Burma and the Kipling mystique -- New Mandala

Burma and the Kipling mystique -- New Mandala
ANDREW SELTH, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR – 31 MARCH 2015

A recent visit to Burma brought home to me the fact that, in the minds of many Westerners, the country is still irrevocably attached to the bard of the British Empire, Rudyard Kipling. At the Governor’s Residence in Rangoon, for example, there is a watering hole known as the Kipling Bar, where the hotel’s guests are invited to imbibe, along with their drinks, the atmosphere of the Raj. In its promotional literature, the Strand Hotel proudly (and probably inaccurately) boasts that Kipling once stayed there. A best-selling guide book states that the Pegu Club in Rangoon was where Kipling was inspired to write his famous poem ‘Mandalay’. It was more likely an incident in Moulmein that sparked Kipling’s muse, but this claim is repeated in a brochure produced by an organisation dedicated to preserving Rangoon’s marvellous but now sadly neglected colonial buildings. In other places, and in other ways, Kipling is repeatedly invoked, giving the impression that the poet paid a lengthy visit to Burma and knew it well.

Kipling wrote a number of poems and stories that featured Burma, but he only visited the then province of India for three days, and part of that time was spent at sea. In fact, he later wrote that his sojourn in Rangoon was ‘countable by hours’. Despite the claims of several writers, he never sailed on the Irrawaddy River, nor did he ever visit Mandalay.

In his essay ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, the poet T.S. Eliot spoke of how, when a new literary work appeared, every existing work was somehow modified by it and the whole scene subtly rearranged. He was speaking purely of literature, and his comment can be applied to Kipling’s oeuvre, but the poem ‘Mandalay’ did this in another sense too. Despite all the critical comments that have appeared over the past 125 years or so, both the poem and its musical settings (usually published under the title ‘On the Road to Mandalay’) have been enormously influential. The poem irrevocably altered public perceptions of Burma, and by extension Western notions of the ‘Far East’. In different ways, and to different degrees, its musical settings coloured almost all the popular songs and tunes about Asia that followed — and there were hundreds of them. As a survey of Burma-related compositions shows, Kipling’s images became fixed firmly in people’s minds and inspired dozens of composers and lyricists in the UK, the US and elsewhere.

It would be going too far to claim that ‘Mandalay’ alone was responsible for the outpouring of songs and tunes during the colonial period that related in some way to Burma. By 1890, when the poem first appeared in print, there was already a long association between the ‘Orient’ and Western music, much of which dwelt on relationships between Asian women and Western men. Also, the poem not only appeared at the height of Britain’s imperial expansion, but it also coincided with a number of social movements in the UK and further afield, to do with questions of race, religion and gender. In addition, soon after ‘Mandalay’ was published, the popular music industry underwent a radical transformation. Technical advances in recording, marketing and broadcasting led to the globalisation of Western music and the appearance of a mass culture that affected most countries, including Burma. Even so, assisted by all those developments, Kipling’s ‘Barrack Room’ ballad had a remarkable impact which is still being felt today.

In literature too, the poem has long been a favourite of publishers and authors. If one dips into the websites of a few prominent on-line booksellers they reveal about 30 works about Burma with their main titles drawn directly from Kipling’s poem. In addition to several named The Road to Mandalay, they encompass such variations asThe Road from Mandalay, Back to Mandalay, Red Roads to Mandalay, The Road Past Mandalay and On the Back Road to Mandalay. There are similar titles in French, German and other languages. The publication dates of these works range from the early 20^th century right through to the present day. The list includes novels, travelogues, autobiographies, histories, collections of poetry, science fiction stories and books of photographs. Also, ‘Mandalay’ has long been used to punctuate stories about Burma in the news media and to illuminate longer works. This is in addition to a dozen or so feature films, documentaries and travel movies, all named with the obvious intention of capitalising on the popularity of Kipling’s poem, or at least the likelihood that its exotic and historical associations would be recognised and acknowledged.

Once it became well known, the name ‘Mandalay’ acquired commercial value in other spheres. It was applied to condiments and cocktails, ships and streets, buildings and businesses. In 1907, for example, H.J. Heinz invested heavily in his Mandalay Sauce which sought to replicate some of the ‘spicy garlic smells’ described by Kipling. A drink based on rum and fruit juice was dubbed ‘A Night in Old Mandalay’. There was even a children’s board game called ‘Mandalay’, released in 1960. It is stretching a point, but at one stage ‘Manderley’, believed by many to be a variant spelling of ‘Mandalay’, was reputed to be the most popular house name in the UK. In fact, the ubiquity of the name was more likely due to the popularity of Daphne de Maurier’s 1938 novel Rebecca (and Alfred Hitchcock’s 1940 film adaption of the same name), in which ‘Manderley’ was the name of the fictional country estate owned by the main character. Even so, the opening line of the novel, ‘Last night I dreamt I went to Manderley again’, has been likened by some commentators to the wish expressed by the British solider in Kipling’s iconic poem to return to Mandalay.

During the colonial period, Burma never achieved quite the same status in the mind of the British public as Sax Rohmer’s ‘mysterious orient’, or Walter de la Mare’s ‘heart-beguiling Araby’, but it became an easily recognisable reference point, representing exotic places far away, full of mystery and promise. This was particularly true of Mandalay. Like Timbuktu, Samarkand and other semi-mythical places that captured the popular imagination of the West during the 19^th and early 20^th centuries, the old royal capital became a powerful symbol. After passing through the city in the 1920s, for example, Somerset Maugham observed:

First of all Mandalay is a name. For there are places whose names from some accident of history or happy association have an independent magic and perhaps the wise man would never visit them, for the expectations they arouse can hardly be realised … Mandalay has its name; the falling cadence of the lovely word has gathered about itself the chiaroscuro of romance.

Maugham felt that the very name Mandalay ‘informs the sensitive fancy’. To his mind, it was not possible for anyone to write it down ‘without a quickening of the pulse and at his heart the pain of unsatisfied desire’. Such was the power of its accumulated associations. The ‘magic’ described by Maugham was in large part derived from Kipling’s ballad, and helped shape the reception given to later musical compositions with Oriental themes.

