Thailand must end trafficking of all migrant workers | New Mandala

Thailand must end trafficking of all migrant workers | New Mandala
Ruji Auethavornpipat, 29 JUN, 2016

Slavery in the seafood industry is just one part of a broader problem. And here’s how it can be addressed.

On 6 June Thailand’s Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha gave a 35-minute speech commemorating the annual Stop Human Trafficking Day in Bangkok. He was also shown on state media donating 3,000 Baht to the Labour Rights Promotion Network (LPN), a non-governmental organisation well-known for rescuing trafficked victims.

While the PM appeared to forget the date and name of the event during the speech, there is no doubt that human trafficking is high on the government’s agenda, despite other pressing issues such as national reconciliation and August’s referendum on the constitution.

Thailand’s renewed interest in human trafficking has come at the height of international criticism. The ruling junta has tremendously intensified its efforts in combating human trafficking but it has only done so in a few sectors, namely seafood industries.

Thailand is the third largest seafood exporter in the world. It makes sense that the government would want to focus its resources on cleaning up the industry. Thailand should be commended for its attempt. This however should not come at the cost of other groups of migrant workers.

Ever since the major exposés by international media like The Guardian and Associated Press, which linked Thailand’s seafood exports to slave labour and big retailers in the United States and Europe, the government has actively worked to improve the image of what Human Rights Watch calls, “Made in Thailand” brands.

Thailand also went through “a moment of shame” at the latest Universal Period Review (UPR), a cyclical review of human rights practice in 193 United Nations member states, and where the international community made sure migrant worker rights were firmly on the agenda.

Since 2014, Thailand has ranked in the lowest Tier 3 in the US Trafficking in Person (TIP) report for not making “significant effort” to combat human trafficking. The report recognises Thailand as “a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking.” The subsequent penalty is the cutting of the US non-humanitarian, non-trade assistance with Tier 3 countries.

In 2015, the European Union (EU) also decided to issue a ‘yellow card’, giving Thailand six months to clean up its illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing or otherwise face harsh trade sanctions against its seafood exports in the European market. This May, the EU gave Thailand another six months to solve the problem.

Thailand took another blow from the US after President Obama signed a new bill to stop slave-made imports from entering the US earlier this year.

With a heavy storm of international criticism, the ruling junta declared human trafficking a “national agenda” in 2015. The once unfamiliar scene of military men raiding workplaces is now a regular routine.

The government adopted a “Zero Tolerance” policy on human trafficking and increased its expenditure to combat it by 69.33 per cent. Prayuth even mentioned that Section 44 of the Interim Charter, which gives him absolute power, has been put to a “beneficial” use.

Although Thailand pledged to end human trafficking in all sectors, recent legal amendments, ministerial regulations and international treaty ratifications (like the ILO Maritime Labour Convention) demonstrate that Thailand’s effort selectively targets migrant workers in the seafood industries.

Thailand can make its domestic commitment a more genuine one by coming up with a comprehensive policy protecting all migrant workers.

Those employed in other sectors are also doing it tough.

For example, domestic workers, also among the most vulnerable group of migrants, are still excluded from the Labour Protection Act. They work in secluded and private homes without the guarantee of a minimum wage, specified hours of work and overtime pay.

Thailand can further make its commitment a regional one. PM Prayuth has repeatedly called for cooperation among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members.

Thailand can ratify the ASEAN convention on human trafficking – after all, as a Thai government official once told me, Thailand pushed for it so hard that “its body is bent” (dtua gohng). It can also help the Philippines and Indonesia push for a legally binding ASEAN instrument on the protection of migrant worker rights which has been on the negotiation table for almost a decade.

A call on ASEAN is the right way forward, as human trafficking can only be dealt with comprehensively when source, destination and transit countries work together.

This year’s TIP report will be released soon. If the PM really wishes to convey his serious commitment, the government must deal with the issue holistically and regionally. It needs to match words with deeds, as urged by the government itself a year ago.

Ruji Auethavornpipat is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations, ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs.

Thailand’s hidden republican tradition | New Mandala

Thailand’s hidden republican tradition | New Mandala
Dr Patrick Jory, 19 JUL, 2016

Despite the intense royalist indoctrination of the Bhumibol era it would be naïve not to imagine that at least some Thais draw inspiration from the country’s long republican tradition.

Thailand is typically understood as a deeply royalist country ruled by a highly revered monarch.

The king’s image is everywhere. The capital, Bangkok, is strewn with monuments to past kings. Countless streets, bridges, dams, universities, schools, army bases, hospitals, etc. are named after royalty. The calendar is full of royal holidays. Thailand has one of the world’s strictest lèse majesté laws which forbids criticism of the king and royal family.

