Islam, politics and violence in Malaysia | New Mandala

Islam, politics and violence in Malaysia | New Mandala

MOHD NAWAB MOHD OSMAN, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

9 JANUARY 2015

In Kuala Kedah, the Chinese community burned a Qur’an piece by piece during their religious ceremony

Dr Mashitah Ibrahim at the 2014 UMNO General Assembly meeting

The recent United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) meeting was full of contradictions. While Prime Minister Najib Razak exhorts the need for the government to be more inclusive of non-Muslims while others such as Dr Mashitah, a famous preacher and former junior minister, called for Islam to be protected from the threat of secularism, liberalism and Christianity. From the debate over the usage of the term Allah to describe God in the Malay translation of the bible to the discrimination of the minority Shiite community in the country, the Malaysian government has taken a conservative stance depicting a shift in its own Islamic orientation.  Recent revelations that about thirty Malaysians are fighting alongside the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq has further underscored the more conservative turn that is taking place within the Muslim community in Malaysia.

Playing with the fire of Islamism

Since the 1990s, the Malaysian government has attempted to use its own brand of Islamist politics to counter the political threat from the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). The Islamisation race between PAS and UMNO led to a series of Islamic policies to be introduced. This race subsided in the mid-2000s mainly due to the strategy of moderation undertaken by PAS. Following the 2008 elections which saw a strengthened Pakatan Rakyat (PR), UMNO has once again focused its rhetoric on the need for the position of Islam to be defended in the country. The debate over the usage of the word Allah in the Malay language bible was portrayed as UMNO’s defence of Islam from the threat of Christianisation in Malaysia. During the 2013 elections, the threat of Christianisation was used as a bogeyman to coax Malay voters to support UMNO.

More recently, UMNO in the state of Kelantan, has openly supported PAS’s plan to implement hudud laws in Kelantan. On its part, PAS today sees the hudud issue as an integral part of its struggle. Since the 2013 elections, many PAS leaders feel that the party’s move away from its Islamist agenda has reduced support for the party. The failure of Anwar Ibrahim to be more consultative in making key decisions for the coalition such as the recent Kajang Move has convinced some in PAS that the party’s future lies in being an opposition party outside the fold of the PR. Interestingly, the conservative turn in both UMNO and PAS have brought their agendas closer. While some observers have argued that this will inevitably lead to a future coalition between PAS and UMNO, sources within PAS noted that a vast majority of PAS members do not support this alliance. As such, both PAS and UMNO will once again engage in an Islamisation race to prove that their respective party is indeed the true champion of Islam in Malaysia.

Normalising intolerance: The chicken has come home to roost

Another manifestation of this conservative turn in Malaysia is the recent discovery that a number of Malaysians were fighting and recruiting for ISIS in the country. ISIS fighters have been adept in using modern technology to spread their message. This could be seen in the case of Mohd Lotfi Ariffin, a former PAS member from Kedah who was fighting in Syria, who regularly posts pictures and videos of himself and other militants, seeking to inspire other Malaysian youths to fight there. Lofti had in July 20 been killed during fighting in Syria. Beyond the power of the social media, a number of Malaysian government policies have been instrumental in creating mind-sets that are fertile for recruitment by extremist groups like ISIS.

Since June 2013, the Malaysian religious authorities and government have been on an anti-Shiite frenzy. The Shiites, which represent the minority sect of Islam, were deemed as deviant and was banned. A number of Shiite religious scholars were detained and their places of worship were shut down. The Syrian conflict further exacerbated this anti-Shiite sentiment. The struggle against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad is portrayed as a holy war against the Shiite “infidels”.

Numerous television programmes, newspaper articles and ceramahs throughout Malaysia were filled with anti-Shiite rhetoric. The anti-Shiite fervour has led to a number of Muslim scholars in the country to declare that it is permissible for Sunni Muslims to wage a holy struggle against the Shiites. While Malaysian government leaders have never themselves called for a violent struggle against Shiites, the anti-Shiite rhetoric provided important religious justifications for some Malaysian youths to fight for groups like ISIS against Shiites in Iraq and Syria.

Likewise, the growth of Salafism in Malaysia is another important factor that has an impact on the strong support that ISIS has received from some Malaysian Muslims.Salafism is a religious orientation denoted by puritan and legalistic interpretation of the Qur’an. Salafis reject interpretations of classical Muslim scholars and seek to rid Islam of any cultural practices that are deemed as innovations. The Salafis are particularly notorious for their fervent rejection of Sufi and Shiite Muslims whom they deem as deviant. While most Salafis belong to the non-violent strand of Salafism, ISIS subscribe to the Salafi-jihadi strand which legitimise the use of violence in the name of Islam. The Salafi-jihadi doctrine argues that given the fact that most of the regimes in the Muslim World are in the state of jahiliyyah (idolatrous condition), it is the duty of all Muslims to rebel using violence to uphold hakimiyyah (God’s sovereignty). It must be added that the boundaries between the two Salafi ideologies are porous and Salafis can easily slide from one group to another. This could be seen from the example of the Salafi movement in Indonesia led by the preacher Jaafar Umar Thalib, which was a politically quietist movement that quickly transformed itself into a Salafi-jihadist movement (Lashkar Jihad) following the collapse of the Suharto government.