To use Nicoleta Medrea’s memorable phrase, during the Victorian and Edwardian eras Rudyard Kipling ‘colonised the imagination’ of the West. His ballad ‘Mandalay’ captured ‘the psychic energy of empire’. It became firmly fixed in popular culture and endured into the 21st century. It did not matter if accuracy suffered in the process. By the 1930s, the singer Peter Dawson (famous for his renditions of the song) was claiming that ‘No man knew or saw more, in and about India and Burma, than Rudyard Kipling’. During the Second World War, correspondents in Burma repeatedly invoked ‘Mandalay’ in stories, confident that their readership would make the connection. After a visit to Burma in 1951, Norman Lewis wrote: ‘Mandalay. In the name there was a euphony which beckoned to the imagination’. Hugh Tinker could have expanded the scope of his observation when he stated in 1957, ‘to the average Englishman Burma conjured up one poem and perhaps a short story by Kipling — Kipling, who spent three days in Burma’. Writing in 2002, an American travel writer took a less generous view: ‘Rare is the book about Burma’, he wrote, ‘that doesn’t gush the obligatory line or two of Kipling!’.

This complex amalgam of fact and fantasy, realism and romance, in the public imagination of the West was nicely captured in 2004 by Emma Larkin. In her bookSecret Histories, in which she retraced George Orwell’s footsteps in Burma, she confessed to feeling something of the ‘independent magic’ of Mandalay:

I always find it impossible to say the name ‘Mandalay’ out loud without having at least a small flutter of excitement. For many foreigners the name conjures up irresistible images of lost oriental kingdoms and tropical splendour. The unofficial Poet Laureate of British colonialism, Rudyard Kipling, is partly responsible for this, through his well-loved poem ‘Mandalay’.

These sentiments are clearly widely held. As demonstrated by countless modern musicians, authors, film makers, journalists, tour company operators, hoteliers and travel guides, Kipling’s ballad is widely recognised, and still holds enormous appeal. It continues to evoke strong responses among all those who read the ballad or, more likely, hear it sung. As George Orwell once wrote:

Unless one is merely a snob and a liar it is impossible to say that no one who cares for poetry could not get any pleasure out of such lines as: ‘For the wind is in the palm trees, and the temple bells they say, / ‘Come you back, you British soldier, come you back to Mandalay!’.

Andrew Selth is an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University. This post draws on Andrew Selth, Kipling, “Mandalay” and Burma in the Popular Imagination, Working Paper No.161, (Hong Kong: South East Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong, January 2015).

A hopeful moment for civil society in Myanmar -- New Mandala

A hopeful moment for civil society in Myanmar -- New Mandala
ANDREW MORGAN, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR – 30 MARCH 2015

With the “opening up” of Myanmar in 2011 after decades of repressive military rule, domestic civil society organizations, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and aid organizations, have been eager to increase their activities inside the country. Corresponding with this ramp up, a remarkable occurrence unfolded between the summers of 2013 and 2014: the nation’s formerly authoritarian government opened its doors to a rigorous debate on the state of civil society in Myanmar and abandoned a restrictive law in place since the infamous 1988 crackdown.

In recent decades Myanmar has enacted and carried out among the most draconian and repressive policies toward civil society organizations in the world. In this light, the fact that it allowed a representative body of 275 such organizations to air their criticisms of a recently passed law is virtually without precedent. Perhaps more remarkably, the government then revised the proposed 2013 law in response to these criticisms, and subsequently published the final version of the Association Registration Law in July 2014 thereby fundamentally altering the people’s right to freely associate.

Civil society has a long and controversial history in Myanmar, and its reemergence is among one of the recent and rapid changes occurring in Myanmar. It could be argued that no truly democratic society is complete without an open and flourishing civil society. As long time Myanmar expert and academic, Professor David I. Steinberg noted, “[c]ivil society is . . . an essential element of political pluralism—the diffusion of power is the hallmark of modern democracies.” The significance, Steinberg posited, lies “in the hypothesis that if civil society is strong and its citizens band together for the common good based on a sense of community or programmatic trust and efficacy…[that] translate[s] into overall trust in the political process of democracy or democratization and lead[s] to diffusion of the centralized power of the state. It is precisely this characteristic of civil society that makes it a threat to autocratic governments.” Noting a brief period where civil society flourished between independence and the first military coup, Steinberg then asserts flatly that “[c]ivil society died under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (“BSPP”) . . . more accurately, it was murdered.” It is in this context that the recent changes must be placed.

Under the infamously restrictive rule of General Ne Win, he and his advisers managed to smother democracy in Burma, jail hundreds of political leaders without trials, replace Parliament with a military dictatorship, and implement a drastic program, called the Burmese Way to Socialism. In the ensuing years, the military built the BSPP from a relatively small cadre of loyal followers of Ne Win to a vast following even as it introduced an extremely rigid socialist system that eliminated private business and brought all private organizations under state control. Consistent with this new system, the BSPP virtually closed the state to all outside influence. AsSteinberg put it:

No one legally left the country without authorization, visas for foreigners for a period were limited to 24 hours, internal travel was greatly restricted, and foreign and domestic news [sic] subject to complete control or censorship. Foreign missionaries who left on leave were not allowed to return. Private foreign assistance organizations were ordered to depart, and ties between internal groups and their foreign counterparts were truncated as far as possible. Burma had turned from neutral to isolationist, and an official policy of virtual xenophobia was introduced. Thus, the relatively open society that flourished in post-independence Burma was effectively crushed and brought under the control of the extremely isolationist regime of Ne Win from the years 1962 to 1988.

Food shortages and widespread economic discontent inspired mass protests in 1988, led by the country’s student activists and revered Buddhist monks. Hundreds of thousands of people marched through the then-capital, Rangoon, calling for a transition to democracy in what was the largest mass protests in the country since independence in 1948. The army seized power in a coup, abolished the 1974 constitution, and silenced the protests by opening fire on unarmed dissidents, leaving more than 3,000 dead, according to official figures. Following the bloody crackdown, the military regime attempted to quell criticism by making cosmetic changes. The ruling BSPP party changed its name to the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and adopted modest economic reforms.

Nevertheless, the military regime’s control of civil society continued as before, albeit subject to more external scrutiny and criticism due to the international media attention given to the country following the bloody crackdown of 1988. Indeed, at the time of his report on civil society in Burma in 1997, Steinberg wrote that there was “no letup in the attempt to prevent the rise of any pluralistic institutions in the society that could offer avenues of public debate or disagreement over state policies and the role of the military . . . the immediate future for civil society remains bleak.” During this period, then, civil society went underground, remained dormant, and waited for its chance to reemerge.

The legal basis for such restrictions was established when the SLORC passed a restrictive association law in the wake of the 1988 crackdown that governed the process for NGOs and civil society organizations to legally operate in the country. TheLaw Relating to Forming of Organizations No. 6/88 contained broad, vaguely defined restrictions that effectively banned any civil society organization from registering (and thus, legally operating) unless it maintained close ties to the government. Under the law, a member of an organization that was deemed to “disrupt law and order, peace and tranquility” could be sentenced to up to five years imprisonment, while someone found to have any link to an unregistered organization could face up to three years in prison. These draconian policies violated the Myanmar people’s right to freely associate – a right that is nearly universally recognized as foundational to human rights.

