Thailand’s social media battleground -- New Mandala

Thailand’s social media battleground -- New Mandala
ROBERT TALCOTH, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR – 26 MARCH 2015

Social media and political conflict

The internet and social media is playing an important new role in Thai politics. With the rise of new media, politicians, activists and intellectuals are increasingly using social media as a platform to share ideas and opinions. Leading politicians like Yingluck Shinawatra, Abhisit Vejjajiva and Suthep Thaugsuban all have Facebook accounts that have received more than two million likes. Thai politicians started using Facebook and Twitter extensively in 2009 and 2010. Politicians and social commentators usually post thoughts on political matters, photos, links to their articles, and YouTube links of interviews.

With increasing internet access in Thailand, the internet is gradually becoming the main source of news for Thai people. This is particularly the case for people living in urban areas.

According to a 2012 survey, one third of Thailand’s population has regular internet access and about 8.6 million Thais use the internet every day. Statistics from 2014 showed that Thailand had roughly 24 million Facebook users, making Thailand Facebook’s ninth biggest country worldwide. 55 percent of Thai Facebook users live in Bangkok. Even with growing access to the internet and wireless communication there still exist inequalities in broadband access and educational gaps in the ability to operate a digital culture. In the provinces outside of Bangkok and other major cities internet access is still limited.

The media and the state

Historically, Thai media, although relatively free by regional standards, has been under direct or indirect control of the government. This has particularly been the case during the periods of military rule. Broadcast media has been censored and used as a tool of control by the state.

Up until the 1990’s the military had practically total control of print and broadcast media. Following the end of military dictatorship in the early 1990’s media became freer but several major TV and radio-stations remain under military ownership and mainstream media is still largely under elite control. The mainstream media is generally Bangkok centered, and journalists often practice self-censorship and stay away from “sensitive” topics. The current political conflict has resulted in increasing media restrictions, and in 2014 Reporters Without Borders rated Thailand 130 of 180 nations in press freedom, while U.S based non-government organization, Freedom House rated the Thai press as being “not free”.

In a country where people historically haven’t been allowed to openly and freely discuss certain matters, social media has the potential power to alter society. On social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter millions of user can share news, ideas and opinions that would not make it into traditional media. Direct, uncensored criticism of powerful people can be shared and discussed freely without interference. File-sharing and p2p networks have also made it possible to get access to books and articles that are banned in Thailand. The rise of these technologies, which allows the public increasing access to information, could lead to the democratization of knowledge and the development of a more democratic society. New media is providing people with a platform to discuss their political beliefs.

The Military Coup

When the military staged the May coup and ousted the elected government they also took control of all TV-stations in Bangkok and some other parts of the country. Broadcast media were ordered to suspend all normal programming. Television and radio-stations were forced to broadcast government programs whenever required. For several days nationalist songs, pro-military propaganda and announcements by the junta was broadcasted. The military warned journalist from spreading information that might cause “confusion and unrest”.

Picture from the junta’s television program ‘returning happiness to the people’

Previous coup makers had also made an effort to take control of media and silence the opposition. This time, the military successfully took control of television, newspapers and radio but they could not control the internet. Uncensored information about the political situation in Thailand was shared by millions of users. Journalists and academics were banned from addressing political matters on traditional media channels but the military could not prevent internet users from sharing their views on the coup online.

The situation was somewhat new for the military. It had clearly become more difficult for them to control information.

Since the PDRC’s anti-government, pro-military street protests, a number of people had created live blogs which they linked to their Facebook and twitter accounts. The blogs provided live updates, often with pictures, on what was taking place in Bangkok. After the military coup the live blogs reported on the political development and shared information on public protests against the military junta and the movement of soldiers in the capital. Groups that opposed the military junta used social media to stage flash mobs throughout the capital. Wireless communication networks created spontaneous processes of mobilization. This was an example of the mobilization capacities of the internet.

Anti-coup protesters in Bangkok

While browsing through the internet during lunch in the Siam Square area of Bangkok I read a tweet about a protest taking place in Ratchaprasong. I quickly moved towards the area and found several hundred pro-democracy protesters that had gathered to show their disapproval of the junta. Images of the protesters were posted on various social media sites in real time. This attracted people to get out on the street and join the protest. Protesters walked from Ratchaprasong to Victory Monument. Along the way people took pictures and recorded the march using their mobile phones. The ability to communicate in real time enabled people to construct instant networks of communication.

Government control of the internet

Social media is a medium that is currently beyond the control of the military government. It therefore poses a threat to their power and ambitions of controlling information. The Thai junta is currently still figuring out how to increase their control of the internet. The 2007 Computer Crimes Act, which is currently being revised and updated, have been used to bring enforcements of Thailand’s laws to the internet. Thousands of websites are currently blocked in Thailand. The total number of blocked websites in 2011 was estimated to be between 80-100 000. Although thousands of websites featuring “illegal” content have been blocked, social media sites are still available. The Thai government blocked YouTube for a short period in 2007 but the backlash from the public pressured the government to make the website accessible again.

Shortly after the 2014 military coup Facebook went down for a couple of hours. Rumors spread that the military had put it down. This was denied by the army and the popular social media site was soon up and running again. The Junta received criticism from the public during the short hours Facebook was down; this clearly showed that attempts by the government to block social media sites would have negative consequences.

Internet control in Asia

Government power partially relies on the control of information, and the internet, with its free flow of information, has come to pose a threat to authoritarian states throughout Asia. The state wishes to protect its values and political ideals from the influence of opposing ideologies. It’s in the interest of the authoritarian state to limit the population’s access to information and to prevent them from discussing topics that might threaten the power of the government.

