Thailand must end trafficking of all migrant workers | New Mandala

Thailand must end trafficking of all migrant workers | New Mandala
Ruji Auethavornpipat, 29 JUN, 2016

Slavery in the seafood industry is just one part of a broader problem. And here’s how it can be addressed.

On 6 June Thailand’s Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha gave a 35-minute speech commemorating the annual Stop Human Trafficking Day in Bangkok. He was also shown on state media donating 3,000 Baht to the Labour Rights Promotion Network (LPN), a non-governmental organisation well-known for rescuing trafficked victims.

While the PM appeared to forget the date and name of the event during the speech, there is no doubt that human trafficking is high on the government’s agenda, despite other pressing issues such as national reconciliation and August’s referendum on the constitution.

Thailand’s renewed interest in human trafficking has come at the height of international criticism. The ruling junta has tremendously intensified its efforts in combating human trafficking but it has only done so in a few sectors, namely seafood industries.

Thailand is the third largest seafood exporter in the world. It makes sense that the government would want to focus its resources on cleaning up the industry. Thailand should be commended for its attempt. This however should not come at the cost of other groups of migrant workers.

Ever since the major exposés by international media like The Guardian and Associated Press, which linked Thailand’s seafood exports to slave labour and big retailers in the United States and Europe, the government has actively worked to improve the image of what Human Rights Watch calls, “Made in Thailand” brands.

Thailand also went through “a moment of shame” at the latest Universal Period Review (UPR), a cyclical review of human rights practice in 193 United Nations member states, and where the international community made sure migrant worker rights were firmly on the agenda.

Since 2014, Thailand has ranked in the lowest Tier 3 in the US Trafficking in Person (TIP) report for not making “significant effort” to combat human trafficking. The report recognises Thailand as “a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking.” The subsequent penalty is the cutting of the US non-humanitarian, non-trade assistance with Tier 3 countries.

In 2015, the European Union (EU) also decided to issue a ‘yellow card’, giving Thailand six months to clean up its illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing or otherwise face harsh trade sanctions against its seafood exports in the European market. This May, the EU gave Thailand another six months to solve the problem.

Thailand took another blow from the US after President Obama signed a new bill to stop slave-made imports from entering the US earlier this year.

With a heavy storm of international criticism, the ruling junta declared human trafficking a “national agenda” in 2015. The once unfamiliar scene of military men raiding workplaces is now a regular routine.

The government adopted a “Zero Tolerance” policy on human trafficking and increased its expenditure to combat it by 69.33 per cent. Prayuth even mentioned that Section 44 of the Interim Charter, which gives him absolute power, has been put to a “beneficial” use.

Although Thailand pledged to end human trafficking in all sectors, recent legal amendments, ministerial regulations and international treaty ratifications (like the ILO Maritime Labour Convention) demonstrate that Thailand’s effort selectively targets migrant workers in the seafood industries.

Thailand can make its domestic commitment a more genuine one by coming up with a comprehensive policy protecting all migrant workers.

Those employed in other sectors are also doing it tough.

For example, domestic workers, also among the most vulnerable group of migrants, are still excluded from the Labour Protection Act. They work in secluded and private homes without the guarantee of a minimum wage, specified hours of work and overtime pay.

Thailand can further make its commitment a regional one. PM Prayuth has repeatedly called for cooperation among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members.

Thailand can ratify the ASEAN convention on human trafficking – after all, as a Thai government official once told me, Thailand pushed for it so hard that “its body is bent” (dtua gohng). It can also help the Philippines and Indonesia push for a legally binding ASEAN instrument on the protection of migrant worker rights which has been on the negotiation table for almost a decade.

A call on ASEAN is the right way forward, as human trafficking can only be dealt with comprehensively when source, destination and transit countries work together.

This year’s TIP report will be released soon. If the PM really wishes to convey his serious commitment, the government must deal with the issue holistically and regionally. It needs to match words with deeds, as urged by the government itself a year ago.

Ruji Auethavornpipat is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations, ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs.

Thailand’s hidden republican tradition | New Mandala

Thailand’s hidden republican tradition | New Mandala
Dr Patrick Jory, 19 JUL, 2016

Despite the intense royalist indoctrination of the Bhumibol era it would be naïve not to imagine that at least some Thais draw inspiration from the country’s long republican tradition.

Thailand is typically understood as a deeply royalist country ruled by a highly revered monarch.

The king’s image is everywhere. The capital, Bangkok, is strewn with monuments to past kings. Countless streets, bridges, dams, universities, schools, army bases, hospitals, etc. are named after royalty. The calendar is full of royal holidays. Thailand has one of the world’s strictest lèse majesté laws which forbids criticism of the king and royal family.

