Princess Pa’s thesis | New Mandala

Princess Pa’s thesis | New Mandala

RICARDO MATHEWS, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

3 SEPTEMBER 2015

Photo: Phuket News.

Military junta could learn much from royal’s research on criminal fairness and justice in Thailand.

As I was driving along my usual Bangkok bus route on 16 August, I was stopped for hours by nearly 73,000 blue-shirt wearing cyclists.

My passengers started getting a bit irritated, but then we learned it was for Queen Sirikit so it was no problem.

As the sea of cyclists approached, I saw a beautiful woman at the front take a selfie. That’s “Princess Bajrakitiyabha!” a passenger exclaimed. As I am single, I quickly stalked her on Google as the blue tide whooshed past.

I soon discovered that Princess Bajrakitiyabha, or Princess Pa, has been a consistent advocate of women’s welfare – especially the welfare of pregnant inmates and children born to female inmates.  She even started a prison yoga program.

Princess Pa is the patron of a great many charities, perhaps too many to list here. Before becoming Ambassador to Austria (a position she now no longer occupies) she was the First Secretary at the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations in New York from 2005-2006. Aung San Suu Kyi was only ever an Assistant Secretary!

Princess Pa has a law degree from Thammasat University, and a real doctorate from Cornell (among several other honorary degrees). I was immediately curious about her Cornell doctorate, given I am a bus driver who once attended the university (but dropped out).

So I searched and found her thesis on ProQuest. The abstract to her 2005 Doctor of Judicial Science (SJD) dissertation begins:

This dissertation addresses the issues of fundamental fairness in the criminal justice process in Thailand. Its basic inquiry is whether criminal suspects and defendants in criminal cases, most of whom are poor and less educated, have adequate protection against powerful state law enforcement mechanisms, both in terms of a defendant’s basic rights and the implementation of those rights in actual practice. 

Since I have been beaten up by both Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts at different rallies, and thrown in prison briefly, I found this abstract very intriguing. I still have many legal costs. So I tried to buy the thesis for around 1,500 baht on the ProQuest site.

That is my entire wage for a fortnight, but I thought it might help my case since if I could adopt Princess Pa’s position on fairness, the courts might be more lenient on me next time. The transaction went through smoothly, but then it would not download?

So I called ProQuest via Skype and the nice American lady said she was not sure why I could not download it but that I could have a full refund. The refund would take another two weeks. This would mean I would have to borrow from my brother to eat Pad Thai, again.

Also hungry for answers, I wondered why I could not download the thesis. Had Princess Pa embargoed it because what she argues is sensitive given the post-2006 coup political environment? What would reading her thesis with post-2006 coup glasses illuminate? If Princess Pa was to talk about her thesis openly would it anger the military?

Ajarn Pavin Chachavalpongpun once highlighted Princess Chulabhorn’s potentially partisan politics. And of course we must remember Princess Pa is the daughter of Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, apparently in lock-step with a certain former prime minister who must not be named lest we be damned by our caw thi spirits.

But I am sure Princess Pa is smart enough to avoid playing into such partisanship while being able to tell us what she really thinks.

As I sat in traffic I wondered what Princess Pa was thinking right then.

The burden of being part of Thailand’s first family with a doctorate in law about ‘fairness’ must weigh heavily in these trying times. But perhaps it would be a good time to talk about her research.

Maybe the Junta could learn something from Princess Pa. I certainly hope they will.

I can’t afford to keep paying trainee lawyers from Assumption University to help me avoid going to prison because of my big mouth.

Ricardo Mathews is a pseudonym. The writer is a scholar of Southeast Asia and may or may not be a bus driver.  

Myanmar and the world’s next mass atrocity | New Mandala

Myanmar and the world’s next mass atrocity | New Mandala

Rohingya orphans at a Malaysian madrasah. Photo: Firdaus Latif/ Wikimedia Commons.