Authoritarian regimes in the region have used different methods of limiting people’s access to the internet. China is one of the most extreme cases of state control of the internet.

In China, it’s not allowed to criticize the government and the internet is monitored and censored. The Chinese government’s apparatus of Internet control is the most extensive and advanced in the world. Social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook are blocked by the government. Instead, Chinese internet users use Weibo (Chinese for microblog). Weibo has a format that is similar to Twitter and share some similarities with Facebook. Weibo users can exchange short sentences, images, or video links. Weibo has approximately 300 million users in China. The microblogs have been used to share information about politics and social issues. Bloggers have discussed and shared information on topics that can be viewed as critical or damaging to the government. Posts on government corruption and abuse of power have been deleted by authorities and the Weibo accounts of journalists, academics and social activists are regularly blocked. In the governments regulations on microblog development it is stated that “It (microblogs) should propagate the socialist core value system and the advanced socialist culture, and serve to the establishment of a socialist harmonious society”. Posts that violate this are illegal, and could lead to long prison sentences.

In an attempt to make bloggers more cautious about what they post, the Chinese government has issued a law that states that bloggers that post false information that gets more than 5000 views risks three years in prison. Keywords such as human rights and Liu Xiaobo are on the governments blacklist. All posts featuring the blacklisted words will immediately be tracked down and deleted. Depending on the severity of the post arrests might be carried out.

The Thai government wants to increase its control of the internet and it is not unlikely that they will look to China for inspiration on how to curb online dissent. China has already a ready framework for how the state can control the internet and monitor online political activity. The question remains if new technologies will remain “free” in Thailand or if the Chinese model of internet monitoring will be implemented.

Social media and the Thai political crisis

The political conflict in Thailand is a war of words. The two opposing sides have very different perspectives on political matters and supporters of the different fractions tend to frame the conflict in fundamentally different ways. They represent two very contrasting worldviews.

Red-shirt sympathizers’ view the political conflict as being about democracy and about building a more socially just society were people are given equal opportunities. They frame the conflict as a battle between the majority population and a political and economic elite which has practically monopolized the access to power and opportunity. Yellow-shirt sympathizers argue that the conflict is about getting rid of corrupt politicians that have enriched themselves and their families at the expense of the nation. They believe that a return to authoritarian rule and restrictions on freedom of speech is needed to create “order” and to fix a rotten system. The Yellow-shirts also claim that they want to develop democracy in Thailand, but their vision of democracy is quite different from the red-shirts. They want a democratic system that is “compatible” with, what they refer to as “Thai values” and “tradition”, a so-called guided democracy under the supervision of “enlightened” rulers.

The yellow-shirts view people on the red-side as being ignorant and misguided people under the control of Thaksin. The term Thaksin’s slave is frequently used to attack their opponents. The leaders of the red-movement are often described as evil, corrupt traitors that wish to destroy Thailand. On the other hand, the reds argue that the yellow have been indoctrinated by state propaganda and that they represent the interest of a wealthy elite that refuse to allow the development of democracy in Thailand.

Ultimately, the red-shirts speak of democracy, social justice and freedom of speech, while the yellow-shirts speak of morality, tradition, anti-corruption and good governance. People that support the red-shirts question the dominant nationalist ideology promoted by the state and they advocate change. The yellow-shirts are predominantly conservative nationalists that wish to preserve the “traditional” attitudes, beliefs, values and socio-political order.

A woman that voted in the February election is portrayed as a heroine while the PDRC protesters that obstructed the election are depicted as the living dead

The two opposing sides are waging a digital war to shape public opinion. Information about political events and developments are often very different depending on the source. The spread of conflicting stories and contradictory facts on social media sites make it difficult for the public to develop an understanding of the political situation. Rumors, lies and smear campaigns have been used by both sides to attack the opposition. For the public, it has become more and more difficult to determine what is true and what is false.

A political demonstration might be described by a yellow-shirt commentator as a gathering of rented thugs paid by Thaksin to cause havoc and confusion, while a red-shirt sympathizer might view demonstrators as pro-democracy activists standing up for their right to vote.

The pro-establishment yellow-shirt movement is the most vocal on social media. The Yellow-shirts, whom mainly consist of middle-and upper-class Thais from Bangkok, have better access to the internet than the red-shirt supporters whom mainly live in the provinces outside of Bangkok. They have also usually more money and can afford new technology.

Example of the type of pictures shared by military supporters on social media

Besides access to internet and new technology there are also differences in how people from the opposing sides use the internet and express their political beliefs. The yellow-shirts represent the dominant ideology of the military and the traditional elite and have therefore little problems in terms of openly showing their political affiliations and convictions. Throughout the political crisis yellow-shirt supporters have openly worn t-shirts, hats and other symbols in public to show that they belong to and support a particular political fraction. On social media sites they are very vocal and open about their beliefs and political affiliations. The situation for the red-shirts is quite different, particularly since the beginning of the PDRC street movement that lead to the 2014 military coup. A person that openly shows support for the red-shirt movement risks being labeled as a traitor, terrorist or threat to national security. The red-shirt sympathizers also, unlike the yellow-shirts, risk being subjected to state-sponsored harassment. An example of this is the cases involving vocal academics and journalists that have been visited and questioned by police and military. While yellow-shirt supporters are very vocal on online forums red-shirts often hide behind fake identities or approach political matters very carefully.

