Bersih 4.0 takes over Kuala Lumpur | New Mandala

Bersih 4.0 takes over Kuala Lumpur | New Mandala

 

GERHARD HOFFSTAEDTER, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

30 AUGUST 2015

Gerhard Hoffstaedter reports from the middle of Malaysia’s massive march for clean politics taking place this weekend. 

Bersih (‘clean’ in Malay) is a coalition of non-governmental organisations, which demands free and clean elections in Malaysia.

They began their quest to achieve this in late 2006 in anticipation of the 2008 general elections. Their first rally in 2007 drew large crowds of Malaysians from all major ethnic backgrounds in a country where ethnicity remains a hotly contested identity marker and where the majority continues to benefit from affirmative action policies funded from government coffers.

Thus a large Malay turnout demonstrated dissatisfaction with the ruling coalition government and a growing realisation that Malaysians were getting tired of a staid political system that had allowed the ruling coalition to retain a two-thirds majority in parliament since independence.

Many believed that Malaysia was ready to give opposition rule at the federal level a go.

The 2008 elections resulted in huge losses for the government – they lost their two-third majority – but they managed to hold on to power federally. Gerrymandering, the practice of redrawing election district lines to give one party an advantage, phantom voters on the electoral roll and postal votes were seen as particular issues going forward and subsequent bersih protests in 2011 and 2012 demanded the government change these practices and dismiss the electoral commission, which was widely seen to condone and support them.

The government dragged their feet and another controversial election in 2013 ensued that saw the ruling coalition returned even though the opposition won the popular vote and claimed electoral fraud had cost them victory.

This takes us to Bersih 4 this weekend, another event for Malaysians to mark their dissatisfaction with the government over how elections are carried out and how little influence Malaysians have in the interim between elections. Calls for more transparency and good governance reached a crescendo when allegations of corruption against Prime Minister Najib Razak became public.

I do not have space to go into the details of a highly publicised US $700 million ‘donation’ that ended up in Najib Razak’s personal bank account, suffice it to say that it made many people angry, especially after the Prime Minister cleansed his cabinet of anyone who dared raise questions. Corruption has long been a mainstay in politics and everyday business in Malaysia, but the brazenness with which the political elite reacted to the allegations caught many by surprise.

Bersih 4 set their rally date to tie into merdeka (independence) day celebrations on 31 August and couched their continued demands of free and fair elections in terms of a patriotic duty of Malaysians to continue defending and building on their founding fathers’ legacy of a multi-ethnic and rule based polity.

The government, too, is looking back to its own history to defend what they deem sacred; their nationalist narrative of how independence was won from the British.

Both look to Dataran Merdeka as a hallowed ground and the government’s actions of barricading it against bersih protesters may be a hollow victory. Independence square remains in government hands, but the only people within it are police officers.

Protesters meanwhile have marched, sang, conducted lectures, speeches and made their rally cries known all around Dataran Merdeka, encircling but never breaching the cordoned off area.

The following photo essay paints a colourful picture of the all-important rally.

Crowds converge in Petaling Street in Chinatown ahead of 2pm marches towards Dataran merdeka. People are jubilant, excited and almost all are wearing the banned Bersih 4 t-shirts. Last night the government banned yellow shirts with Bersih 4 on them, but most people took no note, some coloured over the four or wore Berish 2 t-shirts.

Protesters demand: ‘Bersihkan Malaysia, undurlah Najib!’ – Clean Malaysia, resign Najib! with a picture of Najib with his 2.6 billion Ringgit (approx US $700 million). Behind the banner free water is handed out to protesters.

Although the t-shirts were banned by the government many protesters wore them. In Chinatown last minute shoppers could still get their hand on them.

This one says: Negara bersih, rakyat sihat – a clean country, a healthy people.

Close to Pasar Seni (central market) protesters coming and going ahead of the 2pm rally start. Many protesters were in small groups of friends and family. Ahead of 2pm the restaurants were packed out with protesters having lunch and meeting up.

Two days ahead of Merdeka day (independence day) this Bersih rally was awash with Malaysian flags and people singing the national anthem. Crowds converging across from Pasar Seni (central market) just before 2pm.

Pasar Seni (central market) was one of the staging sites with speeches and people converging. Many came into the market for some relief from the heat and humidity outside. Here is the entrance with some ladies posing with their brooms ready to sweep Malaysia clean! Stallholders look on bemused.

