Kachin rebels in Burma allege new air attacks | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
AP News, Jan 04, 2013
YANGON, Burma (AP) — Kachin ethnic rebels in northern Burma said Thursday that military air attacks against them are continuing, but that the guerrillas still hold key positions protecting their main base.
Kachin Independence Army spokesman La Nan acknowledged that one of the guerrillas’ hilltop posts had fallen, as reported by the government. But he said other posts remain in rebel hands to safeguard their main base at Laiza.
Burma’s military on Wednesday acknowledged carrying out air attacks and seizing the hilltop position to keep the Kachin from blocking supply convoys to a government base at Lajayang, which is near Laiza. The Kachin admit attacking the convoys, saying they carry ammunition and arms that put their own base at risk of being overrun.
(READ MORE: Burma ‘using Chinese airspace’ as fighting nears Kachin HQ)
La Nan said two government fighter planes launched rocket attacks Thursday, following several days of strafing and bombing by fighter planes and helicopters.
The Kachin, like Burma’s other ethnic minorities, have long sought greater autonomy from the central government. They are the only major ethnic rebel group that has not reached a cease-fire agreement with elected President Thein Sein’s reformist government, which came to power in 2011 after almost five decades of military rule.
The United States has said the use of air power in Kachin state is “extremely troubling.” On Thursday, State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said the U.S. is seeking clarity on the situation following conflicting statements from Burma authorities, and is urging both the government and Kachin representatives to stop fighting.
“Our view is that all sides need to cease and desist and get into dialogue with each other,” she told a news briefing.
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged Burma’s authorities “to desist from any action that could endanger the lives of civilians living in the area or further intensify the conflict in the region,” U.N. spokesman Martin Nesirky said. Ban called on the government and rebels to work toward political reconciliation.
“It is necessary to hold a dialogue,” La Nan said Thursday in an email interview. “Military means will only prolong the problem. Peace can be achieved only through political dialogue.”
He said there appeared to have been casualties on both sides, but the government suffered more losses as the attacking force. The military’s announcement Wednesday said several soldiers were killed and injured in attacks by the Kachin.
The military’s acknowledgment that it was carrying out an air attack came just two days after a presidential spokesman denied there was an air offensive, and raised new questions about how answerable the army is to the government.
The military by law continues to hold much influence in government, and is also seen as pulling the strings behind the scenes, even as Thein Sein’s government has been hailed for instituting democratic reforms. An order in late 2011 by Thein Sein to halt offensive operations against the Kachin was not honored in practice.
Tensions with ethnic minorities are considered a major long-term problem for any Burma government and a threat to the nascent democracy.
Fighting erupted in Kachin state in June 2011 after the KIA refused to abandon a strategic base near a hydropower plant that is a joint venture with a Chinese company.
The government last month delivered an ultimatum to the Kachin to clear a road by Christmas Day so it could supply its base. The Kachin rejected the ultimatum for fear of a government attack on their own outpost.
Friday, January 4, 2013
Tuesday, January 1, 2013
Asian Giants Revise Myanmar Policy | The Irrawaddy Magazine
Asian Giants Revise Myanmar Policy | The Irrawaddy Magazine
SIMON ROUGHNEEN / THE IRRAWADDY, January 1, 2013
As reforms are slowly worked through Myanmar’s Parliament, a shift is taking place in the country’s foreign relations. Better dealings with the West aside, the long-time military-ruled nation’s international rebirth has prompted other palpable changes.
Some of Asia biggest brand names are making their mark in Yangon and other cities in Myanmar. (Photo: Steve Tickner / The Irrawaddy)
Under the former junta, trade sanctions left businesses from China, India, South Korea and Southeast Asia with an open goal in Myanmar—a land rich in natural resources coveted by Asia’s bustling economies.
During the sanctions era, China and Thailand have been arguably the two most prominent investor-nations, with China first among equals given its additional role as Myanmar’s minder on the United Nations Security Council—deflecting criticism and blocking damning resolutions in the wake of the former junta’s heinous human rights abuses.
But a year ago, China was handed a surprising snub by the nominally civilian Myanmar government. In one of the first signals that Naypyitaw was about to undertake a series of reforms, President U Thein Sein suspended the controversial Myitsone Dam in Kachin State.
The project was set to flood an area the size of Singapore yet have 90 percent of power generated exported to China, despite only a quarter of the domestic population having access to electricity, according to the Asian Development Bank.
With Western investors likely to stream in soon, and with Japan offering the Myanmar government a helping hand with debt relief and major investment pledges in much-needed infrastructure, does this mean Beijing has suddenly been pushed onto the back foot?
“Yes and no,” say those keeping an eye on regional affairs. Jan Zalewski, an analyst covering Myanmar for the IHS Global Insight research firm, told The Irrawaddy that “Myanmar’s re-balancing of foreign relations means that China will increasingly have to compete with other foreign players when dealing with the country.”
As challenges arise, there are signs that China is recalibrating its approach to Myanmar. A recent editorial in the Global Times warned Chinese businesses to take local sensitivities into account when doing business in Myanmar.
The article cited the Myitsone debacle and recent mass protests against a copper mining project in the Letpadaung Mountains of Sagaing Region—the latter jointly owned by the military-controlled Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd and Wan Bao Company, a subsidiary of state-owned Chinese arms manufacturer North China Industries Corp.
“Myanmar’s increasing gearing-up to attract Western investments not least means that the modus operandi of doing business with Myanmar is changing, which will alter the position of many Chinese businesses that hitherto had to rely on only a handful of key contacts within the previous military regime for entering the country,” said Mr Zalewski.
This does not mean, however, that China has completely lost out in Myanmar. In 2011, bilateral trade between the two countries came to US $6.5 billion, up 46 percent year-on-year, according to Beijing, while China’s investment in Myanmar hit a total of $20.26 billion by the end of last year, going by Naypyitaw figures.
According to Chinese reports of Wu Bangguo’s visit to Myanmar ahead of the Chinese Communist Party leadership changes in November, U Thein Sein said Myanmar welcomes Chinese investment, especially in labor-intensive industries.
“Myanmar knows that it won’t be beneficial for it to completely sideline its powerful northern neighbor, so China’s role in the country will still remain dominant,” added Mr Zalewski.
That should hold even if Myanmar’s opposition wins the 2015 general election, as democracy icon and former political prisoner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has welcomed continued good relations with Beijing, telling Chinese state-run Xinhua News Agency in June that, “We are very good friends with China. I really don’t see why we cannot continue to be good friends.”
Indeed, with Western economies struggling with debt and stagnation, even a China that is now running into slowdown seems set to be the single biggest investor in Myanmar for the foreseeable future.
But as China’s prominence recedes in relative terms, Japan is moving fast to bolster commercial ties after generally going along with Western sanctions in recent years. Now, however, Japan is stealing a march on potential competitors by plowing money into Myanmar as Westerners cautiously await new laws, such as the long-overdue Foreign Direct Investment law passed in early November.
According to Toshihiro Kudo, a Japan External Trade Organization researcher speaking in Bangkok, Japanese interest in Myanmar is “feverish,” with up to 200 businesspeople a month passing through its Yangon office compared with perhaps only 200 per year in the past.