Yellow-shirt supporter posts a picture of what to bring to an anti-Yingluck demonstration

The military coup, foreign media and yellow-shirt reaction

The political conflict in Thailand has gotten increasing coverage in the foreign press. The bloody military crackdown on protesters in 2010 and the 2014 military coup made headlines around the world. In foreign media, the conflict is generally presented in a way that favors the red-shirts. They are portrayed as being a pro-democracy movement that represents the will of the majority population. The yellow-shirts have often been labeled as elitist and anti-democratic. Some writers have used terms like ultra-nationalist and neo-fascist to describe their movement. Leaders of the yellow movement have reached out to the foreign press to explain their position, but this has in most cases caused more harm than good. The pro-military movement’s view on political events and their role in the current political struggle does not correspond with the image presented in foreign media and respected academic work. Instead, journalists and academics writing about Thailand tend to portray the current political conflict in a manner that favors the red-shirts. This constitutes a problem for the Yellow group.

A young PDRC protester surfs the net during the shutdown Bangkok campaign

Frustrated by their inability to win the media war the yellow group has often resorted to hate speech and attempts at intimidation. Their method of dealing with negative publicity has in many cases been to criticize, discredit and intimidate journalists, academics and activists that do not share their views. Attacking people with opposing views has over time become an intricate part of their struggle against the opposition. The objective of their attacks on media and the opposition appears to be to create an atmosphere where foreign media and intellectuals are distrusted and their views rejected.

The support the red-shirts have received from western media and leading academics have provided them with a moral high-ground that has caused anger and frustration within the yellow camp. People that sympathize with the red-shirts often share and discuss articles and news stories about Thailand produced by foreign media. The yellow-shirts tend to reject the opinions of foreigners that are critical of the army.

Social media has played an important role in the yellow movement’s attempts to discredit and silence its critics. Foreign media outlets that have criticized the democrat party, the military or other groups associated with the yellow-shirts have regularly been attacked.

CNN’s reporter Dan River’s is one of many reporters that have been targeted by the yellow-shirts. Pictures of Dan Rivers have been widely circulated online and CNN has been accused of portraying a false image of the political situation in Thailand. BBC’s Southeast Asian correspondent Jonathan Head and New York Times Bangkok correspondent Thomas Fuller are other examples of journalists that have been accused of receiving money from Thaksin to distort the truth about what is happening in Thailand. There are numerous conspiracy theories floating around the internet that claim that Thaksin has paid western media to produce lies about Thailand. The idea that Thaksin has influence over western media appears to be firmly established within certain fractions of the yellow movement. They have not produced any evidence to back up their accusations.

The yellow movement has also launched campaigns against local Thai and foreign journalists. Bangkok based freelance journalist Nick Nostitz was accused of working for Thaksin Shinawatra. Pictures of Mr. Nostitz have been shared on social networking sites and he received threats. While attending a yellow-shirt protest site he was physically assaulted and during a later incident a group of yellow-shirt activists tried to kidnap him. The online hate campaign against Mr. Nostitz made it impossible for him to continue covering the political unrest. He feared for his safety. During the PDRC protests journalists were regularly attacked and intimidated by protesters. Wimonwan Thampakdee, of Thairath TV commented on the increasingly hostile attitudes towardsjournalists in the following way “When Thailand faced political rallies in 2004, the Thai Journalists Association gave out armbands to distinguish reporters from protesters – but today armbands made reporters targets for some protesters…………An armband is like a vacuum cleaner that sucks protesters to us. People walk up to reporters after they see an armband and ask ‘Where do you work?’ And some ask us: ‘Do you come from Channel 9?'”

While intimidation and attacks on reporters working for TV-channels believed to portray the protest movement in an unfavorable way were common, reporters coming from the anti-Thaksin or military-owned news stations did not receive the same treatment.

Throughout the PDRC street protests journalists accused of siding with the Yingluck government or of criticizing the PDRC was regularly smeared online.

Anti-Americanism

In late 2013, US Ambassador Kristie Kenney came under fire after stating in an interview that she supported the new election called by the Yingluck Shinawatra government. The Ambassador had previously been criticized by the yellow-shirt movement after she had voiced her concern over the imprisonment of an American citizen for translating and posting a book online that was banned in Thailand. Kenney had stated that she was “troubled by prosecutions inconsistent with international standard of freedom of expression”,

Kenney’s support for the new elections came during a time when the PDRC and the Yellow movement had been criticized in foreign media. The ambassador’s statement, which was interpreted as the U.S taking sides in the conflict, angered the yellow-shirts.

They responded by launching an online smear campaign against the ambassador. Yellow-shirt supporters were urged to criticize Kenney on the Facebook page of the American Embassy in Bangkok. They demanded that Kenney would be removed from her position and that the U.S stops interfering in Thailand’s internal affairs.

In January 2015 visiting US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel Russell, delivered a speech at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. In the speech Mr. Russell stated that he was “concerned about the significant restraints on freedoms since the coup, including restrictions on speech and on assembly”. Daniel Russel’s statement sparked another wave of online anti-Americanism. Supporters of the junta urged the U.S to mind their own business.

Once again the yellow-shirts launched a campaign against the U.S embassy, filling their page with anti-American posts. Conspiracy theories about the relationship between Thaksin and the U.S government reappeared on Yellow-shirt social media sites. In the wake of western criticism the junta declared that they would develop closer relations with China. This statement was embraced by the online community. China would not interfere in Thailand’s internal affairs.

Smear campaigns

Character assassination is one of the most potent weapons in media politics. It can progress in numerous ways, by distorting statements made by a person, making false claims, or spreading rumors and lies that would harm an individual’s reputation.