The vast majority of Salafis in Malaysia do not subscribe to the ISIS ideology. Nonetheless, the mindset created by Salafism is susceptible for recruitment by groups like ISIS. In more recent times, UMNO itself has promoted the Salafi doctrine through their recruitment of a number of prominent Salafi scholars including Ustaz Fathul Bari, as part of its young ulama wing. These scholars have also formed an organisation, Pertubuhan Ilmuwan Malaysia (ILMU) which has been in the forefront in defending the government’s Islamic credentials. The Salafi ulama are also fervent enemies of the Shiite community in Malaysia. They have gone out of their way to portray the Shiites not only as deviant but a group that seeks the destruction of Islam and the Muslim community. While the ILMU ulama have categorically rejected the ISIS ideology and discouraged Malaysian Muslims from joining the group, the similarities in the mind-set and religious doctrine between ISIS and the Salafi ulama are making some Malaysian Muslims more susceptible to ISIS’ recruitment strategy.

The future of Islam in Malaysia

It is clear that there has been a conservative turn in Malaysia. Nonetheless, there are voices within Malaysia that are now opposed to this conservatism. 25 prominent Malays comprising a number of retired high level civil servants cautioned Malaysian Muslims about the implementation of Islamic laws, and the way Islam is being used to shape public policies in this country. This came shortly after the Selangor Islamic Religious Department issued a fatwa declaring the Sisters in Islam (SIS), a Muslim feminist group as deviant. Indeed, it will take more than just 25 prominent Malays to ensure that this conservative turn will not alter Malaysia’s social fabric. As long as Islam is politicised and puritan understanding of the religion is promoted, Malaysia will see the radicalisation of more Muslims in the country.

Dr Mohd Nawab Mohd Osman is an Assistant Professor and Coordinator of the Malaysia Programme (IDSS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 

Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta or civil society?| New Mandala

Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta or civil society?| New Mandala

SOPHIE LEMIERE, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

7 JANUARY 2015

For over 30 years, Pekida has been one of the shadow allies of the ruling party, UMNO; emerging in the media only in 2008. The election results of 2008 were seen as an awakening of political consciousness among the majority of Malaysians. Facing this new wave of awareness, certain UMNO leaders felt even more threatened, fearing that their power and the accompanying benefits might be jeopardised by the growing discontent emanating from Malaysians, particularly the Malays. The strategy of the gangs and the party thus changed, and new NGOs and gangs mushroomed in the public sphere, forming what is often seen as a new ethno-nationalist “ultra-Malay” movement.

Pekida is often referred to as Tiga Line (or the 3 Lines) alluding to the colours of its official flag: red, yellow and green. The use of these three colours signifies Pekida‘s allegiances: to the Malay community (red as in blood), to the Sultan (yellow symbolising royalty) and to Islam (green). But Pekida’s nebula cannot be reduced to a set of colours: the NGO is in fact an umbrella for a nationwide network. Pekida is a complex and loose network of discreet NGOs created by gangs for which political militancy is a business. Pekida is indeed a generic name used to describe this network, but in reality the name “Pekida” is the name of one of those numerous NGOs created by this network to offer political support and to legalise parts of their activities.

Pekida, in its widest meaning, is a polymorphic entity: a thousand headed hydra, none of which talk to each other nor look in the same direction. Pekida groups share the same roots, hierarchy, codes of honour and similar introductions rites, while bearing different ethnic compositions (exclusive or inclusive), nature of business (legal or illegal: drugs, clubs, racketeering), level of political involvement and degree of violence. Leadership rivalries have sealed these differences and led to a political split. Each network is composed by several sub-groups, which may answer to different names. Names and logos, if any, are often representing numbers and animals – tiger, dragon, eagle, etc. – inspired by the names of kongsi gelap[i]. The name Pekida, often wrongly used, thus became a generic term, a label that embraces a very large national network of gangs spread across the country.

The popular perception of Pekida is disparate: a militia, the arm of UMNO, the Malay mafia etc. In fact, categorising Pekida as a gang or a mafia is difficult. Most members of Pekida identify themselves as “gangster”, hence the term gang was chosen to describe the organisation. The definition of Pekida as a nebula of gangs is based on the work of Hagerdorn (2008)[ii] and has been substantiated by fieldwork observation.

I define gang as: (1) a hierarchical group federated under a leader; (i) that may exists on its own, (ii) belong to a larger network, or (iii) be allied to other groups of different leadership allegiance. The credibility and longevity of the group is reliant on its level of institutionalisation; (2) The main objective of the gang is to make profit, and increase its power through various means. Members are involved in illegal activities and may use different degrees of violence. This basic ambition is often reshaped into pseudo-ideological terms in order to facilitate recruitment, group cohesion, and justify the use of violence; (3) The sustainability of the group is ensured by its potential for adaptation to political and social changes. A gang’s political and sociological identity, and discourse, may change according to opportunity. This means that gangs are entities that transcend space and time. Gangs are neither the exclusive products of cities and urbanisation nor a consequence of industrialisation: gangs may be grounded in rural or semi-urban areas, and pre-industrialised or industrialised societies; (4) Authoritarian or transitional political contexts are favourable to the development of an opportunist relationship between gangs and political parties. In this context, gangs may become an entrepreneur of politics or connivance militants to whom political actions are sub-contracted too in order for certain political parties to sustain political power.