The 3G network was largely down by this time, probably due to overuse, making communication difficult. I was lucky to be allowed onto the Wi-Fi of a handicraft seller in the market to send tweets.

Pop! There goes justice…

Festival atmosphere with witty signs and balloons. Every now and then a ‘justice’ or ‘democracy’ balloon would succumb to heat and pop. The irony was not lost on anyone. Just out of shot is a protester picking up rubbish, making sure this rally (and Kuala Lumpur) remain bersih (clean).

This picture captures the multi-ethnic make up of the protests outside Pasar Seni just as marchers take off towards Dataran merdeka. There were early reports that this was mostly a Chinese rally and coming through Chinatown this may have been correct, but once crowds converged near Masjid Jamek and Dataran Merdeka it was much more multi-ethnic. Even though the crowds were at a standstill and everyone was sweating in the relentless heat, people were in good spirits, singing, chanting and clapping.

Still outside Pasar Seni just after 2pm and the rally has started, but no-one is moving. How far do the crowds stretch? Too far to see. It is a sea of yellow t-shirts, Malaysian flags and people making their way towards Masjid Jamek with speeches and chants along the way.

The police barricade on the bridge along Leboh pasar besar. No-one was allowed into the vicinity of Dataran merdeka (Independence square). On the other side of the bridge more police were milling about, with some wearing FRU (federal reserve unit) uniforms – they are the Malaysian riot police. At the barricades itself it was a relaxed atmosphere, with police chatting to protesters at times.

One of the few party political banners on show. Opposition party officials were prominent at the rally, giving speeches, but not dominating the rally. Some protesters I spoke to told me that: ‘of course, this rally is against the current government, so the opposition will be there, but that doesn’t mean we support them. We are here because things have gotten out of hand’. Such sentiments attest to the growing frustration of middle class Malaysians with a government that has overseen a weaker economy with growing pressures of living costs (an unpopular GST of 6 per cent and rising petrol prices).

This was the scene at around 4pm. Dataran merdeka is to the left, barricaded, and thousands of protesters continue to pile into the area from all other directions. Much was made of a brief visit to this site by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who has emerged as a vocal critic of Najib. Of course, the supreme irony cannot be lost on anyone that a man who as Prime Minister cracked down on protesters, oversaw the dismantling of the independent judiciary and who cemented all power in the hands of the Prime Minister position now used people power to make his point that Najib had to go.

Gerhard Hoffstaedter is a lecturer in Anthropology in the School of Social Science at the University of Queensland. See more of his photos from the Bersih 4 rally on his Twitter feed. 

Remembering the victims of lese majeste | New Mandala

Remembering the victims of lese majeste | New Mandala

 

CHATWADEE ROSE AMORNPAT, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

27 AUGUST 2015

Thai student Patiwat Saraiyaem, 23, left, and activist Porntip Mankong, 26, are escorted by prison security guards after their verdict at the Criminal Court in Bangkok. Photo: AFP.

As lese majeste sentences escalate under the junta, a system that protects the monarchy only punishes the people.

Lately, I can’t stop thinking about two Thai university students who were thrown in a filthy jail earlier this year for taking part in a play impersonating a fairy tale king and his political advisers.

In February, Patiwat Saraiyaem, 23, and Porntip Maunkong, 26, pleaded guilty to lese majeste following their arrest last August for their role in The Wolf Bride, a satire set in a fictional kingdom. The play was said to parallel Thailand’s current political conflict.

The Wolf Bride was only performed once, in 2013 at Bangkok’s Thammasat University, as part of a series of events marking the 40th anniversary of a pro-democracy student protest at the university that was brutally crushed by the military regime in October 1973.

At the time it went largely unnoticed and unremarked. That all changed after General Prayuth Chan-ocha seized control of the country in the May 2014 coup.

Now both former students have been charged with one count each of lese majeste, or insulting the monarchy.

Their original sentence was five years in jail, but, as with many lese majeste cases, the accused admitted their guilt and apologised to the king; their sentences subsequently cut in half. They pleaded and hoped for leniency, considering they had no prior convictions. In any case, they didn’t get it, and it was the first time the performance of a stage play in Thailand had landed someone in jail.