Attacks on Rohingya Muslims could escalate ahead of November’s election. Myanmar’s Southeast Asian neighbours must act now.

The world’s next mass atrocity may very well take place in Myanmar.

Attacks against the ethnic minority Rohingya Muslims threaten to escalate in the run up to elections this November. With few voices standing up for the Rohingya inside Myanmar, the only way to stop the attacks is for the world to speak out and demand their protection.

Violence since 2012 has killed scores and left 140,000 trapped in displacement camps that have been described as open air prisons. Over one million Rohingya face persecution in Myanmar and nowhere in the world are there more known precursors to genocide.

Living in horrendous conditions where they are denied the most basic of rights, even the right to self-identify, the Rohingya are trying to escape any way possible. This played out in Southeast Asia in May 2015 when thousands of Rohingya were abandoned by human traffickers in the Andaman Sea and over 100 mass graveswere discovered in human trafficking camps along the Thai-Malaysia border.

When I visited Rohingya families who had just completed their flight to Malaysia earlier this year, they described a harrowing mix of desperation and abuse at the hands of notorious human traffickers. Yet when asked if they would recommend the journey to their friends and family still in Myanmar, they all said yes.

In order to prevent genocide and to avoid another potential mass atrocity at sea, the world and Myanmar’s neighbours in particular, will need to address the root of the problem, the ongoing persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority by the government of Myanmar.

For decades Burmese authorities at the local and national levels have placed restrictions on the Rohingya’s freedom of movement, marriage, childbirth, and on other basic rights. The Bangkok-based advocacy group Fortify Rights has obtained leaked official government documents and found that the abuses could amount to crimes against humanity. Further restrictions are in the works as four new so-called “Protection of Race and Religion” laws move forward.

The government has also blocked access to humanitarian assistance to Rohingya, notably kicking out Doctors Without Borders for several critical months in 2014. The floods that affected a million people across Myanmar in August 2015 showed the vulnerability of Rohingya in camps near the coast.

The government has also refused to speak out against the extreme elements among the local Rakhine and ultra-nationalist monks, who are fomenting hatred and violence against the Rohingya and other Muslims in Myanmar.

President Thein Sein has described Ashin Wirathu, the inflammatory leader of the anti-Muslim 969 Movement, as a “son of Lord Buddha” and remained noticeably silent when Wirathu denounced the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Yanghee Lee as a “whore” for speaking out on behalf of the Rohingya. She was denied access to the Rohingya in her most recent visit.

On top of this looms the hotly contested national elections in Myanmar, slated for 8 November. Outside observers warn that campaigning and political maneuvering will almost certainly result in increased anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence. Already, thousands of Rohingya and other Muslims and foreigners who had been allowed to vote in the last election have been disenfranchised through discontinuing of temporary identification cards.

Outside pressure is sorely needed. Myanmar’s neighbours in Southeast Asia in particular had been largely silent on the treatment of the Rohingya until thousands were stranded on boats off their shores.

Still, some of those in the best position to help refused. Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott flat out refused to take in any Rohingya asylum seekers, citing fear of creating new incentives for more people to take to sea. An obvious way around this is to address what is causing the Rohingya to flee.

Myanmar’s neighbours can help by reminding Myanmar that its treatment of the Rohingya is not simply a domestic issue, but an ASEAN one, and, with the acute threat of genocide or other mass atrocities, one that tries the conscience of the world.

ASEAN took an important step in finally formally discussing the Rohingya at the time of the crisis at sea and the regional group should continue to prioritise the issue in its Summits. Malaysia’s former Prime Minister has even suggested Myanmar be kicked out of ASEAN, an idea that, if Myanmar fails to address the Rohingya crisis, should be seriously considered. Other forms of pressure could include targeted sanctions, freezing of military cooperation and training, and freezing of diplomatic exchanges.

