs in the 1980s.
“The Aquino regime and its retinue of military officers keep on boasting that most areas of the Philippines have become insurgency-free…(the) fact is, that NPA armed strength in 1986 was only 6,100 rifles,” the CPP central committee said Monday.
But in Mindanao, the NPAs are gaining grounds where comrades elsewhere in the country are still struggling to rebuild their forces after two decades of ‘rectification movement.’
Rebel spokesman Jorge Madlos, a.k.a Ka Oris, said in an e-mailed statement that despite massive military operations in rebel strongholds in the island, they were able to increase the number of guerilla fronts from 39 in 2008 to 44 this year.
Ka Oris said 40 percent of its 44 guerrilla fronts now have company sized formations in addition to its 5 main regional guerilla units (sentro de grabidad).
He said the NPAs are growing at the rate of 10 percent every year over the last three years.
The CPP in Mindanao is also now building regional and sub-regional operational commands for the NPA, something that it used to have in the 1980s but decided to disband following ideological debate which led to the decimation of rebel ranks nationwide in the 1990s.
Rebel forces in the island, especially those in the Davao and Caraga regions, are again capable of launching undersized battalion formations for tactical offensives as they did in raiding Taganito Mines more than a year ago.
Lt. Gen. Jorge Segovia, commanding general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Eastern Mindanao Command, however said rebel forces in the island could not be more than 1,500 fully armed regulars.
The CPP was re-established in December 26, 1968 led by University of the Philippines professor Jose Maria Sison and a motley group of intellectuals.
It is waging a Maoist-inspired protracted guerilla warfare that goes into “3 strategic stages” namely, strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive.
Forty four years after, the CPP is still in the strategic defensive stage.
The Philippine insurgency is the longest running of its kind in Southeast Asia.
Edwin Espejo Dec 26, 2012
In 2008, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) boldly declared that it was aiming for a strategic stalemate in its guerrilla war with the Philippine government in five years.
In its statement to observe its 44th founding anniversary posted on its website Sunday but dated December 26, the CPP is saying “it is making substantial progress in carrying out the strategic plan to advance the people’s war from the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate.”
Today, however, its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), is still far away from that armed parity with the Philippine military.
“It currently operates in more than 100 guerrilla fronts and is striving to increase these to 180 within the next five years since 2010 or for a longer period if need be. There are efforts to assist regions that are lagging behind in order to keep them apace with the overall advance,” the CPP stated in reference to its 2008 target.
For the first time also, the CPP-NPA and its political umbrella, the National Democratic Front (NDF), is putting to rest military claims that the armed regulars of the communist have been reduced to a little over 4,000 from a high of 25,000 fully armed NPAs in the 1980s.
“The Aquino regime and its retinue of military officers keep on boasting that most areas of the Philippines have become insurgency-free…(the) fact is, that NPA armed strength in 1986 was only 6,100 rifles,” the CPP central committee said Monday.
But in Mindanao, the NPAs are gaining grounds where comrades elsewhere in the country are still struggling to rebuild their forces after two decades of ‘rectification movement.’
Rebel spokesman Jorge Madlos, a.k.a Ka Oris, said in an e-mailed statement that despite massive military operations in rebel strongholds in the island, they were able to increase the number of guerilla fronts from 39 in 2008 to 44 this year.
Ka Oris said 40 percent of its 44 guerrilla fronts now have company sized formations in addition to its 5 main regional guerilla units (sentro de grabidad).
He said the NPAs are growing at the rate of 10 percent every year over the last three years.
The CPP in Mindanao is also now building regional and sub-regional operational commands for the NPA, something that it used to have in the 1980s but decided to disband following ideological debate which led to the decimation of rebel ranks nationwide in the 1990s.
Rebel forces in the island, especially those in the Davao and Caraga regions, are again capable of launching undersized battalion formations for tactical offensives as they did in raiding Taganito Mines more than a year ago.
Lt. Gen. Jorge Segovia, commanding general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Eastern Mindanao Command, however said rebel forces in the island could not be more than 1,500 fully armed regulars.
The CPP was re-established in December 26, 1968 led by University of the Philippines professor Jose Maria Sison and a motley group of intellectuals.
It is waging a Maoist-inspired protracted guerilla warfare that goes into “3 strategic stages” namely, strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive.
Forty four years after, the CPP is still in the strategic defensive stage.
The Philippine insurgency is the longest running of its kind in Southeast Asia.
Monday, December 17, 2012
Toothless Thai Human Rights Commission | Asia Sentinel
Toothless Thai Human Rights Commission | Asia Sentinel
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 16 December 2012
An important agency is rendered toothless by its Quisling chairwoman
Amara Pongsapich, the chairperson of Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission. must have felt frustrated to hear that former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva had been charged with murder in connection with his role in a military crackdown against pro-Thaksin protesters in 2010.
That is not because as the commission’s head she wanted to punish Abhisit for ordering brutal attacks on protesters during the April-May 2010 protests that wracked central Bangkok as part of her duty to defend human rights. It may be because she saw the need to protect Abhisit, the face of the Thai upper class of which she is a part.
Thailand’s human rights situation has been in dire straits, particularly since the military coup of 2006. Amara was selected to chair the newly established human rights body at a critical time in Thai politics where violence had been repeatedly used against the people, but she has been a disappointment for many in Thailand.
The Human Rights Commission was established in 2009 and its members were appointed, rather than elected, thus raising questions pertaining to its accountability, impartiality and transparency. The commission was established during the Abhisit administration, suggesting that her appointment could have been politically motivated.
Indeed, it has been rather clear that the two are close allies. Amara has never been politically neutral since the beginning. Her inclinations and sympathy toward the People’s Alliance for Democracy, the royalist Yellow Shirts, has cast doubt upon her ability to lead an important organization that deals with justice spanning multi-political ideologies and alignments.
A former professor and dean of Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science, Amara earned her doctorate in anthropology from the University of Washington. Her research interests have been in the sociology of religion, development and cultural change, society and culture, women studies, and ethnicity. Supposedly, she must possess a deep understanding of the way in which human rights are defined.
But in reality, Amara has never condemned the use of violence in the hands of the Abhisit government against the red-shirt protesters. Some 92 were believed killed and 2,000 injured. The NHRC has been silent all along. This poses a question of whose interests Amara has been protecting.
When the Yingluck Shinawatra government decided to employ teargas to disperse crowds in the latest anti-government rally led by an elderly former general in late November, Amara and her NHRC were fuming. She immediately released a statement reproaching the government’s measures in dealing with the demonstrators.
“The government was over-reacting and the use of teargas was unacceptable,” she said. It is important to note that only a few casualties were reported during the rally, a stark contrast to what happened during April-May 2010.
Since the charges against Abhisit have been brought out into the public, Amara has, as expected, made no comment, even when Abhisit denied all responsibility. The intimate connection between Abhisit and Amara could have a played a role in the human rights commission’s lackluster response regarding the continuing investigation of several cases related to the 2010 violence.
In the aftermath of the 2006 coup, Amara was invited to join a constitutional drafting committee sponsored by the Thai junta. The result is the 2007 constitution which, as many would argue, has remained largely “undemocratic. Considering that she was a political science professor who taught her students about political ethics, Amara’s decision to serve the junta in such committee seriously called into question her own ethics and integrity.
Allying with the traditional elite appears to have rendered many benefits to Amara. She is herself an elite. There is little evidences that she genuinely cares about the rights of the Thai people, especially those in the underclass.
In 2010, upon taking up her position at the NHRC, she beautifully reiterated her passion for human rights protection.
“I enjoy learning about people from different backgrounds, how they live, what they believe and what is important to them,” she said. “My work has exposed me to many of the issues facing indigenous peoples and minority groups – the hardship they experience, the lack of access to basic social services and, as a result, the many opportunities that are denied to them.”
These statements have proved flimsy. Under Amara’s leadership, the commission has refused to discuss one of the most pressing issues in Thailand: the lèse-majesté law and its impact on human rights. Lèse-majesté cases have continued to skyrocket. More people have been charged with Article 112 of lèse-majesté law, both Thais and foreigners. Some have received extremely harsh sentences. And the NHRC did not even show its concern.
The case of Amphon Tangnoppakul, known in Thailand as Akong, who was sentenced to 20 years in jail for allegedly sending four text messages deemed insulting to the Thai monarchy, failed to alert the NHRC of the serious human rights violations. Akong died in prison on cancer this May. No sympathy was sent out to his family from Amara.
The NHRC has shown a marked lack of interest in many other cases involving political prisoners, as well as harassment against Thai academics in Thailand who spoke critically of the monarchy. This is a sad story indeed as Amara is also a one-time academic.
This year alone, the NHRC has enjoyed a hefty Bt173.59 million budget (US$5.67 million) for its works on the promotion of human rights. Yet, a big question is how Amara can justify the spending of this budget when the human rights situation has continued to deteriorate.
As evidence of further damage the reputation of her agency, Amara, at year’s end, has offered human rights awards to a number of dubious personalities, ranging from a celebrity monk, a controversial forensic pathologist and a detainee in a Phnom Penh prison who was arrested by Cambodia for provoking a conflict between the two countries.
Amara needs to reconsider her role as the leader of the commission. Her performance has let many of her compatriots down, as well as those who are monitoring the Thai human rights situation in the outside world.
(Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Centre for Southeast Asian Studies.)
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 16 December 2012
An important agency is rendered toothless by its Quisling chairwoman
Amara Pongsapich, the chairperson of Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission. must have felt frustrated to hear that former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva had been charged with murder in connection with his role in a military crackdown against pro-Thaksin protesters in 2010.
That is not because as the commission’s head she wanted to punish Abhisit for ordering brutal attacks on protesters during the April-May 2010 protests that wracked central Bangkok as part of her duty to defend human rights. It may be because she saw the need to protect Abhisit, the face of the Thai upper class of which she is a part.
Thailand’s human rights situation has been in dire straits, particularly since the military coup of 2006. Amara was selected to chair the newly established human rights body at a critical time in Thai politics where violence had been repeatedly used against the people, but she has been a disappointment for many in Thailand.
The Human Rights Commission was established in 2009 and its members were appointed, rather than elected, thus raising questions pertaining to its accountability, impartiality and transparency. The commission was established during the Abhisit administration, suggesting that her appointment could have been politically motivated.
Indeed, it has been rather clear that the two are close allies. Amara has never been politically neutral since the beginning. Her inclinations and sympathy toward the People’s Alliance for Democracy, the royalist Yellow Shirts, has cast doubt upon her ability to lead an important organization that deals with justice spanning multi-political ideologies and alignments.
A former professor and dean of Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science, Amara earned her doctorate in anthropology from the University of Washington. Her research interests have been in the sociology of religion, development and cultural change, society and culture, women studies, and ethnicity. Supposedly, she must possess a deep understanding of the way in which human rights are defined.
But in reality, Amara has never condemned the use of violence in the hands of the Abhisit government against the red-shirt protesters. Some 92 were believed killed and 2,000 injured. The NHRC has been silent all along. This poses a question of whose interests Amara has been protecting.
When the Yingluck Shinawatra government decided to employ teargas to disperse crowds in the latest anti-government rally led by an elderly former general in late November, Amara and her NHRC were fuming. She immediately released a statement reproaching the government’s measures in dealing with the demonstrators.
“The government was over-reacting and the use of teargas was unacceptable,” she said. It is important to note that only a few casualties were reported during the rally, a stark contrast to what happened during April-May 2010.
Since the charges against Abhisit have been brought out into the public, Amara has, as expected, made no comment, even when Abhisit denied all responsibility. The intimate connection between Abhisit and Amara could have a played a role in the human rights commission’s lackluster response regarding the continuing investigation of several cases related to the 2010 violence.
In the aftermath of the 2006 coup, Amara was invited to join a constitutional drafting committee sponsored by the Thai junta. The result is the 2007 constitution which, as many would argue, has remained largely “undemocratic. Considering that she was a political science professor who taught her students about political ethics, Amara’s decision to serve the junta in such committee seriously called into question her own ethics and integrity.
Allying with the traditional elite appears to have rendered many benefits to Amara. She is herself an elite. There is little evidences that she genuinely cares about the rights of the Thai people, especially those in the underclass.
In 2010, upon taking up her position at the NHRC, she beautifully reiterated her passion for human rights protection.
“I enjoy learning about people from different backgrounds, how they live, what they believe and what is important to them,” she said. “My work has exposed me to many of the issues facing indigenous peoples and minority groups – the hardship they experience, the lack of access to basic social services and, as a result, the many opportunities that are denied to them.”
These statements have proved flimsy. Under Amara’s leadership, the commission has refused to discuss one of the most pressing issues in Thailand: the lèse-majesté law and its impact on human rights. Lèse-majesté cases have continued to skyrocket. More people have been charged with Article 112 of lèse-majesté law, both Thais and foreigners. Some have received extremely harsh sentences. And the NHRC did not even show its concern.
The case of Amphon Tangnoppakul, known in Thailand as Akong, who was sentenced to 20 years in jail for allegedly sending four text messages deemed insulting to the Thai monarchy, failed to alert the NHRC of the serious human rights violations. Akong died in prison on cancer this May. No sympathy was sent out to his family from Amara.