While I chose to describe Pekida as a “gang”, interestingly the older generation of members often used the term “mafia”, or “Mafia Melayu”. These expressions were found widely on blogs and i-chat room in English and in Malay. I believe the use of the term mafia by Pekida members and outsiders have two origins: first it lies in the influence of stereotypes and fantasies conveyed by the idea of the mafia, and secondly it reveals a generational gap between members: the elder using the term mafia and the younger, the term gang. American, Asian and Malaysian movies and TV series[iii] and Malaysian and/or American inspired Hip Hop music[iv] have had an influence on the younger generation, while the older generations have identified with the classical themes presented in Italian mafia movies where being an outlaw typifies sophistication and masculinity, based on idealisations developed since the 1970s (Larke-Walsh 2010)[v].

Diego Gambetta’s (1993)[vi] analysis of the Italian mafia’s organisation gives a precise idea of how the study of criminalised phenomena raises stereotypes that will ineluctably lead to scientific solecisms. His work disentangled some “beliefs” regarding the mafia’s organisational structures. These beliefs echo the rumours spread around Pekida’s nature and to some extent has shaped the fantastical narratives of gang members about their own organisation, to quote Gambetta’s words:

1. Mafia families are bound by well-defined organisational arrangements which coordinate their action to the point that the mafia can be treated, at least some of the time, as a single agent (the most plausible version in this claim is that the mafia is a sort of overarching secret society).
2. Mafia arrangements include a set of well-defined norms, which regulate behaviour across families.
3. The organisation is fully Sicilian but has national and international ramifications
4. The organisation has a name, a language, and a style of its own.
5. Membership status is precisely defined, possibly by an initiation.

The striking points of this comparison are: first the fact that the stereotypes usually convey a concept of the mafia as “a single agent” or a “secret society” possessing “family laws” which has often been noted as a similar characteristic of the stereotypes concept of gangs. Secondly, mafia and gangs are seen as different forms of “organised crime” or criminal organisation”. These expressions bear the idea of a rigorous hierarchy, uncompromising codes and a deeply bound “family”.

Pekida’s structure is what distinguishes it from the classification usually conveyed by gang stereotypes (and stereotypes of mafia) in terms of its organisation, norms and codes; invalidating the idea of universality – without discrediting its strong sense of brotherhood. Despite possessing a common hierarchy, norms or regulations are in fact defined by leaders and thus an internal constitution or code does not exist.Pekida can be described as a union of firms that use the same brand name “Pekida” and occasionally associate among the different groups. In the same vein as the mafia as described by Gambetta, Pekida’s dark chapters are in fact many individual “firms” united by a “brand name and, intermittently, a cartel” forming an “industry of protection” or connivance militancy. Secondly, despite the existence of several codes –signs and strategies of communication-, and similar rituals the norms existing within the groups are often breached and manipulated and should not be seen as part of a fixed and universally agreed-on rule.

Pekida gangs are mostly local or national organisations; international connections may exist but they rely mostly on personal relationships rather than being a result of “family” ties. The membership status in gangs is well defined and initiation rituals are used to demonstrate the potential of violence as well as being a means for imposing the gangs’ order and hierarchy onto new recruits.

The members’ beliefs express a reformulation of dogmatic religious-inspired stories (like the return of Imam Mahdi[vii]) and the ultimate goal of safeguarding the Malays: rhetoric embedded in the ethno-nationalist discourse usually found in UMNO’s propaganda. Interestingly, and despite the fact that all respondents were of Malay descent, Pekida and its satellites should not be seen as an exclusively Malay organisation. Pekida’s gangs form an ethnically diverse nebula organisation where Malays are the majority. As such, these gangs mirror Malaysian society and its political environment: its sociological mix and political rivalries.

Despite the rumours and the fact that most members believe in a very strong brotherhood-link and network; Pekida gangs are not a homogeneous entity but a nationally spread nebula. Each branch and group share similarities to each other but remain independent in loose alliance. These gangs may share their history but are marked by different evolutions and may eventually, as opportunist groups, change their political allegiance in a timely manner.

Concludes with Part 4. Part 1 can be read HERE and Part 2 can be read HERE.

Sophie Lemière is the Jean Monnet Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. She holds a PhD and a Masters in Comparative Politics from Sciences-Po (France). She is the author of Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People.

[i] Colloquial term referring to Chinese organised crime.

[ii] A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gangsta Culture, University of Minnesota Press, 2008. John Hagerdon has made a valuable contribution to the field of gang studies by comparing gang’s behaviour in America from a sociological perspective.

[iii] American movies like the Godfather or the TV show the Sopranos ; Hong Kong, Korean, Japanese and Thai gangsters movies like « Internal Affairs », « City on fire », « The Killer » …etc.

[iv] American « gangsta Hip Hop » or East and West coast (of the United States) rap, as well as Malaysian hip-hop singers mostly from the label Kartel produced by Joe Flizzow.

[v] Screening the Mafia: Masculinity, Ethnicity and Mobsters from The Godfather to The Sopranos, George S. Larke-Walsh, McFarland 2010

[vi] Diego Gambetta is one of the world’s leading experts on the Italian Mafia. He is based at the European University Institute. The Sicilian Mafia: the Business of Private Protection, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993

[vii] Imam Mahdi the prophesied redeemer of Islam, who upon Christ’s return, aid him in cleansing the world of evil and uniting humanity.

Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta beyond stereotypes | New Mandala

Gangsta to the roots:  Gangsta beyond stereotypes | New Mandala

SOPHIE LEMIERE, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

7 JANUARY 2015

For over 30 years, Pekida has been one of the shadow allies of the ruling party, UMNO; emerging in the media only in 2008. The election results of 2008 were seen as an awakening of political consciousness among the majority of Malaysians. Facing this new wave of awareness, certain UMNO leaders felt even more threatened, fearing that their power and the accompanying benefits might be jeopardised by the growing discontent emanating from Malaysians, particularly the Malays. The strategy of the gangs and the party thus changed, and new NGOs and gangs mushroomed in the public sphere, forming what is often seen as a new ethno-nationalist “ultra-Malay” movement.

Pekida is often referred to as Tiga Line (or the 3 Lines) alluding to the colours of its official flag: red, yellow and green. The use of these three colours signifies Pekida‘s allegiances: to the Malay community (red as in blood), to the Sultan (yellow symbolising royalty) and to Islam (green). But Pekida’s nebula cannot be reduced to a set of colours: the NGO is in fact an umbrella for a nationwide network. Pekida is a complex and loose network of discreet NGOs created by gangs for which political militancy is a business. Pekida is indeed a generic name used to describe this network, but in reality the name “Pekida” is the name of one of those numerous NGOs created by this network to offer political support and to legalise parts of their activities.

Pekida, in its widest meaning, is a polymorphic entity: a thousand headed hydra, none of which talk to each other nor look in the same direction. Pekida groups share the same roots, hierarchy, codes of honour and similar introductions rites, while bearing different ethnic compositions (exclusive or inclusive), nature of business (legal or illegal: drugs, clubs, racketeering), level of political involvement and degree of violence. Leadership rivalries have sealed these differences and led to a political split. Each network is composed by several sub-groups, which may answer to different names. Names and logos, if any, are often representing numbers and animals – tiger, dragon, eagle, etc. – inspired by the names of kongsi gelap[i]. The name Pekida, often wrongly used, thus became a generic term, a label that embraces a very large national network of gangs spread across the country.

The popular perception of Pekida is disparate: a militia, the arm of UMNO, the Malay mafia etc. In fact, categorising Pekida as a gang or a mafia is difficult. Most members of Pekida identify themselves as “gangster”, hence the term gang was chosen to describe the organisation. The definition of Pekida as a nebula of gangs is based on the work of Hagerdorn (2008)[ii] and has been substantiated by fieldwork observation.

I define gang as: (1) a hierarchical group federated under a leader; (i) that may exists on its own, (ii) belong to a larger network, or (iii) be allied to other groups of different leadership allegiance. The credibility and longevity of the group is reliant on its level of institutionalisation; (2) The main objective of the gang is to make profit, and increase its power through various means. Members are involved in illegal activities and may use different degrees of violence. This basic ambition is often reshaped into pseudo-ideological terms in order to facilitate recruitment, group cohesion, and justify the use of violence; (3) The sustainability of the group is ensured by its potential for adaptation to political and social changes. A gang’s political and sociological identity, and discourse, may change according to opportunity. This means that gangs are entities that transcend space and time. Gangs are neither the exclusive products of cities and urbanisation nor a consequence of industrialisation: gangs may be grounded in rural or semi-urban areas, and pre-industrialised or industrialised societies; (4) Authoritarian or transitional political contexts are favourable to the development of an opportunist relationship between gangs and political parties. In this context, gangs may become an entrepreneur of politics or connivance militants to whom political actions are sub-contracted too in order for certain political parties to sustain political power.

While I chose to describe Pekida as a “gang”, interestingly the older generation of members often used the term “mafia”, or “Mafia Melayu”. These expressions were found widely on blogs and i-chat room in English and in Malay. I believe the use of the term mafia by Pekida members and outsiders have two origins: first it lies in the influence of stereotypes and fantasies conveyed by the idea of the mafia, and secondly it reveals a generational gap between members: the elder using the term mafia and the younger, the term gang. American, Asian and Malaysian movies and TV series[iii] and Malaysian and/or American inspired Hip Hop music[iv] have had an influence on the younger generation, while the older generations have identified with the classical themes presented in Italian mafia movies where being an outlaw typifies sophistication and masculinity, based on idealisations developed since the 1970s (Larke-Walsh 2010)[v].

Diego Gambetta’s (1993)[vi] analysis of the Italian mafia’s organisation gives a precise idea of how the study of criminalised phenomena raises stereotypes that will ineluctably lead to scientific solecisms. His work disentangled some “beliefs” regarding the mafia’s organisational structures. These beliefs echo the rumours spread around Pekida’s nature and to some extent has shaped the fantastical narratives of gang members about their own organisation, to quote Gambetta’s words:

1. Mafia families are bound by well-defined organisational arrangements which coordinate their action to the point that the mafia can be treated, at least some of the time, as a single agent (the most plausible version in this claim is that the mafia is a sort of overarching secret society).
2. Mafia arrangements include a set of well-defined norms, which regulate behaviour across families.
3. The organisation is fully Sicilian but has national and international ramifications
4. The organisation has a name, a language, and a style of its own.
5. Membership status is precisely defined, possibly by an initiation.

The striking points of this comparison are: first the fact that the stereotypes usually convey a concept of the mafia as “a single agent” or a “secret society” possessing “family laws” which has often been noted as a similar characteristic of the stereotypes concept of gangs. Secondly, mafia and gangs are seen as different forms of “organised crime” or criminal organisation”. These expressions bear the idea of a rigorous hierarchy, uncompromising codes and a deeply bound “family”.