Even though they have pleaded guilty, and even if they both serve out their two-and-a-half year terms, upon release Patiwat and Porntip will be ostracised by Thai society. Victims of lese majeste prosecutions often carry a stigma with them for the rest of their lives — I should know.

Unfortunately, today in Thailand and under the current military regime the enforcement of the unjust lese majeste law is increasing in an ever relentless manner.

Just two weeks ago a US State Department spokesperson, Mark Toner, said his government was “deeply concerned” about recent lese majeste charges.

“No one should be jailed for peacefully expressing their views,” Toner said in a statement.

“We regularly urge Thai authorities, both privately and publicly, to ensure that freedom of expression is not criminalised and is protected in accordance with Thailand’s international obligations and commitments.”

Just to illustrate how bad things have become under the junta, earlier this month 48-year-old tour operator Pongsak Sriboonpeng was given a record lese majeste sentence for six posts made to Facebook that were deemed to insult the king. The military court judge sentenced him to 10 years for each post.

The 60-year-term was halved after he pleaded guilty.

In a separate case, a 29-year-old hotel worker and mother of two was sentenced to 56 years by a court in the northern city of Chiang Mai. Her sentence was also halved after a guilty plea.

As in most lese majeste cases, Thai authorities urged the defendants to plead guilty to save time. A prolonged trial could be seen to potentially damage the king’s reputation, someone who is often described as “compassionate”.

Of course there are those who refuse to plead guilty (either at trial or at least during the first five years after their arrest).

One such victim is Darunee Charnchoensilpakul, dubbed “Da Torpedo” for her sharp-tongued speeches. She received 15 years in jail for lese majeste because of talks she made at Red Shirt rallies in 2008.

Sentenced in 2009 and now in her seventh year in jail (she was imprisoned for a year without charge), she has recently been refused treatment for a gum infection.

There’s also Somyot Pruksakasemsuk, a prominent democracy activist and editor who in 2013 was sentenced to 11 years in prison for defaming the king. Several rights groups condemned his sentence as an affront to freedom of expression in the Southeast Asian country.

Somyot was convicted of publishing two articles in an anti-establishment magazine that made negative references to the crown. However, some argue that the heavy sentence is less for what he published, and more for his efforts to reform the lese majeste law.

He has filed an appeal with the royal court but has waited years to no avail for a decision. I have heard from his wife that he too may be forced to seek royal pardon, because of the physical and mental torture he has endured thus far.

That’s the way the system works, even for those who don’t plead guilty.

The lese majeste victim is charged and sentenced often without the details of the charges ever being particularly clear. Then the “benevolent monarch” is seen to grant a pardon, with the media sometimes giving more attention to the pardon than to the case itself.

Meanwhile, the nurturing and cherishing of such a draconian law, as well as long periods of imprisonment and vicious repression, occurs at the very time that the monarchy claims it has no need for such “protection” because it is loved by one and all.

It’s worth remembering that if Somyot is ever granted an appeal, the trial will take place in a court where there is a huge picture of the king hanging on the wall above the panel of judges.

It doesn’t bode well for the almost impossible task of winning such a case, particularly when the judges were appointed and approved by the king in the first place.

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat is based in London. She was charged with lese majeste by the Thai junta in July 2014. For previous New Mandala coverage of her situation see this post.

Thailand’s nightmare scenario | New Mandala

Thailand’s nightmare scenario | New Mandala

 

JOHN FRANKLIN, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

26 AUGUST 2015

A multi-faith ceremony commemorates the victims of the Bangkok blast. Photo: Ritchie B Tongo/EPA.

There will be grim consequences if the Bangkok blast proves to have its origin in domestic politics.  

Recent posts for New Mandala by Zachary Abuza and Lee Jones have accurately highlighted the obvious weaknesses in the Thai authorities’ investigation of the lethal bombing at the Erawan Shrine on 17 August.

Perhaps it should also be said, though, that few governments emerge from terrorist attacks looking good. Every terrorist attack represents an intelligence failure, and security agencies’ post-attack responses are often characterised by confusion and lack of coordination.

There has been much speculation about the identity of the terrorists who carried out the attack.