Recent estimates indicate that Japan has or will put at least $18 billion into Myanmar, based on a round-up of loan write-offs, public and private investment pledges and bilateral aid promises. Myanmar wants Japan to develop the Thilawa Port, a half-hour drive from downtown Yangon, and possibly inject much needed cash into the stillborn multibillion dollar port planned for Dawei in the southwestern Tanintharyi Region.
Japan’s NTT—one of the world’s apex telecommunications infrastructure providers—has established an office in Yangon in advance of a planned liberalization of Myanmar’s minuscule telecoms sector, which will likely allow foreign companies to operate as network providers. The Myanmar office came on the back of U Thein Sein meeting company executives of NTT in Japan in April—one of several investment-related trips in Asia that the pacemaker-wearing president has made in recent months.
Japanese foundations have promised money for Myanmar’s impoverished ethnic borderlands—lending the country’s interests a selfless air. However, Yuki Akimoto, a director of BurmaInfo Japan who researches and documents human rights and environmental issues in Myanmar, says Japan’s interest is much more business-driven than altruistic.
With tensions between Tokyo and Beijing increasing over disputed islands and long-simmering nationalistic mutual hostility, Japanese business sees an opportunity to cut-and-run with a cheaper labor market now on the scene in Myanmar. “Japanese manufacturers already had been looking for alternative production bases because producing in China was getting too expensive,” Ms Akimoto told The Irrawaddy.
But what of Asia’s third biggest economy, India, which shares a 1,463km border with Myanmar as well as a history of British colonial rule?
India has typically been seen as floundering somewhat in its Myanmar policy, the oft-touted “world’s largest democracy” reversing support for Myanmar’s democratically-elected winners of the 1990 election in favor of “pragmatic engagement” with the coup-installed former military dictatorship—the rationale being that India would otherwise lose economic and strategic ground in Myanmar to an ascendant China.
That happened anyway, and although bilateral trade between India and Myanmar is expected to more than double by 2015, according to a speech given in Kolkata by the Myanmar consul general there, the projected leap from $1.28 billion in 2010-11 to $3 billion 2014-15 would still amount to less than half of Myanmar-China trade today.
In November, opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi visited India—the country where she lived as a young woman while her mother was Myanmar ambassador there during the 1960s. Her trip came on the heels of yet another international suitor arriving in Myanmar earlier this year, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh—himself under fire at home for dithering over India’s now-backfiring economy—paid a visit.
But after a decade-and-a-half of playing catch-up with China, will increased investment and engagement from Japan and the West crowd out New Delhi once more? Again, it is a “yes and no” answer, according to some who keep tabs on India’s regional policies.
Dr K Yhome, a Myanmar researcher at the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian think-tank, believes that increasing Western engagement means that the window of opportunity for New Delhi will narrow.
It might not be a complete loss for India in Myanmar, however, he says, telling The Irrawaddy that “New Delhi also would see the West’s engagement as adding to its efforts to counterbalance China in Myanmar,” and in turn, facilitate India deploying geographical and cultural advantages in its eastern neighbor.
“Despite the West’s presence in Myanmar, New Delhi has the advantage of proximity, both land and maritime, to Myanmar and also cultural linkages,” said Dr K Yhome. “The question is how effectively India will leverage these strengths in Myanmar.”
Last year, in what was one of the first tangible international rewards for what were then just promises of reform, Myanmar’s nearest neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) agreed to let Myanmar lead the group in 2014—eight years after it was stopped from chairing Asean as Western countries objected on human rights grounds.
For the most part, though, Asean’s “non-interference” mantra put the bloc at odds with the West over Myanmar, leaving both sides now claiming credit for pushing the country toward reforms. Asean is often considered the sole source of regional political pressure
on Naypyitaw—urging the former junta to hold free and fair elections and attempting to codify human rights—compared to China and India, which both happily look the other way on humanitarian issues as long as investments pay off.
And while the West says sanctions backed the junta into a corner—an assertion backed up by some leaked diplomatic cables from the US Embassy in Yangon—Asean claims the opposite: that sanctions did not work and that years of “engagement” nudged the generals into seeing the folly of military rule.
Asean countries such as Thailand and Malaysia benefited, like China, from Western sanctions on Myanmar, capitalizing on absent business competitors to milk Myanmar’s natural resources. Myanmar’s economic stagnation and civil wars meant that both countries were favored destinations for migrant workers—something that could change in future if Myanmar’s political glasnost is followed by an Asian Tiger take-off.
A big if, perhaps, but a revived Myanmar economy could drive a “reverse brain drain” back to the former pariah nation and cause problems for those neighboring economies dependent on cheap, and sadly often-abused, migrant labor.
There is change in other ways too—with Asean countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia touting a blunter line on anti-Muslim, anti-Rohingya sentiment in Myanmar than Westerners giddy at the thought of making quick money in what is deemed world’s biggest remaining “virgin market.” Non-interference comes full circle, it seems.
This story first appeared in the December 2012 print issue of The Irrawaddy magazine.
SIMON ROUGHNEEN / THE IRRAWADDY, January 1, 2013
As reforms are slowly worked through Myanmar’s Parliament, a shift is taking place in the country’s foreign relations. Better dealings with the West aside, the long-time military-ruled nation’s international rebirth has prompted other palpable changes.
Some of Asia biggest brand names are making their mark in Yangon and other cities in Myanmar. (Photo: Steve Tickner / The Irrawaddy)
Under the former junta, trade sanctions left businesses from China, India, South Korea and Southeast Asia with an open goal in Myanmar—a land rich in natural resources coveted by Asia’s bustling economies.
During the sanctions era, China and Thailand have been arguably the two most prominent investor-nations, with China first among equals given its additional role as Myanmar’s minder on the United Nations Security Council—deflecting criticism and blocking damning resolutions in the wake of the former junta’s heinous human rights abuses.
But a year ago, China was handed a surprising snub by the nominally civilian Myanmar government. In one of the first signals that Naypyitaw was about to undertake a series of reforms, President U Thein Sein suspended the controversial Myitsone Dam in Kachin State.
The project was set to flood an area the size of Singapore yet have 90 percent of power generated exported to China, despite only a quarter of the domestic population having access to electricity, according to the Asian Development Bank.
With Western investors likely to stream in soon, and with Japan offering the Myanmar government a helping hand with debt relief and major investment pledges in much-needed infrastructure, does this mean Beijing has suddenly been pushed onto the back foot?
“Yes and no,” say those keeping an eye on regional affairs. Jan Zalewski, an analyst covering Myanmar for the IHS Global Insight research firm, told The Irrawaddy that “Myanmar’s re-balancing of foreign relations means that China will increasingly have to compete with other foreign players when dealing with the country.”
As challenges arise, there are signs that China is recalibrating its approach to Myanmar. A recent editorial in the Global Times warned Chinese businesses to take local sensitivities into account when doing business in Myanmar.
The article cited the Myitsone debacle and recent mass protests against a copper mining project in the Letpadaung Mountains of Sagaing Region—the latter jointly owned by the military-controlled Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd and Wan Bao Company, a subsidiary of state-owned Chinese arms manufacturer North China Industries Corp.
“Myanmar’s increasing gearing-up to attract Western investments not least means that the modus operandi of doing business with Myanmar is changing, which will alter the position of many Chinese businesses that hitherto had to rely on only a handful of key contacts within the previous military regime for entering the country,” said Mr Zalewski.
