Singapore Forum Seeks Spratlys Options | The Irrawaddy Magazine

Singapore Forum Seeks Spratlys Options | The Irrawaddy Magazine
KHANH VU DUC / THE ASIA SENTINEL| Monday, May 27, 2013


On May 31, delegates primarily from the Asia-Pacific states will gather again in Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue. The three-day security forum, held annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) since 2002, addresses a wide array of regional and non-regional security issues. It should then surprise no one that on the agenda will be a discussion on avoiding conflict at sea.

Suffice it to say, maritime and territorial disputes present a threat to the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region. Front and center of these disputes is the fluid and volatile situation in the South China Sea, particularly in the area of the Spratly Islands, which are being contested by several nations. Far from a recent development, these disputes have been long-running. However, as the Asia Pacific increases in prominence on the world stage in economic development, the need to resolve these disputes is becoming urgent.

Having pursued diplomatic and political alternatives to no avail, the Philippines has ultimately taken its case against China to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), seeking arbitration to settle the South China Sea disputes. In response, China has refused to participate in or even acknowledge the legal proceedings, surrendering its chance to appoint one of the five arbitrators who will hear the case.

Despite China’s absence, however, a legal victory for the Philippines is far from certain; and as this case will likely highlight, to be observed by other claimant states with similar stakes in the South China Sea, international law is far from perfect.

International Law Shortcomings

To resolve the disputes via international law will require overcoming seemingly insurmountable obstacles. The first hurdle facing the Philippines is ITLOS’s authority to settle those matters brought before it.

The next hurdle then becomes enforcing the tribunal’s ruling. Even if the Philippines achieves a successful legal outcome, who and what will prevent China or any other country from violating ITLOS’s decision? Whereas within countries the police the enforce laws of the land, no such police exist at the international level.

Regardless of the legal outcome of the Philippine appeal for arbitration, assuming China ignores ITLOS’s ruling, other claimant states are unlikely to seek settlement via international law given the lack of enforcement mechanisms.

Should international law fail to resolve these disputes, their peaceful settlement will fall upon the shoulders of claimant states and the international community. Given how little progress has been made in resolving these disputes, however, it is difficult to imagine how much will be accomplished. Nevertheless, it is worth hypothesizing and examining what choices face claimant states and the international community.

Searching for Alternative Solutions

The international community could, as a matter of emergency, establish a maritime police force to monitor naval activities in the South China Sea. Such a force should omit those claimant states involved in the disputes, relying instead on third parties. However, the difficulty then becomes finding states not only capable of fielding such a force but also willing to volunteer resources. In addition, claimant states must have confidence in the impartiality and reliability of this force so as to provide it (the maritime police force) with the required credibility to carry out its mission. Given the indefinite nature of the South China Sea disputes, it is questionable if an international maritime police force could remain active until the disputes are resolved.

Another option for claimant states, if the option of a maritime police force is unpalatable, is to set aside all questions of sovereignty and resolve to partake in a joint exploration of resources in the disputed region (specifically with regard to the Spratlys). The challenge then becomes one of power sharing—that is, not all claimant states stand equal with China, holding the most influence in terms of economic and military might, and therefore the country most likely to benefit from such an arrangement. As a result, the power to negotiate and leverage goes to the strongest state, leaving a country like Brunei at a disadvantage.

If the question of sovereignty remains insurmountable, claimant states should at least seek a temporary modus vivendi (an agreement between the parties that they agree to disagree), to set aside differences and focus on resolving those matters that can be agreed upon. In dealing with the lowest common denominator, it is hoped that at least some progress can be made. Failure to achieve even this, however, and it is unlikely that the South China Sea disputes can be resolved peacefully.

No Silver Bullet

Although it is unlikely that a solution to these disputes will be found at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the forum does provide an opportunity for those contesting states to discuss the matter at length behind closed doors, free from political grandstanding and rhetoric.

Delivering the keynote address at the forum will be Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung of Vietnam, whose country is also in conflict with China over the Paracel Islands, in addition to the Spratlys. It is likely that he will share his thoughts on the regional disputes and urge fellow contesting states and the international community to assist in bringing these matters to a peaceful resolution.

While there is no single, easy solution to the South China Sea disputes, to do nothing is most certainly not the answer. The Shangri-La Dialogue might not provide an answer to the maritime and territorial disputes, but it will allow countries to share their concerns, talk, and perhaps pave a path toward a peaceful settlement.

Khanh Vu Duc is a lawyer and part-time law professor at the University of Ottawa who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations and international law.

As Burma Opens, Critical NGOs look in | Asia Sentinel

As Burma Opens, Critical NGOs look in | Asia Sentinel
William Boot, The Irrawaddy

Some international organizations urge foreign businesses to stay out until conditions improve

Although Burma is still far from being open and transparent on many issues of business and financing, one consequence of the Thein Sein-led reforms is that the outside world is looking in more closely and critically.

In the past few weeks alone, Burma's business dealings have come under close scrutiny from several international organizations, even urging some foreign companies to reconsider doing business in Burma at all until conditions improve.