For Thailand’s military government and ordinary Thai people, the most worrying possibility is that the 17 August attack signalled a dramatic escalation of domestic political violence, whether the conflict in the Thailand’s far south, or the long-running fight for control of the national government. Many hundreds of Thais have lost their lives in these bitter conflicts since the 1970s.

In the south, ethnic-Malay insurgents routinely murder not only military and police personnel, but also schoolteachers, Buddhist monks and other civilians, and make frequent use of IEDs. On their part, the security forces have sometimes in the past, particularly under the Thaksin Shinawatra administration, reacted with excessive brutality to the insurgency.

However, although there have been signs of an expansion of the insurgents’ target-list to include tourist zones in the south, the southern conflict has until now been almost entirely contained within several provinces.

If southern terrorists were responsible for the 17 August attack – perhaps in retaliation for the military government’s hard-line towards peace negotiations – this would represent a serious expansion of an already vicious but contained conflict, with serious implications for international confidence in Thailand’s internal security.

Meanwhile, the central political conflict has seen large numbers of people from all sides lose their lives: students and left-wingers during the 1970s, students again in 1992, Red Shirts and soldiers in 2010, and Yellow Shirt protesters in 2013-14. However, the conflict has previously not involved any serious efforts to inflict large-scale casualties on civilians through terrorist attacks.

But while the military regime led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha has imposed superficial calm since the armed forces took power through their May 2014 coup, tensions have grown beneath the surface.

These tensions reflect not only a sense of disenfranchisement among the majority of the population whose political agency grew under the 1997 Constitution and the successive governments led or backed by Thaksin.

Most Thais recognise that, like it or not, the country’s present twilight era is likely to end soon. A struggle for power and wealth within Thailand’s conservative establishment may be imminent.

The nightmare scenario for Thailand would be outright violence between the country’s domestic factions, with ordinary people caught in the middle. The 17 August attack might provide a worrying portent of such violence.

However, despite sometimes contradictory and confusing statements from the Thai authorities, the circumstantial evidence that has emerged since the brutal and cowardly attack on the Erawan shrine suggests that it was more probably a manifestation of international terrorism than of domestic politics.

Under any government, Thailand, with its easy visa-free or visa-on-arrival access for many nationalities, its cosmopolitan environment, widespread corruption, pervasive organised crime, weak law-enforcement, patchy record of international cooperation on counter-terrorism, and plethora of sites popular with tourists, would be vulnerable to violent extremists from outside the country.

While in the past there doesn’t seem to have been a clear rationale for Islamist or other extremist groups to attack Thailand, Anthony Davies has argued quite persuasively that the Turkish nationalist-fascist group, the Grey Wolves,
may have perpetrated the bombing in retaliation for the Thai government’s forced repatriation of Uighur refugees to China.

If Thailand was a victim of international terrorism, this will pose serious challenges for the military government in Bangkok. To prevent future attacks, and to restore already sagging confidence in the country’s tourist sector, Thailand will need to improve its counter-terrorist capabilities, including in terms of intelligence collection and analysis. It will particularly need to intensify intelligence exchanges with the US, Australia, and other Western countries as well as Asian partners.

Indonesia’s acceptance of international support for its counter-terrorism effort following the 2002 Bali attack provides an example example of how such assistance can significantly bolster national capabilities. A bonus for Thailand and its international interlocutors would be expanded interaction on practical matters despite the tensions precipitated by Western governments’ reaction to the 2014 coup.

Overall, if the 17 August attack originated outside the country, there are grounds for an optimistic prognosis. With international assistance, the culprits may be tracked down. Enhanced counter-measures including tightened border controls and strengthened intelligence exchanges with regional and international partners could go a long way towards preventing similar attacks in future.

The outlook would be much grimmer if the attack was found to have domestic origins.

John Franklin is the nom de plume of a security analyst based in Southeast Asia. He has worked in the region since the 1980s.

Thai junta turning tragedy to farce | New Mandala

Thai junta turning tragedy to farce | New Mandala

LEE JONES, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

21 AUGUST 2015

A few ideas? General Prayuth talks to Thai journalists. Photo by Reuter/ Athit Perawongmetha.

In the aftermath of the Bangkok bombing, all we’ve seen is an investigation characterised by inconsistency and incompetency.

As sympathetic as everyone must be towards the Thai and other victims of this week’s bombing at Bangkok’s Erawan shrine, we must also recognise that the Thai authorities’ response is turning a tragedy into a farce.