Given all this it may come as a surprise that republicanism is deeply ingrained in Thailand’s political tradition. In fact, Thailand has one of the oldest republican traditions in Asia.

The first proposal to limit the absolute power of the monarch famously came in a petition to the king in 1885. It was drafted not by the European colonial powers but by a group of Thai princes. Though unsuccessful, this was among the first indigenous attempts to limit monarchical power anywhere in Asia.

In 1912, one year after the Chinese revolution ended 2000 years of imperial monarchy, the Thai authorities foiled a plot involving “thousands” to overthrow Siam’s monarchy. It was even said that lots had been drawn to assassinate King Rama VI. The plotters were split between republicans and constitutional monarchists.

As Copeland has shown, the Siamese press at the time mercilessly mocked the monarchy and aristocracy in a way that is unheard of today.

The People’s Party finally succeeded in ending Siam’s absolute monarchy in a bloodless coup on June 24 1932.

What is not widely acknowledged is the influence of republican thinking on the People’s Party, especially the leading intellectual force behind the movement, French-trained lawyer Pridi Phanomyong. It is clearly evident in the famous People’s Party Announcement Number 1, issued after the coup, which Pridi is credited with drafting:

On the question of the head of state, the People’s Party does not wish to seize the throne. It will invite this king to continue in his office as king, but he must be placed under the law of the constitution governing the country. He will not be able to act of his own accord without receiving the approval of the House of Representatives. The People’s Party has informed the king of its wish. We await his reply. If the king refuses the invitation or does not reply by the deadline, selfishly believing that his power has been reduced, then he will be judged to be a traitor to the nation. It will be necessary to govern the country as a republic [prachathipatai]; that is, the head of state will be a commoner appointed by the House of Representatives for a fixed term of office [my italics].

Royalist historiography which dominates the official interpretation of the events of 1932 downplays the role of the People’s Party, instead crediting King Rama VII with granting the gift of “democracy” to the Thai people.

But as the highlighted sentence from the Announcement shows, the term “prachathipatai”, normally translated today as “democracy”, originally conveyed the meaning of “republic”.

In fact, as Nakharin has pointed out, in the original 1932 draft of the Announcement to eliminate any doubt the Thai wordprachathipatai was followed by the English translation, “republic.”

Official dictionaries from this period, both Thai-to-Thai and Thai-to-English, also commonly translate the Thai word prachathipatai as “republic.”

Before 1932, Pridi himself had taught his law students that there were two types of “democracy” (prachathipatai): a country with a president as the head of government, as in France, or a government in which executive authority lay with a committee, as in the Soviet Union.

So Thailand’s democratic history has distinctly republican roots.

For that reason royalists later coined the phrase, “prachathipatai an mi phra maha kasat song pen pramuk” to describe Thailand’s political system. The phrase is officially translated today as “constitutional monarchy”, but its literal translation is “democracy with the sacred, great king as head of state”. Its real purpose is to erase the original republican associations of the wordprachathipatai. Even the word “constitution” has been sacrificed, since placing the king “under” a constitution violates Buddhist spatial norms about the proper place of the king.

Following the failed Boworadet rebellion in 1933 the royalists were routed. King Prajadhipok went into exile and eventually abdicated. Other princes fled Siam or were imprisoned. The heir to the throne escaped to Switzerland. For a decade there was no king in Thailand. Military strongman Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram, who also had republican leanings, ruled as a virtual president. This was the closest Thailand has come to republican rule.

The story of the restoration of the monarchy after World War II has been told before. It culminates with the coups of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in 1957 and 1958, following which, with the support of the United States, the monarchy became the figurehead of a virulently anti-communist military dictatorship. As Somsak has pointed out, for the royalists “the threat of communism and the threat of republicanism were one and the same thing”.

From this period monarchy in Thailand became more than just an institution. It legitimised an ideology of submission and servilitythat lives on today.

Under this royalist-military regime the erasure of Thailand’s republican tradition from official history was completed.

Following the routing of the Communist Party of Thailand and the end of the Cold War the last traces of republican political thinking were expunged. As a result a generation of Thais have been estranged from their country’s republican tradition.

The political conflict that erupted in 2005 between Thaksin and the palace has now entered its eleventh year with no resolution in sight. Royalists repeatedly accuse the Thaksin forces of seeking to lom jao – “overthrow the monarchy”. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, pro-Thaksin parties have repeatedly won free elections.