The NHRC has shown a marked lack of interest in many other cases involving political prisoners, as well as harassment against Thai academics in Thailand who spoke critically of the monarchy. This is a sad story indeed as Amara is also a one-time academic.
This year alone, the NHRC has enjoyed a hefty Bt173.59 million budget (US$5.67 million) for its works on the promotion of human rights. Yet, a big question is how Amara can justify the spending of this budget when the human rights situation has continued to deteriorate.
As evidence of further damage the reputation of her agency, Amara, at year’s end, has offered human rights awards to a number of dubious personalities, ranging from a celebrity monk, a controversial forensic pathologist and a detainee in a Phnom Penh prison who was arrested by Cambodia for provoking a conflict between the two countries.
Amara needs to reconsider her role as the leader of the commission. Her performance has let many of her compatriots down, as well as those who are monitoring the Thai human rights situation in the outside world.
(Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Centre for Southeast Asian Studies.)
Saturday, December 15, 2012
US Pivot Heightens Asian Disputes by Richard Javad Heydarian -- Antiwar.com
US Pivot Heightens Asian Disputes by Richard Javad Heydarian -- Antiwar.com
Richard Javad Heydarian, December 15, 2012
With newly re-elected President Barack Obama having chosen Southeast Asia as his first foreign destination, where he also attended the much-anticipated pan-Pacific East Asia Summit, the U.S. has underscored its commitment to its so-called strategic ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region.
Months after the 2011 U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, President Obama signaled the formal launch of the pivot in a November speech to the Australian parliament: “As a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.”
The U.S. already has around 320,000 troops stationed in the region, as well as 50 percent of its formidable global naval assets. Under the pivot strategy, the U.S. is set to commit several thousand additional troops and increase its naval strength by another ten percent in the coming few years.
The Obama administration has repeatedly denied that the pivot is a containment strategy aimed at Beijing, arguing it is simply a logical ‘rebalancing’ towards the region in light of Asia’s stunning economic growth and the increasing importance of maintaining U.S. interests there.
However, more than two years into the so-called U.S. pivot, many strategic commentators across the Pacific have raised major questions as to its real intentions, actual impact, and practicability, given the United States’ deep fiscal constraints ahead of scheduled defence-spending cuts.
Reacting to lingering uncertainties over the U.S. strategy, China, which views the pivot as an act of provocation, as well as other countries in the region such as Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan, have stepped up their territorial claims in the Western Pacific – indirectly testing America’s resolve to uphold its strategic commitments.
In this sense, the pivot – purportedly to reinforce the United States’ role as an ‘anchor of stability and prosperity’ in the Pacific – has ironically contributed to greater uncertainty, turbulence, and belligerence vis-à-vis the festering maritime disputes.
In a recent op-ed for the Singapore-based daily The Straits Times, Barry Desker, the dean of the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), called for ‘mutual restraint’ by all disputing littoral states to ‘diffuse’ tensions, while contending that all parties are “guilty of occupying uninhabited islands and land features.”
And a recent report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group says: “With tensions on the rise, Manila is eager to pursue closer military cooperation with the U.S., and Hanoi (as a strategic partner) is keen to carefully bring in and balance U.S. influence in the region.
“If these countries frame any U.S. assistance as being directed against China, it will be harder for the former to persuade the latter that it will not get involved in territorial disputes.”
The pivot can be traced as far back as the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, where Secretary of State Hillary Clinton injected the U.S. into the centre of decades-long territorial disputes in the South China Sea by announcing that her country had a ‘national interest’ in the freedom of navigation across the Western Pacific, including the South China Sea.
As a result, allies such as Japan and the Philippines have repeatedly sought U.S. re-assurance vis-à-vis existing bilateral mutual defence treaties, especially in the event of military confrontation with China over disputed maritime features in the Western Pacific.
The Philippines and Vietnam are mired in bitter maritime disputes with China over a whole host of features in the Spratly and Paracel chains of islands in the South China Sea, while Japan is contesting China’s claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain of islands in the East China Sea.
Meanwhile, Washington’s allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea, are locked in a separate territorial dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islands in the Sea of Japan.
In last month’s Australia-U.S. Ministerial Meeting, Clinton sought to calm Chinese nerves by stating, “We (the U.S.) welcomed a strong, prosperous and peaceful China, which plays a constructive role in promoting regional security and prosperity… We do not take a position on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea.”
The U.S. Navy also invited China to join the large-scale, U.S.-led ‘Rim of the Pacific Exercise’ by 2014.
Yet an unconvinced China, under its new leadership, has nudged up its claims. Recently, authorities in the southern Chinese Island of Hainan have issued new laws, whereby beginning next year, they will have the authority to intercept and board any foreign vessel seen to violate China’s ‘sovereignty’ over all claimed features in the South China Sea.
In response, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Surin Pitsuwan warned that such a decision “…has increased a level of concern and a level of great anxiety among all parties, particularly parties that would need the access, the passage and the freedom to go through.” Beijing subsequently insisted that the new authority was not aimed against sea-borne commercial traffic.
China’s new passport design, incorporating disputed territories in the South China Sea under the country’s official map, has also sparked renewed concerns among some of its southern neighbours.
In the face of what it sees as Chinese provocations, however, a deeply divided ASEAN has failed to make any meaningful progress in crafting a legally-binding regional Code of Conduct to resolve disputes, as strongly urged by Washington.
If the pivot is seen in Beijing as a provocation, it has also encouraged greater assertiveness on the part of some of its neighbours.
While the Vietnamese have stepped up their energy exploration projects in disputed territories, and the Japanese government decided to purchase from its private owner one of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, the Philippines has pushed to upgrade its military ties with the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea to defend its own claims.
“While we are all aware that the U.S. does not take sides in disputes, they do have a strategic stake in the freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, and the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea,” Filipino President Benigno Aquino stated at last month’s East Asian Summit, prodding further U.S. involvement in the South China Sea disputes.
How Washington will react to these kinds of pressures, particularly given its own fiscal challenges that have already resulted in nearly 500 billion dollars in cuts to its projected military budgets over the next ten years, adds yet another level of uncertainty to the calculations of the contending parties in the region.
Already, the pivot is being attacked by the U.S. right as insufficient. “This reallocation of military and diplomatic resources was supposed to guarantee stability in a region seeking to balance China’s rise. In reality, this strategic shift is less than it appears,” argued Michael Auslin in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal. “In reality…it won’t solve Asia’s problems and may even add to the region’s uncertainty by over-promising and under-delivering.”
This article was originally published at IPS News.
Richard Javad Heydarian, December 15, 2012
With newly re-elected President Barack Obama having chosen Southeast Asia as his first foreign destination, where he also attended the much-anticipated pan-Pacific East Asia Summit, the U.S. has underscored its commitment to its so-called strategic ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region.
Months after the 2011 U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, President Obama signaled the formal launch of the pivot in a November speech to the Australian parliament: “As a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.”
The U.S. already has around 320,000 troops stationed in the region, as well as 50 percent of its formidable global naval assets. Under the pivot strategy, the U.S. is set to commit several thousand additional troops and increase its naval strength by another ten percent in the coming few years.
The Obama administration has repeatedly denied that the pivot is a containment strategy aimed at Beijing, arguing it is simply a logical ‘rebalancing’ towards the region in light of Asia’s stunning economic growth and the increasing importance of maintaining U.S. interests there.
However, more than two years into the so-called U.S. pivot, many strategic commentators across the Pacific have raised major questions as to its real intentions, actual impact, and practicability, given the United States’ deep fiscal constraints ahead of scheduled defence-spending cuts.
Reacting to lingering uncertainties over the U.S. strategy, China, which views the pivot as an act of provocation, as well as other countries in the region such as Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan, have stepped up their territorial claims in the Western Pacific – indirectly testing America’s resolve to uphold its strategic commitments.
In this sense, the pivot – purportedly to reinforce the United States’ role as an ‘anchor of stability and prosperity’ in the Pacific – has ironically contributed to greater uncertainty, turbulence, and belligerence vis-à-vis the festering maritime disputes.
In a recent op-ed for the Singapore-based daily The Straits Times, Barry Desker, the dean of the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), called for ‘mutual restraint’ by all disputing littoral states to ‘diffuse’ tensions, while contending that all parties are “guilty of occupying uninhabited islands and land features.”
And a recent report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group says: “With tensions on the rise, Manila is eager to pursue closer military cooperation with the U.S., and Hanoi (as a strategic partner) is keen to carefully bring in and balance U.S. influence in the region.
“If these countries frame any U.S. assistance as being directed against China, it will be harder for the former to persuade the latter that it will not get involved in territorial disputes.”
The pivot can be traced as far back as the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, where Secretary of State Hillary Clinton injected the U.S. into the centre of decades-long territorial disputes in the South China Sea by announcing that her country had a ‘national interest’ in the freedom of navigation across the Western Pacific, including the South China Sea.
As a result, allies such as Japan and the Philippines have repeatedly sought U.S. re-assurance vis-à-vis existing bilateral mutual defence treaties, especially in the event of military confrontation with China over disputed maritime features in the Western Pacific.
The Philippines and Vietnam are mired in bitter maritime disputes with China over a whole host of features in the Spratly and Paracel chains of islands in the South China Sea, while Japan is contesting China’s claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain of islands in the East China Sea.
Meanwhile, Washington’s allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea, are locked in a separate territorial dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islands in the Sea of Japan.
In last month’s Australia-U.S. Ministerial Meeting, Clinton sought to calm Chinese nerves by stating, “We (the U.S.) welcomed a strong, prosperous and peaceful China, which plays a constructive role in promoting regional security and prosperity… We do not take a position on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea.”
The U.S. Navy also invited China to join the large-scale, U.S.-led ‘Rim of the Pacific Exercise’ by 2014.
Yet an unconvinced China, under its new leadership, has nudged up its claims. Recently, authorities in the southern Chinese Island of Hainan have issued new laws, whereby beginning next year, they will have the authority to intercept and board any foreign vessel seen to violate China’s ‘sovereignty’ over all claimed features in the South China Sea.
In response, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Surin Pitsuwan warned that such a decision “…has increased a level of concern and a level of great anxiety among all parties, particularly parties that would need the access, the passage and the freedom to go through.” Beijing subsequently insisted that the new authority was not aimed against sea-borne commercial traffic.
China’s new passport design, incorporating disputed territories in the South China Sea under the country’s official map, has also sparked renewed concerns among some of its southern neighbours.
In the face of what it sees as Chinese provocations, however, a deeply divided ASEAN has failed to make any meaningful progress in crafting a legally-binding regional Code of Conduct to resolve disputes, as strongly urged by Washington.
If the pivot is seen in Beijing as a provocation, it has also encouraged greater assertiveness on the part of some of its neighbours.
While the Vietnamese have stepped up their energy exploration projects in disputed territories, and the Japanese government decided to purchase from its private owner one of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, the Philippines has pushed to upgrade its military ties with the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea to defend its own claims.
“While we are all aware that the U.S. does not take sides in disputes, they do have a strategic stake in the freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, and the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea,” Filipino President Benigno Aquino stated at last month’s East Asian Summit, prodding further U.S. involvement in the South China Sea disputes.
How Washington will react to these kinds of pressures, particularly given its own fiscal challenges that have already resulted in nearly 500 billion dollars in cuts to its projected military budgets over the next ten years, adds yet another level of uncertainty to the calculations of the contending parties in the region.
Already, the pivot is being attacked by the U.S. right as insufficient. “This reallocation of military and diplomatic resources was supposed to guarantee stability in a region seeking to balance China’s rise. In reality, this strategic shift is less than it appears,” argued Michael Auslin in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal. “In reality…it won’t solve Asia’s problems and may even add to the region’s uncertainty by over-promising and under-delivering.”
This article was originally published at IPS News.
Thursday, December 13, 2012
Asia Provocateur: Abhisit rumour: Willing to be a coup Prime Minister?
Asia Provocateur: Abhisit rumour: Willing to be a coup Prime Minister?
Abhisit was Thai PM from 2008 to 2011 but hasn't won any of the three elections he has led his party into and leads a party that hasn't even been the largest in the Thai Parliament since 1992.
Whilst unsubstantiated the rumour that Abhisit would be willing to be a "coup PM" has some foundation given Abhisit's route to power in 2008 which involved support from the neo-fascist PAD, the army and a political party which was conjured out of thin air in order to give Abhisit a large enough "coalition" to take the PM seat.
Abhisit then clung to power for 30months using 10s of 1000s of troops to crush pro-democracy protests in 2009 and 2010 which called for fresh elections to test Abhisit's mandate (his Democrat Party was crushed in the 2011 election). Almost 100 civilians died and 1000s were injured as a result and Abhisit has recently been charged with murder.
Given his record it's pretty clear Abhisit is a Democrat who doesn't believe in democracy. So the question remains: would he be willing to be a Coup Prime Minister?
I have written to a member of the team of a senior Democrat Party asking them if they wish to respond to this post. I will publish their response here should they make one.