The Rohingya have been driven from their homes, denied humanitarian aid, stranded at sea, buried in mass graves, and now flooded by monsoons. With the end of the monsoon season and the run up to the elections looming, the clock is already ticking on the next round of misery faced by this most persecuted people. The world can and must act.

Daniel P Sullivan is the Director of Policy and Government Relations at United to End Genocide, where he manages the organisation’s conflict analysis and development of policy recommendations, and prevention of genocide and mass atrocities related to Myanmar, South Sudan, Sudan and Syria.

This article is a collaboration between New Mandala and Policy Forum, Asia and the Pacific’s platform for analysis and discussion on public policy.

Were the Grey Wolves behind Bangkok bombing? | New Mandala

Were the Grey Wolves behind Bangkok bombing? | New Mandala

MURAT YURTBILIR, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

2 SEPTEMBER 2015

‘Adem Karadag’ has been arrested in connection to the Bangkok bombing. But is he a member of the Grey Wolves? Photo: Royal Thai Police.

On 8 July 2015, the deportation of 109 Uighur refugees back to China by Thai authorities shifted mob attacks against Asian tourists in Turkey to protests at the Consulate General of Thailand in Istanbul and the Thai Embassy in Ankara.

After stoning the consulate, smashing the windows and wrenching the doors open, the mob poured consular documents and files onto the street.

Roughly two months later, on 28 August a man identified as Adem Karadag, with a fake Turkish passport, was arrested by Thai police in Nong Chok district of Bangkok, as a possible key suspect in the 17 August bombing at the Erawan shrine.

He was found with dozens of fake Turkish passports and explosives similar to the ones used in what is now Thailand’s most deadly peacetime attack.

The recent anti-Thai and anti-Chinese protests by the Grey Wolves and the arrest of an alleged Turkish citizen by Thai police has sparked arguments putting the group at the forefront of those possibly behind the deadly bombing that killed 20 and left more than one hundred injured.

For example Susan Cunningham’s piece in Forbes outlines long-time security analyst Anthony Davis’ argument for the strong probability of the Grey Wolves’ involvement in the Bangkok bombings. Lindsay Murdoch of Australia’s Fairfax media has also outlined the Grey Wolves past activities, including military operations in post-Soviet states with Turkic people. But before the blame is laid squarely at their feet, a few key points need to be considered.

First, the Grey Wolves, a group also known as the Idealist Hearts, was founded in February 1968 to break the hegemony of socialist groups in Turkish universities throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Formed by the leader of the Nationalist Action Party, Alparslan Turkes, the group’s raison d’etre was anti-communism.

The Nationalist Action Party has since then held firm de facto control of the Idealist Hearts, although the organisation is not a formal sub-branch of the party. Hearts members came to be known as the Grey Wolves because of their logo, which was originally derived from a Turkic myth.

The organisation soon spread all over Turkey, and until the 1980s, a fierce anti-left stance was combined with Pan-Turkic myths, racism and some Islamic discourses under a typical fascistic leadership cult and strict hierarchy.

During the late 1970s many Grey Wolves sympathisers were recruited for counter-guerrilla operations and used as hoods in the paramilitary actions of the Turkish “deep state” (a group of anti-democratic coalitions with strong influence in Turkish politics) against rising left wing activism in the country.

During this era, members of the group were also involved in several assassinations of left wing intellectuals and a few massacres against Turkey’s Alevite population who were the main base of the far left during that decade.

In the decade following the 1980 Turkish military coup, the suppression of the Turkish left by the military, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the consequent eradication of “the traditional other” of the Grey Wolves left the group in an ideological vacuum.

With this identity crisis a few sympathisers of the group became largely affiliated with the Turkish Mafia. Several members of the Hearts established connections with international crime, with some becoming hit men for international terrorist groups.

One frequenter of the Grey Wolves, Mehmet Ali Agca, who was convicted of assassinating a prominent left-wing Turkish journalist, was later caught at St Peter’s Square after attempting to assassinate Pope Jean Paul in May 1981.