Many local and foreign academics that have criticized the PDRC, the military and the yellow movement have been attacked on social media. On social networking sites like Facebook supporters of the yellow movement regularly share pictures of academics and activists and accuse them of either being paid by Thaksin or of being disloyal towards the monarchy. The comment section of these posts often features threats and rude and vulgar language. Several academics have been threatened and assaulted after having their pictures posted on yellow-shirt Facebook pages. When academics produce work that does not correspond with the ideas of the anti-Thaksin camp they are quick to accuse the author of being paid by Thaksin. A post that has been widely circulated on social media feature a picture of Thai University professors known to be critical of the military and the yellow-shirts. Under the picture is the text” how can these people be allowed to teach your children? ”. In the comment section the professors are accused of being paid by Thaksin, disloyal to the monarchy, traitors and not “real” Thais.

The objective appears to be to make the public distrust and question the opinions of academics and journalists, and also to create a sense of fear and uncertainty. They want to silence opposing voices and make people scared to question certain ideas and beliefs. An intellectual that openly questions the dominant, nationalist values and ideology, risks being branded as a traitor and an enemy of the nation and this could cost them their career.

There are also a number of cases were students and activists have been attacked on social media. One case which has received a lot of attention involves a Thammasat student who was accused of being disloyal to the monarchy on social media. Pictures of the student was widely shared on yellow-shirt Facebook pages, in the comment section several people wrote that they would kill or hurt the student if they ever came across her. The student was described as a traitor, and an animal that deserves to die. The student fled Thailand after the coup, she feared that she would get arrested by the military. ASTV Manager, one of the main yellow-shirt newspapers and a pioneer in Thai online media, published a fictional article in which the student was arrested by the police, sent to prison and then gang-raped by inmates. The article was supposed to be “funny”. Another case involves a young, well-known student activist. The student received online threats after openly questioning the motives of the PDRC protesters and the Thai military. His picture was shared amongst thousands of Facebook users whom accused him of being a traitor and disloyal to the monarchy. While studying abroad the student was threatened by a soldier who said he would shot him once he returned to Thailand.

Student activists that have staged peaceful protests against the 2014 military coup have also had their names and pictures shared on anti-Thaksin, yellow-shirt media sites. They have frequently been accused of being terrorists paid by Thaksin to destroy Thailand. These are just some examples of how social media has been used to attack and smear political opponents.

Summary

As mentioned earlier in the article, new media has come to play an important role in contemporary Thai politics. It has provided politicians, intellectuals and social commentators with a platform that enables them to reach millions of people.

New media has made it easier for the public to access information and educate themselves about political matters. Alternative views on society and politics that would most likely not make it into the mainstream public discourse are today available online. This new technology has played an important role in the recent political awakening of the masses. Groups that previously were excluded from the political sphere are educating themselves and becoming more active. The internet has undoubtedly democratized the access to information and it has provided people with a platform to express views and beliefs on society, history, politics and culture. Social media is increasingly being used as a tool by the opposition to challenge and question the dominant ideologies of the traditional elite.

The internet poses a genuine challenge to the traditional elite’s values, beliefs, and morals that make up the bulk of Thailand’s dominant ideology. The core of their beliefs is now being challenged by the opposition. The reproduction of the dominant ideology has been dependent on the elite’s control of mass media. Now, people are gradually moving away from traditional media and are increasingly receiving their news and information from a complex virtual network. They are exposed to alternative narratives and ideologies that challenge that of the dominant ideology.

Comment on freedom of speech from the popular FB page มานีมีแชร์

The military and political elite are working hard to censor and silence the opposition. Their methods have been censorship, restrictions on freedom of speech and criminalizing dissent. At the same time as the junta is silencing opposing views they are launching campaigns aimed at gaining support from the public. The military’s ability to remain in power is directly connected to their ability to control information and to shape public opinion. But can they convince enough people that what they are doing is in the interest of the nation? Censorship, restrictions on freedom of speech and criminalization of social protest can only continue as long as the military receive support from large groups of people.

A large portion of the yellow-shirts seem to be supporting the military’s attempt at silencing the opposition. In their struggle against corruption and what they perceive as bad governance, they view human rights violations and restrictions on freedom of speech as being justified. Some fractions of the yellow movement do not only support the military’s efforts at muzzling public debate, they have themselves used social media to attack and slander those that challenge the dominant ideology. We can see a similar development in China, where the middle and upper-class, those that have benefited from the existing socio-political order, support state repression and violence against those that challenge the dominant ideology. Just like in Thailand, Chinese government supporters have used the internet to voice their support for the government and attack dissidents.

The question that remains is, if what we’re seeing is just a phase or if it is the beginning of increasing government control of the internet and social media. The government is already monitoring social media and the new computer crimes act appears to be designed to make it easier for them to take legal action against people sharing certain types of information online. But, it is still too early to make any conclusions about the future. We must wait and see how the government chooses to implement the law and what effects it will have on the internet usage in Thailand. Social media can function as a liberator but it also has the potential of becoming another tool of oppression.

Robert Talcoth is a graduate of Chulalongkorn University’s Southeast Asian Studies Program

Thailand at Stalemate - Asia Sentinel

Thailand at Stalemate - Asia Sentinel
03 FEBRUARY 2014

In a lose-lose scenario, the crisis continues as the Democrats use the bureaucracy to battle the government

With Thailand’s emergency election over with a minimum of violence but a maximum of confusion, it appears the government’s opponents were successful in disrupting the polls just enough to prevent a decisive outcome. The Bangkok Post called it a “lose-lose” outcome in an editorial Monday.