The current Constitution of Myanmar, published in a 2008 referendum, enshrines the freedom of association. Paragraph 354 of the 2008 Constitution states as follows:

Every citizen shall be at liberty in the exercise of the following rights, if not contrary to the laws, enacted for Union security, prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquility or public order and morality: 1. to express and publish freely their convictions and opinions 2. to assemble peacefully without arms and holding procession; 3. to form associations and organizations . . .

Despite this guarantee, the laws and processes put in place by the regime in 1988 hampered the free association of individuals, in particular those related to the formation of civil society and non-governmental organizations. This led many NGOs to criticize and pushback against the opaque and cumbersome registration process and the harsh potential punishments for not properly doing so.

Although still restricted in many important ways, civil society groups in Myanmar began to reemerge in larger numbers even prior to the reform measures of the summer 2013. As of 2011, Harvard University’s Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations reported that the government continued to stifle an emergent, but weak, civil society through tight controls on media and threats to punish or restrict organizations that engage in political activities. Nevertheless, the report found that the government began to allow the growth of independent groups that they perceived as useful or innocuous, especially social services providers—likely due to the reformist attitude of the Thein Sein government. In the midst of this modest growth came most critical event for the growth of civil society in recent Myanmarese history: Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.

Amidst the tragedy of Cyclone Nargis, which left more than 84,500 dead and roughly 53,800 missing, according to official figures, international pressure led the government to eventually alter its draconian response and allow aid organizations to operate with greater freedom in the country. Many recognize Cyclone Nargis as something of a turning point for the humanitarian and civil society space in Myanmar.According to one report, there were only forty international NGOs operating on the ground in Myanmar prior to Cyclone Nargis. In the following year alone, the number grew to over 100. Because most local civil society groups were not registered, it is difficult to get an accurate estimate of their numbers and thereby project their growth. Nevertheless, international organizations operating in Myanmar at the time that were interviewed by the Hauser Center observed a rise in the number of local groups as well as their overall level of activity post-Cyclone Nargis. The response to the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis represented a sea change for civil society in Myanmar where government policies took a backseat to humanitarian imperatives, and, perhaps, were altered indefinitely.

Perhaps in response to criticisms during the Cyclone Nargis response, the Thein Sein government began to signal its willingness to adopt reforms, and Parliament began to legislate in the spring and summer of 2013. On July 27, 2013, the Public Affairs Management Committee of Myanmar released a revised law called the Draft Law on Associations. The Draft Law raised several concerns, including restrictive constraints on unregistered associations, overly-burdensome registration procedures, re-registration requirements, and troubling ambiguities on several issues that would make it difficult for domestic and foreign NGOs alike to carry out their programs without fear of reprisal.

In an unprecedented show of collaboration, however, on August 15, 2013, representatives from more than 275 civil society organizations (local and foreign), community-based organizations, and networks, met with Myanmar MPs and the Parliamentary Affairs Committee regarding the Draft Law. The organizations made a slate of recommendations and presented a civil society-developed alternative version of the Draft Law on Associations. On August 19, 2013, the lower house issued a revised version of the Draft Law, with a new title, the Association Registration Law, and the revised law was posted on Parliament’s website (in Burmese only) a few days later.

Despite the remarkable occurrence of the government meeting with and responding directly to concerns raised by civil society organizations given the military government’s historically repressive treatment of them, the law still included several harsh policies, including punitive measures that were not in line with international standards. Perhaps even more remarkably then, on November 4, 2013, another revised version of the Draft Association Registration Law appeared to abandon some of the more draconian measures and reflected substantial improvement over prior versions, including the July 27th and August 19th versions of the draft law. After much delay, the Union Parliament enacted the new Association Registration Law on June 25, 2014, and it was soon signed by the President and officially ‘gazetted’ in the newspaper on July 20, 2014.

The new law marks a dramatic shift from the draconian legal constraints that had become status quo for Myanmar government policy toward civil society. Likewise, the process undertaken in which civil society was invited to the government’s table to revise and draft the more progressive law is a marked shift from the frosty reception civil society found in recent decades. Indeed, one cannot help but hope that the collaborative process in the case of the association law is much more broadly illustrative of the changing winds of reform in Myanmar – just one step on the long journey of enshrining the international rights and freedoms its people so desperately crave.

Andrew Morgan serves as in-house counsel at an international NGO in Washington, D.C. He received his Juris Doctor degree from the University of Washington School of Law where he was an editor for the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, where a previous version of this article appeared. Morgan also obtained a Master of Public Service degree from the University of Arkansas – Clinton School of Public Service in 2012.

Singapore after Lee Kuan Yew -- New Mandala

Singapore after Lee Kuan Yew -- New Mandala
HAMISH MCDONALD – 27 MARCH 2015

Will Singapore Inc survive the passing of its long-time CEO, and more importantly will there finally be time for rhyme, asks Hamish McDonald?

When James Minchin, an Anglican priest from Australia who had lived in Singapore for many years, wrote an insightful book about its then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew in 1986, he gave it the title No Man is an Island.

Yet when this week, after Lee died at the age of 91, his son and current prime minister Lee Hsien Loong broke the news to the nation by stating: “We won’t see another man like him. To many Singaporeans, and indeed others too, Lee Kuan Yew was Singapore.”

Now that his overpowering presence is gone, the question is whether the Singapore that was almost synonymous with Lee Kuan Yew will hold together or start to fragment (or free up, to use a less ominous term).

It was sometimes called Singapore Inc, reflecting its tight managerial style of government and directed thinking, but the island-republic has at times more closely resembled a family firm rather than an executive-run corporation.

Not only has the family provided two prime ministers, the Civil Aviation Authority, state-owned SingTel, the sovereign investment fund Temasek, and the Singapore Armed Forces have all had Lee family members in command positions.

The family law firm, Lee & Lee, for many years run by Lee Kuan Yew’s late wife, was one instrument used to break political challengers from outside the ruling People’s Action Party through the notorious defamation actions in a cowed judiciary.

The bureaucracy would dig up dirt on political defectors like former president Devan Nair or former solicitor-general Francis Seow. The details would then be slathered across the state-owned print and broadcast media. After standing as an opposition candidate, Chee Soon Juan lost his university job after alleged misuse of official stationery and postage was suddenly discovered.

Yet after continuous power since 1959, the grip of the PAP on the minds of Singaporeans has noticeably weakened.