Andrew Spooner, 12 December 2012
A rumour is circulating in Bangkok that Thai Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva has made it very clear he would be willing to be installed as Prime Minister again if a military coup was used to topple the present, democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra.
Abhisit was Thai PM from 2008 to 2011 but hasn't won any of the three elections he has led his party into and leads a party that hasn't even been the largest in the Thai Parliament since 1992.
Whilst unsubstantiated the rumour that Abhisit would be willing to be a "coup PM" has some foundation given Abhisit's route to power in 2008 which involved support from the neo-fascist PAD, the army and a political party which was conjured out of thin air in order to give Abhisit a large enough "coalition" to take the PM seat.
Abhisit then clung to power for 30months using 10s of 1000s of troops to crush pro-democracy protests in 2009 and 2010 which called for fresh elections to test Abhisit's mandate (his Democrat Party was crushed in the 2011 election). Almost 100 civilians died and 1000s were injured as a result and Abhisit has recently been charged with murder.
Given his record it's pretty clear Abhisit is a Democrat who doesn't believe in democracy. So the question remains: would he be willing to be a Coup Prime Minister?
I have written to a member of the team of a senior Democrat Party asking them if they wish to respond to this post. I will publish their response here should they make one.
Wednesday, December 12, 2012
Asia Provocateur: When Boris Johnson met the Butcher of Bangkok; yet more Abhisit lies
Asia Provocateur: When Boris Johnson met the Butcher of Bangkok; yet yet more Abhisit lies
Well, it will probably come as no surprise to readers here that Abhisit misrepresented this too.
I was in contact with the Mayor of London's press office during the day and they confirmed that Abhisit and the Mayor's meeting was not official in any way, shape or form.
So what was Abhisit actually doing in London? He had no real official engagements apart from the ones he made up in his head and just to seemed flit around in a desperate attempt to appear relevant. It's quite a sad and sorry spectacle and one can only hope that he gets the chance to spend plenty of time in the future defending himself from that troublesome murder charge.
Andrew Spooner, 11 December 2012
As noted by several other posts in this blog Abhisit's visit to London hasn't gone terribly well.
Only last week the Butcher of Bangkok, former Thai PM, Abhisit Vejjajiva, was charged with murder relating to the death of an unarmed protester in Bangkok in 2010 after he ordered a bloody military crackdown on pro-democracy protests that resulted in almost 100 deaths. (WARNING The video footage here and here of clearly unarmed protesters being shot by Thai soldiers is harrowing and very graphic).
From UCL students cancelling and then reinstating his appearance at the university, to his bizarre claim that he was "invited to speak by the UK Parliament", followed by his butt-clenchingly bad interview with the BBC's Mishal Husain it's not been a great few days for Mark.
But there's more. With Abhisit there are always more misrepresentations and lies to debunk and the latest is his visit to the Greater London Authority (GLA) and the Mayor of London.
As we can see from Abhisit's Facebook page here (screengrab below) he seems to be suggesting that his GLA visit was was some kind of very important high profile official visit.
Only last week the Butcher of Bangkok, former Thai PM, Abhisit Vejjajiva, was charged with murder relating to the death of an unarmed protester in Bangkok in 2010 after he ordered a bloody military crackdown on pro-democracy protests that resulted in almost 100 deaths. (WARNING The video footage here and here of clearly unarmed protesters being shot by Thai soldiers is harrowing and very graphic).
From UCL students cancelling and then reinstating his appearance at the university, to his bizarre claim that he was "invited to speak by the UK Parliament", followed by his butt-clenchingly bad interview with the BBC's Mishal Husain it's not been a great few days for Mark.
But there's more. With Abhisit there are always more misrepresentations and lies to debunk and the latest is his visit to the Greater London Authority (GLA) and the Mayor of London.
As we can see from Abhisit's Facebook page here (screengrab below) he seems to be suggesting that his GLA visit was was some kind of very important high profile official visit.
Well, it will probably come as no surprise to readers here that Abhisit misrepresented this too.
I was in contact with the Mayor of London's press office during the day and they confirmed that Abhisit and the Mayor's meeting was not official in any way, shape or form.
This was a private meeting between two men, Mr Vejjajiva and Mr Johnson, who were at school together.The well-known and respected blog on London politics, Snipe London also picked up on the story with a headline that said
Boris welcomes former Thai PM despite murder charge
So what was Abhisit actually doing in London? He had no real official engagements apart from the ones he made up in his head and just to seemed flit around in a desperate attempt to appear relevant. It's quite a sad and sorry spectacle and one can only hope that he gets the chance to spend plenty of time in the future defending himself from that troublesome murder charge.
Asia Provocateur: Abhisit's invitation to speak to Parliament debunk: official UK Parliament response.
Asia Provocateur: Abhisit's invitation to speak to Parliament debunk: official UK Parliament response
Andrew Spooner, 10 December 2012
Brief post but just had a response from the UK Parliament's press office. And it is unequivocal. Abhisit was not invited by Parliament nor was he invited to speak to Parliament nor was the person who invited him, chair of the Thailand All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG), Roger Godsiff MP, even an official representative of Parliament. That he and Korn claimed they were invited by Parliament is quite risible. They were invited to a simple reception inside the Parliament building hosted by an MP.
With regards to your query, foreign politicians often address parliamentarians at meetings of APPGs or receptions, but this should not be taken as an invitation to address Parliament as a whole, as APPGs have no official status within Parliament. An Address to Parliament normally takes place as part of a state visit, and involves a speech to both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. A formal address is a comparatively rare event, and you can see a listing of some of the most recent ones here:http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/ research/briefings/snpc-04092. pdf.
Sunday, December 9, 2012
Korn: more lies about his and Abhisit's "invitation to speak at the UK Parliament" | Asia Provocateur
Korn: more lies about his and Abhisit's "invitation to speak at the UK Parliament" | Asia Provocateur
Very obviously this invitation is not from the Parliament nor is it one to speak. It is a simple reception invitation from an MP acting as a host. Receptions like this are being hosted several times a day in the UK Parliament with a huge range of people being invited.
So let's reiterate: an invitation to a reception at Parliament is absolutely not an invitation from the UK Parliament to speak and to claim that it is is completely absurd. In fact, over the last two months I've personally been invited to two similar receptions and at no time did I make the ludicrous claim I'd been invited to speak at the Parliament.
Korn also claimed Abhisit was invited by the parliament to speak. I will ask the Parliament press office tomorrow if the Parliament has invited either Korn or Abhisit to speak. I will also inform Roger Godsiff MP that Korn deliberately misrepresented his invitation to Thais and claimed it was a parliamentary invite to speak when it was just a basic invitation to a reception.
Andrew Spooner, 9 December 2012
Yesterday I blogged
about Korn's grandiose Facebook claims that Abhisit and he had been
invited by the UK Parliament to speak there during a reception hosted by
the Thai Children's Trust.
As stated yesterday after checking both the Thai Children's Trust and Parliament website I could find no mention of either Korn or Abhisit's attendance or invitation.
Korn has recent form on bizarre statements and claims with tasteless, oddball comparisons of the democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra to "Hitler".
Korn's team have now reacted to my claims and published a photo of Korn's invitation to attend a reception at Parliament. The event is hosted by Roger Godsiff, the Labour Party MP who is chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Thailand.
As stated yesterday after checking both the Thai Children's Trust and Parliament website I could find no mention of either Korn or Abhisit's attendance or invitation.
Korn has recent form on bizarre statements and claims with tasteless, oddball comparisons of the democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra to "Hitler".
Korn's team have now reacted to my claims and published a photo of Korn's invitation to attend a reception at Parliament. The event is hosted by Roger Godsiff, the Labour Party MP who is chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Thailand.
Very obviously this invitation is not from the Parliament nor is it one to speak. It is a simple reception invitation from an MP acting as a host. Receptions like this are being hosted several times a day in the UK Parliament with a huge range of people being invited.
So let's reiterate: an invitation to a reception at Parliament is absolutely not an invitation from the UK Parliament to speak and to claim that it is is completely absurd. In fact, over the last two months I've personally been invited to two similar receptions and at no time did I make the ludicrous claim I'd been invited to speak at the Parliament.
Korn also claimed Abhisit was invited by the parliament to speak. I will ask the Parliament press office tomorrow if the Parliament has invited either Korn or Abhisit to speak. I will also inform Roger Godsiff MP that Korn deliberately misrepresented his invitation to Thais and claimed it was a parliamentary invite to speak when it was just a basic invitation to a reception.
Saturday, December 8, 2012
Ex-Thai PM to Face Murder Charges for Crackdown | The Irrawaddy Magazine
Ex-Thai PM to Face Murder Charges for Crackdown | The Irrawaddy Magazine
THANYARAT DOKSONE / AP WRITER| December 7, 2012
BANGKOK—Investigators say they plan to file murder charges against Thailand’s former prime minister and his deputy in the first prosecutions of officials for their roles in a deadly 2010 crackdown on anti-government protests.
The protests and crackdown left more than 90 people dead and about 1,800 injured in Thailand’s worst political violence in decades. Former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s Democrat Party, now in the opposition after being ousted in elections last year, and “Redshirt” supporters of the ruling Pheu Thai Party have blamed each other for the bloodshed since.
Department of Special Investigation chief Tharit Phengdit said Thursday that investigators found Abhisit possibly culpable in the death of a taxi driver because he allowed troops to use war weapons and live ammunition against protesters.
Abhisit and former Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, who was in charge of the ad hoc security agency set up to contain the protests, will be summoned Wednesday to be formally charged. The courts must accept the case before it can go to trial.
Democrat Party spokesman Chavanond Intarakomalyasut called the decision “an abuse of government’s power to threaten its opponents.” He noted that it was done while parliament is in recess so the two men’s immunity from arrest is lifted.
Tharit denied that the decision is politically motivated and said the case is significant “for society because the deaths were inflicted by an act of government officers.”
The deaths occurred during the red shirts’ nine-week anti-government protest in the heart of the capital that had sought to force Abhisit to call early elections. Central Bangkok was garrisoned by soldiers until they moved in to crush the protest on May 19, 2010.
The protest was staged primarily by supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted by a 2006 military coup after being accused of corruption and disrespect to the monarchy. His supporters and opponents have vied for power since then, and Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra now leads the government.
A Criminal Court inquest recently found that taxi driver Phan Kamkong was killed by guns used by military personnel during the crackdown.
Chavanond alleged that the inquest was a one-sided trial in which the accused could not defend themselves and that no one was pinpointed as the shooter.
He insisted the security body set up to contain the protests issued no order to use force against or kill civilians, only to keep order in dealing with “black shirts,” armed men who served as guards for the demonstrators.
“To use the court’s inquest to conclude that the two men had the intention of murder was groundless and against the law,” Chavanond said.
He said both Abhisit and Suthep “are ready to prove their innocence,” and that “those who brought up false charges will have to take responsibility.”
DSI chief Tharit said factors leading to the planned charges include the continuing use of force over time and the killing of civilians without resorting to other methods of controlling protesters.
THANYARAT DOKSONE / AP WRITER| December 7, 2012
BANGKOK—Investigators say they plan to file murder charges against Thailand’s former prime minister and his deputy in the first prosecutions of officials for their roles in a deadly 2010 crackdown on anti-government protests.
The protests and crackdown left more than 90 people dead and about 1,800 injured in Thailand’s worst political violence in decades. Former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s Democrat Party, now in the opposition after being ousted in elections last year, and “Redshirt” supporters of the ruling Pheu Thai Party have blamed each other for the bloodshed since.
Department of Special Investigation chief Tharit Phengdit said Thursday that investigators found Abhisit possibly culpable in the death of a taxi driver because he allowed troops to use war weapons and live ammunition against protesters.
Abhisit and former Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, who was in charge of the ad hoc security agency set up to contain the protests, will be summoned Wednesday to be formally charged. The courts must accept the case before it can go to trial.
Democrat Party spokesman Chavanond Intarakomalyasut called the decision “an abuse of government’s power to threaten its opponents.” He noted that it was done while parliament is in recess so the two men’s immunity from arrest is lifted.
Tharit denied that the decision is politically motivated and said the case is significant “for society because the deaths were inflicted by an act of government officers.”
The deaths occurred during the red shirts’ nine-week anti-government protest in the heart of the capital that had sought to force Abhisit to call early elections. Central Bangkok was garrisoned by soldiers until they moved in to crush the protest on May 19, 2010.
The protest was staged primarily by supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted by a 2006 military coup after being accused of corruption and disrespect to the monarchy. His supporters and opponents have vied for power since then, and Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra now leads the government.
A Criminal Court inquest recently found that taxi driver Phan Kamkong was killed by guns used by military personnel during the crackdown.
Chavanond alleged that the inquest was a one-sided trial in which the accused could not defend themselves and that no one was pinpointed as the shooter.
He insisted the security body set up to contain the protests issued no order to use force against or kill civilians, only to keep order in dealing with “black shirts,” armed men who served as guards for the demonstrators.
“To use the court’s inquest to conclude that the two men had the intention of murder was groundless and against the law,” Chavanond said.
He said both Abhisit and Suthep “are ready to prove their innocence,” and that “those who brought up false charges will have to take responsibility.”