The results won’t be known for weeks or months but it seems unlikely a new parliament can be convened after 438 of Bangkok’s 6,671 polling places and several constituencies in the south were denied the right to vote by anti-government protesters.

That leaves Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra weakened and vulnerable to the end game in her opponents’ apparent strategy: the use of the government bureaucracy and the courts to finish off her government and perhaps put an end to electoral democracy in Thailand for an indefinite period.

While Yingluck and her Pheu Thai party remain popular, she does not have enough strength in the armed forces to impose her will and any attempt to use her allies in the police to clear the streets of illegal protesters under an existing emergency decree could provoke a military backlash. The result is stalemate. 

Having boycotted the polls and orchestrated the street protests that have roiled Bangkok in recent months, it appears that the Democrat Party and its business and royalist backers have given up all hope of beating the forces of ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra at the polls. Instead, they have done all that they can to make any polls meaningless, while creating as much chaos as possible.

Thaksin, who was ousted in a coup in 2006, can thank his own hubris for creating the conditions that gave his opponents an opening for the crisis they wanted. He and his Pheu Thai allies (with Yingluck’s apparently reluctant consent) pushed forward a blanket amnesty bill late last year that would have forgiven thousands of corruption cases, including Thaksin’s own, thus clearing the way for him to come home from his self-imposed exile in Dubai.

When the foolish and ill-timed bill was passed in parliament, the outraged public reaction was immediate and heartfelt. Yingluck withdrew the bill but the damage was done and the Democrat’s had the opening they needed to create a crisis in the streets.

Yingluck played into their hands by dissolving parliament on December 9 and seeking a fresh mandate with a snap election.

“Suthep Thaugsuban [the protest leader and one-time Democrat politician] and his team took two years to prepare for this to happen," Jatuporn Prompan, a senior Pheu Thai member, told Reuters recently. "He was preparing with the support of a network of elite bureaucrats."

The protests, sustained by massive donations from numerous large businesses in Bangkok and backed by a combination of popular support among the middle classes and thugs providing muscle, created unease, harmed the economy and allowed Suthep’s calls for ill-defined reforms to appear reasonable. 

Violence along the edges, some of which has been blamed on Suthep’s People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC),  claimed ten lives and caused hundreds of injuries in recent weeks, adding to a sense of an impending cataclysm.

Now the Democrats can use their control of the permanent bureaucratic machinery of government to finish the job. Thailand's anti-corruption commission has already launched an impeachment investigation into Yingluck’s role as head of a wasteful rice-pledging scheme that had a devastating impact on the treasury and has left unpaid farmers furious.
There are other cases in the Constitutional Court brought by the PDRC seeking to nullify Sunday’s polls. In addition, the Election Commission itself seemed to be more on the side of the Democrats than the government in the run-up to the polls.

Thaksin himself is said by sources to expect his sister to soon be out of a job. He is said to be supporting his long-time ally, the current foreign minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul, to take over the leadership of the party should Yingluck be indicted.

There are at least two new groups of supposedly nonpartisan figures proposing a series of reforms as a way out of the crisis, but it remains to be seen how much traction they will gain. There is also the murky role of the monarchy.

It has long been presumed that the king is gravely ill and that a transition to a new monarch will be underway fairly soon. Inevitably, a new monarch will be weak and uncertain during a time of crisis and many analysts believe that the Bangkok establishment deeply fears having Thaksin and his forces in control of the country during that crucial period.

So is there a way forward? In the north and northeast, furious “Red Shirt” enemies of the Bangkok status quo are said to be ready to fight against any coup d’état, which means that while massive violence has been avoided so far, the nation remains on a razor’s edge. The Red Shirts, backed by Thaksin’s resources, would far outnumber any street heavies Suthep could muster and the prospect of pitched battles even against the army is not out of the question.

Meanwhile, the elite bureaucrats will likely push Yingluck out of the way relatively soon but that will neither give the country a government nor forge a consensus for a way forward. 
For that to happen, a change will be needed in a mindset of confrontation. There appears no sign of that anytime soon.

Insight: How Thaksin's meddling sparked a new Thai crisis for PM sister | Reuters

Insight: How Thaksin's meddling sparked a new Thai crisis for PM sister | Reuters
Andrew R.C. Marshall and Jason Szep, BANGKOK Thu Jan 30, 2014 7:04pm EST


(Reuters) - Yingluck Shinawatra's journey from political nobody to prime minister was breathtakingly swift. Her premiership's descent into crisis has been just as rapid.

A political neophyte when she took office in 2011, the 46-year-old former business executive surprised many observers by steadying Thailand after years of often bloody political unrest.


Then she leaned over and pushed a button marked "SELF-DESTRUCT".

Behind Thailand's lurch into its worst crisis in years was a disastrous intervention by Yingluck's billionaire brother Thaksin, who was deposed in a 2006 military coup and now lives abroad to escape a corruption conviction.

Thaksin's meddling turned a bill that would have freed ordinary Thais charged with protest-related crimes into a controversial wider amnesty for politicians such as himself, say senior members of Yingluck's ruling Puea Thai Party.

The passing of the bill last November sparked street protests and unrest that have killed 10 people, wounded hundreds and dramatically changed Yingluck's political fortunes.

A Reuters reconstruction, based on interviews with senior Puea Thai members and its "red shirt" allies, reveals how Thaksin's intervention shattered two years of relative calm.

It also highlights how quickly political missteps can spiral into violence in Thailand, a warning sign ahead of a general election on Sunday that protesters have vowed to disrupt.