Most of these organizations are based in the United States, where President Thein Sein has just become the first Burmese leader to visit the White House for almost half a century.

The latest call for caution comes from International Rivers, a US-based environmental and human rights NGO, which today submitted a petition to shareholders of the giant Chinese hydroelectric project developer Sinohydro Corporation, whose annual meeting was held in Beijing.

Sinohydro is a joint-venture partner in planned massive hydroelectric dam projects on the Salween River at Hat Gyi and Tasang in eastern Burma.

"Local groups affected by Sinohydro's Tasang and Hat Gyi hydropower projects are today urging Sinohydro at its Annual General Meeting to wait until peace negotiations are completed and stability has been established before taking any further actions to advance the projects," International Rivers told The Irrawaddy.

The dams are in Karen and Shan conflict zones.

"Field surveys in 2012 and 2013 conducted by Sinohydro and its contractors have heightened tensions in the area. Militarization of the dam sites has preceded each field survey, which has fueled anxiety and tensions in the community because they have not been informed about the projects, nor has their consent been obtained," said International Rivers.

If the two hydro-dams went ahead, they would have a potential electricity-generating capacity of 8,290 megawatts—more than that planned for the halted Myitsone hydro project on the Irrawaddy River and more than double Burma's current overall generating capacity.

Most of the planned Salween dam power is designated for transmission to China and Thailand under current development agreements with the Naypyidaw government, said the NGO Burma Rivers Network.

Another US-based NGO, the Revenue Watch Institute, has suggested that Burma's future would be best served if all 30 of the offshore oil and gas exploration blocks now open for bidding were won by companies only from Norway, Britain and the United States.

Those three countries are the only ones out of 58 oil and gas producing states which came close to a full score for good governance and transparency. Burma came last in the institute's Resource Governance Index, scoring less than 30 out of 100 points.

"Citizens lack access to fundamental information about the oil, gas and mining sector. For instance, a country might provide little or no information about which companies, domestic and foreign, operate in the extractive sector, how much the government collects in resource revenues and where those funds are allocated," said the institute in its report.

A business risk assessor said Burma's oil and gas sector was particularly hazardous for foreign companies concerned about a possible backlash from shareholders over bad publicity.

"In the medium term, foreign petroleum companies investing in [Burma] will continue to face risks connected to deeply-entrenched corruption and on-going human rights violation in the country," senior analyst Guo Yu told The Irrawaddy.

"This is particularly pertinent as NGOs as well as foreign governments actively monitor foreign investor activity in the country and are most likely to publicly raise any concerns about their business practices," said Guo, from business risk assessors Maplecroft in Britain.

Maplecroft last week wrote a report on the reputational risks still facing well-known foreign companies doing business in Burma.

"Although foreign companies are permitted to own deep-water blocks, onshore and offshore upstream production is still required to be shared with local firms, predominantly the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). The commercial operations of these large [state-owned enterprises] lack transparency, which fosters corruption, nepotism and cronyism," Guo told The Irrawaddy.

Another US-based human rights NGO, Earthrights International, has exposed the foreign business links in the ownership and operation of the major oil and natural gas pipelines being built through Burma from the coast into southwest China.

The pipelines have been largely constructed by the Chinese state oil company China National Petroleum Corporation. Ownership of the oil line is shared between CNPC and MOGE, but Earthrights has shown that the gas pipeline is a partnership involving South Korean and Indian firms as well.

Daewoo International holds a 25 percent stake in the gas pipeline, with smaller shares held by Kogas, another Korean company, plus India's state-owned ONG Videsh and GAIL.

Most foreign news reports make no mention of their commercial involvement in a pipeline that NGOs allege has led to numerous human rights abuses across Burma, including land theft, loss of homes and in some cases forced labor.

"This is important because by leaving out the Korean and India companies, they are in effect absolved of responsibility for the onshore gas pipelines impacts," Earthrights' campaign director Paul Donowitz told The Irrawaddy.

Daewoo International have acknowledged their participation and said they were in contact with CNPC about "complaints of negative impacts," Donowitz said.

Winners of the bidding for the 30 offshore oil and gas blocks being offered by the Ministry of Energy are due to be announced.

(This first appeared in The Irrawaddy, with which Asia Sentinel has a content sharing agreement)

Australian Greens join protests against dams in Sarawak | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

Australian Greens join protests against dams in Sarawak | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Rowena Dela Rosa Yoon May 23, 2013

Former Australian Greens Senator Bob Brown flew to Kuching, the capital of the Malaysian state of Sarawak, this week to give his backing to a large group of local communities opposing the controversial mega dam projects in the region.

Former Greens Senator Bob Brown addresses the 'alternative' conference organized by SAVE Rivers.

More than 300 local indigenous people held a rally in Kuching amid the International Hydropower Association’s (IHA) biannual conference – the IHA World Congress on Advancing Sustainable Hydropower  - which runs from May 20-25.