Pekida’s structure is what distinguishes it from the classification usually conveyed by gang stereotypes (and stereotypes of mafia) in terms of its organisation, norms and codes; invalidating the idea of universality – without discrediting its strong sense of brotherhood. Despite possessing a common hierarchy, norms or regulations are in fact defined by leaders and thus an internal constitution or code does not exist.Pekida can be described as a union of firms that use the same brand name “Pekida” and occasionally associate among the different groups. In the same vein as the mafia as described by Gambetta, Pekida’s dark chapters are in fact many individual “firms” united by a “brand name and, intermittently, a cartel” forming an “industry of protection” or connivance militancy. Secondly, despite the existence of several codes –signs and strategies of communication-, and similar rituals the norms existing within the groups are often breached and manipulated and should not be seen as part of a fixed and universally agreed-on rule.

Pekida gangs are mostly local or national organisations; international connections may exist but they rely mostly on personal relationships rather than being a result of “family” ties. The membership status in gangs is well defined and initiation rituals are used to demonstrate the potential of violence as well as being a means for imposing the gangs’ order and hierarchy onto new recruits.

The members’ beliefs express a reformulation of dogmatic religious-inspired stories (like the return of Imam Mahdi[vii]) and the ultimate goal of safeguarding the Malays: rhetoric embedded in the ethno-nationalist discourse usually found in UMNO’s propaganda. Interestingly, and despite the fact that all respondents were of Malay descent, Pekida and its satellites should not be seen as an exclusively Malay organisation. Pekida’s gangs form an ethnically diverse nebula organisation where Malays are the majority. As such, these gangs mirror Malaysian society and its political environment: its sociological mix and political rivalries.

Despite the rumours and the fact that most members believe in a very strong brotherhood-link and network; Pekida gangs are not a homogeneous entity but a nationally spread nebula. Each branch and group share similarities to each other but remain independent in loose alliance. These gangs may share their history but are marked by different evolutions and may eventually, as opportunist groups, change their political allegiance in a timely manner.

Concludes with Part 4. Part 1 can be read HERE and Part 2 can be read HERE.

Sophie Lemière is the Jean Monnet Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. She holds a PhD and a Masters in Comparative Politics from Sciences-Po (France). She is the author of Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People.

[i] Colloquial term referring to Chinese organised crime.

[ii] A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gangsta Culture, University of Minnesota Press, 2008. John Hagerdon has made a valuable contribution to the field of gang studies by comparing gang’s behaviour in America from a sociological perspective.

[iii] American movies like the Godfather or the TV show the Sopranos ; Hong Kong, Korean, Japanese and Thai gangsters movies like « Internal Affairs », « City on fire », « The Killer » …etc.

[iv] American « gangsta Hip Hop » or East and West coast (of the United States) rap, as well as Malaysian hip-hop singers mostly from the label Kartel produced by Joe Flizzow.

[v] Screening the Mafia: Masculinity, Ethnicity and Mobsters from The Godfather to The Sopranos, George S. Larke-Walsh, McFarland 2010

[vi] Diego Gambetta is one of the world’s leading experts on the Italian Mafia. He is based at the European University Institute. The Sicilian Mafia: the Business of Private Protection, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993

[vii] Imam Mahdi the prophesied redeemer of Islam, who upon Christ’s return, aid him in cleansing the world of evil and uniting humanity.

Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta through the years| New Mandala

Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta through the years| New Mandala

SOPHIE LEMIERE, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

 6 JANUARY 2015

Reconstructing the history of Pekida and its network’s is a hard task. No historical account of the organisation has been found, and every attempt to locate official records has been an arduous mission. This article relies primarily on oral history (rarely shared with outsiders). The historical accounts collected are a reflection of members’ perception of the organisation’s history, and thus differs from one individual to another. In this context, every individual story, every piece of published document either from archives, administrative papers, newspapers articles or a few lines in an academic publication brings new pieces to the construction of the overall puzzle. Interestingly, the more one looks at these pieces, the more one may feel as if they are staring at different parts of many different puzzles. The challenge is thus to create a coherent image, made up of pieces different in origin. Despite these efforts, the puzzle is still incomplete and missing pieces are each of them an ocean of possible interpretations. So the last step is about connecting the dots, filling the blanks, imagining the colours and shape of the missing pieces towards re-constructing the image of an untold story.

History of PEKIDA

The only official account of the creation of Pekida can be found in the archive of theAsian Almanac (a Singapore based journal focusing on Asian affairs since 1963). According to this source, Pekida emerged in 1978 when Tentera Sabillullah (the Holy Army), an alleged religious criminal organisation, was dissolved. The members reformed into two separate organisations: Persatuan Angkatan Sabilullah(P.A.S/Association of Holy Forces) and Pekida. Government authorities dissolved P.A.S a decade later when the group was conveniently accused of being a terrorist organisation linked to the well-known Islamist party – the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), collateral damage of the government’s attempt to discredit the Islamic political party.

Most members are not aware of this official date (1978) and instead carry with them the many versions of Pekida’s creation. For some, the origins of Pekida go back “to the time of the prophet” or are the heritage of the walisongo^[i] in preparation for the return of Imam Mahdi^[ii]. But the story shared by most members is the version in which Pekida was created in the aftermath of the violent events of May 1969 as a way to prevent a repeat and when all else fails, to protect the Malays in the event of another racial riot.

This narrative of Pekida’s history by its members bears four elements: the temporality, the secrecy, the exclusivity and the ultimate mission. Pekida would be an organisation entrenched in the history of the Malay world and a heritage of the Malay community that has transcended time; created by “warriors”, and “heroes” joining the group is like an act of bravery; the organisation has transcend generations and maintain its existence and activity in secrecy whatever its form or its name or umbrella; finally Pekida exists to defend Islam and the Malays, as a member would say “It is for Allah, and Allah’s will”.