DSI chief Tharit said factors leading to the planned charges include the continuing use of force over time and the killing of civilians without resorting to other methods of controlling protesters.
Wednesday, December 5, 2012
VIDEO: On King's birthday Thai royalists threaten Red Shirt street vendor | Asia Provocateur
VIDEO: On King's birthday Thai royalists threaten Red Shirt street vendor | Asia Provocateur
As can be seen from the following video, the vendor was surrounded by an enraged mob who screamed abuse and attempted to damage the vendor's goods.
This is fairly typical behaviour from Thailand's royalists who have a long record of using extreme violence, threats and intimidation against those who dare to dissent against the dominant royalist view.
Luckily, on this occasion, a police office steps in to protect the woman. In the past, royalists such as the Red Guar, have been involved in terrible massacres such as the one at Thammasat University in 1976.
UPDATE: It seems like the video has now been removed. We do, however, have a photo of the vendor being attacked below and the screen grab of the opening frame of the original video. The first picture is from a bizarre Facebook site called "Dislike Yingluck for Concentration Citizen" and includes various death threats by a variety of Thai royalists. One by a Ta Piyawan states in Thai that the vendor should be "detained" and then taken away where, after the royal celebrations, the vendor can suffer some "harsh treatment" and turned into "fertiliser".
UPDATE 2: We've now found another source of the video of the attack (h/t to "Dan") on the Red Shirt vendor. It's quite clear that the crowd is whipped up into quite a frenzy. Maybe it's only a matter of time before the royalists start hanging people from Bangkok's trees again?
Andrew Spooner, 5 December 2012
As 1000s of Thais gather today in Bangkok to pay homage to the Thai king
on his 85th birthday it didn't take long for the more fanatical
royalist element to make their feelings known.
A single female street vendor near Kasetsart University had the temerity to sell a few products showing the picture of the elected Thai Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra and to wear some red coloured clothing.
A single female street vendor near Kasetsart University had the temerity to sell a few products showing the picture of the elected Thai Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra and to wear some red coloured clothing.
As can be seen from the following video, the vendor was surrounded by an enraged mob who screamed abuse and attempted to damage the vendor's goods.
This is fairly typical behaviour from Thailand's royalists who have a long record of using extreme violence, threats and intimidation against those who dare to dissent against the dominant royalist view.
Luckily, on this occasion, a police office steps in to protect the woman. In the past, royalists such as the Red Guar, have been involved in terrible massacres such as the one at Thammasat University in 1976.
UPDATE: It seems like the video has now been removed. We do, however, have a photo of the vendor being attacked below and the screen grab of the opening frame of the original video. The first picture is from a bizarre Facebook site called "Dislike Yingluck for Concentration Citizen" and includes various death threats by a variety of Thai royalists. One by a Ta Piyawan states in Thai that the vendor should be "detained" and then taken away where, after the royal celebrations, the vendor can suffer some "harsh treatment" and turned into "fertiliser".
UPDATE 2: We've now found another source of the video of the attack (h/t to "Dan") on the Red Shirt vendor. It's quite clear that the crowd is whipped up into quite a frenzy. Maybe it's only a matter of time before the royalists start hanging people from Bangkok's trees again?
Sunday, December 2, 2012
Thai Group helping lese majeste detainees upset with media, govt | The Nation
Thai Group helping lese majeste detainees upset with media, govt | The Nation
Pravit Rojanaphruk, The Nation on Sunday December 2, 2012
Nearly half a year ago, a group of family members affected by the controversial lese majeste law decided to form The Network of Family Members and Peoples Affected by Article 112.
This, they believed, was necessary as they felt not enough is being done to guarantee justice for those detained under the law while censorship and the curbs to freedom of expression are not adequately raised and discussed in society.
When the network launched itself, only Thailand's two-English language newspapers paid interest while the Thai-language papers ignored their formation. It is symptomatic of how the media and society warily treat the issue of lese majeste law, said 45-year-old Sukanya Prueksakasemsuk, wife of lese majeste detainee Somyos Prueksakemsuk.
"There are more foreigners who pay attention to the formation of our network," said the mild-speaking Sukanya, a private company employee, who had to learn about political activism from scratch after the group was formed to partly help her husband who has been behind bars for more than a year without bail. Sukanya cited a German radio journalist interviewing the group and a journalist from France. "Hardly any Thai media," she added.
That hasn't stop the group, with 18 members, to meet once a month and hold activities highlighting what they believe to be infringement of basic legal rights such as the denial of bail to most lese majeste detainees, and more.
One new member of the group knows this well; Surapak Phuchaisaeng was released from prison just at the end of last month after the court threw out his lese majeste case due to insufficient evidence. Surapak, 40, a computer programmer, was denied bail eight times while fighting the case.
He said that while he was in prison, the network visited him and other prisoners of conscience twice or three times a week, offering food and bringing news about the outside world as well as moral support that sustained him and others. The support the network proved invaluable, he said.
"I decided to join the network myself [after being released from jail] because we share the same predicament," Surapak, who is still trying to recover from life in jail, told The Nation on the phone from Buengkarn province. Surapak criticised the recent decision by the Pheu Thai-dominated Parliament to refuse to debate a proposed amendment of the law as an act of "cowardice" and said people will probably have to wait for a new parliament.
"What kind of system does this country have if Parliament dare not discuss laws pertaining to the monarchy institution?" asked Surapak, adding that in the future the network will seek
to identify political parties that will openly support the amendment of the law, which now
carries a maximum penalty of 15 years' imprisonment.
Sukanya said even if there's very little or no hope to see the law amended, she and others hope that the seven prisoners of conscience, including her husband, will have the right to get bail. She visited her husband once a week and clung to the hope that Somyos will be found not guilty when the court will hand the verdict on December 19, so she can celebrate the New Year with him.
Pravit Rojanaphruk, The Nation on Sunday December 2, 2012
Nearly half a year ago, a group of family members affected by the controversial lese majeste law decided to form The Network of Family Members and Peoples Affected by Article 112.
This, they believed, was necessary as they felt not enough is being done to guarantee justice for those detained under the law while censorship and the curbs to freedom of expression are not adequately raised and discussed in society.
When the network launched itself, only Thailand's two-English language newspapers paid interest while the Thai-language papers ignored their formation. It is symptomatic of how the media and society warily treat the issue of lese majeste law, said 45-year-old Sukanya Prueksakasemsuk, wife of lese majeste detainee Somyos Prueksakemsuk.
"There are more foreigners who pay attention to the formation of our network," said the mild-speaking Sukanya, a private company employee, who had to learn about political activism from scratch after the group was formed to partly help her husband who has been behind bars for more than a year without bail. Sukanya cited a German radio journalist interviewing the group and a journalist from France. "Hardly any Thai media," she added.
That hasn't stop the group, with 18 members, to meet once a month and hold activities highlighting what they believe to be infringement of basic legal rights such as the denial of bail to most lese majeste detainees, and more.
One new member of the group knows this well; Surapak Phuchaisaeng was released from prison just at the end of last month after the court threw out his lese majeste case due to insufficient evidence. Surapak, 40, a computer programmer, was denied bail eight times while fighting the case.
He said that while he was in prison, the network visited him and other prisoners of conscience twice or three times a week, offering food and bringing news about the outside world as well as moral support that sustained him and others. The support the network proved invaluable, he said.
"I decided to join the network myself [after being released from jail] because we share the same predicament," Surapak, who is still trying to recover from life in jail, told The Nation on the phone from Buengkarn province. Surapak criticised the recent decision by the Pheu Thai-dominated Parliament to refuse to debate a proposed amendment of the law as an act of "cowardice" and said people will probably have to wait for a new parliament.
"What kind of system does this country have if Parliament dare not discuss laws pertaining to the monarchy institution?" asked Surapak, adding that in the future the network will seek
to identify political parties that will openly support the amendment of the law, which now
carries a maximum penalty of 15 years' imprisonment.
Sukanya said even if there's very little or no hope to see the law amended, she and others hope that the seven prisoners of conscience, including her husband, will have the right to get bail. She visited her husband once a week and clung to the hope that Somyos will be found not guilty when the court will hand the verdict on December 19, so she can celebrate the New Year with him.
Saturday, December 1, 2012
Somsak 'Pessimistic' about Lese Majeste Law Fight | Prachatai English
Somsak 'Pessimistic' about Lese Majeste Law Fight | Prachatai English
Pravit Rojanaphruk, December 1, 2012
Well-known Thammasat historian Somsak Jeamteerasakul said he was both surprised and appalled by the decision of police to forward his lese majeste police complaint case to the Office of the Attorney General (OAG).
Somsak, who lectures at Thammasat University, said on the phone that since the complaint lodged against him was made by the “influential” Thai Army, the case which first surfaced last year, is unlikely to be dropped.
He insisted that he did not violate the controversial lese majeste law, which carries a maximum imprisonment term of 15 years, because he criticized Princess Chulabhorn who is not an heir apparent and thus not protected under the law.
Somsak requested and was permitted to defer his appearance to the OAG from to a date yet to be set in December in order to prepare his legal fight. “The prosecutor could arrest me [on that day], however,” said Somsak. “Lese majeste is a kind of legal case that has no way out. I look at it very pessimistically.”
The historian also criticized the House of Representatives and the Yingluck Shinawatra administration for not doing anything to amend the law, thus allowing the climate of fear to persist.
He said members of the campaign to amend to law must have been caught “clueless” by the recent rejection by the House to even debate the law. “The government is totally silent. The government has not even left a room,” said Somsak, who enjoys a large following for his writings critical of the law and the monarchy institution.
There are currently at least seven people detained under the law with hundreds more in the process of possibly being charged or having received police complaints made against them.
Pravit Rojanaphruk, December 1, 2012
Well-known Thammasat historian Somsak Jeamteerasakul said he was both surprised and appalled by the decision of police to forward his lese majeste police complaint case to the Office of the Attorney General (OAG).
Somsak, who lectures at Thammasat University, said on the phone that since the complaint lodged against him was made by the “influential” Thai Army, the case which first surfaced last year, is unlikely to be dropped.
He insisted that he did not violate the controversial lese majeste law, which carries a maximum imprisonment term of 15 years, because he criticized Princess Chulabhorn who is not an heir apparent and thus not protected under the law.
Somsak requested and was permitted to defer his appearance to the OAG from to a date yet to be set in December in order to prepare his legal fight. “The prosecutor could arrest me [on that day], however,” said Somsak. “Lese majeste is a kind of legal case that has no way out. I look at it very pessimistically.”
The historian also criticized the House of Representatives and the Yingluck Shinawatra administration for not doing anything to amend the law, thus allowing the climate of fear to persist.
He said members of the campaign to amend to law must have been caught “clueless” by the recent rejection by the House to even debate the law. “The government is totally silent. The government has not even left a room,” said Somsak, who enjoys a large following for his writings critical of the law and the monarchy institution.
There are currently at least seven people detained under the law with hundreds more in the process of possibly being charged or having received police complaints made against them.
Wednesday, November 28, 2012
Pitak Siam’s failure | New Mandala
Pitak Siam’s failure | New Mandala
Aim Sinpeng, Guest Contributor, 26 November 2012
“There is no real democracy in Thailand. Elected politicians come from vote-buying, fraud and corruption. We can’t wait for these crooks to be voted out…it may take 100 years to get rid of them. We need to act now…We need to topple this government and freeze democracy for 5 years in order to begin real political reforms.” vowed Seh Ai, leader of the newly formed conservative, anti-government coalition, Pitak Siam.
This weekend the Pitak Siam Organisation (PSO) declared their D-Day where thousands of supporters would gather in the heart of Bangkok to oust elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra. Their “warm-up” rally in late October 2012, which drew an estimated 35,000 demonstrators, suggests anti-government momentum was gathering strength and that time might be “ripe” for what General Boonlert, or Seh Ai, called the last step of his two-stepped ladder. The PSO leaders hoped this D-Day would attract enough supporters to delegitimize the current government and eventually prompt a military intervention.
On 24 November 2012, more than 20,000 supporters turned up to major rally sites in the heart of Bangkok. Prime Minister Yingluck invoked the Internal Security Act (ISA) ahead of the rally, while deputy prime minister Chalerm Yoobamrung cleverly employed deterrence tactics, such as road blocks and checkpoints to hinder protesters from reaching the rally sites. After a somewhat violent morning, where clashes with the authorities led to a few arrests (now released) and use of tear gas, General Boonlert called it quits just before 6pm, stating that the government’s dirty and violent tactics made it unviable for the rallies to continue. He also stepped down as Pitak Siam’s leader.
But this rally is not about the Yingluck government, or the Red Shirts for that matter. Rather, it is an attempt of the former Yellow Shirt forces to recalibrate an identity and position in Thai society. The decline of the movement beginning in 2009, has led to the breakup of its leadership, nasty back-stabbing and significant loss of support. Since the coming to power of yet another Thaksin-aligned party, Pheua Thai, Yellow Shirt forces have continued their activities with mixed success through smaller-scale, albeit targeted, opposition be it via the constitutional court, the military or the privy council. Pitak Siam rallies in late 2012 exemplify a renewed effort to build opposition alliances across various groups and mimic the Yellow Shirt’s pre-coup success.