The host of contradictory statements emanating from police and, especially, from the erratic and incompetent dictator, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, suggest severe internal disarray, making it unclear whether the perpetrators will ever be caught.

There have been at least three major sources of confusion. The first is the nature of perpetrator. Initially, they were supposedly Thai: Prayuth instantly linked the bombing to an ‘opposition’ (ie Red Shirt) group based in Thailand’s northeast. The regime’s spokesman quickly rowed back from this, saying they could be foreigners.

Following the release of extremely grainy CCTV footage showing a yellow-shirted figure leaving a backpack at the shrine, police quickly declared – on no apparent basis – they were seeking a ‘“Caucasian” or “Arab-looking” man’ (sic).

However, the advisor to the deputy prime minister for security later stated it was unclear whether the figure was even a man or a woman. The release of an identikit apparently confirms his sex, but certainly not his ethnicity. Police still admit he could have been a Thai in disguise.

Secondly, how many culprits were they? Police initially declared that yellow-t-shirt man was ‘not just the suspect: he is the bomber’. Now they say they are only ‘more than 50 per cent sure’.

They subsequently identified two others in the CCTV footage as his accomplices. They then backtracked, saying that subsequent footage proved their innocence since they reacted ‘girlishly’ to the blast – truly a deduction worthy of Sherlock Holmes. (The two terrified men later handed themselves into police and were swiftly cleared of involvement.)

Even before that, though, other police spokesmen were saying that at least 10 peoplewere involved in a ‘network’ – apparently pure guess work.

Third, were there any international linkages and motives? Initially it was implied that the supposed ‘network’ of 10 involved foreigners – though it took three days for Thai police to file the case with Interpol. However, international terrorists were then ruled out – apparently solely on the basis of discussions with allies’ intelligence agencies.

Prayuth again boldly declared this, while also dismissing any link to the recent deportation of 109 Uighurs to China (which might explain why Chinese tourists were apparently targeted). Yet, it was simultaneously reported that the police had been pursuing this as their main lead, with Special Branch having specific forewarning of a possible attack on Chinese tourists after 11 August.

Nonetheless, this was apparently scotched by Prayuth and his allies, who are stilltrying to refocus attention on internal oppositionists. Others in the police are suggesting an organised crime link – though why the Thai mafia should want to bomb the Erawan shrine is anyone’s guess.

Obviously, any attack of this sort, which catches security forces entirely unaware, creates confusion and panic, and a wide range of hypotheses must be investigated to narrow down an investigation. But the Thai response is particularly chaotic.

Yesterday, BBC reporter Jonathan Head found fragments of the bomb near the shrine and was unable even to hand them in to police – who instead subsequently criticised Head’s own knowledge of explosives.

Indeed, the haste with which the shrine has been swept and repaired may have seriously compromised the investigation. Prayuth and his allies have obviouslyprioritised the restoration of superficial calm and ‘happiness’ over apprehending the culprits.

This is all redolent of the 2006/7 New Year bombings in Bangkok.

Then, as now, the military ruler, Surayud Chulanont, instantly (and baselessly) blamed the Red Shirts. Then, as now, the sites were rapidly swept and repaired, undermining the investigation.

Then, as now, the regime seemed to be caught in complete internal disarray, with suspects ranging from Thaksin’s friends, to Thaksin’s enemies, to the police, to factions within the military regime itself.

Then, as now, Thailand’s Muslim separatists were instantly discounted as suspects – yet the best guess of Thai intelligence today is that the Pattani United Liberation Organisation was responsible (possibly with external assistance from Jemaah Islamiyah). This is consistent with the fact that no one ever claimed responsibility – a hallmark of separatist bombings in the South.

It also refutes the suggestion, repeated today, that the separatists have never struck outside the South and have never harmed tourists (10 foreigners were among the 38 injured).

Ultimately, no one was ever caught for the 2006 attacks. This could well be the outcome this time around.

The Thai police’s professionalism, competence, expertise, political independence and moral rectitude have not noticeably improved in the intervening nine years; they appear well out of their depth. Prayuth is even worse than Surayud: paranoid, bombastic, loose-mouthed, erratic, idiosyncratic and ignorant.

Having presided over a security disaster, he now has every incentive to direct investigators away from anything for which the military could also be blamed – notably the escalating Southern insurgency and the Uighur deportations.