On one side is Thaksin and his younger sister Yingluck. Thaksin redrew the political map by courting rural voters in the north and northeast to gain an unbeatable electoral mandate that he then used to advance the interests of major companies, including his own. Thaksin-backed parties have convincingly won every general election since 2001.

On the other are the traditional Bangkok elites threatened by his meteoric rise, mainly the military, palace and bureaucracy, who see Thaksin as corrupt and his sister as his proxy.


"LET'S PUSH THIS THROUGH"

Thaksin once famously described Yingluck as a "clone" who could make decisions on his behalf. Her party's election slogan was "Thaksin thinks, Puea Thai acts".

But after her landslide victory in July 2011, Thailand's first female prime minister often set her own agenda, say analysts. She refused to reshuffle her Cabinet on Thaksin's demand, and deployed her formidable charm to soothe relations with her divisive brother's opponents in the establishment, particularly the military that had removed him from office.
The previous six years of unrest, which culminated in a military crackdown on Thaksin's red-shirted supporters that killed 91 people in 2010, began to fade.

But the self-exiled Thaksin wanted to come home, and would not take no for an answer.
The vehicle for his return would be a draft bill that sailed through the Puea Thai-majority parliament last August. It would grant amnesties to protesters - but not leaders - charged and jailed in waves of unrest between 2006 and 2011.

Before the bill's second reading, Thaksin's aides told Puea Thai MPs that the former prime minister wanted to radically expand it to absolve leaders on both sides, say senior Puea Thai members.

A parliamentary scrutiny committee, also dominated by Puea Thai and its coalition allies, passed a revised draft of the bill on October 18.

The amnesty now extended to murder charges laid against former Democrat Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his deputy, Suthep Thaugsuban, for ordering the 2010 crackdown. Abhisit led an unelected government for nearly three years after a pro-Thaksin administration was removed from office by the courts in 2008.

It also quashed hundreds of corruption cases and nullified the two-year jail sentence against Thaksin, allowing the return of $1.4 billion of his seized wealth - and a ticket back to Thailand.

Yingluck had reservations about the blanket amnesty, particularly about dropping the charges against Abhisit and Suthep, said her chief of staff Suranand Vejjajiva. "But in the end the MPs agreed, 'Let's push this through'," he said.


GROWING CRISIS

The revised bill electrified Thaksin's opponents and split his supporters. Leaders of the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), a pro-government red shirt group, soon made public their anger with the party, seeing the new bill's forgiveness of Abhisit and Suthep as a denial of justice for slain protesters. At the same time, small protests by Thaksin's opponents began gathering steam.

More than half of Puea Thai MPs disagreed with the bill, but few dared to speak up, said a senior Puea Thai MP who spoke on condition of anonymity. "The way they put it, if you want to help Thaksin, support the bill. If you don't support the bill, you don't want to help Thaksin."

But Suranand denied the MPs were coerced. "No one put a gun to their head and said, 'You have to vote'," he said.

Even so, many Puea Thai insiders feared Thaksin and his sister were blind to the growing crisis, underestimating the ability of his enemies to exploit public anger against the bill, said the senior party member.

At 4 a.m. on November 1, a buzzer rang through the hall of Thailand's House of Representatives. After 19 hours and the abstention of the Democrats, bleary-eyed MPs unanimously passed the amnesty bill.

Protests against the bill, now headed for the senate, dramatically picked up. On Monday November 4, thousands of largely middle class Bangkokians gathered sporting Thai flag paraphernalia and whistles. Leading the pack was Suthep.


SNOWBALL EFFECT

Faced with public outrage, Yingluck quickly ordered the bill to be pulled from the Senate. Her advisors now spin this as proof that she listens to the public and admits her mistakes, and shift the blame for the bill onto Puea Thai and its MPs.

"As a political party, we didn't anticipate the very negative feedback from the public," Noppadon Pattama, a Puea Thai strategist who advises both Thaksin and Yingluck, told Reuters.

The aborted bill provided Yingluck's long-dormant enemies with the ammunition they needed. On November 12, Suthep resigned from parliament along with eight other Democrat MPs. The protests began their evolution into an uprising against, first, the "Thaksin regime", and then Thailand's system of electoral democracy itself.

"Once they were participating in the rallies against Thaksin, people who were against the bill became people against the system," the Puea Thai MP told Reuters. "They got their critical mass and snowball effect."

Jatuporn Prompan, a UDD leader and senior Puea Thai member, said he could see that Suthep and other establishment figures had long been planning a fresh uprising. He warned party leaders that the amnesty bill was just the trigger they needed.

"Suthep Thaugsuban and his team took two years to prepare for this to happen," Jatuporn Prompan, a leader of the UDD and senior Puea Thai member, told Reuters. "He was preparing with the support of a network of elite bureaucrats."

The protests unleashed by the aborted bill have added to a perfect storm of crisis for Yingluck, who has been a caretaker prime minister - with limited powers - since dissolving parliament on December 9 to call a snap election.

Thailand's anti-corruption commission has launched an impeachment investigation into her role as head of a wasteful and opaque rice-pledging scheme. Farmers waiting payment under the multi-billion-dollar scheme are blocking provincial highways in protest.

Thousands of protesters still occupy major intersections in an attempt to "shut down" Bangkok. The capital is braced for violence during Sunday's election, which the Democrat Party is boycotting.

Protesters want the election postponed until parliament is replaced by an unelected "people's council" to reform Thai politics. They also demand Yingluck's resignation and the exile of the entire Shinawatra clan.

Yingluck refuses to go. Even today, said Suranand, she broadly stands by the amnesty bill that might yet destroy her.