The Pitak Siam Organisation is the re-incarnation of the 2006 Yellow Shirt Movement, with largely the same supporters and alliances, but with new leadership structure and re-organisation. Pitak Siam brought back former Yellow Shirt-aligned groups that have left the movement following the 193-day rally in 2008, such as Dr. Tul’s Multi Colored Shirts, the Thai Patriot Networks, some sections of the Assembly of the Poor and state enterprise unions, under the guidance of Somsak Kosaisuk, a former People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) leader. Pitak Siam endorsed a new leader, a retired army general Boonlert Kaewprasit, in an attempt to elicit support from “old soldiers [who] never die” and entice the current military top brass, which has clearly softened their stance towards the Yingluck government in the past few months. The PAD retreated its role into the back seat, which makes sense given the unpopularity of Sonthi Limthongkul among key groups of PAD’s former alliances. Even so, Pitak Siam admitted using ASTV as one of the main media outlets and relying heavily on Santi Asoke’s Dharma Forces for organisation. The PAD leaders reckoned more than 50 percent of the Pitak Siam supporters are PAD members.
The PSO justify their rallies with three key reasons: 1) the current government turned their eyes blind to, and in some cases supported, lese majeste activities; 2) the Yingluck government is a nominee of Thaksin; 3) continuous and widespread corruption both in terms of government policies and state projects. These are the same grievances the Yellow Shirts trumpeted in the pre-coup period as well as during the Samak-Somchai governments. The leadership hoped to reignite the fire inside those who either loathe Thaksin and/or are fiercely protective of the monarchy. They have purposely sidelined issues that have proved unpopular in previous rallies, such as national sovereignty, and Khao Pra Viharn and kept to the basic, “Nation, Religion, Monarchy”. WIth this in mind the rhetoric is robust. ”The crisis, the disaster and the tragedy of this government and its politicians is unprecedented. It’s the biggest threat to our nation. Our demonstrations represent the real power of the people. We have the right to protest and demand our rights, as citizens, back,” said Prasong Soonsiri to the cheering crowd at Nang Leong racecourse.
Yet the real purpose of the Pitak Siam rallies is three-fold. First, the new grouping needs to gauge the size of their supporters to determine the likelihood of future rounds of large-scale mobilisation. Earlier rounds of opposition rallies in 2012, organised by the Multi-Colored Shirts and the Siam Prachapiwat Group, for instance, were able to turn out a maximum of a thousand protesters. Overestimating its own support-base, an expensive lesson the PAD learned in 2010, can lead to movement overreach.
Second, Pitak Siam rallies are meant to lure back old Yellow Shirt supporters and to attract new ones. Campaigns against the Yingluck government’s policies, such as the rice pledging scheme, 300 baht minimum wage and ongoing state infrastructure projects, which have been waged by other opposition groups, are incorporated into Pitak Siam’s protest platforms. These are aimed to gain support among disaffected farmers, community rights activists and business owners.
Third, the new leadership of Seh Ai, endorsed by Yellow Shirt old-timers, such as Pramote Nakorntap, Prasong Soonsiri, and several retired generals and high-ranking civil servants, was strategic. Seh Ai was not an active Yellow Shirt in the past and could conceivably represented some degree of “neutrality” in terms of leadership – a much needed factor given how much bad blood within the various opposition groups over the years. More importantly, as an army general himself, if Seh Ai succeeded in turning out mass rallies against Yingluck government, Pitak Siam would be able to signal strong mass support for military intervention that would overthrow the government. When asked during a Thai PBS interview whether Pitak Siam is calling for a coup, Seh Ai said: “A military coup requires popular support to succeed. If we [Pitak Siam] are able to show the military that we have a lot of supporters then we hope the military would know what to do. The military are there to serve the people…they must stand by the people. If we do well, the military will take our side.”
At this stage, the Pitak Siam rallies failed on a number of fronts, be it in terms of leadership, numbers and coordination among various groups. Nonetheless their continued opposition to the “Thaksin regime” and zealous efforts to preserve their vision of royalist-conservative Thailand will not be abated.
Aim Sinpeng is a doctoral candidate at the University of British Columbia, Canada
Aim Sinpeng, Guest Contributor, 26 November 2012
“There is no real democracy in Thailand. Elected politicians come from vote-buying, fraud and corruption. We can’t wait for these crooks to be voted out…it may take 100 years to get rid of them. We need to act now…We need to topple this government and freeze democracy for 5 years in order to begin real political reforms.” vowed Seh Ai, leader of the newly formed conservative, anti-government coalition, Pitak Siam.
This weekend the Pitak Siam Organisation (PSO) declared their D-Day where thousands of supporters would gather in the heart of Bangkok to oust elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra. Their “warm-up” rally in late October 2012, which drew an estimated 35,000 demonstrators, suggests anti-government momentum was gathering strength and that time might be “ripe” for what General Boonlert, or Seh Ai, called the last step of his two-stepped ladder. The PSO leaders hoped this D-Day would attract enough supporters to delegitimize the current government and eventually prompt a military intervention.
On 24 November 2012, more than 20,000 supporters turned up to major rally sites in the heart of Bangkok. Prime Minister Yingluck invoked the Internal Security Act (ISA) ahead of the rally, while deputy prime minister Chalerm Yoobamrung cleverly employed deterrence tactics, such as road blocks and checkpoints to hinder protesters from reaching the rally sites. After a somewhat violent morning, where clashes with the authorities led to a few arrests (now released) and use of tear gas, General Boonlert called it quits just before 6pm, stating that the government’s dirty and violent tactics made it unviable for the rallies to continue. He also stepped down as Pitak Siam’s leader.
But this rally is not about the Yingluck government, or the Red Shirts for that matter. Rather, it is an attempt of the former Yellow Shirt forces to recalibrate an identity and position in Thai society. The decline of the movement beginning in 2009, has led to the breakup of its leadership, nasty back-stabbing and significant loss of support. Since the coming to power of yet another Thaksin-aligned party, Pheua Thai, Yellow Shirt forces have continued their activities with mixed success through smaller-scale, albeit targeted, opposition be it via the constitutional court, the military or the privy council. Pitak Siam rallies in late 2012 exemplify a renewed effort to build opposition alliances across various groups and mimic the Yellow Shirt’s pre-coup success.
The Pitak Siam Organisation is the re-incarnation of the 2006 Yellow Shirt Movement, with largely the same supporters and alliances, but with new leadership structure and re-organisation. Pitak Siam brought back former Yellow Shirt-aligned groups that have left the movement following the 193-day rally in 2008, such as Dr. Tul’s Multi Colored Shirts, the Thai Patriot Networks, some sections of the Assembly of the Poor and state enterprise unions, under the guidance of Somsak Kosaisuk, a former People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) leader. Pitak Siam endorsed a new leader, a retired army general Boonlert Kaewprasit, in an attempt to elicit support from “old soldiers [who] never die” and entice the current military top brass, which has clearly softened their stance towards the Yingluck government in the past few months. The PAD retreated its role into the back seat, which makes sense given the unpopularity of Sonthi Limthongkul among key groups of PAD’s former alliances. Even so, Pitak Siam admitted using ASTV as one of the main media outlets and relying heavily on Santi Asoke’s Dharma Forces for organisation. The PAD leaders reckoned more than 50 percent of the Pitak Siam supporters are PAD members.
The PSO justify their rallies with three key reasons: 1) the current government turned their eyes blind to, and in some cases supported, lese majeste activities; 2) the Yingluck government is a nominee of Thaksin; 3) continuous and widespread corruption both in terms of government policies and state projects. These are the same grievances the Yellow Shirts trumpeted in the pre-coup period as well as during the Samak-Somchai governments. The leadership hoped to reignite the fire inside those who either loathe Thaksin and/or are fiercely protective of the monarchy. They have purposely sidelined issues that have proved unpopular in previous rallies, such as national sovereignty, and Khao Pra Viharn and kept to the basic, “Nation, Religion, Monarchy”. WIth this in mind the rhetoric is robust. ”The crisis, the disaster and the tragedy of this government and its politicians is unprecedented. It’s the biggest threat to our nation. Our demonstrations represent the real power of the people. We have the right to protest and demand our rights, as citizens, back,” said Prasong Soonsiri to the cheering crowd at Nang Leong racecourse.
Yet the real purpose of the Pitak Siam rallies is three-fold. First, the new grouping needs to gauge the size of their supporters to determine the likelihood of future rounds of large-scale mobilisation. Earlier rounds of opposition rallies in 2012, organised by the Multi-Colored Shirts and the Siam Prachapiwat Group, for instance, were able to turn out a maximum of a thousand protesters. Overestimating its own support-base, an expensive lesson the PAD learned in 2010, can lead to movement overreach.
Second, Pitak Siam rallies are meant to lure back old Yellow Shirt supporters and to attract new ones. Campaigns against the Yingluck government’s policies, such as the rice pledging scheme, 300 baht minimum wage and ongoing state infrastructure projects, which have been waged by other opposition groups, are incorporated into Pitak Siam’s protest platforms. These are aimed to gain support among disaffected farmers, community rights activists and business owners.
Third, the new leadership of Seh Ai, endorsed by Yellow Shirt old-timers, such as Pramote Nakorntap, Prasong Soonsiri, and several retired generals and high-ranking civil servants, was strategic. Seh Ai was not an active Yellow Shirt in the past and could conceivably represented some degree of “neutrality” in terms of leadership – a much needed factor given how much bad blood within the various opposition groups over the years. More importantly, as an army general himself, if Seh Ai succeeded in turning out mass rallies against Yingluck government, Pitak Siam would be able to signal strong mass support for military intervention that would overthrow the government. When asked during a Thai PBS interview whether Pitak Siam is calling for a coup, Seh Ai said: “A military coup requires popular support to succeed. If we [Pitak Siam] are able to show the military that we have a lot of supporters then we hope the military would know what to do. The military are there to serve the people…they must stand by the people. If we do well, the military will take our side.”
At this stage, the Pitak Siam rallies failed on a number of fronts, be it in terms of leadership, numbers and coordination among various groups. Nonetheless their continued opposition to the “Thaksin regime” and zealous efforts to preserve their vision of royalist-conservative Thailand will not be abated.
Aim Sinpeng is a doctoral candidate at the University of British Columbia, Canada
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Protect Siam: What’s new? | New Mandala
Recently the new anti-government group “Pitak Siam”, or in its English name “Protect Siam”, under its leader General Boonlert “Sae Ai” Kaewprasit rallied at the Royal Turf Club.
It was quite obvious though that this is an attempt to regroup the same alliance whose protests led to the 2006 military coup against the Thaksin Shinawatra government and in 2008 to the ouster of the Somchai Wongsawat- led People Power Party government.
Many old acquaintances were there – several second generation People’s Alliance for Democracy leaders, members of the Group of 40 Senators, General Pathompong Kesornsuk, Dr. Tul, and several groups allied with the Siam Sammakhi network, such as Boworn Yasinthorn, leader of the “Network of Monarchy Protection Volunteers”. The Democrat Party claimed that it was not involved in Pitak Siam, nevertheless, in the days prior to the rally on Sunday, 28 October 2012, the event was heavily advertised on the Democrat Party’s Satellite TV station Blue Sky.
One of its presenters compared the coming Pitak Siam rally with Sondhi Limthongkul’s rally in Lumpini Park back in late 2005 being the spark for the 2006 PAD mass protests. Also guards that were at the recent Democrat Party rally in Lumpini were at the Pitak Siam rally on duty. Santi Asoke’s Dhamma Army organised the food.
One interesting aspect was that Prasong Songsiri made an open appearance at the rally, even spoke on the stage, as far as I know the first time in the political turmoil of the past 7 years.
A group of 52 former members of the Communist Part of Thailand who were stationed in the Khonkaen area during the insurgency took part in the rally as well. I asked them why they now allied themselves with with ultra-royalist forces while in the 1970s they were fighting them. They said that they have changed, and now support the monarchy.
The number of protesters surprised all observers. Initially 2000 to 3000 protesters were expected, but in the end about 10,000 showed up. Estimates of 20,000 are exaggerated — the stadium was not almost full, the center, opposite the stage was full, but towards the upper ranks and the side wings the crowd ranged from thin to non-existent. Also police estimates of 6000 were too low. As usual, I go with Special Branch estimates, which I have found over the last years the most reliable, and mostly correspond with my own impressions as well.
One of the second generation PAD leaders present described the event to me as “warming up the engine”. Given the number of protesters, more than any recent PAD, Siam Samkkhi or Blue Sky event, we may be in for more interesting times.
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
Why Burma is of Growing Importance to China | The Irrawaddy Magazine
Why Burma is of Growing Importance to China | The Irrawaddy Magazine
WILLIAM BOOT, November 27, 2012
Burma’s strategic importance to China will grow as Beijing’s dependency on the Middle East increases and the United States’ declines. That’s the message in a new assessment of trends in oil production and consumption over the next two decades by the International Energy Agency (IEA).