The last elections in 2011 saw its vote share fall to 60 per cent, its lowest ever. Though the PAP still held 81 of the 87 seats in parliament, the first-past-the-post voting system could translate further electoral slippage into an avalanche of seats for the opposition.

With attractive young professionals like the lawyer-academic Sylvia Lim replacing the old soap-box orators like Jayaretnam in the Workers Party of Singapore, the opposition is much more presentable to the public vis-à-vis the high-achievers typically recruited by the PAP, and perhaps seen as less elitist.

The PAP itself could break up along factional lines, especially if Lee Hsien Loong hands over to a non-family successor.

Beneath the glittering achievement of Lee Kuan Yew and his chosen successors in raising per capita GDP to some US$55,000, are resentments over rising inequality and a sense of identity loss, with Singaporean citizens now less than two-thirds of the island’s 5.5 million residents.

Lee’s tough-minded and blunt views on international strategy made him a darling of conservatives in the Western world, who overlooked his domestic restrictions on free expression and the corporatist economics of high mandatory savings funnelled into state investment funds (which were not always well-invested).

Yet Singapore remains unpopular in its closest region, one reason why it maintains the best-equipped and most battle-ready armed forces in Southeast Asia.

It is resented not just for its success, but for the reason that part of the success has come from exploiting the weaknesses of its neighbours. Singapore is regarded as clean on corruption, but possibly $200 billion in corrupt earnings from Indonesia is held in its banks. Singapore was the conduit of choice for the Myanmar military and its business cronies when sanctions held.

Recently even Australia has been querying the use of Singapore as a pathway for profit shifting, though Australian businesses and institutions find the island a comfortable regional base and source of partnerships, and the two peoples, with comparable hybrid immigrant popular cultures, get along well.

So where does Singapore go from here? One reason for the question is the zig-zagging path of Lee Kuan Yew himself, usually defined as commendable “pragmatism”.

His background made him a chameleon. His wealthy Straits Chinese family gave him a sense of non-British identity. Working for three years for the Japanese state news agency Domei during the wartime occupation he perhaps learned a lot about media control. Then he became Harry Lee, the Cambridge and Inns of Court barrister. Moving into politics he enlisted Leftists as allies, then crushed them mercilessly.

In office he stressed English language, then Mandarin. Races were ranked as “hard” and “soft”. The promotion of “Asian values” waxed and waned as the Western economic model was seen as in decline or revival. Population growth was discouraged, then promoted as wealthier Singaporeans showed unwillingness to propagate their genes. Strict morality was eased to accommodate a synthetic version of Bugis Street, the old transvestite hangout, and two lavish casinos to capture more of Asia’s stray money.

No doubt Singapore will continue to go with the global and regional trade winds.

Internally, its system and political culture seem ripe for change. As expatriate Singaporean writer Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan wrote in Foreign Policy this week, the island’s younger and educated people are no longer inclined to accept Lee’s 1960s statement that “Poetry is a luxury we cannot afford.”

Hamish McDonald is Journalist-in-Resident at the Australian National University’sCollege of Asia & the Pacific, and a former regional editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review.

Social media machinations in Vietnam -- New Mandala

Social media machinations in Vietnam -- New Mandala
HUONG LE THU, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR – 26 MARCH 2015

As the country prepares for the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in January 2016, the public attention to power continuity appears natural. A phenomenon of ‘mushrooming’ social media platforms, blogs and information websites starts to play a novel role in the pre-Congress period.

A sequence of articles dedicated to the CPV in a critical tone has been a signature of the foreign-based Vietnamese news outlets for the occasion of the 85th anniversary of the Party. The Voice of America (VOA) Vietnamese featured an article entitled “Where is the CPV going?” expressing skepticism about the longevity of a single party future. On 1 February 2015 the BBC Vietnamese published an article with suggestive title “The Party doesn’t do any good for the country”. The news outlet reinforced this line as the next day it released another piece entitled with “Who is still taking pride of being a member of the CPV?” Based on significantly decreasing interests of young generation in joining the Party, this article spelled out the reluctance of being connected to the Party system among the Vietnamese nowadays. On the same day, the website published another article entitled “The Party and the question of legitimacy” featured a selfie of a Vietnamese young woman holding a banner “I don’t like the CPV”. The article reported growing Facebook groups united under the theme of “Ain’t like CPV”.

Before the power transition within the CPV, there surface new dimensions of political blogging. Chân Dung Quyền Lực (CDQL), translated as Profiles in Power, a website with mysterious sources, but with documentation that is believed to be in the possession within the top of the establishment. The aim of this blog is to provide the people with facts about the current leadership elected in the last 11th Party Congress and to allow them to understand better how the leadership of the approaching 12th Party Congress will decide about the future of Vietnam. The CDQL exposes concrete numbers and cases of illegitimate assets that each member Politburo has gained during the time in power. Cases include the Minister of Defense who used a private company name to ‘empty out’ the army’s budget, or how Deputy Prime Minister’s son-in-law exercised money laundering. Within a month since its inception, the website received over 14 million of visits.

The CDQL is considered as an ‘ace in the sleeve’ in the internal power battle among Party rivals. Although ‘just a blog’, the CDQL has shaken up the domestic stage of public information, forcing the mainstream media to comment on it. The fact that despite such directly confronting messages, the website is still accessible supports the suspicion that this is a project that has the blessing from someone in the top. Another attempt of tackling corruption by The Elderly, a printed newspaper established in 1995, was treated with severer treatment, including dismissing the chief editor, Kim Cuc Hoa. For ‘disseminating the distorted truth’ and ‘revealing state secrets’ The Elderly was fined for … publishing inappropriate advertisements.

The accumulation of doubtful voices, not only among the foreign-based news websites, but with a growing number of domestic platforms, suggests that there have started a new stage in the Vietnamese political environment. An indicator of change is that people are no longer afraid of self-identification when posting anti-regime banners, uploading their photos and revealing their online identities. Whether they are political activists managing regular blogs with quality information and discussions, or they are ‘just’ netizens expressing their sporadic opinions on Facebook groups, they have established a new generation of cyber-dissidents. Even Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who in 2013 said that “social media should not be used to share news or opinions on current issues” recently changed his opinion to: It’s impossible to ban information on social media”.

The CPV regime has proven that it has the capability to ‘deal’ with dissidents and limit the access. As a matter of fact, Vietnam is ranked 175 out of 182 in the 2015 World Freedom Press Index by the Reporters without Borders, and the government’s treatment of the prisoners of conscience remains a thorn in the eye of the US-Vietnam relations. However, it is rather doubtful that, with such a widespread number of Internet users in a social media-active young population, the Party will be able to continue to assert absolute control over dissemination of diversification of opinions and assessments towards its performance. Social media has become a form of emancipation through technology that has allowed pluralization of political opinions inside the country, unlike in the past where uncensored content could only be publicized on the exile. In fact, the Party has learned to recognize how social media can be a very efficient tool. It is now not only the domain of the dissidents, but it could also be used by those involved in the power struggle. As the atmosphere becomes increasingly tense towards next January more revealing developments in Vietnam’s political cyberspace are bound to occur.