Unsurprisingly, Prayuth immediately refused offers of external assistance – including help from the British government – as attempts to ‘intervene’ in Thailand. His brilliantsolution was instead to urge Thai police to watch the US crime drama Blue Bloods to get ‘tips, ideas and insights’.

Many Thais see all this as a national disgrace. They are right.

Lee Jones (@DrLeeJones) is Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Queen Mary, University of London. He is author, most recently, of Governing Borderless Threats: Non-Traditional Security and the Politics of State Transformation (CUP, 2012).

Politics and security in Thailand | New Mandala

Politics and security in Thailand | New Mandala

ZACHARY ABUZA, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

19 AUGUST 2015

Experts investigate the Erawan shrine at the site of a deadly blast in central Bangkok.

Editor’s note: look at a table by Zachary Abuza examining potential culprits for the Bangkok blast and the likelihood they committed the attack.  

In the wake of the Bangkok blasts, politics and the junta’s self interests should not trump a proper investigation. 

It is still too early to attribute the bombings in Bangkok to any group and to date no one has claimed responsibility.

There are plenty of suspects: radical red shirts seeking to discredit the military regime by crippling the economy; southern Thai insurgents, in particular younger more radical members frustrated at the pace and scope of the insurgency now in its 12th year, but no closer to achieving its goals, who have been inching out of the deep south since December 2013; or international terrorist groups which have always seen Bangkok as a very appealing target.

Each has motives and reasons to eschew such violence. The attack fits no group’s MO, so nothing can be ruled out right now.

But what is needed more than anything is for the investigation to take its course without political interference. At first the security forces pledged to not rule any suspects or groups out.

And yet, one cannot forget the junta’s recent handling of the April 2015 bombing on the resort island of Koh Samui: within hours senior junta leaders attributed the attack to radical Red Shirts, despite the preponderance of evidence to the contrary.

The bomb design was identical to those most commonly used in the south, the vehicle was from Yala, apparently stolen in an insurgent operation, and the attack mirrored the March 2013 bombing of the Lee Gardens hotel: detonated in a remote car park to cause few casualties but sending a clear signal.

And yet the police commander from the Deep South was quickly over-ruled by the national police chief and the junta. Investigations into Red Shirt connections have gone no where, with one arrest and quick release of a Red Shirt activist for a cryptic comment on FaceBook.

Quietly, so as for the junta to not lose face, there have been a number of arrests of southern insurgents in connection to the Samui attacks.

That is not to say that insurgents were behind the two bombings in Bangkok. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that it was international-based terrorism or a hybrid.

But the investigation must follow the evidence, not the political dictates of a junta hell bent on vilifying their political rivals. And sadly, the junta seems to be pursuing another Cheyney-esque attempt to find evidence to fit their pre-existing political world-view. The police chief Somyot Poompanmoung has already suggested Red Shirts were behind at least the second attack.

Let us be clear: this was a massive intelligence failure on the part of Thai security forces that have richly rewarded themselves since the coup. Indeed, between the 2006 and 2014 coups, military expenditures increased nearly fourfold.

Spending increased sharply in 2015 following the coup, which is set to rise by 7 percent more in the 2016 budget, some $6.3 billion. Police and other security force expenditure has likewise increased as the regime has prioritised security since the May 2014 coup d’etat.

At the same time, the military government has expanded their legal and investigative powers, in particular in the cyber and telecommunications fields.

Despite all of these increases and new powers, the junta’s obsession with neutralising their domestic political rivals has blinded them to other serious threats to national security. Their biases and aversion to facts give pause that the hope that the investigation will be conducted honestly and transparently.

It’s a reminder once again of the dangers posed by autocratic regimes that equate their own survival with national survival. That always leaves a country, its people and economy, more vulnerable.

With the international community watching, there is finally some hope that the regime will do what’s best for the country, not their consolidation of power.

Zachary Abuza is a principal at Southeast Asia Analysis specialising in regional politics and security issues. He has authored numerous books including Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand(2008) and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia (2003).

Look at a table by Zachary Abuza examining potential culprits for the Bangkok blast and the likelihood they committed the attack.   