The congress is the world’s largest gathering of dam builders and financiers to discuss industry issues. It is also a venue to share practical experiences, policies, and solutions to climate, water, and energy challenges.

Australian-owned Hydro Tasmania (HT) is involved in the controversial dams and is also a sponsor of the event.

HT joined the project as a technical adviser to Sarawak Energy, the dam-building authority of the multi-billion Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE).  The project involves 12 highly controversial dams projected to produce 28,000 MW of power.

Ex-Senator Bob Brown poses with indigenous and local people in Sarawak.

SAVE Sarawak Rivers Network (SAVE Rivers), which organised an alternative conference, said the dams would affect tens of thousands of indigenous people and flood over 2,000 square kilometres of rainforest.

The project is said to be lacking environmental impact assessments despite repeated demands from the affected communities. SAVE Rivers also says that China’s Three Gorges Corporation “began construction on the 944 megawatt Murum Dam in 2012 before its environmental impact assessment had even commenced, leaving affected communities with no option to negotiate resettlement outcomes.”

SAVE Rivers said the dams would be the energy backbone of the Sarawak government’s SCORE Initiative, the plan to rapidly industrialize the state primarily through the expansion of aluminium smelting facilities, palm oil plantations, and other commodity sectors.
Brown, accompanied by Jenny Weber of the Huon Valley Environment Centre, addressed the SAVE Rivers’ alternative conference while HT Chair David Crean and CEO Roy Adair are taking part in the IHA conference.

At the alternative conference,  indigenous communities were given a voice to oppose the dams being built on their land. On Wednesday, they arrived carrying banners saying ‘Respect Native Rights’, ‘Stop Baram Dam’, ’IHA Stop Collaborating With Corrupt Regime’, and ‘No More Dams,’ among other signs.

Indigenous and local communities arrive and flash banners at the IHA Congress in Kuching.

The dams are project of the Sarawak state government of Abdul Taib Mahmud who is under investigation by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission after amassing a fortune of billions of dollars while in office.

Brown said in a statement: “Hydro Tasmania’s senior officers are addressing this conference of the world’s biggest dam builders on ‘sustainability’ while the indigenous people of Sarawak are protesting outside and while HT has four consultants working on these megadams which international organizations have condemned as involving gross corruption.”

In 2011, the IHA launched a voluntary auditing tool for dam builders to assess their social and environmental performance, called the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAP). Zachary Hurwitz, Policy Program Coordinator at International Rivers, said  HSAP may be useful to guide dam builders and governments on sustainability. However, he admits the risk that “dam builders could use it to greenwash the worst dams, especially given such a context of heavy-handed repression and corruption.”

More protesters at the IHA Congress

In December last year, Peter Kallang, chairman of the SAVE Rivers group of Sarawak Indigenous leaders and James Nyurang, village headman from the Baram River Region, led a tour to Australia and called on Hydro Tasmania to pull their support out of the controversial dams. Related article HERE.

Burma: Kachin want more international observers in peace talks | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

Burma: Kachin want more international observers in peace talks | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Zin Linn May 24, 2013

A series of skirmishes have taken place in Kachin and northern Shan State despite government officials declaring that war has been stopped between government troops and the ethnic armies in those areas. Local sources reported that reinforcements of government troops and transportation of military supplies to frontline areas have continued in recent weeks. The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the Burma government’s Peace Making Committee will meet at Myitkyina this Tuesday, May 28, to resume peace talks, though there has been ongoing dispute about whether or not international observers will be allowed.

After  government airstrikes on positions of the KIO, hostilities between the KIO and Burmese government armed forces have decreased in number considerably since January. However, clashes between the two sides have still frequently occurred in many areas of Kachin and northwest Shan state, as reported by the Kachin News Group.

The government and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) have agreed to go on with their incomplete talks on a lasting ceasefire. During the last meeting, which was held in the Chinese border town of Ruili on 11 March 2013, the two sides discussed the situation between the two armies. The negotiations of the two parties in China lead to a helpful progress for continuation of ceasefire talks. The government’s peace delegation was led by Union Minister Aung Min and Lt-Gen. Myint Soe. The KIO team consisted of Central Committee Member Sumlut Gam and Deputy Chief-of-Staff Brig-Gen Gum Maw.

Peace talks resume between representatives of Kachin Independence Organization and the Burmese government peacemaking team in Shweli, China-Myanmar border in China’s Yunnan Province on Monday, March 11, 2013. (Photo: U Ye Htut / FB)

It was said that more talks were supposed to be held before the end of April. However, due to a variety of reasons, particularly continual disagreement over the insertion of third party observers, the talks took additional time to put in order.

“Recently, the Myanmar peace talks in Thailand were sponsored by the Japanese; while the meeting at Ruili, China, opposite Muse in Shan State, a border town of Sino-Burma, Chinese was directly involved. According to some reports, Chinese even interfered[in] the internal affairs. Japanese and Chinese are rivalry. If these two major powers take a leading role in the peace process, I doubt about if it goes smooth. In order to balance the two influential [sides], the U.S should consider taking a leading role for Myanmar’s peace process” Khuensai Jaiyen, editor-in-chief of the Shan Herald Agency for News, said at a press conference in Bangkok on March 18, which was arranged by Burma News International (BNI).