Huong Le Thu is a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Kokang 2015: Unknown unknowns -- New Mandala

Kokang 2015: Unknown unknowns -- New Mandala
EISEL MAZARD, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR – 26 MARCH 2015

The border between Yunnan and Myanmar is no longer the dangerous and mysterious place that empries tried to control –from afar– in the 19th century. Perhaps it was simply the region’s remoteness from the capital cities negotiating its fate that created the mystique in the first place, but for many who have studied (and loved) the region’s history, the greatest shock from the latest photographs of the Kokang conflict may have been the extent of urbanization in Laukkai’s [老街市] downtown core. In 2015, Laukkai looks more like “a real city” than Vientiane [萬象市] did when I first arrived there.

Years ago, I wrote an article that ridiculed the grandiose dreams of both the French and British Empires that imagined they would quickly criss-cross the area with railway tracks, opening up the supposedly-tremendous trade potential of what was (then) a poverty-stricken backwater, still using opium and seashells as (de facto) currency. Just a few months ago, I wrote an essay that included a rapid evaluation of the current projects to (finally) complete the links of road, rail and pipeline from Kyaukpyu [皎漂] to Kunming [昆明]. The area is emerging from obscurity, with a somewhat different timeline for each district on the map.

With the end of obscurity, new opportunities commence. Perhaps this is the opportunity for Kokang district (or, “special administrative zone”) to make a move for independence, separating from Myanmar. Perhaps not. Perhaps China will again demonstrate its policy of opposing separatism everywhere, as a matter of principle, regardless of its own national interests. This principle has been significant to the history of Burma more than once before, as, e.g., when Karen revolutionaries [K.N.U.P.] sought Beijing’s support for their own separate state, under the banner of Communism. They were refused. If China had been interested in supporting ethnic separatism within Burma, in order to create satellite states, they have had many decades of opportunities to do so, and declined.

Although photographs by tourists and hoteliers are easy to find on the internet, the 2015 conflict also highlights the decline of the conventional, western news media. In an era when CNN has closed its Baghdad bureau, and the whole news industry has collapsed its commitments to even the most headline-grabbing wars, an unpopular conflict in a poor country is unlikely to merit a single visit from a western journalist. I recall that when I was interviewed by a reporter from Le Monde he mentioned to me that his editor’s policy was, “One story on Laos about every four years” –unless there were nuclear war. The Yunnan border is presumably an even lower priority.

Of course, within Southeast Asia, the few publications from the past that might have lept at the opportunity to send someone into the field have disappeared, and never were replaced (the Far Eastern Economic Review being a prominent example). Admittedly, if some news bureau were to cover the travel-expenses and health insurance for such a venture, very few western journalists –if any– would have the combination of language-skills and political expertise to accomplish much more than sparking up casual conversations around the refugee camps (if they’re even allowed to approach the camps).

However, the round numbers of refugees being reported are too round for my liking (some sources say 30,000, some say 60,000), and it bothers me that I can’t find anything like a direct (independent) source, taking responsibility for the estimates. Instead, what reports exist, in English, rely on relationships with “stringers” sending back photographs by e-mail, and, of course, the recycling of official government statements from both Chinese and Burmese sources as “news”. A journalist in a Beijing office, or even a Rangoon office, may not have access to much more information than I have, from my desk in Canada.

The Kokang uprising raises many interesting questions that I can’t answer. What, currently, is the relationship between the Kokang and the Kachin Independence Army [K.I.A.]? For that matter, how could the current uprising change the situation for the (treaty-abiding) Wa State Army? The tiny parcel of land represented by Kokang seems as if it could be separated without any devastating effect on the Burmese economy, and yet, perhaps, the deeper threat to Myanmar is from the Kokang’s connection to broader claims of democracy and self-determination. If the Kokang had any degree of success whatsoever, would this provoke Shan State to demand independence? Presumably, for many in the Burmese military, it would be preferable not to have to ask these questions, and to instead eliminate the uprising. Conversely, I wonder if the other ethnic groups (thinking of sovereignty) would reject the prospect of Kokang leadership.

I’m unlikely to find answers to even these preliminary questions by reading in English, and while I may complain about the paucity of Western journalists conducting research on the ground, I’m aware, also, that the majority of such reporters couldn’t do much more than I once did, wandering around Jinghong [景洪], in gathering together anecdotes about the politics along the borderlands. Admittedly, however, I learned many strange and secret things in the cafés of Jinghong.

Eisel Mazard researches Southeast Asian society and cultures. His website iswww.eisel-mazard.com

Thailand’s social media battleground -- New Mandala

Thailand’s social media battleground -- New Mandala
ROBERT TALCOTH, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR – 26 MARCH 2015

Social media and political conflict

The internet and social media is playing an important new role in Thai politics. With the rise of new media, politicians, activists and intellectuals are increasingly using social media as a platform to share ideas and opinions. Leading politicians like Yingluck Shinawatra, Abhisit Vejjajiva and Suthep Thaugsuban all have Facebook accounts that have received more than two million likes. Thai politicians started using Facebook and Twitter extensively in 2009 and 2010. Politicians and social commentators usually post thoughts on political matters, photos, links to their articles, and YouTube links of interviews.

With increasing internet access in Thailand, the internet is gradually becoming the main source of news for Thai people. This is particularly the case for people living in urban areas.

According to a 2012 survey, one third of Thailand’s population has regular internet access and about 8.6 million Thais use the internet every day. Statistics from 2014 showed that Thailand had roughly 24 million Facebook users, making Thailand Facebook’s ninth biggest country worldwide. 55 percent of Thai Facebook users live in Bangkok. Even with growing access to the internet and wireless communication there still exist inequalities in broadband access and educational gaps in the ability to operate a digital culture. In the provinces outside of Bangkok and other major cities internet access is still limited.

The media and the state

Historically, Thai media, although relatively free by regional standards, has been under direct or indirect control of the government. This has particularly been the case during the periods of military rule. Broadcast media has been censored and used as a tool of control by the state.

Up until the 1990’s the military had practically total control of print and broadcast media. Following the end of military dictatorship in the early 1990’s media became freer but several major TV and radio-stations remain under military ownership and mainstream media is still largely under elite control. The mainstream media is generally Bangkok centered, and journalists often practice self-censorship and stay away from “sensitive” topics. The current political conflict has resulted in increasing media restrictions, and in 2014 Reporters Without Borders rated Thailand 130 of 180 nations in press freedom, while U.S based non-government organization, Freedom House rated the Thai press as being “not free”.