In the 2000s the organisation turned into a nation-wide club where attendees were exposed to a blend of pan-Turkic, Islamist and anti-Kurdish racist ideas. Today the appeal of this ideological mixture is mostly attractive for Turkey’s least educated youth, and they gather in protests from time to time for pan-Turkic causes.

Despite the Grey Wolves possibly providing a large pool of followers to be used in petty crime, minor mafia activities and even human trafficking, I highly doubt their capacity and preparedness to conduct a bombing such as that at Bangkok’s Erawan shrine.

Simply put, the group has never participated in such a transnational mass bombing.

The person charged in Bangkok may be a sympathiser or a regular member/visitor of branches of this organisation in Turkey. He may also be a supporter of the pan-Turkic ideology of the Grey Wolves. Furthermore, the Grey Wolves might have been so agitated in their nationalist feelings for the Uighur cause to develop strong anti-Thai and anti-Chinese responses.

However, as an organisation the Idealist Hearts, or Grey Wolves, under strict control of the leadership of Turkey’s Nationalist Action Party, is unlikely to be the group behind the Bangkok bombings.

Dr M. Murat Yurtbilir is an associate lecturer in Turkish studies at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, The Australian National University. His research focuses on Turkish politics, history and foreign policy, and international politics in Central Asia. 

Bersih 4.0 takes over Kuala Lumpur | New Mandala

Bersih 4.0 takes over Kuala Lumpur | New Mandala

 

GERHARD HOFFSTAEDTER, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

30 AUGUST 2015

Gerhard Hoffstaedter reports from the middle of Malaysia’s massive march for clean politics taking place this weekend. 

Bersih (‘clean’ in Malay) is a coalition of non-governmental organisations, which demands free and clean elections in Malaysia.

They began their quest to achieve this in late 2006 in anticipation of the 2008 general elections. Their first rally in 2007 drew large crowds of Malaysians from all major ethnic backgrounds in a country where ethnicity remains a hotly contested identity marker and where the majority continues to benefit from affirmative action policies funded from government coffers.

Thus a large Malay turnout demonstrated dissatisfaction with the ruling coalition government and a growing realisation that Malaysians were getting tired of a staid political system that had allowed the ruling coalition to retain a two-thirds majority in parliament since independence.

Many believed that Malaysia was ready to give opposition rule at the federal level a go.

The 2008 elections resulted in huge losses for the government – they lost their two-third majority – but they managed to hold on to power federally. Gerrymandering, the practice of redrawing election district lines to give one party an advantage, phantom voters on the electoral roll and postal votes were seen as particular issues going forward and subsequent bersih protests in 2011 and 2012 demanded the government change these practices and dismiss the electoral commission, which was widely seen to condone and support them.

The government dragged their feet and another controversial election in 2013 ensued that saw the ruling coalition returned even though the opposition won the popular vote and claimed electoral fraud had cost them victory.

This takes us to Bersih 4 this weekend, another event for Malaysians to mark their dissatisfaction with the government over how elections are carried out and how little influence Malaysians have in the interim between elections. Calls for more transparency and good governance reached a crescendo when allegations of corruption against Prime Minister Najib Razak became public.

I do not have space to go into the details of a highly publicised US $700 million ‘donation’ that ended up in Najib Razak’s personal bank account, suffice it to say that it made many people angry, especially after the Prime Minister cleansed his cabinet of anyone who dared raise questions. Corruption has long been a mainstay in politics and everyday business in Malaysia, but the brazenness with which the political elite reacted to the allegations caught many by surprise.

Bersih 4 set their rally date to tie into merdeka (independence) day celebrations on 31 August and couched their continued demands of free and fair elections in terms of a patriotic duty of Malaysians to continue defending and building on their founding fathers’ legacy of a multi-ethnic and rule based polity.

The government, too, is looking back to its own history to defend what they deem sacred; their nationalist narrative of how independence was won from the British.