This does not mean, however, that China has completely lost out in Myanmar. In 2011, bilateral trade between the two countries came to US $6.5 billion, up 46 percent year-on-year, according to Beijing, while China’s investment in Myanmar hit a total of $20.26 billion by the end of last year, going by Naypyitaw figures.
According to Chinese reports of Wu Bangguo’s visit to Myanmar ahead of the Chinese Communist Party leadership changes in November, U Thein Sein said Myanmar welcomes Chinese investment, especially in labor-intensive industries.
“Myanmar knows that it won’t be beneficial for it to completely sideline its powerful northern neighbor, so China’s role in the country will still remain dominant,” added Mr Zalewski.
That should hold even if Myanmar’s opposition wins the 2015 general election, as democracy icon and former political prisoner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has welcomed continued good relations with Beijing, telling Chinese state-run Xinhua News Agency in June that, “We are very good friends with China. I really don’t see why we cannot continue to be good friends.”
Indeed, with Western economies struggling with debt and stagnation, even a China that is now running into slowdown seems set to be the single biggest investor in Myanmar for the foreseeable future.
But as China’s prominence recedes in relative terms, Japan is moving fast to bolster commercial ties after generally going along with Western sanctions in recent years. Now, however, Japan is stealing a march on potential competitors by plowing money into Myanmar as Westerners cautiously await new laws, such as the long-overdue Foreign Direct Investment law passed in early November.
According to Toshihiro Kudo, a Japan External Trade Organization researcher speaking in Bangkok, Japanese interest in Myanmar is “feverish,” with up to 200 businesspeople a month passing through its Yangon office compared with perhaps only 200 per year in the past.
Recent estimates indicate that Japan has or will put at least $18 billion into Myanmar, based on a round-up of loan write-offs, public and private investment pledges and bilateral aid promises. Myanmar wants Japan to develop the Thilawa Port, a half-hour drive from downtown Yangon, and possibly inject much needed cash into the stillborn multibillion dollar port planned for Dawei in the southwestern Tanintharyi Region.
Japan’s NTT—one of the world’s apex telecommunications infrastructure providers—has established an office in Yangon in advance of a planned liberalization of Myanmar’s minuscule telecoms sector, which will likely allow foreign companies to operate as network providers. The Myanmar office came on the back of U Thein Sein meeting company executives of NTT in Japan in April—one of several investment-related trips in Asia that the pacemaker-wearing president has made in recent months.
Japanese foundations have promised money for Myanmar’s impoverished ethnic borderlands—lending the country’s interests a selfless air. However, Yuki Akimoto, a director of BurmaInfo Japan who researches and documents human rights and environmental issues in Myanmar, says Japan’s interest is much more business-driven than altruistic.
With tensions between Tokyo and Beijing increasing over disputed islands and long-simmering nationalistic mutual hostility, Japanese business sees an opportunity to cut-and-run with a cheaper labor market now on the scene in Myanmar. “Japanese manufacturers already had been looking for alternative production bases because producing in China was getting too expensive,” Ms Akimoto told The Irrawaddy.
But what of Asia’s third biggest economy, India, which shares a 1,463km border with Myanmar as well as a history of British colonial rule?
India has typically been seen as floundering somewhat in its Myanmar policy, the oft-touted “world’s largest democracy” reversing support for Myanmar’s democratically-elected winners of the 1990 election in favor of “pragmatic engagement” with the coup-installed former military dictatorship—the rationale being that India would otherwise lose economic and strategic ground in Myanmar to an ascendant China.
That happened anyway, and although bilateral trade between India and Myanmar is expected to more than double by 2015, according to a speech given in Kolkata by the Myanmar consul general there, the projected leap from $1.28 billion in 2010-11 to $3 billion 2014-15 would still amount to less than half of Myanmar-China trade today.
In November, opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi visited India—the country where she lived as a young woman while her mother was Myanmar ambassador there during the 1960s. Her trip came on the heels of yet another international suitor arriving in Myanmar earlier this year, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh—himself under fire at home for dithering over India’s now-backfiring economy—paid a visit.
But after a decade-and-a-half of playing catch-up with China, will increased investment and engagement from Japan and the West crowd out New Delhi once more? Again, it is a “yes and no” answer, according to some who keep tabs on India’s regional policies.
Dr K Yhome, a Myanmar researcher at the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian think-tank, believes that increasing Western engagement means that the window of opportunity for New Delhi will narrow.
It might not be a complete loss for India in Myanmar, however, he says, telling The Irrawaddy that “New Delhi also would see the West’s engagement as adding to its efforts to counterbalance China in Myanmar,” and in turn, facilitate India deploying geographical and cultural advantages in its eastern neighbor.
“Despite the West’s presence in Myanmar, New Delhi has the advantage of proximity, both land and maritime, to Myanmar and also cultural linkages,” said Dr K Yhome. “The question is how effectively India will leverage these strengths in Myanmar.”
Last year, in what was one of the first tangible international rewards for what were then just promises of reform, Myanmar’s nearest neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) agreed to let Myanmar lead the group in 2014—eight years after it was stopped from chairing Asean as Western countries objected on human rights grounds.
For the most part, though, Asean’s “non-interference” mantra put the bloc at odds with the West over Myanmar, leaving both sides now claiming credit for pushing the country toward reforms. Asean is often considered the sole source of regional political pressure
on Naypyitaw—urging the former junta to hold free and fair elections and attempting to codify human rights—compared to China and India, which both happily look the other way on humanitarian issues as long as investments pay off.
And while the West says sanctions backed the junta into a corner—an assertion backed up by some leaked diplomatic cables from the US Embassy in Yangon—Asean claims the opposite: that sanctions did not work and that years of “engagement” nudged the generals into seeing the folly of military rule.
Asean countries such as Thailand and Malaysia benefited, like China, from Western sanctions on Myanmar, capitalizing on absent business competitors to milk Myanmar’s natural resources. Myanmar’s economic stagnation and civil wars meant that both countries were favored destinations for migrant workers—something that could change in future if Myanmar’s political glasnost is followed by an Asian Tiger take-off.
A big if, perhaps, but a revived Myanmar economy could drive a “reverse brain drain” back to the former pariah nation and cause problems for those neighboring economies dependent on cheap, and sadly often-abused, migrant labor.
There is change in other ways too—with Asean countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia touting a blunter line on anti-Muslim, anti-Rohingya sentiment in Myanmar than Westerners giddy at the thought of making quick money in what is deemed world’s biggest remaining “virgin market.” Non-interference comes full circle, it seems.
This story first appeared in the December 2012 print issue of The Irrawaddy magazine.
Thursday, December 27, 2012
With Pragmatists in Control, What’s Next for the KNU? | The Irrawaddy Magazine
With Pragmatists in Control, What’s Next for the KNU? | The Irrawaddy Magazine
SAW YAN NAING / THE IRRAWADDY, December 27, 2012
Pragmatic leaders who won the Karen National Union’s (KNU) recent elections are expected to accelerate peace talks with the government and business development projects, but some Karen observers are urging caution to ensure benefits for local communities and not just the ethnic group’s leaders.
Three policy makers with close ties won key positions in the elections, which closed on Tuesday after a nearly month-long congress to choose new leaders.