The mainstream pro-Thaksin forces have consistently denied they have a republican agenda. For obvious reasons surveying republican sympathies in Thailand today is impossible. Yet despite the intense royalist indoctrination of the Bhumibol era it would surely be naïve not to imagine that at least some of them may draw inspiration from Thailand’s long republican tradition.

Patrick Jory’s new book, “Thailand’s Theory of Monarchy: The Vessantara Jataka and the Idea of the Perfect Man”, has just been published by SUNY Press. For details, including how to order the book, see this link: http://www.sunypress.edu/p-6222-thailands-theory-of-monarchy.aspx

Thai youth activism rekindling hope | New Mandala

Thai youth activism rekindling hope | New Mandala
Kriangsak Teerakowitkajorn, 11 JUL, 2016

Are new protest movements driven by young people enough to inspire citizens and save the country’s ever-decreasing democratic hopes?

Once upon a time, there was a land of smiles. Now, with the bleak economy, and the rising household debts of the working class, some are calling Thailand ‘the sick man of Southeast Asia.’

The political deadlock has reached the point where ordinary Thais have almost forgotten how it started in the first place. Everyday it seems, the junta introduces new, more worrisome, problems— takethe Single Gateway for instance.

In terms of civil and political freedoms, Thailand’s record is abominable. The junta has silenced liberal and progressive critics – by both coercion and repression. Some of the most outspoken voices have either gone underground or into exile. Those who do not have the privilege to flee join the growing number of political prisoners now filling up prisons.

In the face of these concerns, the Thai public is being told to ‘shut up and consume,’ and leave their future in the hands of a paternalist oligarchy. Their proposed charter gives us a frightening glimpse into the society that they wish to bring about. For example, proposed cuts to free high school—replaced by pre-elementary education—redistributes state welfare to the needs of the urban middle class, at the expense of working families.

Without the freedom of speech to debate the charter, hope seems to be wanting, desperately, in the land of ‘free people.’

Over the last few months I have been living in Myanmar. There, concerned NGO and activist friends often ask me about the political situation in Thailand: am I optimistic about the political future?

Given the downward spiral we have witnessed since the military coup in May 2014, I am always tempted to offer a pessimistic outlook. Recently, however, I am inclined to give a different kind of response, one informed by new sources of inspiration.

The Thai political landscape has changed so rapidly and profoundly since Thailand’s latest coup – not to mention the previous coup in 2006 – that the counter-movement it has created is nascent and still taking form. Yet, the emergent movement – or rather, movements – of young activists has already become a source of strength for ordinary people.

I am talking about the arrival of courageous, well-organised and creative student activism led by Dao Din, Liberal League of Thammasat for Democracy (LLTD), Liberal Assembly of Chiang Mai University for Democracy (LACMUD), and the New Democracy Movement (NDM).

In my conversations with older generations of Thai activists, people often raise the concern that activists struggle to build on disparate protest events to create an organised sustained movement. This challenge is associated with the fact that, in past years, protests led by Bangkok-based activists frequently resulted in one unintended consequence: activists are singled out and turned into high profile martyrs, leaving the campaign disrupted and momentum lost.

Over the past two years, however, Thai student activists have increasingly shown that they are not only better coordinated, but also more strategic in their response to the limitations of the legal landscape.

Looking back to the days of the spontaneous ‘Hunger Games’ salute, recent actions are more effective and better conceived; especially in the way they allow broader participation with low personal risk. For instance, the series of ‘Toys, Dolls and Balloons’ protests in Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, Pattani and Chiang Rai, allow people to use objects to express otherwise outlawed opinions on the country’s proposed new charter.

It would be misleading to talk about the movements without acknowledging the critical supporting role of human rights lawyers, progressive scholars and journalists, and other veteran activists. More importantly, each group in the student movement has its own strengths, approaches, and area of priorities.

For instance, the urban-based groups such as NDM are shrewd in their ability to frame campaigns around the tastes and interests of urban Thais, whereas Dao Din, recently organising under the umbrella of the New E-Saan Movement, is committed to grassroots community organising on issues that resonate in the Northeast.

While urban Thais and Northeasterners share the goal of returning democracy to the country, there remains a fundamental question in terms of how to negotiate different priorities on everything from free education to development projects.

What I have learned from the movement for democracy in Myanmar is that movements are at their most powerful when diverse groups with different priorities manage to cultivate trust and a shared collective vision. With Thai youth activists breathing new life into political activism, hope has been rekindled for the most cynical among us.

The challenge that awaits us – for both the inspired and cynical – is how we can now collectively build on the strength and diversity of the democracy movement to bring into being a shared vision inclusive of the needs and desires of the whole country.