While yet another popular narrative is that the evolution of the organisation has followed the political path of the country where the defence and safety of the Malays has become a necessity, reinforced by the events of May 1969. Despite the differences found in the narratives of the history of the organisation, they tend to have the same message: Pekida is, and was, needed.

The roots of legitimacy

The origins of Pekida are a set of stories members relate discreetly, lowering their voice as if they are revealing the secret of their organisation. The oral transmission of this history and shared stories are important for the group. It is a way to establish solidarity and group values. These stories are at the core of the group’s cohesion and give legitimacy to its action whether legal or illegal, violent or non-violent. The legitimacy of Pekida’s action lays in arguments that echo of “Ketuanan Melayu” – Malay supremacy – propaganda. The ethnonationalist rhetoric embedded in a subjective interpretation of the country’s political and demographic history could be summed up in three concepts: Origins: “Malays are the original inhabitants of the soil”; Resistance “Malays must resist the Chinese, the Indians and the non-Muslims” and Sovereignty: “Malays must remain the rulers of the country”. These political myths added to the narrative of the organisation’s history and its “sacred” and “heroic”dimensions, are demagogical tools serving many purposes: recruitment, group cohesion and violence legitimation. The coherence of Pekida’s gangs, despite their nebulous character, resides in the sacred and/or legitimate aspect of their existence. Both notions either the “realisation of Allah’s design”, or the “protection of the Malays”, are taken as justification for the use of violent means. In that vein, illegal activities become a way to sustain the movement for its greater achievement.

Pekida-kini

Today, Pekida – an NGO – is a Malay organisation with a religious agenda shaped bydakwah^[iii]and Islamic education. It does not have a website anymore but mostlyFacebook pages. The organisation’s former website^[iv]used to show that the official branch of Pekida runs very few activities and apparently does not belong to any coalition to which Islamist or Muslims NGOs are usually linked;^[v] and that is untilPekida became a component of the Himpunan movement, an anti-apostasy movement lead by Mohammed “Cikgu” Azmi [vi] in 2012. Nevertheless, Pekida as an NGO has several chapters spread nationally and its activities are actively promoted by members via the social media platform of Facebook. On these pages the NGO is often “confusingly” referred to as Pekida or “Tiga Line”, or “The Three Lines” without making any real distinction.

A real confusion exists regarding the nature of Pekida and its shadowy activities. As explained, the NGO is in fact an umbrella for a nationwide network. Pekida is a complex and loose network of discreet NGOs created by gangs for which political militancy is a business. Pekida is indeed a generic name used to describe this network, but in reality the name “Pekida” is the name of one of those numerous NGOs created by this network to offer political support, legalise parts of their activities.

Two colours, red and white, are used to differentiate the underground arms of Pekidafrom the official (the NGO arm of Pekida). The “white line” is indeed the legal face of an underground and illegal network called 36 (or 30-6) or the “red line”.  The “white line” arm symbolises a focus towards religious activities while the “red” arm symbolises a focus towards “society, business and politics”. This particular arm is involved in politics. It is difficult to determine which was created first, the NGO or the gangs. The gangs may have existed prior to 1978, under another form or name, or alternatively members of the NGOs may have oriented their network towards entrepreneurial opportunities offered by the development of the NGO’s network and its activities.

The red line was founded by a silat [vii] master from Kedah. His name holds a sacred dimension for members and out of respect they refrain from stating his name in full – especially not in front of outsiders. For that reason most members call him only by his monogram: PLB. His full name is no secret since pictures and articles based on unverified sources are circulated and available on the Internet; and the belated PLB has his own Facebook page.

In 2006, PLB passed away before being able to designate his successor. The highest ranked “tiga line leaders” all claimed the right of inheriting PLB’s position. In the absence of consensus, the leadership was split and various branches were then created. Since the split of the organisation, many have claimed the exclusive leadership of the “36″, or have created their own chapters by renaming their branch; and each branch may include hundreds of groups.

This relabelling was accompanied by an expansion of groups and collaboration between them. According to a former leader of the 36s – now a founder of his own branch – the organisation counts 6 million members: an optimistic figure implying that nearly one-fifth of Malaysian citizens (and almost half of Malaysian Muslims) arePekida members. It is not possible to get a clear estimation of the membership of an underground organisation, but it should be noted that in almost every city and town visited in Malaysia (except Borneo) I was able to locate, identify or was informed of the presence of local members. The existence of Tiga Line and its new chapters are an open secret.

Continued in Part 3, “Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta beyond stereotypes.” Part 1 can be read HERE.

Sophie Lemière is the Jean Monnet Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. She holds a PhD and a Masters in Comparative Politics from Sciences-Po (France). She is the author of Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People.

[i] The Wali Songos are the first of nine missionaries who brought Islam to Java. They are today considered as Saints.

[ii] Imam Mahdi the prophesied redeemer of Islam, who upon Christ’s return, aid him in cleansing the world of evil and uniting humanity.

[iii] Religious propagation.

[iv] Pekida.org. At the time of writing this piece, ehe website contained only one page but another website was accessed http://www.pekida.org/portal/index.php?module=ContentExpress&func=display&ceid=7 explaining the organisation’s activities more in detail. Since then the website has disappeared.