Who is behind the Bangkok blast? | New Mandala

Who is behind the Bangkok blast? | New Mandala

JAMES GIGGACHER, 

18 AUGUST 2015

Debris from the blast in Bangkok. Photo by AP.

In the wake of a devastating bomb attack in Bangkok overnight, which has already claimed more than 20 lives, many questions remain, including who is behind the atrocity and what their motivations are.

To get a clearer picture of who might be responsible, New Mandala spoke to security and Thailand expert Dr John Blaxland from the Australian National University.

These are Blaxland’s responses.

_________

In the absence of any clear declaration claiming ownership, there are three broad possibilities for who is responsible for the bomb blast in Bangkok overnight: the military, Red Shirt supporters, or insurgents from Thailand’s Deep South.

At the same time, there are other rumours circulating in Bangkok claiming that it is Uighurs or people linked to their cause who are behind the incident.

In terms of the military, this is not a very plausible scenario, but nonetheless it is important to address it.

Some would say that the motivation for the military, or a military proxy, carrying out such an atrocity is to justify their ongoing military rule after Thailand’s May 2014 coup and into 2017, when elections are next most likely to take place.

This latest act of terror would seem to cement support for their ongoing rule and tight control of the state.

However, Thailand’s military leaders are currently focused on developing the country’s economy and tourism, and an attack at such an important tourist site would not assist them in this.

An attack on the Erawan shrine also can be seen as inauspicious for the military government, reinforcing the implausibility of the military as the instigators. Reducing the auspiciousness of the Prayuth government is something they would seek to avoid. In addition, their grip on power remains quite strong.

There is no compelling reason why they would feel a need to fabricate an additional and artificial security crisis. For these reasons I don’t think the military is behind it.

Another possibility is that it is a member of, or a supporter of, the Red Shirt political faction, the group which supports former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his sister Yingluck.

They have been marginalised and frustrated by the military government’s success so far in containing political unrest and bringing about legislative changes inimical to the Red Shirts’ interests.

This incident could be seen as an attempt to undermine the military government’s sense of control or to add pressure to return to elections and civilian rule.

It must be remembered that the Erawan shrine, at the heart of the fashionable Rachaprasong shopping district, is also the scene of the May 2010 Red Shirt barricade, which after prolonged demonstrations and protests lead to violence that saw many hundreds injured and at least 90 killed, from the military and both sides of politics. It has great significance for the Red Shirts.

Striking at the heart of downtown Bangkok would be a blow to the nation’s elite, those who have often opposed the Red Shirts and their political aspirations. It would also be a powerful reminder of the power and support of the Red Shirts’ nominal leader, Thaksin.

The third possibility is that it is insurgents from Thailand’s Deep South, who have been waging a separatist campaign there for many years.

The modus operandi of this blast fits with their methods in that it is an improvised explosive device delivered by a motorbike and placed at the foot of a shrine. Thais who live in the Deep South are very familiar with such blasts as they are an all too common occurrence.

However, I think it is unlikely that the bomb came from this group. In all their long years fighting the state, they have avoided making attacks in Bangkok their priority.  In fact, they tend to avoid attacking cities in general. They’ve attacked Hat Yai, but have deliberately avoided attacking so far north or a city as large as Bangkok.

In addition, the insurgents from the Deep South have worked very hard to distance themselves from the global war on terror and the violent extremism of other groups, so as to avoid being entangled in operations that would see them suffer under the heavy hand of the US.

It would make no sense for them to change this approach now, and for that reason I don’t think this latest tragedy is the actions of insurgents.

That’s why on the balance of things, with no one claiming ownership of the attack, I think it would be most likely to have been instigated by a supporter of the Red Shirts.

Outside of these three possible groups, there are rumours that Uighurs or people supportive of their movement are behind the attack.The Uighurs have opposed the Chinese state for many years, sometimes resorting to violence, and only last month Thailand sent back over 100 Uighur asylum seekers to China.

Once again, I don’t think this is plausible, but it goes to show that amid the chaos and confusion it is hard to know exactly what has happened and why.

Whoever is responsible for this terrible tragedy, such violence has no place in any society, and should be abhorred.

Initial thoughts on Bangkok bombing | New Mandala

Initial thoughts on Bangkok bombing | New Mandala

 

NICHOLAS FARRELLY, 

18 AUGUST 2015

Looking at the lists of dead and injured, the human toll of last night’s bombing at the Erawan Shrine in Bangkok is clear. It is a distressing situation: seemingly designed to sow maximum havoc in the heart of the city.