“As Chinese officers were present at the Ruili meeting, some of the decision could not be made: for instance, humanitarian [assistance] and ceasefire monitoring. If those items were included in the agenda, NGOs from the west would flood in; this seems to make the Chinese nervous. So, if Chinese and Japanese pull the string on each side, the peace process would go nowhere; it may take longer than necessary,” Khuensai Jaiyen said, according to Shan Herald Agency for News.

According to KNG, the next round of peace talks between the government peacemaking team and the KIO peace delegation will take place in Myitkyina, the Kachin state capital, on 28 May, according to Kachin sources familiar with the negotiation procedures. It will be the first time that talks between the two sides take place in territory under the central government since fighting resumed in Kachin state in June 2011. Previous rounds of talks took place in the Chinese border town of Ruili as well as in Mai Ja Yang, the KIO’s second largest town in Kachin state.

The UN’s Special Adviser on Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar, will attend the May 28 peace talks between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the Burma government’s Peace Making Committee at Myitkyina, said Kachin peace broker San Aung, according to Mizzima news. Even though the KIO wanted to invite observers from the US, Britain, China and the UN, the government rejected all except the UN.

Despite the goodwill expressed by the government’s chief delegate Aung Min with his advisers from the EU funded Myanmar Peace Center, there has been minor advancement during several rounds of talks between the government and the KIO.

On 22 May, the Kachin National Consultative Assembly (KNCA) issued a press statement on the political and military conflict in Kachin region. The Assembly highlights its 4 main demands in the statement as follow:

(1) Equal ethnic rights, justice and peace
(2) Self-rule over our traditional territories
(3) Full rights of self-determination and autonomy
(4) Establishment of a genuine Federal Union

The KNCA also says in its statement: “Meetings were not as successful as they could be because of a lack of appropriate international monitoring groups involved. Therefore, there is a need to include appropriate international monitoring groups in future meetings as witnesses and mediators. For example, we believe that best result will come out if the UN, UK, China and USA will serve as witnesses and mediators.

SE Asia’s forests: Development’s victims | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

SE Asia’s forests: Development’s victims | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Graham Land May 22, 2013

One of the world’s hotbeds of biodiversity, the forestland of Southeast Asia, is being sacrificed on the altar of development and global capitalism.

A spate of all but unrestrained development projects across SE Asia – from Burma to Vietnam to Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos – is spelling doom for the region’s tropical forests and the uniquely rich ecosystems they support.

Near Mong La, Burma. Pic: Isabel Esterman (Flickr CC)

What’s replacing these forests varies: agricultural projects like coffee and palm plantations, outright deforestation for timber and paper, mining and infrastructure projects like roads or hydropower plants. Some of the deforestation is legal and some illegal. The results are the same: the loss of carbon sinks coupled with the release of astronomical amounts of CO2, the displacement of local peoples, habitat destruction and a staggering loss of biodiversity.
From the Guardian and Yale 360:

The scope of the forest loss was highlighted earlier this month by the conservation group WWF, which noted that from 1973, near the end of the Vietnam War, to 2009, the greater Mekong region lost nearly one-third of its remaining forest cover. Vietnam and Thailand suffered the most forest destruction, each losing 43 percent of their forest cover, according to an analysis of satellite imagery by WWF.

In Indonesia’s Aceh province, home to the largest range of biodiversity in the Asia-Pacific region, a proposal to transform protected forestland into areas for development has met with a global outcry and a petition to save the forests.
From the Jakarta Post:

Data from the Coalition of Aceh Rainforest Movements said that the new spatial planning rules would allow the conversion of around 1.2 million hectares of Aceh’s existing 3.78 million hectares of protected forests into non-forest areas, production forests as well as roads.

Although development in Asia does look to be unstoppable no matter what the cost, there are ways to mitigate deforestation, species loss and humanitarian crises while bolstering conservation. Petitions like the above are one such effort. Supporting conservation groups is another. Pressuring companies like Asia Pulp and Paper does seem to have some effect.
From Australia’s ABC News:

It is partly this thinking which led the Indonesian business Asian Pulp and Paper (APP) to boldly announce in February that it would be ending all deforestation within its supply chain. The announcement came after Greenpeace and other NGOs had undertaken an international campaign focused on their environmental performance and particularly their role in exploiting the habitat of charismatic fauna such as the Sumatran Tiger, Orangutan and rare Sumatran Rhino. While keeping a watchful eye on how the policy is implemented, Greenpeace has now called off the campaign.

In an age of business dominated by image and branding, at least consumers and activists still have some tactics that can influence the practices of giant corporations.

Ulu Masen forest, Aceh, Indonesia. Pic: Abbie Trayler-Smith / Panos Pictures / Department for International Development (DFID)

 

Asia Provocateur: Coup talk update as Thai fascists launch the “Thai...