"She sees it as: If you can forgive everyone, and everyone accepts that forgiveness, then you can reset everything and move on," he said. "Of course, it didn't turn out that way."

(Additional reporting by Aubrey Belford and Amy Sawitta Lefevre; Editing by Alex Richardson)


 

Thai PM Yingluck struggles to stay in power | Asian Correspondent

Thai PM Yingluck struggles to stay in power | Asian Correspondent
AP News, Jan 18, 2014

BANGKOK (AP) — From inside her “war room” in a temporary office at the Defense Ministry, Thailand’s beleaguered Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra is watching television feeds of flag-waving protesters trying to bring down her government.

The demonstrators have taken over key pockets of central Bangkok, blocking off their territory with sandbag walls guarded by supporters. They refuse to negotiate, and they’re trampling campaign billboards bearing Yingluck’s image amid increasing doubt that the election she called for next month can be held.

Yingluck can’t order a police crackdown for fear of triggering a military coup. And she is now facing a serious legal threat: The country’s anti-corruption commission has announced that it will probe her handling of a controversial rice policy, an investigation that could force her from office if it is successful.

What’s the best way to deal with it all?

“Keep calm. And stay cool,” Yingluck said, flashing a brief smile as she rode an elevator at the Defense Ministry this past week, headed for a meeting to monitor the crisis and discuss strategy with top advisers.

Thailand has been plagued by sometimes bloody bouts of unrest ever since then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra — Yingluck’s older brother — was overthrown by the army in 2006 amid charges of corruption and alleged disrespect for the monarchy. The coup touched off a societal schism that in broad terms pits the majority rural poor, who back the Shinawatras, against an urban-based elite establishment that draws support from the army and staunch royalists who see Yingluck’s family as a corrupt threat to their power.

The struggle has taken place against what analysts also see as a battle for control over a crucial transition period when the country’s 86-year-old monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, passes from the scene. But for much of it, Yingluck had stayed out of the spotlight.
Just three years ago, she was largely unknown — the director of a family real estate business, a political neophyte with no experience in government. Today, she is in the political fight of her life — a besieged prime minister who cannot use her own office and whose government has been displaced to myriad backup offices across Bangkok because demonstrators have surrounded her ministries.

“We’ve had to adapt the way that we work. I have ordered every ministry to adapt,” Yingluck said Thursday. “It’s like we are working by remote.”

Protest leader Suthep Thaugsuban — who is wanted by police on charges of insurrection — brazenly vowed to “capture” Yingluck and her Cabinet this past week. The threat is not taken seriously, but Yingluck takes no risks.

“I don’t go to anywhere deemed dangerous,” she said, responding to a question about her safety.

Since Monday, anti-government demonstrators have tried to keep up the pressure by marching across Bangkok, and seizing parts of the city. The protests have been peaceful, but violence has occurred nearly every night, with shooting attacks at protest venues and small explosives hurled at the homes of top protest supporters, including the city’s governor, a political rival of Yingluck’s.

On Friday, a grenade was hurled at marching demonstrators, killing one man and wounding dozens of people. Suthep, who was in the procession but was not wounded, quickly blamed the government. Yingluck urged the police to quickly make arrests, saying she opposed the use of force and was concerned that the situation was becoming increasingly chaotic.
Since assuming the premiership after 2011 elections, Yingluck has struggled to overcome allegations that she is her brother’s puppet. The Pheu Thai party’s landslide victory came largely thanks to Thaksin. The campaign slogan — “Thaksin Thinks, Pheu Thai Acts” — made the party’s political mechanics blatantly clear.

Yingluck’s opponents say she is carrying on the practices of her billionaire brother by using the family fortune and state funds to influence voters and cement her grip on power. But she has widespread support among Thailand’s poor majority because of the populist policies that have brought them things like virtually free health care.

During her first two years in office, Yingluck walked a careful tightrope with the army and her political rivals, managing an unspoken truce that kept the nation calm. But the last few months have badly shaken her grip on power. Critics say she brought much of it on herself with a badly misjudged attempt to rehabilitate Thaksin in a general amnesty bill that triggered widespread opposition. Thaksin, now living in Dubai, has lived overseas since 2008 to avoid a jail sentence on corruption charges that he says were politically motivated.

Yingluck’s economic competence has also come under attack, particularly over a disastrous rice pledging scheme that has cost the government billions of dollars, left it with massive amounts of unsold rice and drawn criticism from the International Monetary Fund. On Thursday, Thailand’s anti-corruption commission announced that it would investigate her role in it, saying she may have been criminally negligent.

A separate corruption case now under scrutiny could also see Yingluck’s party thrown out of office and its members barred from politics.

Although clashes between police and protesters have occurred, Yingluck has mostly taken a soft approach to dealing with the latest unrest, ordering security forces to avert violence. It is a strategy that risks making her appear weak, but one she must pursue because she does not want to give the army any reason to intervene.

Last month, Yingluck dissolved the lower house of Parliament and called Feb. 2 elections to ease tensions. But Suthep is demanding reform before any vote is held. The protesters want to install a non-elected council of “good people” to take power, while Yingluck says the constitution bars her from stepping down as caretaker prime minister and allows no legal means to delay the ballot.

The result is deadlock, with no clear way out.

“She’s not done a bad job, given that she has responded to everything that has been thrown at her,” said Chris Baker, a political economist who has co-authored several books about Thaksin. “I don’t think there’s very much she can do in terms of negotiation at the moment.”

The tone of the protest movement has become venomous in recent weeks. The Thai tradition of politeness has been cast aside, and Yingluck’s femininity, an asset at the start of her term, has been used against her in crude tirades from the protest stage.