In a country where people historically haven’t been allowed to openly and freely discuss certain matters, social media has the potential power to alter society. On social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter millions of user can share news, ideas and opinions that would not make it into traditional media. Direct, uncensored criticism of powerful people can be shared and discussed freely without interference. File-sharing and p2p networks have also made it possible to get access to books and articles that are banned in Thailand. The rise of these technologies, which allows the public increasing access to information, could lead to the democratization of knowledge and the development of a more democratic society. New media is providing people with a platform to discuss their political beliefs.

The Military Coup

When the military staged the May coup and ousted the elected government they also took control of all TV-stations in Bangkok and some other parts of the country. Broadcast media were ordered to suspend all normal programming. Television and radio-stations were forced to broadcast government programs whenever required. For several days nationalist songs, pro-military propaganda and announcements by the junta was broadcasted. The military warned journalist from spreading information that might cause “confusion and unrest”.

Picture from the junta’s television program ‘returning happiness to the people’

Previous coup makers had also made an effort to take control of media and silence the opposition. This time, the military successfully took control of television, newspapers and radio but they could not control the internet. Uncensored information about the political situation in Thailand was shared by millions of users. Journalists and academics were banned from addressing political matters on traditional media channels but the military could not prevent internet users from sharing their views on the coup online.

The situation was somewhat new for the military. It had clearly become more difficult for them to control information.

Since the PDRC’s anti-government, pro-military street protests, a number of people had created live blogs which they linked to their Facebook and twitter accounts. The blogs provided live updates, often with pictures, on what was taking place in Bangkok. After the military coup the live blogs reported on the political development and shared information on public protests against the military junta and the movement of soldiers in the capital. Groups that opposed the military junta used social media to stage flash mobs throughout the capital. Wireless communication networks created spontaneous processes of mobilization. This was an example of the mobilization capacities of the internet.

Anti-coup protesters in Bangkok

While browsing through the internet during lunch in the Siam Square area of Bangkok I read a tweet about a protest taking place in Ratchaprasong. I quickly moved towards the area and found several hundred pro-democracy protesters that had gathered to show their disapproval of the junta. Images of the protesters were posted on various social media sites in real time. This attracted people to get out on the street and join the protest. Protesters walked from Ratchaprasong to Victory Monument. Along the way people took pictures and recorded the march using their mobile phones. The ability to communicate in real time enabled people to construct instant networks of communication.

Government control of the internet

Social media is a medium that is currently beyond the control of the military government. It therefore poses a threat to their power and ambitions of controlling information. The Thai junta is currently still figuring out how to increase their control of the internet. The 2007 Computer Crimes Act, which is currently being revised and updated, have been used to bring enforcements of Thailand’s laws to the internet. Thousands of websites are currently blocked in Thailand. The total number of blocked websites in 2011 was estimated to be between 80-100 000. Although thousands of websites featuring “illegal” content have been blocked, social media sites are still available. The Thai government blocked YouTube for a short period in 2007 but the backlash from the public pressured the government to make the website accessible again.

Shortly after the 2014 military coup Facebook went down for a couple of hours. Rumors spread that the military had put it down. This was denied by the army and the popular social media site was soon up and running again. The Junta received criticism from the public during the short hours Facebook was down; this clearly showed that attempts by the government to block social media sites would have negative consequences.

Internet control in Asia

Government power partially relies on the control of information, and the internet, with its free flow of information, has come to pose a threat to authoritarian states throughout Asia. The state wishes to protect its values and political ideals from the influence of opposing ideologies. It’s in the interest of the authoritarian state to limit the population’s access to information and to prevent them from discussing topics that might threaten the power of the government.

Authoritarian regimes in the region have used different methods of limiting people’s access to the internet. China is one of the most extreme cases of state control of the internet.

In China, it’s not allowed to criticize the government and the internet is monitored and censored. The Chinese government’s apparatus of Internet control is the most extensive and advanced in the world. Social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook are blocked by the government. Instead, Chinese internet users use Weibo (Chinese for microblog). Weibo has a format that is similar to Twitter and share some similarities with Facebook. Weibo users can exchange short sentences, images, or video links. Weibo has approximately 300 million users in China. The microblogs have been used to share information about politics and social issues. Bloggers have discussed and shared information on topics that can be viewed as critical or damaging to the government. Posts on government corruption and abuse of power have been deleted by authorities and the Weibo accounts of journalists, academics and social activists are regularly blocked. In the governments regulations on microblog development it is stated that “It (microblogs) should propagate the socialist core value system and the advanced socialist culture, and serve to the establishment of a socialist harmonious society”. Posts that violate this are illegal, and could lead to long prison sentences.

In an attempt to make bloggers more cautious about what they post, the Chinese government has issued a law that states that bloggers that post false information that gets more than 5000 views risks three years in prison. Keywords such as human rights and Liu Xiaobo are on the governments blacklist. All posts featuring the blacklisted words will immediately be tracked down and deleted. Depending on the severity of the post arrests might be carried out.

The Thai government wants to increase its control of the internet and it is not unlikely that they will look to China for inspiration on how to curb online dissent. China has already a ready framework for how the state can control the internet and monitor online political activity. The question remains if new technologies will remain “free” in Thailand or if the Chinese model of internet monitoring will be implemented.

Social media and the Thai political crisis

The political conflict in Thailand is a war of words. The two opposing sides have very different perspectives on political matters and supporters of the different fractions tend to frame the conflict in fundamentally different ways. They represent two very contrasting worldviews.

Red-shirt sympathizers’ view the political conflict as being about democracy and about building a more socially just society were people are given equal opportunities. They frame the conflict as a battle between the majority population and a political and economic elite which has practically monopolized the access to power and opportunity. Yellow-shirt sympathizers argue that the conflict is about getting rid of corrupt politicians that have enriched themselves and their families at the expense of the nation. They believe that a return to authoritarian rule and restrictions on freedom of speech is needed to create “order” and to fix a rotten system. The Yellow-shirts also claim that they want to develop democracy in Thailand, but their vision of democracy is quite different from the red-shirts. They want a democratic system that is “compatible” with, what they refer to as “Thai values” and “tradition”, a so-called guided democracy under the supervision of “enlightened” rulers.