Given all this it may come as a surprise that republicanism is deeply ingrained in Thailand’s political tradition. In fact, Thailand has one of the oldest republican traditions in Asia.

The first proposal to limit the absolute power of the monarch famously came in a petition to the king in 1885. It was drafted not by the European colonial powers but by a group of Thai princes. Though unsuccessful, this was among the first indigenous attempts to limit monarchical power anywhere in Asia.

In 1912, one year after the Chinese revolution ended 2000 years of imperial monarchy, the Thai authorities foiled a plot involving “thousands” to overthrow Siam’s monarchy. It was even said that lots had been drawn to assassinate King Rama VI. The plotters were split between republicans and constitutional monarchists.

As Copeland has shown, the Siamese press at the time mercilessly mocked the monarchy and aristocracy in a way that is unheard of today.

The People’s Party finally succeeded in ending Siam’s absolute monarchy in a bloodless coup on June 24 1932.

What is not widely acknowledged is the influence of republican thinking on the People’s Party, especially the leading intellectual force behind the movement, French-trained lawyer Pridi Phanomyong. It is clearly evident in the famous People’s Party Announcement Number 1, issued after the coup, which Pridi is credited with drafting:

On the question of the head of state, the People’s Party does not wish to seize the throne. It will invite this king to continue in his office as king, but he must be placed under the law of the constitution governing the country. He will not be able to act of his own accord without receiving the approval of the House of Representatives. The People’s Party has informed the king of its wish. We await his reply. If the king refuses the invitation or does not reply by the deadline, selfishly believing that his power has been reduced, then he will be judged to be a traitor to the nation. It will be necessary to govern the country as a republic [prachathipatai]; that is, the head of state will be a commoner appointed by the House of Representatives for a fixed term of office [my italics].

Royalist historiography which dominates the official interpretation of the events of 1932 downplays the role of the People’s Party, instead crediting King Rama VII with granting the gift of “democracy” to the Thai people.

But as the highlighted sentence from the Announcement shows, the term “prachathipatai”, normally translated today as “democracy”, originally conveyed the meaning of “republic”.

In fact, as Nakharin has pointed out, in the original 1932 draft of the Announcement to eliminate any doubt the Thai wordprachathipatai was followed by the English translation, “republic.”

Official dictionaries from this period, both Thai-to-Thai and Thai-to-English, also commonly translate the Thai word prachathipatai as “republic.”

Before 1932, Pridi himself had taught his law students that there were two types of “democracy” (prachathipatai): a country with a president as the head of government, as in France, or a government in which executive authority lay with a committee, as in the Soviet Union.

So Thailand’s democratic history has distinctly republican roots.

For that reason royalists later coined the phrase, “prachathipatai an mi phra maha kasat song pen pramuk” to describe Thailand’s political system. The phrase is officially translated today as “constitutional monarchy”, but its literal translation is “democracy with the sacred, great king as head of state”. Its real purpose is to erase the original republican associations of the wordprachathipatai. Even the word “constitution” has been sacrificed, since placing the king “under” a constitution violates Buddhist spatial norms about the proper place of the king.

Following the failed Boworadet rebellion in 1933 the royalists were routed. King Prajadhipok went into exile and eventually abdicated. Other princes fled Siam or were imprisoned. The heir to the throne escaped to Switzerland. For a decade there was no king in Thailand. Military strongman Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram, who also had republican leanings, ruled as a virtual president. This was the closest Thailand has come to republican rule.

The story of the restoration of the monarchy after World War II has been told before. It culminates with the coups of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in 1957 and 1958, following which, with the support of the United States, the monarchy became the figurehead of a virulently anti-communist military dictatorship. As Somsak has pointed out, for the royalists “the threat of communism and the threat of republicanism were one and the same thing”.

From this period monarchy in Thailand became more than just an institution. It legitimised an ideology of submission and servilitythat lives on today.

Under this royalist-military regime the erasure of Thailand’s republican tradition from official history was completed.

Following the routing of the Communist Party of Thailand and the end of the Cold War the last traces of republican political thinking were expunged. As a result a generation of Thais have been estranged from their country’s republican tradition.

The political conflict that erupted in 2005 between Thaksin and the palace has now entered its eleventh year with no resolution in sight. Royalists repeatedly accuse the Thaksin forces of seeking to lom jao – “overthrow the monarchy”. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, pro-Thaksin parties have repeatedly won free elections.

The mainstream pro-Thaksin forces have consistently denied they have a republican agenda. For obvious reasons surveying republican sympathies in Thailand today is impossible. Yet despite the intense royalist indoctrination of the Bhumibol era it would surely be naïve not to imagine that at least some of them may draw inspiration from Thailand’s long republican tradition.