In different ways, many New Mandala readers will have been touched by these events. Our condolences to the families of the dead and our sympathy for all those who were injured. It is a heart-breaking scene.

At times of such confusion, there are no immediate answers to questions about who, what and why. Investigators are no doubt mobilising all available resources to ascertain what has happened. The authorities will move quickly to get answers.

In the meantime there will be speculation about everything.

First of all, no matter who is involved, for a short period this attack will draw more attention to Thailand’s long-running war in the southernmost provinces. That conflict continues to fester, receiving only sporadic mention in the international media. Even many Thais have long since disengaged from what must feel like an unending series of violent incidents. One of the latest is the killing of a Thai Ranger at his own wedding. Until we know otherwise, there will be speculation that the conflict from those provinces has spread.

Second, there will also, no doubt, be concern about the prospect that more globally-focused terrorist forces are involved. In 2012 Bangkok was the scene of such a plot. There has long been insinuation about the safe haven that some Islamists have found in Thailand. Many people still remember the arrest of Jemaah Islamiya operational commander, Hambali. Thailand is, of course, embroiled in all manner of contentious international situations, including the recent repatriation of Chinese Muslims. Given the broader international context, there will certainly be discussion of how Thailand fits into the battle between Islamists and their opponents.

Third, the attack will draw renewed focus to Thailand’s own messy politics. Given all of the ill-will between different factions in Thai society there will be the need to eliminate the possibility of their involvement. Previously Thai political conflict has bounced along without mass casualty attacks of the type that are familiar elsewhere in the world. Most of the deaths in the battle between reds and yellows have been shootings. If that has changed then Thailand faces a range of new problems.

Today everyone is scratching their heads wondering who is involved and what this violence will mean. The military regime that has been in-charge since May 2014 faces its biggest test. People in Thailand and beyond will be demanding justice.

Nicholas Farrelly is the co-founder of New Mandala and a Fellow at the Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University

Thailand: Lèse-majesté today | New Mandala

Thailand: Lèse-majesté today | New Mandala

 

NICHOLAS FARRELLY, 

14 AUGUST 2015

Longtime New Mandala readers know that we have, over this past decade, paid a great deal of attention to lèse-majesté prosecutions in Thailand.

Flicking through our hundreds of old posts on the topic I am reminded of the big collective effort to put public criticsm of lèse-majesté on the agenda: remember “Arkong“, Suwicha Thakor and Darunee Charnchoengsilpakul, and Chotisak Oonsong and Chiranuch Premchaiporn, and all the rest.

Even those five names remind us that there have been many difficult cases over the years, where the heavy boots of Thailand’s royalist, militarist and even democratic forces have come down hard on individuals judged to have stepped out-of-line. There isn’t a Thai government I can name that hasn’t played the political game when it comes to lèse-majesté.

Some of our detractors like to claim that New Mandala‘s occasional emphasis on this topic distorts our analysis of the overall picture of Thai society and politics. Of course there is much more to the country’s current problems than the restrictions on free expression reinforced by Article 112 of the Criminal Code.

Yet since it seized power in the May 2014 coup, the military regime has insisted on some of the lengthiest lèse-majesté sentences in Thai history. The 30-year sentence recently imposed on Pongsak Sriboonpeng is a case in point. And sadly he’s not alone. The list of Thailand’s political prisoners grows by the month.

Robust international condemnation has followed these soul-destroying sentences, including hard-hitting statements from the United Nations. And yet there is no indication that Thailand’s power brokers are prepared to temper their aggressive prosecutions.

From their perspective the security, indeed the very existence, of the kingdom relies on such harsh punishments, and they make no apologies for stomping out dissent. It’s classic authoritarian posturing. It also works under conditions where many Thais have been led to believe that perceived opponents of the Thai monarchy are the lowest-of-the-low.

Under the current military regime it looks like there is almost no chance of reform to the law. It is just far too useful given the  politics of succession that are swirling around.

What does this mean for the country? Can anything be done about the chilling effect of lèse-majesté?

Nicholas Farrelly is the co-founder of New Mandala, a Fellow in the Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, ANU, and a strong advocate for the study of Thai society.