The strain has been evident, and Yingluck has occasionally teared up in public, once asking: “Do you not want me to set foot on Thai soil anymore?”

On Friday, a confident Yingluck said she was doing her best.

“I don’t know what happened to democracy in Thailand,” she told reporters. “But we have to keep (our) democracy. That’s why we have to … have elections as soon as possible.”

Desperately Seeking Success in the Thai Deep South | Asia Sentinel

Desperately Seeking Success in the Thai Deep South | Asia Sentinel
Murray Hunter, 02 March 2013

Malaysia to host negotiations with Thailand's Islamic insurgents

The surprise of an agreement signed between the Thai government and Malaysia during Premier Yingluck Shinawatra's visit to Kuala Lumpur for negotiations with one of the major insurgent groups, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), should actually not be a surprise. It is also questionable whether there is anything to the agreement.

Malaysia is heading into what could be called a watershed election. Premier Najib Tun Razak's personal popularity rating has fallen although it is still well into positive territory, there have been a number of campaigning mishaps for him of late, and there is an embarrassing military stand-off in Sabah with a group loyal to the Sulu Sultan, where the Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino is the one taking initiatives.

In this environment, both the Thai and Malaysian governments need a breakthrough. Of late, the insurgents have undertaken many embarrassing ploys like displaying Malaysian flags on Aug. 31, Malaysia?s Independence day. In addition, troops and other security forces are all tied trying to protect major towns like Hat Yai and Chana from attacks, and Yingluck has her brother's legacy of poor handling of the insurgency hanging over her. Najib badly needs some form of diplomatic coup to bolster his credentials, particularly with the rural Malays in Kelantan who are not unsympathetic to the insurgent cause, and the general population of Malaysia with the oncoming election.

The memorandum was signed in Malaysia?s administrative capital of Putrajaya by Lieutenant-General Panradom Pattanathabur, Secretary general of Thailand's National Security Council, and Utaz Hassan Taib, who was identified as the chief of the BRN liaison office in Malaysia. The document, signed on Feb. 28, has been heralded by all as an historical agreement and has been reported widely in both the mainstream Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur Press, although it's interesting Malaysia's online press hardly mentioned it.

The BRN, formed in 1963, is one of up to 20 different insurgency groups in Thailand?s deep south. Although it may one of the largest groups, it is yet to be seen if any others may come on board, or even take a hostile view, believing that they have been left out and should be the group that the government negotiates. With jealousies between some of these groups, this is a minor risk that the Thai government has taken.

As it has actually not been spelt out by the various insurgency groups what demands and aspirations they have, this process will at least put these points on the table for examination. In this sense the memorandum is a potential breakthrough because it may establish the gambit of positions both sides will talk from. Ironically through this insurgency, very few concrete demands or aspirations have actually been aired, although the various groups harbor ideals and aspirations alone a wide continuum.

Malaysia?s will be interesting. With an election nearing, the federal government wants peace along the border and there are actually great trade advantages to a peaceful south through the IMT-GT. The Malaysian military and police are generally cooperative with the Thai authorities over border security issues and have established good relationships. However some insurgents are also Malaysian citizens, or at least have very close Malaysian relatives, and to some degree are integrated within the "pondok communities" within Kelantan. Perhaps Malaysia's prime role will be just acting as a chairman to these meetings to maintain negotiations, rather than acting more proactively in suggesting solutions. The true value of the Malaysian role will therefore be just to hold the process together, which may not be an easy task, given the emotional issues involved.

Any success will depend upon there not being any hidden agendas between the 2+1 parties. With the complexities of Thai politics, the military, the various insurgency groups and their splinters, and Malaysian politics, particularly related to the constituency of Kelantan, this could be a tall order. However there is also the hope that all sides are tired and through this process, there can be reaching out to other insurgency groups.

Much of this will personally depend upon the skills and attitude taken by Panradom Pattanathabur and the reception he gets from members of the BRN delegation. The other question here is over who Hassan Taib actually represents within the BRN, which has a number of splinter groups. Even if Hassan is speaking for a wide series of groups, every point of negotiations would have to be discussed in community shariah in every province to obtain any consensus, which could be daunting.

One must also remember this is not the first time peace talks have been attempted with many different moderators including former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed in the Langkawi talks a few years ago, and later with former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Both went nowhere.

One aspect that has not been tackled by both governments in this agreement is the role drug traffickers, bandits, gangsters, and other criminal elements are playing in this insurgency problem. It is in their interest to have turmoil in the deep south so they can carry out their trade. These groups are part of the problem and they need to be dealt with in any process for it to be a success.

The first meeting is scheduled to be held in Malaysia within the next two weeks, and every fortnight afterwards. It would be surprising if much information about these talks actually leaks out. However the meeting itself is something positive and who actually turns up to these meetings from the insurgents side will be very telling of eventual success of this process.

What is sure, while the violence will not stop immediately, the immediate level of violence may indicate how seriously various groups look at this upcoming process of negotiation. The Yingluck government has given some authority to the military to negotiate, who may take a more hardline than the government would. However from the Thai point of view some process is going on which is better than no process. The agreement to the Malaysian Government as the moderator is a redeeming event in foreign policy for the Najib Government. The BN will be hoping that this may provide some positive mileage among the rural Malays of Kelantan, who they need to win over if any positive electoral.

Meanwhile the people of the deep south will continue to go about their daily lives with extreme caution.

(Murray Hunter is an Australian academic teaching at a Malaysian university and a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel.)