Both look to Dataran Merdeka as a hallowed ground and the government’s actions of barricading it against bersih protesters may be a hollow victory. Independence square remains in government hands, but the only people within it are police officers.

Protesters meanwhile have marched, sang, conducted lectures, speeches and made their rally cries known all around Dataran Merdeka, encircling but never breaching the cordoned off area.

The following photo essay paints a colourful picture of the all-important rally.

Crowds converge in Petaling Street in Chinatown ahead of 2pm marches towards Dataran merdeka. People are jubilant, excited and almost all are wearing the banned Bersih 4 t-shirts. Last night the government banned yellow shirts with Bersih 4 on them, but most people took no note, some coloured over the four or wore Berish 2 t-shirts.

Protesters demand: ‘Bersihkan Malaysia, undurlah Najib!’ – Clean Malaysia, resign Najib! with a picture of Najib with his 2.6 billion Ringgit (approx US $700 million). Behind the banner free water is handed out to protesters.

Although the t-shirts were banned by the government many protesters wore them. In Chinatown last minute shoppers could still get their hand on them.

This one says: Negara bersih, rakyat sihat – a clean country, a healthy people.

Close to Pasar Seni (central market) protesters coming and going ahead of the 2pm rally start. Many protesters were in small groups of friends and family. Ahead of 2pm the restaurants were packed out with protesters having lunch and meeting up.

Two days ahead of Merdeka day (independence day) this Bersih rally was awash with Malaysian flags and people singing the national anthem. Crowds converging across from Pasar Seni (central market) just before 2pm.

Pasar Seni (central market) was one of the staging sites with speeches and people converging. Many came into the market for some relief from the heat and humidity outside. Here is the entrance with some ladies posing with their brooms ready to sweep Malaysia clean! Stallholders look on bemused.

The 3G network was largely down by this time, probably due to overuse, making communication difficult. I was lucky to be allowed onto the Wi-Fi of a handicraft seller in the market to send tweets.

Pop! There goes justice…

Festival atmosphere with witty signs and balloons. Every now and then a ‘justice’ or ‘democracy’ balloon would succumb to heat and pop. The irony was not lost on anyone. Just out of shot is a protester picking up rubbish, making sure this rally (and Kuala Lumpur) remain bersih (clean).

This picture captures the multi-ethnic make up of the protests outside Pasar Seni just as marchers take off towards Dataran merdeka. There were early reports that this was mostly a Chinese rally and coming through Chinatown this may have been correct, but once crowds converged near Masjid Jamek and Dataran Merdeka it was much more multi-ethnic. Even though the crowds were at a standstill and everyone was sweating in the relentless heat, people were in good spirits, singing, chanting and clapping.

Still outside Pasar Seni just after 2pm and the rally has started, but no-one is moving. How far do the crowds stretch? Too far to see. It is a sea of yellow t-shirts, Malaysian flags and people making their way towards Masjid Jamek with speeches and chants along the way.

The police barricade on the bridge along Leboh pasar besar. No-one was allowed into the vicinity of Dataran merdeka (Independence square). On the other side of the bridge more police were milling about, with some wearing FRU (federal reserve unit) uniforms – they are the Malaysian riot police. At the barricades itself it was a relaxed atmosphere, with police chatting to protesters at times.

One of the few party political banners on show. Opposition party officials were prominent at the rally, giving speeches, but not dominating the rally. Some protesters I spoke to told me that: ‘of course, this rally is against the current government, so the opposition will be there, but that doesn’t mean we support them. We are here because things have gotten out of hand’. Such sentiments attest to the growing frustration of middle class Malaysians with a government that has overseen a weaker economy with growing pressures of living costs (an unpopular GST of 6 per cent and rising petrol prices).