The yellow-shirts view people on the red-side as being ignorant and misguided people under the control of Thaksin. The term Thaksin’s slave is frequently used to attack their opponents. The leaders of the red-movement are often described as evil, corrupt traitors that wish to destroy Thailand. On the other hand, the reds argue that the yellow have been indoctrinated by state propaganda and that they represent the interest of a wealthy elite that refuse to allow the development of democracy in Thailand.

Ultimately, the red-shirts speak of democracy, social justice and freedom of speech, while the yellow-shirts speak of morality, tradition, anti-corruption and good governance. People that support the red-shirts question the dominant nationalist ideology promoted by the state and they advocate change. The yellow-shirts are predominantly conservative nationalists that wish to preserve the “traditional” attitudes, beliefs, values and socio-political order.

A woman that voted in the February election is portrayed as a heroine while the PDRC protesters that obstructed the election are depicted as the living dead

The two opposing sides are waging a digital war to shape public opinion. Information about political events and developments are often very different depending on the source. The spread of conflicting stories and contradictory facts on social media sites make it difficult for the public to develop an understanding of the political situation. Rumors, lies and smear campaigns have been used by both sides to attack the opposition. For the public, it has become more and more difficult to determine what is true and what is false.

A political demonstration might be described by a yellow-shirt commentator as a gathering of rented thugs paid by Thaksin to cause havoc and confusion, while a red-shirt sympathizer might view demonstrators as pro-democracy activists standing up for their right to vote.

The pro-establishment yellow-shirt movement is the most vocal on social media. The Yellow-shirts, whom mainly consist of middle-and upper-class Thais from Bangkok, have better access to the internet than the red-shirt supporters whom mainly live in the provinces outside of Bangkok. They have also usually more money and can afford new technology.

Example of the type of pictures shared by military supporters on social media

Besides access to internet and new technology there are also differences in how people from the opposing sides use the internet and express their political beliefs. The yellow-shirts represent the dominant ideology of the military and the traditional elite and have therefore little problems in terms of openly showing their political affiliations and convictions. Throughout the political crisis yellow-shirt supporters have openly worn t-shirts, hats and other symbols in public to show that they belong to and support a particular political fraction. On social media sites they are very vocal and open about their beliefs and political affiliations. The situation for the red-shirts is quite different, particularly since the beginning of the PDRC street movement that lead to the 2014 military coup. A person that openly shows support for the red-shirt movement risks being labeled as a traitor, terrorist or threat to national security. The red-shirt sympathizers also, unlike the yellow-shirts, risk being subjected to state-sponsored harassment. An example of this is the cases involving vocal academics and journalists that have been visited and questioned by police and military. While yellow-shirt supporters are very vocal on online forums red-shirts often hide behind fake identities or approach political matters very carefully.

Yellow-shirt supporter posts a picture of what to bring to an anti-Yingluck demonstration

The military coup, foreign media and yellow-shirt reaction

The political conflict in Thailand has gotten increasing coverage in the foreign press. The bloody military crackdown on protesters in 2010 and the 2014 military coup made headlines around the world. In foreign media, the conflict is generally presented in a way that favors the red-shirts. They are portrayed as being a pro-democracy movement that represents the will of the majority population. The yellow-shirts have often been labeled as elitist and anti-democratic. Some writers have used terms like ultra-nationalist and neo-fascist to describe their movement. Leaders of the yellow movement have reached out to the foreign press to explain their position, but this has in most cases caused more harm than good. The pro-military movement’s view on political events and their role in the current political struggle does not correspond with the image presented in foreign media and respected academic work. Instead, journalists and academics writing about Thailand tend to portray the current political conflict in a manner that favors the red-shirts. This constitutes a problem for the Yellow group.

A young PDRC protester surfs the net during the shutdown Bangkok campaign

Frustrated by their inability to win the media war the yellow group has often resorted to hate speech and attempts at intimidation. Their method of dealing with negative publicity has in many cases been to criticize, discredit and intimidate journalists, academics and activists that do not share their views. Attacking people with opposing views has over time become an intricate part of their struggle against the opposition. The objective of their attacks on media and the opposition appears to be to create an atmosphere where foreign media and intellectuals are distrusted and their views rejected.

The support the red-shirts have received from western media and leading academics have provided them with a moral high-ground that has caused anger and frustration within the yellow camp. People that sympathize with the red-shirts often share and discuss articles and news stories about Thailand produced by foreign media. The yellow-shirts tend to reject the opinions of foreigners that are critical of the army.

Social media has played an important role in the yellow movement’s attempts to discredit and silence its critics. Foreign media outlets that have criticized the democrat party, the military or other groups associated with the yellow-shirts have regularly been attacked.

CNN’s reporter Dan River’s is one of many reporters that have been targeted by the yellow-shirts. Pictures of Dan Rivers have been widely circulated online and CNN has been accused of portraying a false image of the political situation in Thailand. BBC’s Southeast Asian correspondent Jonathan Head and New York Times Bangkok correspondent Thomas Fuller are other examples of journalists that have been accused of receiving money from Thaksin to distort the truth about what is happening in Thailand. There are numerous conspiracy theories floating around the internet that claim that Thaksin has paid western media to produce lies about Thailand. The idea that Thaksin has influence over western media appears to be firmly established within certain fractions of the yellow movement. They have not produced any evidence to back up their accusations.

The yellow movement has also launched campaigns against local Thai and foreign journalists. Bangkok based freelance journalist Nick Nostitz was accused of working for Thaksin Shinawatra. Pictures of Mr. Nostitz have been shared on social networking sites and he received threats. While attending a yellow-shirt protest site he was physically assaulted and during a later incident a group of yellow-shirt activists tried to kidnap him. The online hate campaign against Mr. Nostitz made it impossible for him to continue covering the political unrest. He feared for his safety. During the PDRC protests journalists were regularly attacked and intimidated by protesters. Wimonwan Thampakdee, of Thairath TV commented on the increasingly hostile attitudes towardsjournalists in the following way “When Thailand faced political rallies in 2004, the Thai Journalists Association gave out armbands to distinguish reporters from protesters – but today armbands made reporters targets for some protesters…………An armband is like a vacuum cleaner that sucks protesters to us. People walk up to reporters after they see an armband and ask ‘Where do you work?’ And some ask us: ‘Do you come from Channel 9?'”

While intimidation and attacks on reporters working for TV-channels believed to portray the protest movement in an unfavorable way were common, reporters coming from the anti-Thaksin or military-owned news stations did not receive the same treatment.

Throughout the PDRC street protests journalists accused of siding with the Yingluck government or of criticizing the PDRC was regularly smeared online.