Mutu Say Poe, the KNU’s former military chief, is now the organization’s chairman, while Gen Saw Johnny, a pragmatic commander, was elected as the military chief. The new general secretary is Kwe Htoo Win, who is known for being practical, friendly to ethnic alliances and knowledgeable about international affairs.
The three leaders are believed to have good relations with members of the government’s peace team, who are negotiating with the KNU after decades of war between the government’s army and ethnic Karen rebels fighting for greater autonomy and basic rights. The two sides signed a ceasefire in January.
In addition to speeding up the peace process, the KNU’s new leaders are expected to accelerate development projects in the region, including efforts to clear away land mines and resettle internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
But some observers say the KNU should proceed cautiously in the coming months.
Thierry Falise, a veteran Bangkok-based journalist and author who has covered Burma for more than 25 years, said that although the new leaders may want a quicker peace process, they should take time to guarantee the safety of civilians, the repositioning of government troops in rebel-controlled territory, and the implementation of the organization’s code of conduct.
After speaking with several KNU leaders and Karen civil society organization, Falise, who travels frequently in Karen State, said the code of conduct was seen as crucial for attempts to negotiate with the government peace team.
The KNU and government peace negotiators led by Aung Min, a minister of the President’s Office, signed the code of conduct in the Karen State capital Pa-an on Sept. 4 this year.
The code comprised 11 chapters and 34 detailed points which also consider the safety of civilians.
According to the agreement, the KNU and government must obey the code to cement a permanent ceasefire.
Saw Htoo Klei, secretary of the Karen Office of Relief and Development, a Karen relief organization that provides assistance to IDPs in KNU-controlled areas, said he was optimistic about the new leaders because they offered a range of experience in military, political and international affairs.
But some concerns have also surfaced that the KNU leaders will focus more on economic development than politics, as they are believed to have close ties with businessmen such as Ko Ko Maung, the managing director of Dawei Princess Company, a Burmese partner in the Dawei deep-sea port project led by Thailand’s largest construction company Italian-Thai Development.
The KNU’s former peace negotiator, David Taw, who passed away recently, was reportedly well connected to Hla Maung Shwe, a Burmese peace broker and vice chairman of Myanmar Egress, a leading Rangoon-based NGO.
Hla Maung Shwe is also vice chairman of the Myanmar Fishery Federation and an executive of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
David Taw, who was close to KNU chairman Mutu Say Poe, reportedly spoke with Hla Maung Shwe on the telephone after almost every peace talk. Some Karen sources speculate the discussions focused on development, businesses and NGO projects.
Karen sources also say that as peace talks continue, land has been purchased and seized on a large scale by Karen and Burmese businesspeople in southern Karen State, especially in Pa-an and Tenasserim Division, where the Dawei port is being built.
The multi-billion-dollar port project includes an overland route connecting it to Thailand that passes through territory controlled by a brigade of the KNU’s armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and some local sources have speculated that KNLA leaders are eager to benefit.
Community-based organizations have complained that development projects and business investment are not transparent and lack the input of concerned civilians. As these projects continue, they point out, government troops remain in KNU-controlled territories and Karen civilians do not feel safe enough to return to their abandoned homes.
But if KNU leaders push forward quickly with these projects, one newly elected leader, Lt-Gen Baw Kyaw Heh, may present some resistance.
As the KNLA’s new deputy military chief, Lt-Gen Baw Kyaw Heh leads a group of 1,500 well-trained fighters and is known as more of a hardliner. Karen sources on the Thai-Burmese border said he would likely ignore KNU leaders if they tried to focus on development and business.
The KNU has dealt with internal divisions recently, with concerns that the group might split into two factions. Baw Kyaw Heh was reportedly ready to lead KNLA troops in northern Karen State and break away from the south, which was led by Gen Saw Johnny and Mutu Poe.
The leaders compromised, local sources say, for the “sake of the Karen people.”
SAW YAN NAING / THE IRRAWADDY, December 27, 2012
Pragmatic leaders who won the Karen National Union’s (KNU) recent elections are expected to accelerate peace talks with the government and business development projects, but some Karen observers are urging caution to ensure benefits for local communities and not just the ethnic group’s leaders.
Three policy makers with close ties won key positions in the elections, which closed on Tuesday after a nearly month-long congress to choose new leaders.
Mutu Say Poe, the KNU’s former military chief, is now the organization’s chairman, while Gen Saw Johnny, a pragmatic commander, was elected as the military chief. The new general secretary is Kwe Htoo Win, who is known for being practical, friendly to ethnic alliances and knowledgeable about international affairs.
The three leaders are believed to have good relations with members of the government’s peace team, who are negotiating with the KNU after decades of war between the government’s army and ethnic Karen rebels fighting for greater autonomy and basic rights. The two sides signed a ceasefire in January.
In addition to speeding up the peace process, the KNU’s new leaders are expected to accelerate development projects in the region, including efforts to clear away land mines and resettle internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
But some observers say the KNU should proceed cautiously in the coming months.
Thierry Falise, a veteran Bangkok-based journalist and author who has covered Burma for more than 25 years, said that although the new leaders may want a quicker peace process, they should take time to guarantee the safety of civilians, the repositioning of government troops in rebel-controlled territory, and the implementation of the organization’s code of conduct.
After speaking with several KNU leaders and Karen civil society organization, Falise, who travels frequently in Karen State, said the code of conduct was seen as crucial for attempts to negotiate with the government peace team.
The KNU and government peace negotiators led by Aung Min, a minister of the President’s Office, signed the code of conduct in the Karen State capital Pa-an on Sept. 4 this year.
The code comprised 11 chapters and 34 detailed points which also consider the safety of civilians.
According to the agreement, the KNU and government must obey the code to cement a permanent ceasefire.
Saw Htoo Klei, secretary of the Karen Office of Relief and Development, a Karen relief organization that provides assistance to IDPs in KNU-controlled areas, said he was optimistic about the new leaders because they offered a range of experience in military, political and international affairs.
But some concerns have also surfaced that the KNU leaders will focus more on economic development than politics, as they are believed to have close ties with businessmen such as Ko Ko Maung, the managing director of Dawei Princess Company, a Burmese partner in the Dawei deep-sea port project led by Thailand’s largest construction company Italian-Thai Development.
The KNU’s former peace negotiator, David Taw, who passed away recently, was reportedly well connected to Hla Maung Shwe, a Burmese peace broker and vice chairman of Myanmar Egress, a leading Rangoon-based NGO.
Hla Maung Shwe is also vice chairman of the Myanmar Fishery Federation and an executive of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
David Taw, who was close to KNU chairman Mutu Say Poe, reportedly spoke with Hla Maung Shwe on the telephone after almost every peace talk. Some Karen sources speculate the discussions focused on development, businesses and NGO projects.
Karen sources also say that as peace talks continue, land has been purchased and seized on a large scale by Karen and Burmese businesspeople in southern Karen State, especially in Pa-an and Tenasserim Division, where the Dawei port is being built.
The multi-billion-dollar port project includes an overland route connecting it to Thailand that passes through territory controlled by a brigade of the KNU’s armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and some local sources have speculated that KNLA leaders are eager to benefit.
Community-based organizations have complained that development projects and business investment are not transparent and lack the input of concerned civilians. As these projects continue, they point out, government troops remain in KNU-controlled territories and Karen civilians do not feel safe enough to return to their abandoned homes.