This was the scene at around 4pm. Dataran merdeka is to the left, barricaded, and thousands of protesters continue to pile into the area from all other directions. Much was made of a brief visit to this site by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who has emerged as a vocal critic of Najib. Of course, the supreme irony cannot be lost on anyone that a man who as Prime Minister cracked down on protesters, oversaw the dismantling of the independent judiciary and who cemented all power in the hands of the Prime Minister position now used people power to make his point that Najib had to go.

Gerhard Hoffstaedter is a lecturer in Anthropology in the School of Social Science at the University of Queensland. See more of his photos from the Bersih 4 rally on his Twitter feed. 

Remembering the victims of lese majeste | New Mandala

Remembering the victims of lese majeste | New Mandala

 

CHATWADEE ROSE AMORNPAT, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

27 AUGUST 2015

Thai student Patiwat Saraiyaem, 23, left, and activist Porntip Mankong, 26, are escorted by prison security guards after their verdict at the Criminal Court in Bangkok. Photo: AFP.

As lese majeste sentences escalate under the junta, a system that protects the monarchy only punishes the people.

Lately, I can’t stop thinking about two Thai university students who were thrown in a filthy jail earlier this year for taking part in a play impersonating a fairy tale king and his political advisers.

In February, Patiwat Saraiyaem, 23, and Porntip Maunkong, 26, pleaded guilty to lese majeste following their arrest last August for their role in The Wolf Bride, a satire set in a fictional kingdom. The play was said to parallel Thailand’s current political conflict.

The Wolf Bride was only performed once, in 2013 at Bangkok’s Thammasat University, as part of a series of events marking the 40th anniversary of a pro-democracy student protest at the university that was brutally crushed by the military regime in October 1973.

At the time it went largely unnoticed and unremarked. That all changed after General Prayuth Chan-ocha seized control of the country in the May 2014 coup.

Now both former students have been charged with one count each of lese majeste, or insulting the monarchy.

Their original sentence was five years in jail, but, as with many lese majeste cases, the accused admitted their guilt and apologised to the king; their sentences subsequently cut in half. They pleaded and hoped for leniency, considering they had no prior convictions. In any case, they didn’t get it, and it was the first time the performance of a stage play in Thailand had landed someone in jail.

Even though they have pleaded guilty, and even if they both serve out their two-and-a-half year terms, upon release Patiwat and Porntip will be ostracised by Thai society. Victims of lese majeste prosecutions often carry a stigma with them for the rest of their lives — I should know.

Unfortunately, today in Thailand and under the current military regime the enforcement of the unjust lese majeste law is increasing in an ever relentless manner.

Just two weeks ago a US State Department spokesperson, Mark Toner, said his government was “deeply concerned” about recent lese majeste charges.

“No one should be jailed for peacefully expressing their views,” Toner said in a statement.

“We regularly urge Thai authorities, both privately and publicly, to ensure that freedom of expression is not criminalised and is protected in accordance with Thailand’s international obligations and commitments.”

Just to illustrate how bad things have become under the junta, earlier this month 48-year-old tour operator Pongsak Sriboonpeng was given a record lese majeste sentence for six posts made to Facebook that were deemed to insult the king. The military court judge sentenced him to 10 years for each post.

The 60-year-term was halved after he pleaded guilty.

In a separate case, a 29-year-old hotel worker and mother of two was sentenced to 56 years by a court in the northern city of Chiang Mai. Her sentence was also halved after a guilty plea.

As in most lese majeste cases, Thai authorities urged the defendants to plead guilty to save time. A prolonged trial could be seen to potentially damage the king’s reputation, someone who is often described as “compassionate”.

Of course there are those who refuse to plead guilty (either at trial or at least during the first five years after their arrest).

One such victim is Darunee Charnchoensilpakul, dubbed “Da Torpedo” for her sharp-tongued speeches. She received 15 years in jail for lese majeste because of talks she made at Red Shirt rallies in 2008.