Kriangsak Teerakowitkajorn is a Thai political economist, and trainer for social change. He is completing a PhD at the Department of Geography, Syracuse University, researching the geography of labour activism in the Thailand’s industrial estates.

Red and Yellow in Germany | New Mandala

Red and Yellow in Germany | New Mandala
Nick Nostitz, 04 JUL, 2016

On 18 June, I was invited to talk at a symposium at the University of Bonn in Germany, organised in conjunction with Stiftung Asienhaus and several Red Shirt groups in Europe.

I spoke at a workshop on the Red Shirts after the coup, and the final podium discussion on the future of democracy in Thailand. There were workshops on more sensitive topics as well, which I did not participate in.

After the opening talks in a large and fully occupied lecture hall, Ajarn Pitch Pongsawat and Nopporn Khunikha talked about the new constitution and Ajarn Pavin Chachavalpongpun spoke on the monarchy. Other workshops covered a range of topics, including the constitution and the referendum, led by Professor Wolfram Schaffar, Dr Pitch Pongsawat and Dr Vichien Tansirikongkhont; the monarchy and lese majeste, led by exiles Junya Jimprasert and Aum Neko, Dr Serhat Uenaldi and Andrew MacGregor Marshall; and human rights violations under the military regime, led by Kunthika Nutcharus and Kheetanat Wannaboworn.

A workshop on the Red Shirt movement was led by exiled Red Shirt leader Visa Kanthap, local Red Shirt activist Bangon Schwarz, Dr Claudio Sopranzetti, and myself. The final workshop examined exiled activists, the European Union and strategies for democracy, and was led by Din Buadaeng, exiled Red Shirt leader Jaran Ditapichai and Kwanjai Chularat.

In my workshop Bangon Schwarz talked about why she as an ordinary Thai became interested in politics. Visa Khantap talked about his long political struggle since the 1970s and the split of former friends into the Red and Yellow camps. I talked mostly about why the Red Shirts have not actively opposed the military coup, reasoning that the majority of Red Shirts are not revolutionaries, but normal citizens and a reflection of the Thai population, who want to express their political views via elections. In the present conditions active opposition would mean imprisoned and dead people, and that the UDD and most other Red Shirt groups had to design their strategies according to this.

I also mentioned that the demand that the Red Shirts should separate from Thaksin would be quite unrealistic, given that the majority of the Red Shirts were people who benefited under the populist schemes introduced by his government. In fact, such a demand would be an infringement on the people’s democratic right to support their politician of choice, and would therefore alienate these sectors of the population similar to what took place when the PAD began protesting against Thaksin in 2005/2006.

When it was asked if more aggressive strategies should be followed I said that this would be quite counterproductive as a civil war would not be in anyone’s interest, and that in the end both Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts are still Thais and have to find ways to continue to live with each other.

In our room three PDRC supporters took part as well. There were some frictions, naturally. Some of the Red Shirts in the room objected that the PDRC supporters filmed the talks, but as the event was live-streamed, and several of the participants filmed as well, I said that the PDRC supporters should also be allowed to film. One Danish PDRC supporter said that the Yingluck government came from vote buying and was therefore not democratic.

I answered that this is an unproven allegation, and referred to the ANFREL election observers who concluded that in general, the 2011 elections went well. I also mentioned Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker’s article, published on 6 December 2013, in The Bangkok Post, “Vote-buying claims nothing but dangerous nonsense”. When moderator Oliver Pye asked to get back to the main topic of the Red Shirt movement the three PDRC supporters walked out of the room.

During a break after the workshops, while participants had cake and coffee, about 15 PDRC supporters, who mostly came from Denmark, gathered near the university’s gate for a counter protest. Organisers of the seminar and the later Red Shirt protest march called the police, fearing that some incident might happen.

During the symposium authorities had watched over the PDRC supporters, to protect them against possible attacks from over-emotional Red Shirts, which did not happen. While not happy about the PDRC, the Red Shirts treated them respectfully. Police then arrived, and politely asked the PDRC supporters to gather at a nearby place where they have announced their protest, and the PDRC supporters soon left to their protest venue.

The following day, Naewna newspaper published coverage on thePDRC protest and a scathing report on the seminar.

The final podium discussion took again place in the lecture hall, with Junya Yimprasert, Jaran Ditapichai, Wolfram Schaffar and me on the podium, moderated by Oliver Pye. An interesting friendly side debate took place on the podium between Wolfram Schaffar, who framed the conflict in Thailand in context with the worldwide developments on liberal democracy under attack by rich elites and problems over distribution of wealth, and me, who looked at the Red-Yellow conflict as primarily an identity crises, a transformation conflict and a conflict over participation that is part of the development towards democracy in Thailand.