Asia Provocateur: Coup talk update as Thai fascists launch the “Thai...:
Andrew Spooner, , 18 May 2013

In the days since Thai PM Yingluck made her impressive commitment to democracy in her recent speech at the Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia the reaction of the Thai extreme-rightwing and neo-fascists has reached new heights of hysterical absurdity.

Led by prominent Thai fascist, Vasit Dejkunjorn - a man noted for his violent opposition to democracy – a new group has emerged calling themselves “Thai Spring”. Thai Spring's "position" is that the massively popular PM Yingluck, who won a huge landslide general election victory in 2011 is "not a responsible representative of the Thai people at all". It’s not certain what the group will amount to but they have launched an online petition that, so far, has attracted support from 0.028% of the Thai population. If they can’t even get people to turn out online it’s hard to view them as any other than a farcical joke. 

That’s not to say Vasit’s group don’t represent dangerous anti-democratic undercurrents in Thailand. Of that we can be certain. 

A well-placed government source recently told this blog that serious elements in the Thai Army have made substantial coup-preparations. However, these preparations have stalled on two counts. The first is a failure to identify credible political leadership within the military who could lead a post-coup junta government. The second is that the army are also concerned that they will meet serious resistance from the Thai population – something that could easily escalate very quickly. 

The generals are also concerned by the likely reaction of the international community. Abhisit, who is clearly chomping at the bit to be “returned” to his previous undemocratically assumed position of Thai PM, is now a busted flush internationally with most media commentators seeing through the Butcher of Bangkok’s carefully contrived act. The military leadership would likely maintain other concerns regarding the International Criminal Court and the fact that their counterparts in places like Argentina are now dying in prison. 

With the army likely to remain in the barracks for now my sources tell me that the government are more worried about an attempt to stage a "judicial coup" wherein the Constitutional Court dissolve the democratically elected party of government and ban its leaders. Such a strategy by the Thai elite is likely to be met with very stiff resistance from the Thai population equal to that which might be staged should the military attempt a take-over.

So, in summary, no Army coup for now but the military still view themselves as beyond normal democratic control. The rule of law isn’t staying their hand but the simple fact that this time they might actually lose. And badly. They may, however, attempt to enforce the decisions of the Constitutional Court should the democratically elected government choose to ignore them. Such a situation would be tantamount to a military coup in all but name.

Opinion: Can Aung San Suu Kyi deal with constitutional change? | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

Opinion: Can Aung San Suu Kyi deal with constitutional change? | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Zin Linn, May 16, 2013

It is too early to start campaigning for Burma’s next general elections in 2015, but major parties like the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) and National League for Democracy (NLD) are already making preparations. Ahead of the next polls one of the major issues is the question of constitutional review.

Leaders from various ethnic parties said creating a federal system is impossible under the current constitution during a three-day (8-10 May) Myanmar Constitutional Democracy Workshop on Burma constitutional reform organized by the Sydney Law School at Yangon’s Mi Casa Hotel.

According to Eleven Media Group (EMG), Dr Melissa Crouch from the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law made a comparison between Indonesian constitution and 2008 constitution of Burma during the second-day session of the workshop.  Dr Crouch said that the National Defense and Security Council has chosen the defense services commander-in-chief. But the constitution states no fixed term or set qualifications for the commander-in-chief. Neither does it state any rules or laws on how to remove the commander-in-chief. The 2008 constitution gives the military a much bigger role and the defense services commander-in-chief has more power than the president, she said.

Aye Thar Aung, chairman of the Arakan League for Democracy, added that the current constitution does not go with the basic principle of democracy. Besides, it does not protect the rights of the ethnic people.

Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel laureate and chairperson of the National League for Democracy, said at a press conference following a three-day workshop that the strictest restrictions that make the 2008 constitution unchangeable must be removed before any constitutional amendment could succeed.

Section 435 of the 2008 Constitution says that if 20 percent of the total number of the Union Parliament representatives submits a Bill to amend the Constitution, it shall be considered by the Union Parliament. Section 436 states that the constitution can only be amended with the prior approval of more than 75  percent of all the representatives of the Union Parliament, followed by a nationwide referendum.

So it is understandable that the military-made constitution seems unchangeable, especially if it seeks to remove unelected army representatives from the legislative body.

However, Aung San Suu Kyi declared her willingness in October 2012 to serve as her country’s president and her party’s intention to amend the undemocratic clauses in the constitution to allow her to do so. Suu Kyi said it is her duty as leader of her National League for Democracy to be willing to take the executive office if that is what the people want. She said a clause in the constitution effectively barring her from the job is one of several her party seeks to change.

Section 59 (f) of the Constitution – Qualifications of the President and Vice-Presidents – says the presidential candidate –  or a parent, spouse, or child – cannot owe allegiance to a foreign power, nor be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country. This seems to be designed specifically to keep Suu Kyi from power. Section 60 is also an enormous barrier for Suu Kyi. It says, “The President shall be elected by the Presidential Electoral College.” Indisputably, Electoral College members will be chosen along the lines of military’s secured policy.