Iraq supplied only five percent of China’s oil imports in 2011—around 275,000 barrels per day—but this will increase to more than eight million barrels per day by 2035, IEA Chief Economist Fatih Birol forecast in a study on consumption trends. This will come on top of rising Chinese imports from Saudi Arabia.
Burma’s significance in this is as a conduit for Middle East oil bound for Chinese refineries.
One oil pipeline now being built through Burma into neighboring China’s southwest Yunnan Province by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will begin pumping Middle East oil from around the middle of next year.
When it reaches full capacity the pipeline will carry up to 23 million metric tons per year, Beijing’s Global Times newspaper reported. That’s not a huge amount per se but could be the vanguard of much bigger transshipments of Middle East crude through Burma in the future.
CNPC is spending a total of US $4.7 billion on the current pipeline and a dedicated transshipment terminal at Kyaukphyu, Arakan (Rakhine) State, to handle oil tankers from the Middle East.
“If the Burma pipeline scheme isn’t undermined by armed turmoil by militias operating in some of Burma’s northern regions then it is quite likely that the Chinese NOCs [National Oil Companies] will want to build more pipelines through the country,” regional independent energy industries analyst Collin Reynolds told The Irrawaddy.
“If China is going to increase its imports of oil from Mideast countries it also is going to want to take whatever steps it can to limit the risks of using the sea route through the Malacca [Melaka] Strait. That’s why the Chinese have invested in Burma as an alternative and they are also going to want to protect that route also.”
India has also been expressing concerns about the increased presence of Chinese Navy vessels in the Indian Ocean.
The CNPC and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation are investing billions of dollars in Iraqi oil fields, said the IEA, leading Iraq to soon emerge as the world’s biggest oil producer after Saudi Arabia—with China its biggest customer.
“Increasing oil imports from Iraq is very possible and beneficial for China. Compared with other countries in the Middle East, Iraq is relatively stable at present, but we still should be aware of the risks,” Lin Boqiang, the director of the China Center for Energy Economic Research at Xiamen University, told the China Daily.
China’s domestic oil production is expected to peak at 220 million tons per year by 2020, but if China’s economy continues to expand at seven percent or more a year its oil consumption would then reach over 650 million tons a year, the Sinopec’s Economics and Development Research Institute has forecast.
The IEA report said China’s growing emphasis in Middle East oil will force it and other countries of the region to “focus on the security of the strategic routes” those tankers take.
Beijing is especially concerned with the narrow bottleneck of the Malacca Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia through which all its vessels must navigate via Singapore en route to East Asia. The Chinese are worried that the Strait could easily be blocked in a political crisis.
Beijing’s emerging geopolitical reliance on Burma is becoming a concern as anger grows within the Southeast Asian nation over a perceived view of Chinese firms riding roughshod over local interests.
In the case of the oil pipeline, Burma would receive a maximum of $36.8 million a year in transit fees, according to CNPC’s partners Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and the Ministry of Energy. A flat right-of-way fee of $13.8 million will be supplemented by $1 per ton of oil pumped—a deal criticized by human rights groups as far too cheap.
NGOs allege numerous cases of social disruption, forced community relocations and land theft along the pipeline route which runs in tandem with a separate natural gas pipeline.
CNPC claims to have donated $6 million to “help the locals improve education and healthcare standards,” Global Times reported. CNPC has also agreed to contribute $2 million per year of the pipeline’s life to “further help develop villages along the pipeline.”
However, Chinese firms—mostly NOCs—have not endeared themselves to Burmese communities where they operate on contracts agreed secretly with the likes of MOGE or front firms belonging to the Burmese military leadership.
These are contracts which could cost Burma dearly in compensation if they are canceled, Burma’s President’s Office Minister Aung Min admitted this week during meetings with objectors to an expansion of the Monya copper mine in Saigaing Division.
The mine is jointly owned by Wanbao Company of China and the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings.
Aung Min was seen telling protestors that the Burmese government was “afraid” to upset Chinese businesses because of the possible financial consequences. This applied in particular to the Myitsone hydroelectric dam, construction of which has been officially suspended by President Thein Sein on environmental grounds.
“It would need a stronger Burmese government to take on CNPC and its oil shipments strategy,” said Reynolds.
WILLIAM BOOT, November 27, 2012
Burma’s strategic importance to China will grow as Beijing’s dependency on the Middle East increases and the United States’ declines. That’s the message in a new assessment of trends in oil production and consumption over the next two decades by the International Energy Agency (IEA).
Iraq supplied only five percent of China’s oil imports in 2011—around 275,000 barrels per day—but this will increase to more than eight million barrels per day by 2035, IEA Chief Economist Fatih Birol forecast in a study on consumption trends. This will come on top of rising Chinese imports from Saudi Arabia.
Burma’s significance in this is as a conduit for Middle East oil bound for Chinese refineries.
One oil pipeline now being built through Burma into neighboring China’s southwest Yunnan Province by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will begin pumping Middle East oil from around the middle of next year.
When it reaches full capacity the pipeline will carry up to 23 million metric tons per year, Beijing’s Global Times newspaper reported. That’s not a huge amount per se but could be the vanguard of much bigger transshipments of Middle East crude through Burma in the future.
CNPC is spending a total of US $4.7 billion on the current pipeline and a dedicated transshipment terminal at Kyaukphyu, Arakan (Rakhine) State, to handle oil tankers from the Middle East.
“If the Burma pipeline scheme isn’t undermined by armed turmoil by militias operating in some of Burma’s northern regions then it is quite likely that the Chinese NOCs [National Oil Companies] will want to build more pipelines through the country,” regional independent energy industries analyst Collin Reynolds told The Irrawaddy.
“If China is going to increase its imports of oil from Mideast countries it also is going to want to take whatever steps it can to limit the risks of using the sea route through the Malacca [Melaka] Strait. That’s why the Chinese have invested in Burma as an alternative and they are also going to want to protect that route also.”
India has also been expressing concerns about the increased presence of Chinese Navy vessels in the Indian Ocean.
The CNPC and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation are investing billions of dollars in Iraqi oil fields, said the IEA, leading Iraq to soon emerge as the world’s biggest oil producer after Saudi Arabia—with China its biggest customer.
“Increasing oil imports from Iraq is very possible and beneficial for China. Compared with other countries in the Middle East, Iraq is relatively stable at present, but we still should be aware of the risks,” Lin Boqiang, the director of the China Center for Energy Economic Research at Xiamen University, told the China Daily.
China’s domestic oil production is expected to peak at 220 million tons per year by 2020, but if China’s economy continues to expand at seven percent or more a year its oil consumption would then reach over 650 million tons a year, the Sinopec’s Economics and Development Research Institute has forecast.
The IEA report said China’s growing emphasis in Middle East oil will force it and other countries of the region to “focus on the security of the strategic routes” those tankers take.
Beijing is especially concerned with the narrow bottleneck of the Malacca Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia through which all its vessels must navigate via Singapore en route to East Asia. The Chinese are worried that the Strait could easily be blocked in a political crisis.
Beijing’s emerging geopolitical reliance on Burma is becoming a concern as anger grows within the Southeast Asian nation over a perceived view of Chinese firms riding roughshod over local interests.
In the case of the oil pipeline, Burma would receive a maximum of $36.8 million a year in transit fees, according to CNPC’s partners Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and the Ministry of Energy. A flat right-of-way fee of $13.8 million will be supplemented by $1 per ton of oil pumped—a deal criticized by human rights groups as far too cheap.
NGOs allege numerous cases of social disruption, forced community relocations and land theft along the pipeline route which runs in tandem with a separate natural gas pipeline.
CNPC claims to have donated $6 million to “help the locals improve education and healthcare standards,” Global Times reported. CNPC has also agreed to contribute $2 million per year of the pipeline’s life to “further help develop villages along the pipeline.”
However, Chinese firms—mostly NOCs—have not endeared themselves to Burmese communities where they operate on contracts agreed secretly with the likes of MOGE or front firms belonging to the Burmese military leadership.
These are contracts which could cost Burma dearly in compensation if they are canceled, Burma’s President’s Office Minister Aung Min admitted this week during meetings with objectors to an expansion of the Monya copper mine in Saigaing Division.
The mine is jointly owned by Wanbao Company of China and the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings.
Aung Min was seen telling protestors that the Burmese government was “afraid” to upset Chinese businesses because of the possible financial consequences. This applied in particular to the Myitsone hydroelectric dam, construction of which has been officially suspended by President Thein Sein on environmental grounds.
“It would need a stronger Burmese government to take on CNPC and its oil shipments strategy,” said Reynolds.
Monday, November 26, 2012
Korn compares Thai government to Hitler: has he lost his mind? | Asia Provocateur
Korn compares Thai government to Hitler: has he lost his mind? | Asia Provocateur
About 18months ago I interviewed Thailand's then Finance Minister, Democrat Party Deputy Leader Korn Chatikavanij - my interviews with him can be found here and here.
On the two occasions that I met Korn I found him to be erudite, articulate and willing to engage on a number of subjects and policy details.
A dual-British/Thai national, the UK-born Korn attended Winchester College and later studied politics, philosophy and economics at Oxford. Urbane, well-educated and with a cosmopolitan air, it's hard not to be impressed by Korn, not least because at roughly 6ft 4inches tall, he has quite an imposing physical presence as well. While I disagreed with him on a number of subjects I found him personally charming and certainly likeable.
So, his comments on his Facebook page today (see screen grab in Thai just below) come as a complete shock.
In a rambling monologue Korn complains about the government's handling of this weekend's Pitak Siam protests. Utilising that tried and tested logical fallacy - the false equivalence - he states that the government used the police to assault the protesters and that the Red Shirts abandoned their own principles by supporting such actions.
Of course the simple facts that Pitak Siam's publicly stated aims were to destroy democracy and create conditions for a military coup are oddly missing from Korn's narrative. Also the fact that the Pitak Siam protesters drove a large truck directly into police lines and attacked them with sticks and other weapons. Then there's the tiny inconvenient detail that the present ruling government party, Pheu Thai, has an overwhelming parliamentary majority, something his party has not achieved in its 66years of existence. Absent too is that when the government he served in were faced with Red Shirt protesters in 2010 they sent Army snipers onto the streets and shot nurses and school children.
But it was the final part of Korn's rambling comment that raises questions about his mental state.
Using an arcane Adolf Hitler quote (is it only me who finds it odd Korn could quote Hitler so readily?) Korn states that
To make this bizarre claim is straight out of the nuttiest Thai extremist handbook. The Second World War killed almost 70million people, unleashing unspeakable horrors and crimes on the world. Hitler committed the worst of these crimes, including the terrible slaughter of 6million Jewish men, women and children and 12million Soviet civilians.
It is an utter obscenity for Korn to make a comparison between firing a dozen or so tear gas grenades at violent protesters and Hitler's genocidal slaughter of millions. He should not only be widely ridiculed for making this comparison but condemned as well.
I am quite right to question his sanity in such circumstances and can only hope he sees the error of his ways and offers an immediate retraction and apology.
Asia Provocateur, 25 November 2012
About 18months ago I interviewed Thailand's then Finance Minister, Democrat Party Deputy Leader Korn Chatikavanij - my interviews with him can be found here and here.
On the two occasions that I met Korn I found him to be erudite, articulate and willing to engage on a number of subjects and policy details.
A dual-British/Thai national, the UK-born Korn attended Winchester College and later studied politics, philosophy and economics at Oxford. Urbane, well-educated and with a cosmopolitan air, it's hard not to be impressed by Korn, not least because at roughly 6ft 4inches tall, he has quite an imposing physical presence as well. While I disagreed with him on a number of subjects I found him personally charming and certainly likeable.
So, his comments on his Facebook page today (see screen grab in Thai just below) come as a complete shock.
In a rambling monologue Korn complains about the government's handling of this weekend's Pitak Siam protests. Utilising that tried and tested logical fallacy - the false equivalence - he states that the government used the police to assault the protesters and that the Red Shirts abandoned their own principles by supporting such actions.
Of course the simple facts that Pitak Siam's publicly stated aims were to destroy democracy and create conditions for a military coup are oddly missing from Korn's narrative. Also the fact that the Pitak Siam protesters drove a large truck directly into police lines and attacked them with sticks and other weapons. Then there's the tiny inconvenient detail that the present ruling government party, Pheu Thai, has an overwhelming parliamentary majority, something his party has not achieved in its 66years of existence. Absent too is that when the government he served in were faced with Red Shirt protesters in 2010 they sent Army snipers onto the streets and shot nurses and school children.
But it was the final part of Korn's rambling comment that raises questions about his mental state.
Using an arcane Adolf Hitler quote (is it only me who finds it odd Korn could quote Hitler so readily?) Korn states that
"The Red Shirt government thinks and behaves like this [like Hitler] - therefore they will end up the same as/not different from Hitler."
To make this bizarre claim is straight out of the nuttiest Thai extremist handbook. The Second World War killed almost 70million people, unleashing unspeakable horrors and crimes on the world. Hitler committed the worst of these crimes, including the terrible slaughter of 6million Jewish men, women and children and 12million Soviet civilians.