After, a protest march through Bonn’s inner city was organised. The lecturers flown in from Thailand opted not to take part, as to not violate their university rules. Naturally, I also did not participate, but used the opportunity to take pictures. The day ended in a picnic and party in the villa of one of the organisers in a suburb of Bonn.

Nick Nostitz is a photo-journalist and long-time contributor to New Mandala. Following are some of the images he captured at the symposium.

Andrew MacGregor Marshall prepares for his workshop.

The King is (nearly) dead: long live the King? | New Mandala

The King is (nearly) dead: long live the King? | New Mandala
Llewellyn McCann, 16 JUN 2016

Llewellyn McCann explores what the royal succession will mean for Thai elite politics.

On 9 June 2016, Thailand celebrated the 70th anniversary of the accession to the throne by Bhumipol Adulyadej.  It was a celebration by both the ultra-monarchists and those who had to go through the motions. Conveniently scrubbed from royal history and public discourse (especially with the abuse of lèse majesté laws) is how he ascended the throne, almost certainly having accidentally killed his brother Ananda in 1946.

Almost all Thais have lived under Bhumipol’s reign, and benefitted from the transformation of the country from a poor developing agrarian society with 67 percent poverty in 1986 to a $390 billion economy with a poverty rate of only 11 percent in 2014, though one that is clearly underperforming since the 2014 coup d’etat.  Criticism of the monarch has grown, but during his reign, Thailand was transformed from a subsistence agrarian economy to a middle income.  Peasants have become the aspirational middle class, setting the stage for the country’s ongoing political conflict.

Missing from the paeans was Bhumipol, who was too ill to make a public appearance.  The media often speaks of the societal unease regarding his imminent passing.  But this is overstated.  The King has spent the last year living in Siriraj Hospital, and just underwent angioplasty surgery.  While not a serious procedure anymore, it is on an 88-year-old man who has spent almost all of the past five years confined to a hospital and has recently been treated for water on the brain and lung infections.

While the yellow shirted ultra-royalists prostrated themselves, most Thais went on with their lives with only cursory notice of the anniversary.  The reality is the monarchy means less to average Thais than it did in the past for three key reasons:

First, the King has largely been out of their lives for the past five years, if not more.

Second, while journalists often phrase it as the Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn “not enjoying the same levels of support for his father,” the reality is he commands almost no respect from society.  The moral authority and legitimacy of the monarchy will plummet, and as such, so will its importance in the lives of ordinary Thais.

Third, there is growing fatigue of the political upheavals done in his name, including coups in 2006 and 2014, and the rampant abuse of the lèse majesté law and Computer Crimes Act.  In the two years following the coup, 68 people have been charged with lèse majesté(Art. 112 of the Criminal Code).  If the monarchy is as revered as Thai ultra-royalists and the military say it is, then why must it be so vigorously defended by draconian laws?  A robust monarchy could handle criticism, whether in principle or satire.

So why is the King’s passing so important?  I outlined why here, and a year later the points largely stand.  There are, however, a few aspects that take into account events of the past year.

First and foremost, the succession is about Thai elite politics. The May 2014 coup was thrown, in large part, in order to control the succession.  Neither the military nor the ultra-monarchists could fathom the Pheu Thai under direct, or even indirect, control of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to be in power during the transition.  The political instability was simply their justification to seize power, which they show no sign of relinquishing, now in the third year of military rule.

We know there were rifts between the junta, led by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha, and the ultra-monarchists, led by Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda.  Under the 1924 Palace Law, which predates the establishment of the constitutional monarchy in 1932, the 63-year-old Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn should ascend the throne as the male heir. The ultra-monarchists cannot countenance the Crown Prince be-spoiling the institution of the monarchy.  Despite desperate attempts to clean up his image and make him appear more kingly, his reputation will be a hard one to whitewash.

Despite early and regular signals by Prem and the Privy Council that the Crown Prince is unfit to rule and a peril to the institution of the monarchy, Prem seems to have acquiesced to the reality that he will become the King and has made tepid endorsements. Very tepid in fact, such as showing up for the start of the 16 August 2015 Bike for Mom event led by the spandex-clad Crown Prince, and organized by the Royal Thai Army (RTA).  And the Crown Prince, for his part, has made efforts to patch up the relationship with Prem and the ultras to ensure his succession. In December 2014, he divorced his wife Princess Srirasmi  – whom royalist elites called a “bar girl” – and cut their son out of the line of succession.  At the same time allowed her parents, three brothers, and members of her extended family to be convicted of lese majeste and sentenced to three to five year prison terms.