But if KNU leaders push forward quickly with these projects, one newly elected leader, Lt-Gen Baw Kyaw Heh, may present some resistance.
As the KNLA’s new deputy military chief, Lt-Gen Baw Kyaw Heh leads a group of 1,500 well-trained fighters and is known as more of a hardliner. Karen sources on the Thai-Burmese border said he would likely ignore KNU leaders if they tried to focus on development and business.
The KNU has dealt with internal divisions recently, with concerns that the group might split into two factions. Baw Kyaw Heh was reportedly ready to lead KNLA troops in northern Karen State and break away from the south, which was led by Gen Saw Johnny and Mutu Poe.
The leaders compromised, local sources say, for the “sake of the Karen people.”
Wednesday, December 26, 2012
Philippine Reds still eye stalemate | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Philippine Reds still eye stalemate | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Edwin Espejo Dec 26, 2012
In 2008, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) boldly declared that it was aiming for a strategic stalemate in its guerrilla war with the Philippine government in five years.
In its statement to observe its 44th founding anniversary posted on its website Sunday but dated December 26, the CPP is saying “it is making substantial progress in carrying out the strategic plan to advance the people’s war from the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate.”
Today, however, its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), is still far away from that armed parity with the Philippine military.
“It currently operates in more than 100 guerrilla fronts and is striving to increase these to 180 within the next five years since 2010 or for a longer period if need be. There are efforts to assist regions that are lagging behind in order to keep them apace with the overall advance,” the CPP stated in reference to its 2008 target.
For the first time also, the CPP-NPA and its political umbrella, the National Democratic Front (NDF), is putting to rest military claims that the armed regulars of the communist have been reduced to a little over 4,000 from a high of 25,000 fully armed NPAs in the 1980s.
“The Aquino regime and its retinue of military officers keep on boasting that most areas of the Philippines have become insurgency-free…(the) fact is, that NPA armed strength in 1986 was only 6,100 rifles,” the CPP central committee said Monday.
But in Mindanao, the NPAs are gaining grounds where comrades elsewhere in the country are still struggling to rebuild their forces after two decades of ‘rectification movement.’
Rebel spokesman Jorge Madlos, a.k.a Ka Oris, said in an e-mailed statement that despite massive military operations in rebel strongholds in the island, they were able to increase the number of guerilla fronts from 39 in 2008 to 44 this year.
Ka Oris said 40 percent of its 44 guerrilla fronts now have company sized formations in addition to its 5 main regional guerilla units (sentro de grabidad).
He said the NPAs are growing at the rate of 10 percent every year over the last three years.
The CPP in Mindanao is also now building regional and sub-regional operational commands for the NPA, something that it used to have in the 1980s but decided to disband following ideological debate which led to the decimation of rebel ranks nationwide in the 1990s.
Rebel forces in the island, especially those in the Davao and Caraga regions, are again capable of launching undersized battalion formations for tactical offensives as they did in raiding Taganito Mines more than a year ago.
Lt. Gen. Jorge Segovia, commanding general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Eastern Mindanao Command, however said rebel forces in the island could not be more than 1,500 fully armed regulars.
The CPP was re-established in December 26, 1968 led by University of the Philippines professor Jose Maria Sison and a motley group of intellectuals.
It is waging a Maoist-inspired protracted guerilla warfare that goes into “3 strategic stages” namely, strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive.
Forty four years after, the CPP is still in the strategic defensive stage.
The Philippine insurgency is the longest running of its kind in Southeast Asia.
Edwin Espejo Dec 26, 2012
In 2008, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) boldly declared that it was aiming for a strategic stalemate in its guerrilla war with the Philippine government in five years.
In its statement to observe its 44th founding anniversary posted on its website Sunday but dated December 26, the CPP is saying “it is making substantial progress in carrying out the strategic plan to advance the people’s war from the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate.”
Today, however, its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), is still far away from that armed parity with the Philippine military.
New People's Army in Northern MIndanao. KEITH BACONGCO
For the first time also, the CPP-NPA and its political umbrella, the National Democratic Front (NDF), is putting to rest military claims that the armed regulars of the communist have been reduced to a little over 4,000 from a high of 25,000 fully armed NPAs in the 1980s.
“The Aquino regime and its retinue of military officers keep on boasting that most areas of the Philippines have become insurgency-free…(the) fact is, that NPA armed strength in 1986 was only 6,100 rifles,” the CPP central committee said Monday.
But in Mindanao, the NPAs are gaining grounds where comrades elsewhere in the country are still struggling to rebuild their forces after two decades of ‘rectification movement.’
Rebel spokesman Jorge Madlos, a.k.a Ka Oris, said in an e-mailed statement that despite massive military operations in rebel strongholds in the island, they were able to increase the number of guerilla fronts from 39 in 2008 to 44 this year.
Ka Oris said 40 percent of its 44 guerrilla fronts now have company sized formations in addition to its 5 main regional guerilla units (sentro de grabidad).
He said the NPAs are growing at the rate of 10 percent every year over the last three years.
The CPP in Mindanao is also now building regional and sub-regional operational commands for the NPA, something that it used to have in the 1980s but decided to disband following ideological debate which led to the decimation of rebel ranks nationwide in the 1990s.
Rebel forces in the island, especially those in the Davao and Caraga regions, are again capable of launching undersized battalion formations for tactical offensives as they did in raiding Taganito Mines more than a year ago.
Lt. Gen. Jorge Segovia, commanding general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Eastern Mindanao Command, however said rebel forces in the island could not be more than 1,500 fully armed regulars.
The CPP was re-established in December 26, 1968 led by University of the Philippines professor Jose Maria Sison and a motley group of intellectuals.
It is waging a Maoist-inspired protracted guerilla warfare that goes into “3 strategic stages” namely, strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive.
Forty four years after, the CPP is still in the strategic defensive stage.
The Philippine insurgency is the longest running of its kind in Southeast Asia.
Monday, December 17, 2012
Toothless Thai Human Rights Commission | Asia Sentinel
Toothless Thai Human Rights Commission | Asia Sentinel
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 16 December 2012
An important agency is rendered toothless by its Quisling chairwoman
Amara Pongsapich, the chairperson of Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission. must have felt frustrated to hear that former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva had been charged with murder in connection with his role in a military crackdown against pro-Thaksin protesters in 2010.
That is not because as the commission’s head she wanted to punish Abhisit for ordering brutal attacks on protesters during the April-May 2010 protests that wracked central Bangkok as part of her duty to defend human rights. It may be because she saw the need to protect Abhisit, the face of the Thai upper class of which she is a part.
Thailand’s human rights situation has been in dire straits, particularly since the military coup of 2006. Amara was selected to chair the newly established human rights body at a critical time in Thai politics where violence had been repeatedly used against the people, but she has been a disappointment for many in Thailand.
The Human Rights Commission was established in 2009 and its members were appointed, rather than elected, thus raising questions pertaining to its accountability, impartiality and transparency. The commission was established during the Abhisit administration, suggesting that her appointment could have been politically motivated.
Indeed, it has been rather clear that the two are close allies. Amara has never been politically neutral since the beginning. Her inclinations and sympathy toward the People’s Alliance for Democracy, the royalist Yellow Shirts, has cast doubt upon her ability to lead an important organization that deals with justice spanning multi-political ideologies and alignments.