It is an utter obscenity for Korn to make a comparison between firing a dozen or so tear gas grenades at violent protesters and Hitler's genocidal slaughter of millions. He should not only be widely ridiculed for making this comparison but condemned as well.
I am quite right to question his sanity in such circumstances and can only hope he sees the error of his ways and offers an immediate retraction and apology.
Friday, November 23, 2012
Philippines, Vietnam protest map in China passport | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Philippines, Vietnam protest map in China passport | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
AP News, Nov 23, 2012
MANILA, Philippines (AP) — A map that China has incorporated into its passports has drawn diplomatic fury because it appears to claim the entire South China Sea, ignoring competing claims from the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries.
AP News, Nov 23, 2012
MANILA, Philippines (AP) — A map that China has incorporated into its passports has drawn diplomatic fury because it appears to claim the entire South China Sea, ignoring competing claims from the Philippines, Vietnam and other countries.
Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario told reporters in Manila that he sent a note to the Chinese Embassy that his country “strongly protests” Beijing’s inclusion of an image showing China’s claimed maritime borders in its new passport.
Del Rosario says China’s claims include an area that is “clearly part of the Philippines’ territory and maritime domain.”
The Vietnamese government said it had also sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese embassy in Hanoi, demanding that Beijing remove the “erroneous content” printed in the passport.
In Beijing, the Foreign Ministry said the new passport was issued based on international standards.
“The outline map of China on the passport is not directed against any particular country,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said Thursday.
China maintains it has ancient claims to all of the South China Sea, despite much of it being within the exclusive economic zones of Southeast Asian neighbors. The potentially oil- and gas-rich South China Sea islands and waters also are claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia.
There are concerns that the disputes could escalate into violence. China and the Philippines had a tense maritime standoff at a shoal west of the main Philippine island of Luzon early this year.
The United States, which has said it takes no sides in the territorial spats but that it considers ensuring safe maritime traffic in the waters to be in its national interest, has backed a call for a “code of conduct” to prevent clashes in the disputed territories. But it remains unclear if and when China will sit down with rival claimants to draft such a legally binding nonaggression pact.
The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam are scheduled to meet Dec. 12 to discuss claims in the South China Sea and the role of China.
Del Rosario says China’s claims include an area that is “clearly part of the Philippines’ territory and maritime domain.”
The Vietnamese government said it had also sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese embassy in Hanoi, demanding that Beijing remove the “erroneous content” printed in the passport.
In Beijing, the Foreign Ministry said the new passport was issued based on international standards.
“The outline map of China on the passport is not directed against any particular country,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said Thursday.
China maintains it has ancient claims to all of the South China Sea, despite much of it being within the exclusive economic zones of Southeast Asian neighbors. The potentially oil- and gas-rich South China Sea islands and waters also are claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia.
There are concerns that the disputes could escalate into violence. China and the Philippines had a tense maritime standoff at a shoal west of the main Philippine island of Luzon early this year.
The United States, which has said it takes no sides in the territorial spats but that it considers ensuring safe maritime traffic in the waters to be in its national interest, has backed a call for a “code of conduct” to prevent clashes in the disputed territories. But it remains unclear if and when China will sit down with rival claimants to draft such a legally binding nonaggression pact.
The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam are scheduled to meet Dec. 12 to discuss claims in the South China Sea and the role of China.
Thursday, November 22, 2012
Toxic leaks fuel Thai villagers’ fight against gold mine | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Toxic leaks fuel Thai villagers’ fight against gold mine | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
The Isaan Record, Nov 22, 2012
LOEI – In the past month, the walls of a gold mine’s tailings pond in Na Nong Bong, Loei have collapsed not once but three times. The tailings pond, which holds the waste water used to dissolve the gold from the ore, contains extremely high levels of cyanide and other chemicals used in the extraction process. As such, the community members from the neighboring village, located just one kilometer from the Tungkum Limited mine, are channeling their fear of the effects into their ongoing fight to close the mine.
People Who Love Their Hometown (PWLTH), a community organization comprised of concerned villagers, has been fighting to close the mine since 2006 in attempts to mitigate the contamination of their food and water. Since the gold mine began its operations, the villagers have experienced lower crop yields, skin rashes, and high levels of cyanide and arsenic in their blood which they attribute to contamination from mining operations. As such, the leak from the tailings pond, which contains cyanide and other dangerous chemicals, has given them greater cause for concern.
“On the 28th of October, the day the wall collapsed for the second time,” explained one of the leaders of PWLTH, “We found that that the water leaked out into some of the farms that were growing yard long beans. The farmers couldn’t harvest because there was water in their fields. We didn’t know whether or not the water was dangerous or not.”
The villagers were the first to report the leak to the government offices after a member of PWLTH found unexpected water in his field. The villagers sent a report to the Provincial Industry Office (PIO) as well as the Department of Primary Industry and Mining (DPIM) and then contacted the Tambon Administration Organization (TAO) to survey the area.
On October 30th, the TAO sent a committee to investigate the broken wall as well as the quality of the water that leaked from the pond. The TAO reported, “TKL has admitted the wall did collapse and that they have been continuously repairing the damage to the wall of the tailings pond.”
The community, however, is still not fully convinced that there will be no lasting effects from the leak.
“It is necessary for the company to warn the people,” said one of the leaders from PWLTH. “We don’t know whether or not this water is dangerous, because no tests have been done on the water. But we are scared of what the effects might be.”
In response to the villagers’ report, the DPIM issued an order to the company to shut down operations until the situation was resolved. The company appealed to the PIO, however, claiming that they were working in accordance with Article 58 of the Mineral Act and, furthermore, that they needed to continue mining in order to acquire specific rocks needed to repair the break that can only come through the crushing process. At present, the mining company, which has assured the government they are working to fortify the tailings pond wall, is still operating.
The leak comes at a particularly pivotal moment for PWLTH, as Tungkum Limited will be holding a public scoping forum on the 22nd of this month. The forum, which has been postponed four times already due to protests staged by the community organization, is one step in the process of obtaining concessions for opening a new mining site near the existing one. The members of PWLTH, however, hope that the news of the tailings pond leak will strengthen their case for the decommissioning of the current mine as well as halting concessions for the newly proposed mine.
Tungkum Limited, which has been in hot water with its shareholders and the Stock Exchange of Thailand over the past year for alleged financial mismanagement, now has more to worry about.
The Isaan Record, Nov 22, 2012
LOEI – In the past month, the walls of a gold mine’s tailings pond in Na Nong Bong, Loei have collapsed not once but three times. The tailings pond, which holds the waste water used to dissolve the gold from the ore, contains extremely high levels of cyanide and other chemicals used in the extraction process. As such, the community members from the neighboring village, located just one kilometer from the Tungkum Limited mine, are channeling their fear of the effects into their ongoing fight to close the mine.
People Who Love Their Hometown (PWLTH), a community organization comprised of concerned villagers, has been fighting to close the mine since 2006 in attempts to mitigate the contamination of their food and water. Since the gold mine began its operations, the villagers have experienced lower crop yields, skin rashes, and high levels of cyanide and arsenic in their blood which they attribute to contamination from mining operations. As such, the leak from the tailings pond, which contains cyanide and other dangerous chemicals, has given them greater cause for concern.
“On the 28th of October, the day the wall collapsed for the second time,” explained one of the leaders of PWLTH, “We found that that the water leaked out into some of the farms that were growing yard long beans. The farmers couldn’t harvest because there was water in their fields. We didn’t know whether or not the water was dangerous or not.”
The villagers were the first to report the leak to the government offices after a member of PWLTH found unexpected water in his field. The villagers sent a report to the Provincial Industry Office (PIO) as well as the Department of Primary Industry and Mining (DPIM) and then contacted the Tambon Administration Organization (TAO) to survey the area.
On October 30th, the TAO sent a committee to investigate the broken wall as well as the quality of the water that leaked from the pond. The TAO reported, “TKL has admitted the wall did collapse and that they have been continuously repairing the damage to the wall of the tailings pond.”
The community, however, is still not fully convinced that there will be no lasting effects from the leak.
“It is necessary for the company to warn the people,” said one of the leaders from PWLTH. “We don’t know whether or not this water is dangerous, because no tests have been done on the water. But we are scared of what the effects might be.”
In response to the villagers’ report, the DPIM issued an order to the company to shut down operations until the situation was resolved. The company appealed to the PIO, however, claiming that they were working in accordance with Article 58 of the Mineral Act and, furthermore, that they needed to continue mining in order to acquire specific rocks needed to repair the break that can only come through the crushing process. At present, the mining company, which has assured the government they are working to fortify the tailings pond wall, is still operating.
The leak comes at a particularly pivotal moment for PWLTH, as Tungkum Limited will be holding a public scoping forum on the 22nd of this month. The forum, which has been postponed four times already due to protests staged by the community organization, is one step in the process of obtaining concessions for opening a new mining site near the existing one. The members of PWLTH, however, hope that the news of the tailings pond leak will strengthen their case for the decommissioning of the current mine as well as halting concessions for the newly proposed mine.
Tungkum Limited, which has been in hot water with its shareholders and the Stock Exchange of Thailand over the past year for alleged financial mismanagement, now has more to worry about.
Wednesday, November 21, 2012
How Asia sees Obama’s pivot to the Pacific | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
How Asia sees Obama’s pivot to the Pacific | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
AP News Nov 20, 2012
TOKYO (AP) — A lot has happened in Asia while the United States was off fighting its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and most of it can be summed up in one word — China. Fueled by China’s amazing growth and the promise of its huge and expanding consumer market, the Asia-Pacific region is now, as experts like to say, the global economy’s center of gravity. Sorry, Europe.
AP News Nov 20, 2012
TOKYO (AP) — A lot has happened in Asia while the United States was off fighting its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and most of it can be summed up in one word — China. Fueled by China’s amazing growth and the promise of its huge and expanding consumer market, the Asia-Pacific region is now, as experts like to say, the global economy’s center of gravity. Sorry, Europe.
But prosperity requires stability.
As President Barack Obama tours the region to push his year-old pivot to the Pacific policy, the big question on everybody’s mind is how much of a role Washington, with its mighty military and immense diplomatic clout, can play in keeping the Pacific — well, pacific. Here’s a look at how different countries perceive the U.S. Pacific policy and how it impacts them:
___
CHINA: HOW NOT TO TRAIN YOUR DRAGON
As far as Beijing is concerned, Obama’s pivot was pulled right out of the old Cold War containment playbook. Afraid of China’s rise, Beijing believes, Washington is trying to enflame new tensions by isolating it and emboldening the countries that China has territorial disputes with, which is just about everybody with whom it shares a border.
“Using China’s rise and the ‘China threat’ theory, the U.S. wants to convince China’s neighbors that the Asia-Pacific needs Washington’s presence and protection in order to ‘unite’ them to strike a ‘strategic rebalance’ against China in the region,” security scholar Wang Yusheng wrote recently in the China Daily.
It’s a strategy that’s bound to lose, Beijing says.
China sees its rise as inevitable and unstoppable and believes its neighbors will ultimately opt for stronger ties while gradually excluding the U.S. Beijing also views its economic dominance as an unalloyed good. And as it tests out its first aircraft carrier, stealth jets, cyber capabilities and high-tech missiles, it is in an increasingly strong position to deny Washington access to its shores and some key Pacific sea lanes, which could be a problem if Obama’s pivot ever has to go from push to shove.
___
JAPAN: ALREADY FEELING THE PINCH
Without a doubt, Japan is Washington’s most faithful security partner in the Pacific. And it’s the most pinched by China’s rise.
For months, Japan and China have been in an increasingly tense dispute over a group of small, uninhabited islands in the East China Sea. The near-constant presence of Chinese ships around them has stretched the Japanese Coast Guard to its limits. Japan’s air force says Chinese surveillance flights in the area have increased significantly.
Wary of getting caught up in the volatile brew of nationalism, historical animosity and populist politics that is fueling the flare-up, the U.S. has been careful not to take sides. Instead, it has urged the two countries to work out their problems among themselves, diplomatically.
That has confounded many in Japan, which hosts 52,000 U.S. troops under a treaty signed in 1960 that obliges the U.S. to defend territories under Japanese administration. Washington has repeatedly affirmed that includes the isles at the center of the current tensions with China. Tokyo would have preferred at least some moral support to its claim.
“It’s strange,” said Kazuhiko Togo, a former senior diplomat who now heads the Institute for World Affairs at Kyoto Sangyo University. “I trust the U.S. as our ally, but we need to address this issue of U.S. ‘neutrality.’”
___
MEANWHILE, IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA…
Washington took a similarly standoffish stance early this year in the dispute between China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan over the South China Sea islands, believed to be rich in gas and oil and straddling busy shipping routes.
The Philippines — America’s closest ally in that dispute — eventually pulled its ships out of the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal, but Chinese vessels have remained.
Manila-based political analyst Ramon Casiple said the disputes have left America’s allies more aware of their own vulnerabilities and what they can — or can’t — expect from the U.S.
“America’s treading a very fine line,” Casiple said. “It has to reassure its allies that at the end of the day the U.S. would be there for them.” He added that the U.S. has made it clear it is not willing to risk a major confrontation in which its options would be limited “to either intervene or lose influence.”