Prem probably still views the Crown Prince as an existential threat to the wealth, power and privilege of the ultra-monarchists, but their ability to orchestrate Crown Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn’s ascension to the throne is limited.  Although the Privy Council does have constitutional prerogative to influence the succession, the only part of the 2007 constitution that is currently still in force, following the 22 May 2014 coup, is Chapter II, the section on the monarchy that was incorporated into Chapter I of the draft constitution released in April 2015 in toto.  Chapter I, Section 22 states clearly: “succession to the Throne shall be in accordance with the Palace Law on Succession, B.E. 2467.” In Section 23, if the King has appointed his successor, the Council of Ministers submits the name to the National Assembly for endorsement.  The appointed National Legislative Assembly (NLA) is dominated by military, serving and retired officers. It’s just hard to see them voting against Prayut and the junta on this issue.

It is still likely that Prem and the Privy Council will try to use their influence to at least delay the forwarding of the name to the NLA by calling for an “extended period of mourning” upon the Kings passing; that in itself would weaken Vajiralongkorn’s legitimacy.  But getting the NLA to support Sirindhorn’s ascension or at the least her regency over the Crown Prince’s infant son, born to his fourth wife, is looking increasingly unlikely.  Prem himself is less visible, which is no surprise at age 95.

The single most important reason that Prayut and the RTA are lining up behind the Crown Prince, is not the Constitution (for which they have proven to have no regard for), or their love of the King, in whose name they shamelessly cling to power.  It is about the protection of the military’s and ultra-monarchists’ long-term power, wealth and privilege.  Prayut and the RTA respect the Crown Princess and probably agree that she would serve their interests well.  The RTA made a huge show and diverted resources from their royal adoration budget, which increased by 20% following the coup to US$536 million in 2015, to celebrate her 6th Cycle.

Ultimately for the junta, it is ultimately about stability and political order.

Despite the draft constitution that has done everything it can to strip power away from political parties and elected politicians while empowering the military and non-elected elites including provisions for a non-elected prime minister and military oversight for the following five years, there is strong evidence that the Pheu Thai party will continue to be the predominant political party.  No credible and independent analysis of the draft constitution believes it to be workable charter that will lead to the return of civilian politics, free of military interference.  Indeed, most analysis believes that the charter will lead to years and years of prolonged political strife and deep and societal cleavages.  That the military will not even allow a public debate over the draft charter ahead of the planned 7 August referendum, is telling.

The junta’s claims that it has brought reconciliation or political stability is ludicrous.  Things are calm on the surface because of restrictions on the media and civil society.   According to ILaw, in the two years following the May 2014 coup d’état, 926 were summoned – errr “invited” – to report to the military for “discussions,” 527 have been arrested, 47 have been charged under the Sedition Law, and 167 civilians have been tried in military courts with no right of appeal.    The tempo of political persecutions has been increasing. In April 2016 alone, four people were summonsed to meet with the RTA, 10 were arrested for peaceful demonstrations, three people were arrested for lese majeste, and nine people were tried in military courts.  The military regime is brittle.

The junta believes that the Crown Prince can be managed.  Or to look at it another way, they truly fear what the Crown Prince is capable of should he be passed over;  and here we do not need to revisit the long history of business interests and other ties between Thaksin and the Crown Prince.  There is evidence that the Crown Prince was pressured to break those ties, but if the Crown Prince is passed over, he would have significant grievances with the ultra-monarchist elites.  More importantly, he would have a potential ally in Thaksin Shinawatra.  Though less public since Thaksin’s ouster, the two have met on at least one occasion, and both have a well-founded dislike of the ultra-monarchist elites and military.

There is only one way back for Thaksin, both physically, but also politically and financially: a royal pardon.  He needs the Crown Prince on the throne.  As King he could pardon Thaksin and there is absolutely nothing that the military and the ultra-royalist elites could do to prevent this.

Why would he do this? Simple, the crown prince enjoys little popular support and Thaksin’s endorsement would do much to bolster his legitimacy.  As much as Thaksin needs him, he needs Thaksin.  Moreover, as the RTA has proven disingenuous with their attempts at national reconciliation, the new King could possibly force just that in attempt to quickly broaden his legitimacy, and demonstrate his independence from his military handlers.

This is what causes the greatest fear in Prem and the ultras, and the military is obviously trying to prevent this alliance from happening.  That is why Prayut is working so hard to slavishly court the Crown Prince, ride behind him on his bicycle rides, and try to cut off any questions about the Crown Prince ascending the throne.  The RTA believes that the Crown Prince can be managed, and that they can convince him that pardoning Thaksin would usher in a new wave of political instability.