Patrick Jory’s new book, “Thailand’s Theory of Monarchy: The Vessantara Jataka and the Idea of the Perfect Man”, has just been published by SUNY Press. For details, including how to order the book, see this link: http://www.sunypress.edu/p-6222-thailands-theory-of-monarchy.aspx

Thai youth activism rekindling hope | New Mandala

Thai youth activism rekindling hope | New Mandala
Kriangsak Teerakowitkajorn, 11 JUL, 2016

Are new protest movements driven by young people enough to inspire citizens and save the country’s ever-decreasing democratic hopes?

Once upon a time, there was a land of smiles. Now, with the bleak economy, and the rising household debts of the working class, some are calling Thailand ‘the sick man of Southeast Asia.’

The political deadlock has reached the point where ordinary Thais have almost forgotten how it started in the first place. Everyday it seems, the junta introduces new, more worrisome, problems— takethe Single Gateway for instance.

In terms of civil and political freedoms, Thailand’s record is abominable. The junta has silenced liberal and progressive critics – by both coercion and repression. Some of the most outspoken voices have either gone underground or into exile. Those who do not have the privilege to flee join the growing number of political prisoners now filling up prisons.

In the face of these concerns, the Thai public is being told to ‘shut up and consume,’ and leave their future in the hands of a paternalist oligarchy. Their proposed charter gives us a frightening glimpse into the society that they wish to bring about. For example, proposed cuts to free high school—replaced by pre-elementary education—redistributes state welfare to the needs of the urban middle class, at the expense of working families.

Without the freedom of speech to debate the charter, hope seems to be wanting, desperately, in the land of ‘free people.’

Over the last few months I have been living in Myanmar. There, concerned NGO and activist friends often ask me about the political situation in Thailand: am I optimistic about the political future?

Given the downward spiral we have witnessed since the military coup in May 2014, I am always tempted to offer a pessimistic outlook. Recently, however, I am inclined to give a different kind of response, one informed by new sources of inspiration.

The Thai political landscape has changed so rapidly and profoundly since Thailand’s latest coup – not to mention the previous coup in 2006 – that the counter-movement it has created is nascent and still taking form. Yet, the emergent movement – or rather, movements – of young activists has already become a source of strength for ordinary people.

I am talking about the arrival of courageous, well-organised and creative student activism led by Dao Din, Liberal League of Thammasat for Democracy (LLTD), Liberal Assembly of Chiang Mai University for Democracy (LACMUD), and the New Democracy Movement (NDM).

In my conversations with older generations of Thai activists, people often raise the concern that activists struggle to build on disparate protest events to create an organised sustained movement. This challenge is associated with the fact that, in past years, protests led by Bangkok-based activists frequently resulted in one unintended consequence: activists are singled out and turned into high profile martyrs, leaving the campaign disrupted and momentum lost.

Over the past two years, however, Thai student activists have increasingly shown that they are not only better coordinated, but also more strategic in their response to the limitations of the legal landscape.

Looking back to the days of the spontaneous ‘Hunger Games’ salute, recent actions are more effective and better conceived; especially in the way they allow broader participation with low personal risk. For instance, the series of ‘Toys, Dolls and Balloons’ protests in Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, Pattani and Chiang Rai, allow people to use objects to express otherwise outlawed opinions on the country’s proposed new charter.

It would be misleading to talk about the movements without acknowledging the critical supporting role of human rights lawyers, progressive scholars and journalists, and other veteran activists. More importantly, each group in the student movement has its own strengths, approaches, and area of priorities.

For instance, the urban-based groups such as NDM are shrewd in their ability to frame campaigns around the tastes and interests of urban Thais, whereas Dao Din, recently organising under the umbrella of the New E-Saan Movement, is committed to grassroots community organising on issues that resonate in the Northeast.

While urban Thais and Northeasterners share the goal of returning democracy to the country, there remains a fundamental question in terms of how to negotiate different priorities on everything from free education to development projects.

What I have learned from the movement for democracy in Myanmar is that movements are at their most powerful when diverse groups with different priorities manage to cultivate trust and a shared collective vision. With Thai youth activists breathing new life into political activism, hope has been rekindled for the most cynical among us.

The challenge that awaits us – for both the inspired and cynical – is how we can now collectively build on the strength and diversity of the democracy movement to bring into being a shared vision inclusive of the needs and desires of the whole country.

Kriangsak Teerakowitkajorn is a Thai political economist, and trainer for social change. He is completing a PhD at the Department of Geography, Syracuse University, researching the geography of labour activism in the Thailand’s industrial estates.

Red and Yellow in Germany | New Mandala

Red and Yellow in Germany | New Mandala
Nick Nostitz, 04 JUL, 2016

On 18 June, I was invited to talk at a symposium at the University of Bonn in Germany, organised in conjunction with Stiftung Asienhaus and several Red Shirt groups in Europe.