[v] The anti-ISA movement, or the Islamist NGOs coalitions against apostasy in Islam like Pembela Islam or ACCIN.

[vi] President and founder of TERAS

[vii] A type of Malay martial art.

Gangsta to the roots: A Gangsta’s paradise | New Mandala

Gangsta to the roots: A Gangsta’s paradise | New Mandala

 

SOPHIE LEMIERE, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

5 JANUARY 2015

What if the liberalisation of the public sphere since the Mahathir era paved the way for the emergence of civil surrogates of political parties? What if the so-called “civil society” was used as a veil to hide and promote the rise of militants who are in fact sub-contractors of political parties discourse and actions?

This four part article challenges the general conception of Malaysian politics through the exploration of the relationship between opportunist militant groups or gangs, and political parties. Built on 5 years extensive field-research (from 2008 to 2013) that consisted of ethnographic type interviews and observations in peninsular Malaysia, this analysis is premised on the narrative of individuals who claim their membership to gangs affiliated or satellites of the non-governmental organisation Pekida.

Illusory democracy

The democratisation process that followed Mahathir’s resignation in 2003 transformed Malaysia from an authoritarian state to an “illusory democracy” and reshaped the Malaysian public sphere, promoting the rise of new actors. Despite the perpetuation of authoritarian laws and other legal boundaries, the liberalisation process strengthened non-governmental organisations (NGOs) by providing them an opportunity to play a more active and direct role in politics.

At the beginning of the Abdullah Badawi era, Malaysia witnessed a relative opening of the public sphere. The ambition of Abdullah Badawi and his successor Najib Razak was to create a rupture with the regime of their predecessor and to transform the image of Malaysia as marching towards democracy – at least in appearance. Despite regular arrests of opposition activist and bloggers; muzzling of the press and publications deemed pro-opposition and the use of repressive laws such as the Internal Security Act (ISA), the Sedition Act and the Printing Press and Publication Act has been minimised in comparison to the Mahathir era. As NGO voices became louder, non-governmental entities representing different interests mushroomed and street demonstrations became routine. From 2003 onwards, the public demand for democratic reforms among which included the removal of repressive laws and the revision of the socio-political and economic privileges given to Malays, a message conveyed by NGOs and the media, increased tremendously. The public space was filled with debates and controversies that led to massive and recurrent public demonstrations and forums. During these events, whenever United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) supporters were identified for their violent or excessive behaviour, they were reported as allegedly being members of UMNO Youth (Pemuda UMNO).

It was only in the wave of the 2008 elections tsunami that pro-UMNO shadowy organisations, other than those directly affiliated to the party, appeared clearly to public eyes. Most are believed to be an element of the ethnonationalist movement, or pro-Malay movements supporting government politics. A majority of these groups are registered NGOs supporting UMNO policies within the government’s while denouncing the opposition’s tendency to challenge Malay special rights and authoritarian laws. At the same time these organisations were attacking the government for suggesting or initiating reforms to Malay privileges or authoritarian laws. These groups appeared as fervent defenders of the most extreme right-wing UMNO rhetoric and were thus qualified as “ultra-Malay”. Rumours relayed by the alternative media and blogs started to portray Pekida as the most secretive and violent of these self-proclaimed defenders of the Malay community and Islam.

A system of connivance

Connivere or “to close the eyes” is at the origin of the word “connivance”. The expression implies a notion of sympathy or approval, a notion of secret, and a notion of illegality or the underground. Thus we may understand connivance as an approval or a passive consent of wrong-doing. Connivance is indeed the cornerstone of the “Malaysian system”, a ground where actors who may have different interests secretly collaborate in order to cultivate their power. They master the art of illusion in order to hide their connivance, to look impartial and independent, instilling trust among the people they create this illusion for.

The literature rarely depicts the Malaysian system as a whole but rather separates the entities, or exposes dual linkages (like business and politics or politics and civil society), and has yet to present the spheres of powers as a trio. This Malaysian system is characterised by the connivance of powers; an intricate relationship existing between political, social and economic actors. Visually, this system constitutes a trio of intertwined spheres of actors, which play an active role in the design of contemporary politics. The political sphere encompasses political parties: including the ruling party, the government and state institutions. The economic sphere is that of entrepreneurship, of private and publicly listed companies: it is the “corporate world”; while the public sphere is composed of NGOs and other members of the “civil society”, and the media. The structure of the Malaysian political theatre sets the lines along which the game of politics is played, and the way individuals (or groups of individuals) act in, out, or across the spheres. The porous nature of the spheres is one of the specificities of this system, enabling political actors or individuals to play one or more roles. For example, ruling party politicians sit on the board of private and public listed companies and mainstream media (print, audio and visual) that are run by companies owned by leaders of the component parties (or their proxies) that make up the ruling coalition. “Business politics” or patronage is one of the pillars of the Malaysian political system and refers to a long running relationship between the political and the business spheres.

Connivance militancy is a secret, if not unofficial, political arrangement by which a formal political actor (i.e. a political party, a government or a politician) sub-contracts legal and/or illegal political acts to serve its interests. These activities range from advocacy to demonstrations, and violence directed at groups or individuals.Connivance militants can be seen as entrepreneurs of mobilisation and/or violence who offer their services in exchange for money or advantages, and thus become informal political actors. In the Malaysian context, connivance militants represent the “muscle” and “numbers” a formal political actor may need when challenged by opponents during every occasion of political life: elections, campaigns, demonstrations, controversies, etc.