And if the Crown Prince, i.e. Thaksin’s get out of jail card is passed over, then the fugitive prime minister has no reason to hold back his Red Shirt supporters.  Since the 2014 coup, Thaksin has maintained a low profile and called on his supporters to work with the junta.  This is the real reason that there was less violence following the coup than predicted. Yes, the military has cracked down and systematically upended all human rights protections, but Thaksin also ordered the Red Shirts to stand down as he tried to negotiate a grand bargain for himself and his sister, Yingluck.  While we cannot fall into the military’s trap of thinking that Thaksin and the Red Shirts are one in the same, as they have different agendas and interests, he has clearly held them back in the past two years, trying to give the junta enough rope to hang themselves.

Finally, the military needs to win over the Crown Prince for the very fact that they are clearly planning to stage continued interventions in civilian politics.  They are trying to do this “legally.”  The draft charter, for example, gives the military several avenues to control democratic politics. It will be able to appoint the members of the 250 man senate, with six ex officio positions for the military chiefs, who in turn can appoint the prime minister.  The appointed upper house will have additional appointment and vetting powers, and will be able to check the independent law-making responsibilities of the elected lower house, including constitutional amendments.  The military will lead another unelected body, the National Reform Steering Assembly, responsible for the defining and vetting public policies, including the junta’s “roadmap” to democracy as well as a 20-year national development plan.  The draft charter gives the military sweeping powers in pursuit of law and order, without any accountability, undermining the rule of law.  As one thoughtful analysis recently put it:

The draft Thai charter adds far-reaching discretionary limitations on rights and liberties that fall outside the strict letter of the constitution, as long as any restrictive measures imposed accord with the rule of law. While a limitation of this kind would be exceptional in any context, it is doubly striking and problematic in Thailand, where the concept of the rule of law is imprecisely defined, subject to broad interpretation, and historically vulnerable to manipulation and abuse.

As if all of these powers are not enough, the military is prepared to launch another coup d’etat.  This is what makes the monarchy so indispensable to the military: an extra legal seizure of power becomes legal with the King’s endorsement, just as Bhumipol did in 2014. Without that endorsement, it’s treason.  What if the new King doesn’t sign off on extra-legal actions or fails to endorse a constitution that all objective commentators view as destabilizing?

But it is also about the military’s own purview.  The new King will almost definitely appoint a new 18 person Privy Council, people loyal to him.  He will keep few if any of the current members (and many would refuse to serve under him). The Privy Council sits atop what Duncan McCargo refers to as the “network monarchy” and has vast power, whether through patronage ties through the judiciary, over the Crown Property Bureau that oversees $30-40 billion in assets, but also the military.

The Privy Council formally forwards the names of all flag officers to the King for endorsement. While the military has tried to put itself beyond accountability to civilian politicians under the new charter (budgets and promotions), it still has to account to the monarchy, via the Privy Council, and that is important for Thailand’s nearly 1,100 flag officers. The Crown Prince, who holds the rank of Air Chief Marshall, will promote a cadre of generals loyal to himself. Here the new King, should he chose, could thwart the power and the influence of the Eastern Tigers, who have dominated the Thai military politics and staged the 2006 and 2014 coups.  The new King could completely alter the seeding of protégés that Prayut has overseen to maintain his influence.

The generals have painted themselves into a corner and their legitimacy is quickly ebbing.  The economy continues at an anemic pace with both declining foreign direct investment and exports.  In 2015, foreign direct investment plummeted 78% due to the junta’s continued mismanagement and political risk.  Exports in April 2016 fell 8% from the previous year.  At the same time, income inequality is soaring, with the top 0.1% controlling 46.5% of total assets, making Thailand the sixth most unequal country in the world.  All of this has accelerated under the royalist-elite backed junta.  As Kevin Hewison so rightly pointed out, Thailand is beset by the “prodigious and pernicious influence of a social, political and economic system that is structured to maintain inequality.”  That will continue to fuel support for the Red Shirts and any politician that begins to address the grievances of rural Thais.  But even in the cities, it is increasingly hard to see sustained middle class support for Prayut, as their economic condition becomes even more precarious, and Thailand continues to lose out to regional competitors, such as Vietnam.

The military has backed its longterm fortunes to an unpopular Crown Prince.  Yet the military has legitimized its rule and power as the ultimate defender of the Monarchy.  Soon it will be defending something that few will care to defend.

This has forced the Thai military to increase its assault on democracy, human rights, accountability and oversight, and the rule of law.  New laws are being forwarded to control the internet and social media, while existing laws are being manipulated and abused.  That is not a sign of strength, but a sign of weakness.  This edifice is sure to crack even more, built on the crumbling foundation of the monarchy under Rama X.