There is, however, one other thing it might do in the meantime.
When U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta visited Vietnam in June, he hinted the Navy would like access to Cam Ranh, a deep water port facing the contested waters of the South China Sea. Hanoi’s counter-proposal?
Lift a ban on selling it lethal weapons.
___
TAIWAN: LEFT OUT IN THE COLD
Best friends forever? Not so much.
As China has gotten stronger and more important to the U.S. economy, Washington has become extremely wary of engaging Taiwan as a full security partner — a big pullback from the 1950s and the 1960s, when the two had a formal defense treaty and the U.S. based thousands of troops on what it considered a — if not the — key forward base to keep China at bay.
Today, cooperation is limited to some intelligence sharing, the training of Taiwanese air force personnel in the U.S., occasional security consultations and very restricted arms sales — definitely not the kind of advanced F-16 fighters and diesel submarines the Taiwanese military really wants.
Even so, political scientist Alexander Huang of Taipei’s Tamkang University says Taiwan can play a role in Obama’s pivot — but only if Washington decides to make a clear commitment.
___
THE KOREAS: STEALTH OVER SEOUL?
Ah, North Korea.
It’s got a new leader, about whom, typically, the world knows almost nothing, a nuclear weapons/ballistic missile program that it likes to trot out every so often to raise regional tensions and a belligerent attitude toward the U.S.
But Obama has a friend in Seoul.
Back in the 1950s, the U.S. fought on Seoul’s side in the Korean War — and contemplated nuking China before it was over. China still supports the North, and Washington continues to have about 28,500 troops in the South. South Korea also buys about 70 percent of its weapons from the United States, and a big payday for an American company might come soon after Obama’s inauguration, when South Korea is expected to formally announce the winner in a $7.6 billion project to build 60 sophisticated fighter jets.
The deal will be South Korea’s biggest-ever weapons procurement. The top contender is believed to be Lockheed Martin’s stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter — which after a long run of development problems and cost overruns could certainly use a multi-billion dollar boost. Boeing and European aerospace giant EADS are also in the running.
___
AUSTRALIA: LIVING WITH THE US MARINES
Australia got one of the first waves from the pivot when the U.S. announced last year it would begin rotating up to 2,500 U.S. Marines through the northern city of Darwin. Now the U.S. is seeking access to an Australian navy base south of the western city of Perth and to bombing ranges in the northern Outback.
Some experts fear the relationship may be moving too fast.
On one hand there is broad support for Australia’s defense relationship with the U.S., so having American Marines was seen as a natural step. But it has also raised concerns that Washington will push for more — something Australia might not be ready for. After all China is central to Australia’s economy, buying a bulk of its mineral and coal resources.
“What worries us is the way in which it seems to confirm that the United States and China are increasingly viewing each other as strategic rivals,” said Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at Australian National University.
“We worry about the idea of the U.S.-China relationship becoming more adversarial,” he said. “America wants to remain the dominant power in Asia, and China wants to become the dominant power in Asia.
“What the rest of us all want is for neither of them to be the dominant power in Asia.”
___
AP writers Christopher Bodeen in Beijing, Peter Enav in Taipei, Taiwan, Jim Gomez in Manila, Philippines, Hyung-jin Kim in Seoul, South Korea, Elaine Kurtenbach in Tokyo, Chris Brummitt in Hanoi, Vietnam, Jocelyn Gecker in Bangkok and Kristen Gelineau in Sydney contributed to this report.
As President Barack Obama tours the region to push his year-old pivot to the Pacific policy, the big question on everybody’s mind is how much of a role Washington, with its mighty military and immense diplomatic clout, can play in keeping the Pacific — well, pacific. Here’s a look at how different countries perceive the U.S. Pacific policy and how it impacts them:
___
CHINA: HOW NOT TO TRAIN YOUR DRAGON
As far as Beijing is concerned, Obama’s pivot was pulled right out of the old Cold War containment playbook. Afraid of China’s rise, Beijing believes, Washington is trying to enflame new tensions by isolating it and emboldening the countries that China has territorial disputes with, which is just about everybody with whom it shares a border.
“Using China’s rise and the ‘China threat’ theory, the U.S. wants to convince China’s neighbors that the Asia-Pacific needs Washington’s presence and protection in order to ‘unite’ them to strike a ‘strategic rebalance’ against China in the region,” security scholar Wang Yusheng wrote recently in the China Daily.
It’s a strategy that’s bound to lose, Beijing says.
China sees its rise as inevitable and unstoppable and believes its neighbors will ultimately opt for stronger ties while gradually excluding the U.S. Beijing also views its economic dominance as an unalloyed good. And as it tests out its first aircraft carrier, stealth jets, cyber capabilities and high-tech missiles, it is in an increasingly strong position to deny Washington access to its shores and some key Pacific sea lanes, which could be a problem if Obama’s pivot ever has to go from push to shove.
___
JAPAN: ALREADY FEELING THE PINCH
Without a doubt, Japan is Washington’s most faithful security partner in the Pacific. And it’s the most pinched by China’s rise.
For months, Japan and China have been in an increasingly tense dispute over a group of small, uninhabited islands in the East China Sea. The near-constant presence of Chinese ships around them has stretched the Japanese Coast Guard to its limits. Japan’s air force says Chinese surveillance flights in the area have increased significantly.
Wary of getting caught up in the volatile brew of nationalism, historical animosity and populist politics that is fueling the flare-up, the U.S. has been careful not to take sides. Instead, it has urged the two countries to work out their problems among themselves, diplomatically.
That has confounded many in Japan, which hosts 52,000 U.S. troops under a treaty signed in 1960 that obliges the U.S. to defend territories under Japanese administration. Washington has repeatedly affirmed that includes the isles at the center of the current tensions with China. Tokyo would have preferred at least some moral support to its claim.
“It’s strange,” said Kazuhiko Togo, a former senior diplomat who now heads the Institute for World Affairs at Kyoto Sangyo University. “I trust the U.S. as our ally, but we need to address this issue of U.S. ‘neutrality.’”
___
MEANWHILE, IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA…
Washington took a similarly standoffish stance early this year in the dispute between China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan over the South China Sea islands, believed to be rich in gas and oil and straddling busy shipping routes.
The Philippines — America’s closest ally in that dispute — eventually pulled its ships out of the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal, but Chinese vessels have remained.
Manila-based political analyst Ramon Casiple said the disputes have left America’s allies more aware of their own vulnerabilities and what they can — or can’t — expect from the U.S.
“America’s treading a very fine line,” Casiple said. “It has to reassure its allies that at the end of the day the U.S. would be there for them.” He added that the U.S. has made it clear it is not willing to risk a major confrontation in which its options would be limited “to either intervene or lose influence.”
There is, however, one other thing it might do in the meantime.
When U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta visited Vietnam in June, he hinted the Navy would like access to Cam Ranh, a deep water port facing the contested waters of the South China Sea. Hanoi’s counter-proposal?
Lift a ban on selling it lethal weapons.
___
TAIWAN: LEFT OUT IN THE COLD
Best friends forever? Not so much.
As China has gotten stronger and more important to the U.S. economy, Washington has become extremely wary of engaging Taiwan as a full security partner — a big pullback from the 1950s and the 1960s, when the two had a formal defense treaty and the U.S. based thousands of troops on what it considered a — if not the — key forward base to keep China at bay.
Today, cooperation is limited to some intelligence sharing, the training of Taiwanese air force personnel in the U.S., occasional security consultations and very restricted arms sales — definitely not the kind of advanced F-16 fighters and diesel submarines the Taiwanese military really wants.
Even so, political scientist Alexander Huang of Taipei’s Tamkang University says Taiwan can play a role in Obama’s pivot — but only if Washington decides to make a clear commitment.
___
THE KOREAS: STEALTH OVER SEOUL?
Ah, North Korea.
It’s got a new leader, about whom, typically, the world knows almost nothing, a nuclear weapons/ballistic missile program that it likes to trot out every so often to raise regional tensions and a belligerent attitude toward the U.S.
But Obama has a friend in Seoul.
Back in the 1950s, the U.S. fought on Seoul’s side in the Korean War — and contemplated nuking China before it was over. China still supports the North, and Washington continues to have about 28,500 troops in the South. South Korea also buys about 70 percent of its weapons from the United States, and a big payday for an American company might come soon after Obama’s inauguration, when South Korea is expected to formally announce the winner in a $7.6 billion project to build 60 sophisticated fighter jets.
The deal will be South Korea’s biggest-ever weapons procurement. The top contender is believed to be Lockheed Martin’s stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter — which after a long run of development problems and cost overruns could certainly use a multi-billion dollar boost. Boeing and European aerospace giant EADS are also in the running.
___
AUSTRALIA: LIVING WITH THE US MARINES
Australia got one of the first waves from the pivot when the U.S. announced last year it would begin rotating up to 2,500 U.S. Marines through the northern city of Darwin. Now the U.S. is seeking access to an Australian navy base south of the western city of Perth and to bombing ranges in the northern Outback.
Some experts fear the relationship may be moving too fast.
On one hand there is broad support for Australia’s defense relationship with the U.S., so having American Marines was seen as a natural step. But it has also raised concerns that Washington will push for more — something Australia might not be ready for. After all China is central to Australia’s economy, buying a bulk of its mineral and coal resources.
“What worries us is the way in which it seems to confirm that the United States and China are increasingly viewing each other as strategic rivals,” said Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at Australian National University.
“We worry about the idea of the U.S.-China relationship becoming more adversarial,” he said. “America wants to remain the dominant power in Asia, and China wants to become the dominant power in Asia.
“What the rest of us all want is for neither of them to be the dominant power in Asia.”
___
AP writers Christopher Bodeen in Beijing, Peter Enav in Taipei, Taiwan, Jim Gomez in Manila, Philippines, Hyung-jin Kim in Seoul, South Korea, Elaine Kurtenbach in Tokyo, Chris Brummitt in Hanoi, Vietnam, Jocelyn Gecker in Bangkok and Kristen Gelineau in Sydney contributed to this report.
Tuesday, November 20, 2012
President Obama rejuvenates Rangoon University of Burma | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
President Obama rejuvenates Rangoon University of Burma | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Zin Linn, Nov 20, 2012
Zin Linn, Nov 20, 2012
People of Burma have satisfied with the choice of a venue made by the U.S. President Barack Obama to deliver an important speech to their country. Mr. Obama chose the convocation hall of the University of Rangoon as his podium to make a fresh record with the country. The university he singled out has a remarkable political environment that intertwined with the country’s destiny.
In contemporary history of Burma, Rangoon University is famous for integral to civil disobedience throughout its olden times. The historic nationwide students-led strikes against the British colonialism in 1920, 1936 and 1938 respectively initiated at campus of the then University of Rangoon. Anti-colonial movements were fully ignited by leaders like Aung San, U Nu, Kyaw Nyein, Ba Swe and U Thant were all alumni of Rangoon University. The practice of mass demonstration initiated by the university students sustained also after the country’s independence. Remarkable student-led protests were occurred in 1956, 1958, 1959, 1962, 1974, 1988 and 1996 respectively.
President Obama said: “I came here because of my respect for this university. It was here at this school where opposition to colonial rule first took hold. It was here that Aung San edited a magazine before leading an independence movement. It was here that U Thant learned the ways of the world before guiding it at the United Nations. Here, scholarship thrived during the last century and students demanded their basic human rights. Now, your Parliament has at last passed a resolution to revitalize this university and it must reclaim its greatness, because the future of this country will be determined by the education of its youth.”
By choosing the University of Rangoon as his dais, Obama helped the campus to be liberated. This university had been taken into custody for decades under the previous dictatorial regimes. The university has regained its liberation after Obama’s visit and it indicates that modern education for young generations has to come sooner.
On the other hand, regarding Obama’s visit, 51 political prisoners were released on 19 November, according to Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma). Among them were members of the Human Rights Defenders and Promoters Network – Myint Aye and Yan Shwe and Zaw Zaw Aung – who were sentenced to a minimum of life imprisonment.
Some members from ethnic armed resistance groups were also released. They are Saw Sai Aung Than from the Shan State Army, Tin Oo and Saw Pho Cho from the Karen National Union, Marid Mon Aung and Bar Yar Nar from the Kachin Independence Army respectively.
However, old and new student generations enjoy happiness seeing the redecorating of the Rangoon University Campus which had been under negligence by the successive military regimes. It seems the existing Parliament also convinces the important of education as the promising future of the country. The Parliament has already passed a resolution to rejuvenate the Rangoon University. So, people of Burma probably thank Mr. Obama who helps recovering of their historic university in due course.
“The education of its youth will determine the future of this country”, President Obama predicts.
Obama also pledges to help Burma’s education by extending student-exchange programs in the near future.
“Just as education is the key to America’s future, it is going to be the key to your future as well. And so we look forward to working with you, as we have with many of your neighbors, to extend that opportunity and to deepen exchanges among our students. We want students from this country to travel to the United States and learn from us, and we want U.S. students to come here and learn from you,” Obama emphasizes during a significant speech delivered at the legendary University of Rangoon in Burma.
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