A former professor and dean of Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science, Amara earned her doctorate in anthropology from the University of Washington. Her research interests have been in the sociology of religion, development and cultural change, society and culture, women studies, and ethnicity. Supposedly, she must possess a deep understanding of the way in which human rights are defined.
But in reality, Amara has never condemned the use of violence in the hands of the Abhisit government against the red-shirt protesters. Some 92 were believed killed and 2,000 injured. The NHRC has been silent all along. This poses a question of whose interests Amara has been protecting.
When the Yingluck Shinawatra government decided to employ teargas to disperse crowds in the latest anti-government rally led by an elderly former general in late November, Amara and her NHRC were fuming. She immediately released a statement reproaching the government’s measures in dealing with the demonstrators.
“The government was over-reacting and the use of teargas was unacceptable,” she said. It is important to note that only a few casualties were reported during the rally, a stark contrast to what happened during April-May 2010.
Since the charges against Abhisit have been brought out into the public, Amara has, as expected, made no comment, even when Abhisit denied all responsibility. The intimate connection between Abhisit and Amara could have a played a role in the human rights commission’s lackluster response regarding the continuing investigation of several cases related to the 2010 violence.
In the aftermath of the 2006 coup, Amara was invited to join a constitutional drafting committee sponsored by the Thai junta. The result is the 2007 constitution which, as many would argue, has remained largely “undemocratic. Considering that she was a political science professor who taught her students about political ethics, Amara’s decision to serve the junta in such committee seriously called into question her own ethics and integrity.
Allying with the traditional elite appears to have rendered many benefits to Amara. She is herself an elite. There is little evidences that she genuinely cares about the rights of the Thai people, especially those in the underclass.
In 2010, upon taking up her position at the NHRC, she beautifully reiterated her passion for human rights protection.
“I enjoy learning about people from different backgrounds, how they live, what they believe and what is important to them,” she said. “My work has exposed me to many of the issues facing indigenous peoples and minority groups – the hardship they experience, the lack of access to basic social services and, as a result, the many opportunities that are denied to them.”
These statements have proved flimsy. Under Amara’s leadership, the commission has refused to discuss one of the most pressing issues in Thailand: the lèse-majesté law and its impact on human rights. Lèse-majesté cases have continued to skyrocket. More people have been charged with Article 112 of lèse-majesté law, both Thais and foreigners. Some have received extremely harsh sentences. And the NHRC did not even show its concern.
The case of Amphon Tangnoppakul, known in Thailand as Akong, who was sentenced to 20 years in jail for allegedly sending four text messages deemed insulting to the Thai monarchy, failed to alert the NHRC of the serious human rights violations. Akong died in prison on cancer this May. No sympathy was sent out to his family from Amara.
The NHRC has shown a marked lack of interest in many other cases involving political prisoners, as well as harassment against Thai academics in Thailand who spoke critically of the monarchy. This is a sad story indeed as Amara is also a one-time academic.
This year alone, the NHRC has enjoyed a hefty Bt173.59 million budget (US$5.67 million) for its works on the promotion of human rights. Yet, a big question is how Amara can justify the spending of this budget when the human rights situation has continued to deteriorate.
As evidence of further damage the reputation of her agency, Amara, at year’s end, has offered human rights awards to a number of dubious personalities, ranging from a celebrity monk, a controversial forensic pathologist and a detainee in a Phnom Penh prison who was arrested by Cambodia for provoking a conflict between the two countries.
Amara needs to reconsider her role as the leader of the commission. Her performance has let many of her compatriots down, as well as those who are monitoring the Thai human rights situation in the outside world.
(Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Centre for Southeast Asian Studies.)
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 16 December 2012
An important agency is rendered toothless by its Quisling chairwoman
Amara Pongsapich, the chairperson of Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission. must have felt frustrated to hear that former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva had been charged with murder in connection with his role in a military crackdown against pro-Thaksin protesters in 2010.
That is not because as the commission’s head she wanted to punish Abhisit for ordering brutal attacks on protesters during the April-May 2010 protests that wracked central Bangkok as part of her duty to defend human rights. It may be because she saw the need to protect Abhisit, the face of the Thai upper class of which she is a part.
Thailand’s human rights situation has been in dire straits, particularly since the military coup of 2006. Amara was selected to chair the newly established human rights body at a critical time in Thai politics where violence had been repeatedly used against the people, but she has been a disappointment for many in Thailand.
The Human Rights Commission was established in 2009 and its members were appointed, rather than elected, thus raising questions pertaining to its accountability, impartiality and transparency. The commission was established during the Abhisit administration, suggesting that her appointment could have been politically motivated.
Indeed, it has been rather clear that the two are close allies. Amara has never been politically neutral since the beginning. Her inclinations and sympathy toward the People’s Alliance for Democracy, the royalist Yellow Shirts, has cast doubt upon her ability to lead an important organization that deals with justice spanning multi-political ideologies and alignments.
A former professor and dean of Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science, Amara earned her doctorate in anthropology from the University of Washington. Her research interests have been in the sociology of religion, development and cultural change, society and culture, women studies, and ethnicity. Supposedly, she must possess a deep understanding of the way in which human rights are defined.
But in reality, Amara has never condemned the use of violence in the hands of the Abhisit government against the red-shirt protesters. Some 92 were believed killed and 2,000 injured. The NHRC has been silent all along. This poses a question of whose interests Amara has been protecting.
When the Yingluck Shinawatra government decided to employ teargas to disperse crowds in the latest anti-government rally led by an elderly former general in late November, Amara and her NHRC were fuming. She immediately released a statement reproaching the government’s measures in dealing with the demonstrators.
“The government was over-reacting and the use of teargas was unacceptable,” she said. It is important to note that only a few casualties were reported during the rally, a stark contrast to what happened during April-May 2010.
Since the charges against Abhisit have been brought out into the public, Amara has, as expected, made no comment, even when Abhisit denied all responsibility. The intimate connection between Abhisit and Amara could have a played a role in the human rights commission’s lackluster response regarding the continuing investigation of several cases related to the 2010 violence.
In the aftermath of the 2006 coup, Amara was invited to join a constitutional drafting committee sponsored by the Thai junta. The result is the 2007 constitution which, as many would argue, has remained largely “undemocratic. Considering that she was a political science professor who taught her students about political ethics, Amara’s decision to serve the junta in such committee seriously called into question her own ethics and integrity.
Allying with the traditional elite appears to have rendered many benefits to Amara. She is herself an elite. There is little evidences that she genuinely cares about the rights of the Thai people, especially those in the underclass.
In 2010, upon taking up her position at the NHRC, she beautifully reiterated her passion for human rights protection.
“I enjoy learning about people from different backgrounds, how they live, what they believe and what is important to them,” she said. “My work has exposed me to many of the issues facing indigenous peoples and minority groups – the hardship they experience, the lack of access to basic social services and, as a result, the many opportunities that are denied to them.”
These statements have proved flimsy. Under Amara’s leadership, the commission has refused to discuss one of the most pressing issues in Thailand: the lèse-majesté law and its impact on human rights. Lèse-majesté cases have continued to skyrocket. More people have been charged with Article 112 of lèse-majesté law, both Thais and foreigners. Some have received extremely harsh sentences. And the NHRC did not even show its concern.