Llewellyn McCann is a pseudonym. The author is a long-time watcher of Southeast Asian politics.

Donald Trump is Thailand’s friend | New Mandala

Donald Trump is Thailand’s friend
Tom Winson, 08 APR 2016

As the US stares down the barrel of a Trump presidency, there is a lot that Thailand can learn.

I hope Donald Trump is the next President of the United States. For Thailand’s sake.

Trump is a manipulative orator who wants Americans to feel angry. He doesn’t want them to think.

Trump wants to win power by persuading Americans that America’s complex problems are easy to fix.

Donald Trump is America’s Thaksin Shinawatra. Donald Trump is America’s Suthep Thaugsuban. If Trump is the next President of the United States, Americans will have won Thaksin and Suthep in a single package. Buy one, get one free.

Donald Trump is Sondhi Limthongkul, Buddha Issara, Jatuporn Prompan and Nattawut Saikua. Six extreme populists for the price of one.

Like his six Thai brothers, Donald Trump believes he has all the answers. But he can’t harm the United States as much as his Thai brothers have already harmed Thailand, or as much as they could harm Thailand in the future if Thais don’t protect themselves.

The United States is far from perfect. Think of renditions, water-boarding and Abu Ghraib, and of America’s own political cronyism. But Americans are better protected against their Trump. Thais have little protection against their Trumps.

What will happen when President Trump tries to censor the Internet, deport American-born children of illegal immigrants, close mosques, bar the entry of Muslims, impose the death penalty on murderers of police officers, or order the military to use torture?

President Trump will be challenged in the courts, especially the Supreme Court, the American equivalent of Thailand’s Constitutional Court. Americans will ask Supreme Court judges whether Trump’s actions breach the US Constitution.

Americans respect their constitution because it protects them from people like Trump. And they feel they own their constitution. They own it because their forefathers consulted widely and debated passionately before they put pen to paper.

Thailand’s first constitution was a gift from unhappy bureaucrats. Most of Thailand’s subsequent constitutions have been gifts from grumpy generals.

When Supreme Court judges are considering whether Trump’s actions are constitutional, they won’t have to force their way past mobs of pro-Trump or anti-Trump protesters screaming that they will cripple the judges, their families and the whole nation if the court doesn’t deliver a verdict they like. Most pro-Trump and anti-Trump Americans respect the law and the independence of the judiciary.

If fanatics among them try to seize Washington’s airport or to sabotage an international summit, the government will tell the police to enforce the law. And the police will enforce the law and stop them. The law is supreme, not the mob or the police.

The Supreme Court judges will not care that President Trump has just won an election and that a majority of Americans believed him when he said he would make them happy and rich. The law is supreme, not the voters.

Nor will the judges find eminent figures cajoling them, twisting their arms or offering them rewards. The law is supreme, not the elite.

The judges will explain clearly why they have reached their verdict. They won’t say that they want to restore harmony. They will say why the law supports their findings. The law is supreme, not the judges.

Americans will accept the Supreme Court decisions because American judges are judges; they don’t want to be politicians or administrators. They want to be independent referees and, critically, they want to be perceived as independent referees. So, from the day they become a judge, they scrupulously avoid commenting publicly on politics. They are proud to be judges and stoutly defend the independence of the judiciary.

The courts are likely to find that President Trump’s enthusiasms breach the US Constitution. The Constitution and the courts will protect Americans from the worst of Trump.

Congress will also put a brake on President Trump. The US President can’t pass laws or secure his budget unless he respects the elected representatives of the people and the legislature as an institution.

When Congress and President Trump reach a deadlock, members of Congress won’t resign in a huff, or boycott an election, or be bullied into whistling for another Trump, or call for a military coup. Congress – not the street – is the venue for political debate. Elected MPs – not mobsters, mobs or soldiers – represent the people.

The states will also thwart some of President Trump’s enthusiasms. The United States has a federal system; power isn’t centralised.

And the American media will draw attention to Trump’s deceptions and give Trump’s opponents opportunities to challenge his ideas. If Trump tries to adjust their attitudes, all of America will laugh at him.

President Trump may adapt to these checks and balances that lie at the heart of American democracy. If he doesn’t, the checks and balances will chew him up and spit him out.

The United States will suffer under Trump. But the rule of law will limit the damage and protect ordinary Americans.

The United States doesn’t have the answers to all Thailand’s governance problems. Nor does any other country. But Thailand can learn a lot from the presidency of Donald Trump. Vote One Trump.

Tom Winson is a pen name. The author is a long-time observer of Thailand.