A shadow play

Pekida is a complex and loose network of discreet NGOs created by gangs for which political militancy is a business. These gangs are opportunist militant group. Pekidais indeed a generic name used to describe this network, but in reality the name “Pekida” is the name of one of the numerous NGOs created by this network to offer political support and legalise parts of their activities.

In December 2011, in Shah Alam, the dominantly Malay capital of the State of Selangor; current Prime Minister Najib Razak, attended the annual meeting of Pekida. Najib’s promise of governmental aid in exchange for political support from the members were seen by the alternative media as an endorsement of the ethno-nationalist discourse of UMNO and Pekida. In this pre-electoral context (one year before the 13^th general elections), the prime minister’s move of being seen as endorsing Pekida‘s “ultra-Malay discourse” and alienating moderates in Malaysia was simply too significant to ignore. Indeed this move was the first (and long awaited) public sign of a change of allegiance of these groups from Abdullah to Najib; and the revelation of a new connivance for a leader in need of support.

Continued in Part 2, “Gangsta to the roots: Gangsta through the years.”

Sophie Lemière is the Jean Monnet Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy. She holds a PhD and a Masters in Comparative Politics from Sciences-Po (France). She is the author of Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People.

Grassroots democracy made in Vietnam | New Mandala

Grassroots democracy made in Vietnam | New Mandala

TU PHUONG NGUYEN, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

 5 JANUARY 2015

More than a decade since the birth of the Grassroots Democracy Decree in Vietnam, which became an Ordinance in 2007, the core tenet of this mandate – ‘people know, people discuss, people do, people supervise’ — is entering the political mainstream of the Communist party state. It is meant to be practiced between officials and residents at communes, wards and towns: the administrative levels that are two tiers below provinces and cities. A rural commune  is divided into hamlets (ấp), where the above tenet is getting real. It is seeing the social and the political mixed up.

Let me take a look at a hamlet meeting in Long An Commune, a rural area in Dong Nai Province, held at a resident’s house with a big front yard. The key agenda was to report on the financial contributions and expenses of all households to turn a dirt road into a concrete one, which now has come to its final stage. The hamlet head and deputy chaired an evening meeting with around 25 people representing their households. It proceeded as the head (1) reported the monthly collections of funds and how they were spent, (2) repeated which issues had been agreed in previous meetings, (3) briefly informed the group about a new policy guideline by the province, then leaving time for participants to discuss, raise their concerns and make suggestions.

Some people were questioning the quality of the new road, the credibility of the constructor, and the need for extra funds to be collected. They talked about numbers and exchanged rebuttals, while the hamlet head tried to address their concerns and come up with feasible resolutions. This is perhaps the  best part of the meeting when the people truly contributed their thoughts to a public affair and had them addressed on the spot.

According to an official report by the provincial government on the practice of democratic mechanism up until 2012, a hamlet is not an administrative unit but only a self-rule community. In that same report, following that sentence, activities in a hamlet are claimed to positively contribute to the exercise of the democratic ordinance. Thus, by encouraging and reinforcing communal exchanges, for instance, on a small infrastructure project that was fund-raised from local households, the hamlet head and upper authorities could be happy that the philosophy of the Ordinance has been fulfilled.

One participant told me that the meeting was meant to ‘make finance public’, adding ‘which is the term they [the authorities] use’. So far each household had contributed approximately 1.5 million Vietnamese dong (a little more than 70 US dollars). Other than these grassroots funded constructions, he commented, ‘the authority is not interested in letting the people know how “they” fund other buildings and roads’. Perhaps they might make it public in some form other than holding public meetings; if so, it could be that he is not interested in finding it out.

Of course it is an oversimplification to say that grassroots democracy of the Vietnamese brand is just about meetings where people deliberate on what makes a good road for their neighbouring area. Some other avenues, as stated in the report, include the right to nominate candidates to the municipal legislative body, to vote for the inspection committee and the hamlet head, alongside the right to request handling of grievances, complaints related to housing, land compensation, and civil issues. All these avenues posture a form of people-oriented authority, when better infrastructure, less rural poverty, more civilised communities, and a greater percentage of dispute handling, are time and again stated to serve the people’s good.

Besides, promoting new policy guidelines down to the hamlet level, in direct interactions between the hamlet head and people, is not a bad idea to bring the governed closer to the governing, putting them within a real regulatory conversation. In that meeting the hamlet head mentioned a new mandate on registering permits for house construction. Perhaps it makes a greater and deeper sense to people in such a face-to-face manner than through notices, newspapers and radios.

As in the report, the task of grievance and complaint handling is a part of the broader bureaucratic reform. The turnouts of this task are the number of people that have paid visits to the municipal government office, and the percentages of complaints and denunciation letters solved which are 100 percent. The evaluation includes adjective clichés like ‘serious’ (nghiêm túc), ‘timely’ (kịp thời), and ‘good’ (tốt). This is at best an effective quantifying of bureaucratic performance, leaving a big question mark over its substance.

The meeting discussed here lasted for one hour and a half, when I heard the hamlet head urging everyone to reach a consensus so that he could finalise its minutes, and that they all could go home. The people exchanged some more points, looking contented that they had been given a chance to socialise and know who else had or had not contributed a fair share to rebuilding the road. Unfortunately it was already dark and the dim bulbs in the front yard failed my photography.

Tu Phuong Nguyen is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political and Social Change, ANU. This piece emerges from her recent field observations.