The military still holds a huge amount of power in Burma. For example, the 11-member National Defense and Security Council with the President keeps hold of the constitutional right to declare an emergency  at any time. Most analysts believe that there will be little hope amending the key sections of the 2008 constitution as the military will not agree to give up its legislative clout. Even if the NLD gains more than 50 percent of the seats through the 2015 general elections, it looks impossible to overcome the constitutional barriers designed to keep Suu Kyi from power.

Transferring the decision-making power to a non-military candidate would mean giving up immeasurable economic interests seized by the name of military safety. The Burmese military set up two economic enterprises, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holding Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) in 1990 and 1993 respectively. Both enterprises are still exploiting the country’s key economic sectors with no benefits flowing to the citizens of Burma, especially the ethnic population.

The country’s important natural resources and heavy industriesincluding import, export and service sectors are monopolized and exploited by the UMEHL, MEC and their allies, while most citizens have been living in dire poverty for decades.

In brief, the 2008 constitution gives the military a decisive role through the commander-in-chief who holds more power than the president in order to protect the UMEHL, MEC and their allies. Thus, any attempts by Suu Kyi’ to amend the constitution will face stiff resistance from the military’s hidden hand.

Burma’s Natural Resources Sector Ranked Least Transparent in Global Study | The Irrawaddy Magazine

Burma’s Natural Resources Sector Ranked Least Transparent in Global Study | The Irrawaddy Magazine
SEAMUS MARTOV / THE IRRAWADDY, Thursday, May 16, 2013

A just-released study examining transparency in the global natural resources sector has found that Burma holds the worst record for disclosure and accountability out of 58 nations examined.

The survey, conducted by the Revenue Watch Institute (RWI), ranked Burma’s transparency levels lower than Turkmenistan, Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe, all of which are infamous for their blatantly corrupt extractive sectors.

RWI’s study looked at a list of indicators including the level of information that governments share with the general public about natural resource projects, from the amount of revenues raised to the process by which projects are approved and regulated. Burma consistently ranked at the very bottom of every criterion measured and received an overall failing grade in every category.

RWI is a nonprofit policy institute headquartered in the United States with offices in Africa and Europe. Its aim is to promote “the effective, transparent and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources for the public good.”

RWI attributed Burma’s poor showing on the annual index to the government’s consistent refusal to disclose even basic information about large scale resources projects, and a failure to follow international standards and guidelines.

According to RWI, in Burma “almost no information is available on the management of the extractive sector. Myanmar has no freedom of information law, and environmental and social impact assessments are not required.”

At present, billions of dollars in revenue are flowing into Burmese government coffers from the Yadana and Yetagun natural gas pipelines, which send gas to Thailand. According to the study, however, “It is unclear which authority receives payments from extractive companies. It is widely assumed that corruption is rampant in the sector.”

Burma’s government has acknowledged that from 2006 to present it received more than US$19 billion from the sale of natural gas to Thailand. How this money was spent and where it ended up remains shrouded in mystery.

In 2009, the US-based legal rights NGO, EarthRights International (ERI), accused the Singapore-based Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) of assisting Gen Than Shwe’s military regime in hiding the billions of dollars in revenue it received from the lucrative Yadana pipeline, which continues to be operated by France’s Total, the US firm Chevron and Thailand’s state-owned oil firm.

While President Thein Sein’s government has embarked on a series of reforms since coming to power two years ago, the poor showing on the RWI index supports activists’ claims that corruption remains widespread in Burma’s lucrative energy sector. At a press conference in the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai on Thursday, Wong Aung of the Shwe Gas Movement called the current level of governance and accountability in Burma’s natural resources sector “completely unacceptable.”

Wong Aung, whose advocacy organization provided some research for the RWI report, said his group is very concerned with what the government will do with the vast revenues it will receive from the Shwe oil and gas pipeline project, which will send fuel from Burma’s Arakan State coast to China’s Yunnan province.

The controversial project, led by China’s state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) with partners including South Korea’s Daewoo and a Burmese state-owned firm, is supposed to be ready soon. The project, which will cost more $3 billion, has been marked by a lack of disclosure and transparency from the very beginning, Wong Aung said.

“The projects are backed by military cronies so when we try to push for disclosure of revenue information we face a very hard time,” Wong Aung explained.

The recent lifting of most Western sanctions against Burma over the past 12 months has created a situation where there is a great deal of interest from foreign firms seeking to invest in Burma. According to Wong Aung, however, little has actually changed under President Thein Sein’s nominally civilian government with regard to the way it handles accountability issues in the natural resource sector.

“There are still a lot of problems with mining as well as oil and gas projects in different parts of the country that affect local people who are losing their livelihoods,” he said.

While Burma’s nominally civilian government has indicated a willingness to commit itself to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)—a voluntary framework that sets minimum standards on financial disclosure for nations that sign on—doubts remain as to whether Burma will actually follow through.