Anti-Americanism

In late 2013, US Ambassador Kristie Kenney came under fire after stating in an interview that she supported the new election called by the Yingluck Shinawatra government. The Ambassador had previously been criticized by the yellow-shirt movement after she had voiced her concern over the imprisonment of an American citizen for translating and posting a book online that was banned in Thailand. Kenney had stated that she was “troubled by prosecutions inconsistent with international standard of freedom of expression”,

Kenney’s support for the new elections came during a time when the PDRC and the Yellow movement had been criticized in foreign media. The ambassador’s statement, which was interpreted as the U.S taking sides in the conflict, angered the yellow-shirts.

They responded by launching an online smear campaign against the ambassador. Yellow-shirt supporters were urged to criticize Kenney on the Facebook page of the American Embassy in Bangkok. They demanded that Kenney would be removed from her position and that the U.S stops interfering in Thailand’s internal affairs.

In January 2015 visiting US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel Russell, delivered a speech at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. In the speech Mr. Russell stated that he was “concerned about the significant restraints on freedoms since the coup, including restrictions on speech and on assembly”. Daniel Russel’s statement sparked another wave of online anti-Americanism. Supporters of the junta urged the U.S to mind their own business.

Once again the yellow-shirts launched a campaign against the U.S embassy, filling their page with anti-American posts. Conspiracy theories about the relationship between Thaksin and the U.S government reappeared on Yellow-shirt social media sites. In the wake of western criticism the junta declared that they would develop closer relations with China. This statement was embraced by the online community. China would not interfere in Thailand’s internal affairs.

Smear campaigns

Character assassination is one of the most potent weapons in media politics. It can progress in numerous ways, by distorting statements made by a person, making false claims, or spreading rumors and lies that would harm an individual’s reputation.

Many local and foreign academics that have criticized the PDRC, the military and the yellow movement have been attacked on social media. On social networking sites like Facebook supporters of the yellow movement regularly share pictures of academics and activists and accuse them of either being paid by Thaksin or of being disloyal towards the monarchy. The comment section of these posts often features threats and rude and vulgar language. Several academics have been threatened and assaulted after having their pictures posted on yellow-shirt Facebook pages. When academics produce work that does not correspond with the ideas of the anti-Thaksin camp they are quick to accuse the author of being paid by Thaksin. A post that has been widely circulated on social media feature a picture of Thai University professors known to be critical of the military and the yellow-shirts. Under the picture is the text” how can these people be allowed to teach your children? ”. In the comment section the professors are accused of being paid by Thaksin, disloyal to the monarchy, traitors and not “real” Thais.

The objective appears to be to make the public distrust and question the opinions of academics and journalists, and also to create a sense of fear and uncertainty. They want to silence opposing voices and make people scared to question certain ideas and beliefs. An intellectual that openly questions the dominant, nationalist values and ideology, risks being branded as a traitor and an enemy of the nation and this could cost them their career.

There are also a number of cases were students and activists have been attacked on social media. One case which has received a lot of attention involves a Thammasat student who was accused of being disloyal to the monarchy on social media. Pictures of the student was widely shared on yellow-shirt Facebook pages, in the comment section several people wrote that they would kill or hurt the student if they ever came across her. The student was described as a traitor, and an animal that deserves to die. The student fled Thailand after the coup, she feared that she would get arrested by the military. ASTV Manager, one of the main yellow-shirt newspapers and a pioneer in Thai online media, published a fictional article in which the student was arrested by the police, sent to prison and then gang-raped by inmates. The article was supposed to be “funny”. Another case involves a young, well-known student activist. The student received online threats after openly questioning the motives of the PDRC protesters and the Thai military. His picture was shared amongst thousands of Facebook users whom accused him of being a traitor and disloyal to the monarchy. While studying abroad the student was threatened by a soldier who said he would shot him once he returned to Thailand.

Student activists that have staged peaceful protests against the 2014 military coup have also had their names and pictures shared on anti-Thaksin, yellow-shirt media sites. They have frequently been accused of being terrorists paid by Thaksin to destroy Thailand. These are just some examples of how social media has been used to attack and smear political opponents.

Summary

As mentioned earlier in the article, new media has come to play an important role in contemporary Thai politics. It has provided politicians, intellectuals and social commentators with a platform that enables them to reach millions of people.

New media has made it easier for the public to access information and educate themselves about political matters. Alternative views on society and politics that would most likely not make it into the mainstream public discourse are today available online. This new technology has played an important role in the recent political awakening of the masses. Groups that previously were excluded from the political sphere are educating themselves and becoming more active. The internet has undoubtedly democratized the access to information and it has provided people with a platform to express views and beliefs on society, history, politics and culture. Social media is increasingly being used as a tool by the opposition to challenge and question the dominant ideologies of the traditional elite.

The internet poses a genuine challenge to the traditional elite’s values, beliefs, and morals that make up the bulk of Thailand’s dominant ideology. The core of their beliefs is now being challenged by the opposition. The reproduction of the dominant ideology has been dependent on the elite’s control of mass media. Now, people are gradually moving away from traditional media and are increasingly receiving their news and information from a complex virtual network. They are exposed to alternative narratives and ideologies that challenge that of the dominant ideology.

Comment on freedom of speech from the popular FB page มานีมีแชร์

The military and political elite are working hard to censor and silence the opposition. Their methods have been censorship, restrictions on freedom of speech and criminalizing dissent. At the same time as the junta is silencing opposing views they are launching campaigns aimed at gaining support from the public. The military’s ability to remain in power is directly connected to their ability to control information and to shape public opinion. But can they convince enough people that what they are doing is in the interest of the nation? Censorship, restrictions on freedom of speech and criminalization of social protest can only continue as long as the military receive support from large groups of people.

A large portion of the yellow-shirts seem to be supporting the military’s attempt at silencing the opposition. In their struggle against corruption and what they perceive as bad governance, they view human rights violations and restrictions on freedom of speech as being justified. Some fractions of the yellow movement do not only support the military’s efforts at muzzling public debate, they have themselves used social media to attack and slander those that challenge the dominant ideology. We can see a similar development in China, where the middle and upper-class, those that have benefited from the existing socio-political order, support state repression and violence against those that challenge the dominant ideology. Just like in Thailand, Chinese government supporters have used the internet to voice their support for the government and attack dissidents.

The question that remains is, if what we’re seeing is just a phase or if it is the beginning of increasing government control of the internet and social media. The government is already monitoring social media and the new computer crimes act appears to be designed to make it easier for them to take legal action against people sharing certain types of information online. But, it is still too early to make any conclusions about the future. We must wait and see how the government chooses to implement the law and what effects it will have on the internet usage in Thailand. Social media can function as a liberator but it also has the potential of becoming another tool of oppression.

Robert Talcoth is a graduate of Chulalongkorn University’s Southeast Asian Studies Program