The case of Amphon Tangnoppakul, known in Thailand as Akong, who was sentenced to 20 years in jail for allegedly sending four text messages deemed insulting to the Thai monarchy, failed to alert the NHRC of the serious human rights violations. Akong died in prison on cancer this May. No sympathy was sent out to his family from Amara.
The NHRC has shown a marked lack of interest in many other cases involving political prisoners, as well as harassment against Thai academics in Thailand who spoke critically of the monarchy. This is a sad story indeed as Amara is also a one-time academic.
This year alone, the NHRC has enjoyed a hefty Bt173.59 million budget (US$5.67 million) for its works on the promotion of human rights. Yet, a big question is how Amara can justify the spending of this budget when the human rights situation has continued to deteriorate.
As evidence of further damage the reputation of her agency, Amara, at year’s end, has offered human rights awards to a number of dubious personalities, ranging from a celebrity monk, a controversial forensic pathologist and a detainee in a Phnom Penh prison who was arrested by Cambodia for provoking a conflict between the two countries.
Amara needs to reconsider her role as the leader of the commission. Her performance has let many of her compatriots down, as well as those who are monitoring the Thai human rights situation in the outside world.
(Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Centre for Southeast Asian Studies.)
Saturday, December 15, 2012
US Pivot Heightens Asian Disputes by Richard Javad Heydarian -- Antiwar.com
US Pivot Heightens Asian Disputes by Richard Javad Heydarian -- Antiwar.com
Richard Javad Heydarian, December 15, 2012
With newly re-elected President Barack Obama having chosen Southeast Asia as his first foreign destination, where he also attended the much-anticipated pan-Pacific East Asia Summit, the U.S. has underscored its commitment to its so-called strategic ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region.
Months after the 2011 U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, President Obama signaled the formal launch of the pivot in a November speech to the Australian parliament: “As a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.”
The U.S. already has around 320,000 troops stationed in the region, as well as 50 percent of its formidable global naval assets. Under the pivot strategy, the U.S. is set to commit several thousand additional troops and increase its naval strength by another ten percent in the coming few years.
The Obama administration has repeatedly denied that the pivot is a containment strategy aimed at Beijing, arguing it is simply a logical ‘rebalancing’ towards the region in light of Asia’s stunning economic growth and the increasing importance of maintaining U.S. interests there.
However, more than two years into the so-called U.S. pivot, many strategic commentators across the Pacific have raised major questions as to its real intentions, actual impact, and practicability, given the United States’ deep fiscal constraints ahead of scheduled defence-spending cuts.
Reacting to lingering uncertainties over the U.S. strategy, China, which views the pivot as an act of provocation, as well as other countries in the region such as Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan, have stepped up their territorial claims in the Western Pacific – indirectly testing America’s resolve to uphold its strategic commitments.
In this sense, the pivot – purportedly to reinforce the United States’ role as an ‘anchor of stability and prosperity’ in the Pacific – has ironically contributed to greater uncertainty, turbulence, and belligerence vis-à-vis the festering maritime disputes.
In a recent op-ed for the Singapore-based daily The Straits Times, Barry Desker, the dean of the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), called for ‘mutual restraint’ by all disputing littoral states to ‘diffuse’ tensions, while contending that all parties are “guilty of occupying uninhabited islands and land features.”
And a recent report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group says: “With tensions on the rise, Manila is eager to pursue closer military cooperation with the U.S., and Hanoi (as a strategic partner) is keen to carefully bring in and balance U.S. influence in the region.
“If these countries frame any U.S. assistance as being directed against China, it will be harder for the former to persuade the latter that it will not get involved in territorial disputes.”
The pivot can be traced as far back as the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, where Secretary of State Hillary Clinton injected the U.S. into the centre of decades-long territorial disputes in the South China Sea by announcing that her country had a ‘national interest’ in the freedom of navigation across the Western Pacific, including the South China Sea.
As a result, allies such as Japan and the Philippines have repeatedly sought U.S. re-assurance vis-à-vis existing bilateral mutual defence treaties, especially in the event of military confrontation with China over disputed maritime features in the Western Pacific.
The Philippines and Vietnam are mired in bitter maritime disputes with China over a whole host of features in the Spratly and Paracel chains of islands in the South China Sea, while Japan is contesting China’s claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain of islands in the East China Sea.
Meanwhile, Washington’s allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea, are locked in a separate territorial dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islands in the Sea of Japan.
In last month’s Australia-U.S. Ministerial Meeting, Clinton sought to calm Chinese nerves by stating, “We (the U.S.) welcomed a strong, prosperous and peaceful China, which plays a constructive role in promoting regional security and prosperity… We do not take a position on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea.”
The U.S. Navy also invited China to join the large-scale, U.S.-led ‘Rim of the Pacific Exercise’ by 2014.
Yet an unconvinced China, under its new leadership, has nudged up its claims. Recently, authorities in the southern Chinese Island of Hainan have issued new laws, whereby beginning next year, they will have the authority to intercept and board any foreign vessel seen to violate China’s ‘sovereignty’ over all claimed features in the South China Sea.
In response, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Surin Pitsuwan warned that such a decision “…has increased a level of concern and a level of great anxiety among all parties, particularly parties that would need the access, the passage and the freedom to go through.” Beijing subsequently insisted that the new authority was not aimed against sea-borne commercial traffic.
China’s new passport design, incorporating disputed territories in the South China Sea under the country’s official map, has also sparked renewed concerns among some of its southern neighbours.
In the face of what it sees as Chinese provocations, however, a deeply divided ASEAN has failed to make any meaningful progress in crafting a legally-binding regional Code of Conduct to resolve disputes, as strongly urged by Washington.
If the pivot is seen in Beijing as a provocation, it has also encouraged greater assertiveness on the part of some of its neighbours.
While the Vietnamese have stepped up their energy exploration projects in disputed territories, and the Japanese government decided to purchase from its private owner one of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, the Philippines has pushed to upgrade its military ties with the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea to defend its own claims.
“While we are all aware that the U.S. does not take sides in disputes, they do have a strategic stake in the freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, and the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea,” Filipino President Benigno Aquino stated at last month’s East Asian Summit, prodding further U.S. involvement in the South China Sea disputes.
How Washington will react to these kinds of pressures, particularly given its own fiscal challenges that have already resulted in nearly 500 billion dollars in cuts to its projected military budgets over the next ten years, adds yet another level of uncertainty to the calculations of the contending parties in the region.
Already, the pivot is being attacked by the U.S. right as insufficient. “This reallocation of military and diplomatic resources was supposed to guarantee stability in a region seeking to balance China’s rise. In reality, this strategic shift is less than it appears,” argued Michael Auslin in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal. “In reality…it won’t solve Asia’s problems and may even add to the region’s uncertainty by over-promising and under-delivering.”
This article was originally published at IPS News.
Richard Javad Heydarian, December 15, 2012
With newly re-elected President Barack Obama having chosen Southeast Asia as his first foreign destination, where he also attended the much-anticipated pan-Pacific East Asia Summit, the U.S. has underscored its commitment to its so-called strategic ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region.
Months after the 2011 U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, President Obama signaled the formal launch of the pivot in a November speech to the Australian parliament: “As a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.”
The U.S. already has around 320,000 troops stationed in the region, as well as 50 percent of its formidable global naval assets. Under the pivot strategy, the U.S. is set to commit several thousand additional troops and increase its naval strength by another ten percent in the coming few years.