Paul Donowitz, campaign director for ERI, a group that has focused on Burma’s extractive sector for more than 15 years, believes significant policy changes need to be made by the government before Burma achieves a level of disclosure consistent with the EITI.

Donowitz wants Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the state-owned entity that oversees much of Burma’s energy sector, to change the way it operates in accordance with international standards. “Some of the things that MOGE could do immediately, for example, would be around disclosure. They could require in the new contracts, any company that wants to bid has to agree to disclose payments, contracts, assessments.”

Whether Burma’s government chooses to implement policies that promote transparency remains to be seen. Critics point out that such change is possible. Brazil, a resource-rich nation that was also once run by generals, has scored very well on recent RWI surveys, largely because of transparency rules implemented over the last decade.

Burma reimprisons activist, shows ‘contractual’ freedom of political prisoners | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

Burma reimprisons activist, shows ‘contractual’ freedom of political prisoners | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Francis Wade, May 09, 2013

The decision by Burma’s government to overturn an amnesty granted last year to a political prisoner is deeply troubling for a number of reasons. Nay Myo Zin was originally jailed for 10 years in March 2011 on media-related charges, making him President Thein Sein’s first political prisoner. Ironically, he now carries the equally unhealthy distinction of being the first former political prisoner to be returned to jail.

The 38-year-old charity worker, a former army captain, will have to serve out six years of his remaining sentence. The charge he is being held on, of defaming a police officer following a land rights protest in January, carries only a three-month sentence. However, all political prisoners freed in a series of amnesties last year were forced to sign an agreement, glossed over by the legion of western countries who hailed the amnesties, that stated they could return to prison at any time if they were deemed to have broken a law.

Burma’s legal system is inherently corrupt, and its laws made deliberately malleable in order that it can penalize the opposition when real justification is lacking. This is why a prominent activist like Nay Myo Zin, who tackled land confiscations ordered on behalf of a powerful business elite, can find himself back in prison for six years on spurious and minor charges.
More than anything, the conditions attached to the amnesties last year show that released political prisoners are far from free; they are shackled by statutes that ensure they cannot exercise the right to challenge authority, which should be a cornerstone of a functioning democracy.

What will grate the powers that be in Burma is that Nay Myo Zin was one of them, a former military man who turned his back on the army and took up charity work. His mother had said of his time in the military upon his first arrest in 2011 that ““he didn’t enjoy it there – he is a morally strong kid”. Last year he founded the Myanmar Social Development Network, and joined students as they marched to Kachin state earlier this year in protest at the military’s offensive against the Kachin Independence Army.

His re-arrest is one of several examples of the glaring limitations of new protest and freedom of speech laws, which it seems can only be exercised until they begin to cut into the interests of the government and elite. Other examples include the crackdown on anti-copper mine protestors last year; the hounding of a journalist who criticized parliament’s grip on the judiciary; threats by the mining ministry towards a journalist who lodged accusations of corruption, and many more.

The release of political prisoners was one of the key benchmarks set by the EU in terminating sanctions. Despite around 200 remaining in prison, and thousands more facing the daily threat of being returned to prison, the EU last month saw fit to end sanctions and begin serious moves towards investing in the country. The constant promises of vigilance and pressure from foreign powers are wearing thin. Those who have been courting the Burmese government over the past two years are guilty, through dint of their blind support for the government, of abetting the darker elements of this transition, of which Nay Myo Zin is but one casualty.

It is not in the interests of Burma’s political and business leaders, still intensely wary of opposition after half a century of dictatorial rule, to allow influential activists to do as they see fit to alter the structures of power in the country. It is similarly unclear whether it is in the interests of the EU to scratch beneath the surface and really understand what one man’s sentencing means for the wider transition and future promises of reform.

Reports on violence in Burma’s Rakhine State: Where do they differ? | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent

Reports on violence in Burma’s Rakhine State: Where do they differ? | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Chan Myae Khine, May 07, 2013


Last month, both Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Burmese government’s Rakhine State Conflicts Investigation Commission released reports on infamous riots that started in June of last year in Rakhine State. While HRW says the riot was all about ethnic cleansing, the investigation commission tries to portray it as immigration issue. Where do those reports differ addressing the same issue?

Methodology

HRW interviewed 104 individuals – 54 Rohingya, 34 Arakanese and 9 Kaman and 10 groups. The main researcher is a consultant from Human Rights Watch and deputy directors and directors of different departments edited it with other reviewers.

Burmese policemen walk towards burning buildings in Sittwe, capital of Rakhine State during sectarian violence in June 2012. Pic: AP.

The interviewees for in-depth interviews and focus group discussions conducted by Burmese government’s investigation commission included 1,200 Rakhine (Arakanese) and 800 Bengalis (the term used to refer to Rohingya in the report). The commission was formed with Christian leaders, Muslim leaders, journalists, politicians and ethnic leaders.

(READ MORE: Burma president vows to protect Muslim rights)

Both reports mention the limitations of their research. For HRW access to affected area was the major challenge, while the investigation commission reports that false answers and complaints from both groups affected their progress.