I spoke at a workshop on the Red Shirts after the coup, and the final podium discussion on the future of democracy in Thailand. There were workshops on more sensitive topics as well, which I did not participate in.

After the opening talks in a large and fully occupied lecture hall, Ajarn Pitch Pongsawat and Nopporn Khunikha talked about the new constitution and Ajarn Pavin Chachavalpongpun spoke on the monarchy. Other workshops covered a range of topics, including the constitution and the referendum, led by Professor Wolfram Schaffar, Dr Pitch Pongsawat and Dr Vichien Tansirikongkhont; the monarchy and lese majeste, led by exiles Junya Jimprasert and Aum Neko, Dr Serhat Uenaldi and Andrew MacGregor Marshall; and human rights violations under the military regime, led by Kunthika Nutcharus and Kheetanat Wannaboworn.

A workshop on the Red Shirt movement was led by exiled Red Shirt leader Visa Kanthap, local Red Shirt activist Bangon Schwarz, Dr Claudio Sopranzetti, and myself. The final workshop examined exiled activists, the European Union and strategies for democracy, and was led by Din Buadaeng, exiled Red Shirt leader Jaran Ditapichai and Kwanjai Chularat.

In my workshop Bangon Schwarz talked about why she as an ordinary Thai became interested in politics. Visa Khantap talked about his long political struggle since the 1970s and the split of former friends into the Red and Yellow camps. I talked mostly about why the Red Shirts have not actively opposed the military coup, reasoning that the majority of Red Shirts are not revolutionaries, but normal citizens and a reflection of the Thai population, who want to express their political views via elections. In the present conditions active opposition would mean imprisoned and dead people, and that the UDD and most other Red Shirt groups had to design their strategies according to this.

I also mentioned that the demand that the Red Shirts should separate from Thaksin would be quite unrealistic, given that the majority of the Red Shirts were people who benefited under the populist schemes introduced by his government. In fact, such a demand would be an infringement on the people’s democratic right to support their politician of choice, and would therefore alienate these sectors of the population similar to what took place when the PAD began protesting against Thaksin in 2005/2006.

When it was asked if more aggressive strategies should be followed I said that this would be quite counterproductive as a civil war would not be in anyone’s interest, and that in the end both Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts are still Thais and have to find ways to continue to live with each other.

In our room three PDRC supporters took part as well. There were some frictions, naturally. Some of the Red Shirts in the room objected that the PDRC supporters filmed the talks, but as the event was live-streamed, and several of the participants filmed as well, I said that the PDRC supporters should also be allowed to film. One Danish PDRC supporter said that the Yingluck government came from vote buying and was therefore not democratic.

I answered that this is an unproven allegation, and referred to the ANFREL election observers who concluded that in general, the 2011 elections went well. I also mentioned Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker’s article, published on 6 December 2013, in The Bangkok Post, “Vote-buying claims nothing but dangerous nonsense”. When moderator Oliver Pye asked to get back to the main topic of the Red Shirt movement the three PDRC supporters walked out of the room.

During a break after the workshops, while participants had cake and coffee, about 15 PDRC supporters, who mostly came from Denmark, gathered near the university’s gate for a counter protest. Organisers of the seminar and the later Red Shirt protest march called the police, fearing that some incident might happen.

During the symposium authorities had watched over the PDRC supporters, to protect them against possible attacks from over-emotional Red Shirts, which did not happen. While not happy about the PDRC, the Red Shirts treated them respectfully. Police then arrived, and politely asked the PDRC supporters to gather at a nearby place where they have announced their protest, and the PDRC supporters soon left to their protest venue.

The following day, Naewna newspaper published coverage on thePDRC protest and a scathing report on the seminar.

The final podium discussion took again place in the lecture hall, with Junya Yimprasert, Jaran Ditapichai, Wolfram Schaffar and me on the podium, moderated by Oliver Pye. An interesting friendly side debate took place on the podium between Wolfram Schaffar, who framed the conflict in Thailand in context with the worldwide developments on liberal democracy under attack by rich elites and problems over distribution of wealth, and me, who looked at the Red-Yellow conflict as primarily an identity crises, a transformation conflict and a conflict over participation that is part of the development towards democracy in Thailand.

After, a protest march through Bonn’s inner city was organised. The lecturers flown in from Thailand opted not to take part, as to not violate their university rules. Naturally, I also did not participate, but used the opportunity to take pictures. The day ended in a picnic and party in the villa of one of the organisers in a suburb of Bonn.

Nick Nostitz is a photo-journalist and long-time contributor to New Mandala. Following are some of the images he captured at the symposium.

Andrew MacGregor Marshall prepares for his workshop.