The Obama administration has repeatedly denied that the pivot is a containment strategy aimed at Beijing, arguing it is simply a logical ‘rebalancing’ towards the region in light of Asia’s stunning economic growth and the increasing importance of maintaining U.S. interests there.
However, more than two years into the so-called U.S. pivot, many strategic commentators across the Pacific have raised major questions as to its real intentions, actual impact, and practicability, given the United States’ deep fiscal constraints ahead of scheduled defence-spending cuts.
Reacting to lingering uncertainties over the U.S. strategy, China, which views the pivot as an act of provocation, as well as other countries in the region such as Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan, have stepped up their territorial claims in the Western Pacific – indirectly testing America’s resolve to uphold its strategic commitments.
In this sense, the pivot – purportedly to reinforce the United States’ role as an ‘anchor of stability and prosperity’ in the Pacific – has ironically contributed to greater uncertainty, turbulence, and belligerence vis-à-vis the festering maritime disputes.
In a recent op-ed for the Singapore-based daily The Straits Times, Barry Desker, the dean of the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), called for ‘mutual restraint’ by all disputing littoral states to ‘diffuse’ tensions, while contending that all parties are “guilty of occupying uninhabited islands and land features.”
And a recent report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group says: “With tensions on the rise, Manila is eager to pursue closer military cooperation with the U.S., and Hanoi (as a strategic partner) is keen to carefully bring in and balance U.S. influence in the region.
“If these countries frame any U.S. assistance as being directed against China, it will be harder for the former to persuade the latter that it will not get involved in territorial disputes.”
The pivot can be traced as far back as the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, where Secretary of State Hillary Clinton injected the U.S. into the centre of decades-long territorial disputes in the South China Sea by announcing that her country had a ‘national interest’ in the freedom of navigation across the Western Pacific, including the South China Sea.
As a result, allies such as Japan and the Philippines have repeatedly sought U.S. re-assurance vis-à-vis existing bilateral mutual defence treaties, especially in the event of military confrontation with China over disputed maritime features in the Western Pacific.
The Philippines and Vietnam are mired in bitter maritime disputes with China over a whole host of features in the Spratly and Paracel chains of islands in the South China Sea, while Japan is contesting China’s claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain of islands in the East China Sea.
Meanwhile, Washington’s allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea, are locked in a separate territorial dispute over the Takeshima/Dokdo islands in the Sea of Japan.
In last month’s Australia-U.S. Ministerial Meeting, Clinton sought to calm Chinese nerves by stating, “We (the U.S.) welcomed a strong, prosperous and peaceful China, which plays a constructive role in promoting regional security and prosperity… We do not take a position on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea.”
The U.S. Navy also invited China to join the large-scale, U.S.-led ‘Rim of the Pacific Exercise’ by 2014.
Yet an unconvinced China, under its new leadership, has nudged up its claims. Recently, authorities in the southern Chinese Island of Hainan have issued new laws, whereby beginning next year, they will have the authority to intercept and board any foreign vessel seen to violate China’s ‘sovereignty’ over all claimed features in the South China Sea.
In response, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Surin Pitsuwan warned that such a decision “…has increased a level of concern and a level of great anxiety among all parties, particularly parties that would need the access, the passage and the freedom to go through.” Beijing subsequently insisted that the new authority was not aimed against sea-borne commercial traffic.
China’s new passport design, incorporating disputed territories in the South China Sea under the country’s official map, has also sparked renewed concerns among some of its southern neighbours.
In the face of what it sees as Chinese provocations, however, a deeply divided ASEAN has failed to make any meaningful progress in crafting a legally-binding regional Code of Conduct to resolve disputes, as strongly urged by Washington.
If the pivot is seen in Beijing as a provocation, it has also encouraged greater assertiveness on the part of some of its neighbours.
While the Vietnamese have stepped up their energy exploration projects in disputed territories, and the Japanese government decided to purchase from its private owner one of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, the Philippines has pushed to upgrade its military ties with the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea to defend its own claims.
“While we are all aware that the U.S. does not take sides in disputes, they do have a strategic stake in the freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, and the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea,” Filipino President Benigno Aquino stated at last month’s East Asian Summit, prodding further U.S. involvement in the South China Sea disputes.
How Washington will react to these kinds of pressures, particularly given its own fiscal challenges that have already resulted in nearly 500 billion dollars in cuts to its projected military budgets over the next ten years, adds yet another level of uncertainty to the calculations of the contending parties in the region.
Already, the pivot is being attacked by the U.S. right as insufficient. “This reallocation of military and diplomatic resources was supposed to guarantee stability in a region seeking to balance China’s rise. In reality, this strategic shift is less than it appears,” argued Michael Auslin in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal. “In reality…it won’t solve Asia’s problems and may even add to the region’s uncertainty by over-promising and under-delivering.”
This article was originally published at IPS News.
Thursday, December 13, 2012
Asia Provocateur: Abhisit rumour: Willing to be a coup Prime Minister?
Asia Provocateur: Abhisit rumour: Willing to be a coup Prime Minister?
Abhisit was Thai PM from 2008 to 2011 but hasn't won any of the three elections he has led his party into and leads a party that hasn't even been the largest in the Thai Parliament since 1992.
Whilst unsubstantiated the rumour that Abhisit would be willing to be a "coup PM" has some foundation given Abhisit's route to power in 2008 which involved support from the neo-fascist PAD, the army and a political party which was conjured out of thin air in order to give Abhisit a large enough "coalition" to take the PM seat.
Abhisit then clung to power for 30months using 10s of 1000s of troops to crush pro-democracy protests in 2009 and 2010 which called for fresh elections to test Abhisit's mandate (his Democrat Party was crushed in the 2011 election). Almost 100 civilians died and 1000s were injured as a result and Abhisit has recently been charged with murder.
Given his record it's pretty clear Abhisit is a Democrat who doesn't believe in democracy. So the question remains: would he be willing to be a Coup Prime Minister?
I have written to a member of the team of a senior Democrat Party asking them if they wish to respond to this post. I will publish their response here should they make one.
Andrew Spooner, 12 December 2012
A rumour is circulating in Bangkok that Thai Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva has made it very clear he would be willing to be installed as Prime Minister again if a military coup was used to topple the present, democratically elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra.
Abhisit was Thai PM from 2008 to 2011 but hasn't won any of the three elections he has led his party into and leads a party that hasn't even been the largest in the Thai Parliament since 1992.
Whilst unsubstantiated the rumour that Abhisit would be willing to be a "coup PM" has some foundation given Abhisit's route to power in 2008 which involved support from the neo-fascist PAD, the army and a political party which was conjured out of thin air in order to give Abhisit a large enough "coalition" to take the PM seat.
Abhisit then clung to power for 30months using 10s of 1000s of troops to crush pro-democracy protests in 2009 and 2010 which called for fresh elections to test Abhisit's mandate (his Democrat Party was crushed in the 2011 election). Almost 100 civilians died and 1000s were injured as a result and Abhisit has recently been charged with murder.
Given his record it's pretty clear Abhisit is a Democrat who doesn't believe in democracy. So the question remains: would he be willing to be a Coup Prime Minister?
I have written to a member of the team of a senior Democrat Party asking them if they wish to respond to this post. I will publish their response here should they make one.
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