Background

According to both of the reports, there have been occasional clashes between Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine state over the past few decades. HRW traces it back to British colonial times and reasons that clashes began when Rakhine ethnics joined the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) to fight against British while the Rohingya remained loyal to Britain. It does not detail the origin of Rohingya Muslims.

The investigation commission’s report says the Rohingya came to Burma from Bangladesh as migrant workers early in the 19th century. Both Rakhine ethnics and Muslim resettlers have since maintained their own beliefs, traditions and cultures, the report said. The report comments that the higher fertility rate of Bengalis and their influence in local business has threatened Rakhine people.

Past Conflicts

HRW focuses more on the loss of Rohingya lives during past conflicts while the investigation commission emphasises Rakhine fatalities.

HRW says two armed groups known as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) were founded in 1982 and 1987 with no “serious threat to Burmese military state”. It did not record the conflicts between two ethnic groups before 1992. It also mentions that Rohingya were forcibly returned to Burma in 1992 and 1993. It documents that Arakanese mobs attacked Muslims throughout the country in 2001, destroyed mosques and other buildings that caused “unknown number of deaths and injuries”. It also said 28 mosques were destroyed in 2002.

On the other hand, the investigation commission lists clashes going back to 1942. It said flyers offering rewards for those who married Rakhine women were distributed at a gathering in Taungok, which led to the destruction of the mosques in 1982. In return, Bengalis attempted and failed to take control of Maungdaw during the 1988 nationwide uprising and a Buddhist monastery was also set on fire during the same year. In 1994, Nazi Bazaar in Sittwe was burnt following a dispute between a Buddhist monk and a Bengali pharmacy owner, the report said.

Some information about Rohingya armed forces – RSO and ARIF – in the commission’s report contradicts HRW’s record. It says that the RSO attacked a Rakhine village in Maungdaw in 1994 and the RLO destroyed monasteries and Buddhist structures in Maungdaw in 1998.

Recent Clashes

Both HRW and the investigation commission provided similar information on recent clashes that started in June, 2012.

HRW reprts three Muslims raped a Rakhine girl, after which a Rakhine mob took revenge by “beating to death” to 10 Muslims visiting Taungok, noting that the Burmese government failed to take any action until now.

The investigation commission report described the same crimes but described the three rapists as ‘Bengalis’. It also touched on the effect of online media and how it was used by extremists to spread hatred.

(READ MORE: In Burma, Facebook becomes a hotbed of extremism)

Both reports agree that the riot started on June 8, 2012. HRW reports that state security forces participated in violence against Muslims and that 75,000 out of 100,000 people displaced are Rohingya. The investigation commission’s report says 66 Bengalis were killed, 72 injured and 4,188 houses were destroyed, while 68 Rakhine were killed, 45 injured and 2,371 houses were destroyed.

Discrimination against Rohingya 

The HRW report alleges serious crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing of Rohingya in Burma. It also says it has found extensive evidence that the violence was well organized by monks, political parties, and even govt forces (some of whom committed killings and other abuses).

HRW says the 1982 Myanmar citizenship law is “discriminatory” and the root cause of the violence. It says that since 1982 citizenship law does not allow someone who cannot speak one of the official ethnic languages and whose parents did not reside in the country before independence to become a naturalized citizen, Rohingya who have no valid documents are ineligible for citizenship. Though there is no review and analysis on citizenship law in the investigation commission’s report, it says the government issued a number of white cards (a form of registration card for immigrants) to Bengalis in order to get more votes for the current ruling Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP).

(READ MORE: Burma’s potential for a nationwide religious war)

Other discrimination described by HRW includes different restrictions on Rohingya, such as marriage and childbirth. The report also says that Rohingya are persecuted with murder, sexual assault and forced transfer. The investigation commission claims that some restrictions on Rohingya are applied since their fatality rate and population are a burden to the country and the cultures of Bengalis are not yet in harmony with native Rakhine people.

Recommendations

HRW provides several recommendations to the Burmese government, including: the  proper investigate the abuses during the violence; to allow access to the UN office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); to publicize detainees information and to release Dr. Tun Aung who they claim political prisoner; to provide safety to victims with full access to the affected area; to order security forces and authorities to stop mass arrests of Rohingya; to promote tolerance and non-discrimination among citizens; and to include Rohingya in the current national census program and other suggestions.

The investigation commission also recommends government action on various aspects such as nutrition, accommodation, health and education. Their recommendations include research on malnutrition throughout the state; the provision of employment and business opportunities for Internally Displaced People (IDP); the provision of basic household facilities before the upcoming rainy season; a plan for the resettlement of Bengalis; the provision of healthcare to IDPs including toilets and other basic needs; the education of locals in order to reduce hatred among Rakhine and Bengalis; the provision of an FM radio station and a TV Channel with local the language; the provision of safety to teachers and students at government schools in affected areas; and collaboration with NGOs and CSOs in order to generate a rehabilitation plan.

Next month it will be one year since the beginning of the riots, but the government has not announced any plan and the future of Rakhine State is still uncertain.