Sentenced in 2009 and now in her seventh year in jail (she was imprisoned for a year without charge), she has recently been refused treatment for a gum infection.

There’s also Somyot Pruksakasemsuk, a prominent democracy activist and editor who in 2013 was sentenced to 11 years in prison for defaming the king. Several rights groups condemned his sentence as an affront to freedom of expression in the Southeast Asian country.

Somyot was convicted of publishing two articles in an anti-establishment magazine that made negative references to the crown. However, some argue that the heavy sentence is less for what he published, and more for his efforts to reform the lese majeste law.

He has filed an appeal with the royal court but has waited years to no avail for a decision. I have heard from his wife that he too may be forced to seek royal pardon, because of the physical and mental torture he has endured thus far.

That’s the way the system works, even for those who don’t plead guilty.

The lese majeste victim is charged and sentenced often without the details of the charges ever being particularly clear. Then the “benevolent monarch” is seen to grant a pardon, with the media sometimes giving more attention to the pardon than to the case itself.

Meanwhile, the nurturing and cherishing of such a draconian law, as well as long periods of imprisonment and vicious repression, occurs at the very time that the monarchy claims it has no need for such “protection” because it is loved by one and all.

It’s worth remembering that if Somyot is ever granted an appeal, the trial will take place in a court where there is a huge picture of the king hanging on the wall above the panel of judges.

It doesn’t bode well for the almost impossible task of winning such a case, particularly when the judges were appointed and approved by the king in the first place.

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat is based in London. She was charged with lese majeste by the Thai junta in July 2014. For previous New Mandala coverage of her situation see this post.

Thailand’s nightmare scenario | New Mandala

Thailand’s nightmare scenario | New Mandala

 

JOHN FRANKLIN, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

26 AUGUST 2015

A multi-faith ceremony commemorates the victims of the Bangkok blast. Photo: Ritchie B Tongo/EPA.

There will be grim consequences if the Bangkok blast proves to have its origin in domestic politics.  

Recent posts for New Mandala by Zachary Abuza and Lee Jones have accurately highlighted the obvious weaknesses in the Thai authorities’ investigation of the lethal bombing at the Erawan Shrine on 17 August.

Perhaps it should also be said, though, that few governments emerge from terrorist attacks looking good. Every terrorist attack represents an intelligence failure, and security agencies’ post-attack responses are often characterised by confusion and lack of coordination.

There has been much speculation about the identity of the terrorists who carried out the attack.

For Thailand’s military government and ordinary Thai people, the most worrying possibility is that the 17 August attack signalled a dramatic escalation of domestic political violence, whether the conflict in the Thailand’s far south, or the long-running fight for control of the national government. Many hundreds of Thais have lost their lives in these bitter conflicts since the 1970s.

In the south, ethnic-Malay insurgents routinely murder not only military and police personnel, but also schoolteachers, Buddhist monks and other civilians, and make frequent use of IEDs. On their part, the security forces have sometimes in the past, particularly under the Thaksin Shinawatra administration, reacted with excessive brutality to the insurgency.

However, although there have been signs of an expansion of the insurgents’ target-list to include tourist zones in the south, the southern conflict has until now been almost entirely contained within several provinces.

If southern terrorists were responsible for the 17 August attack – perhaps in retaliation for the military government’s hard-line towards peace negotiations – this would represent a serious expansion of an already vicious but contained conflict, with serious implications for international confidence in Thailand’s internal security.

Meanwhile, the central political conflict has seen large numbers of people from all sides lose their lives: students and left-wingers during the 1970s, students again in 1992, Red Shirts and soldiers in 2010, and Yellow Shirt protesters in 2013-14. However, the conflict has previously not involved any serious efforts to inflict large-scale casualties on civilians through terrorist attacks.

But while the military regime led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha has imposed superficial calm since the armed forces took power through their May 2014 coup, tensions have grown beneath the surface.

These tensions reflect not only a sense of disenfranchisement among the majority of the population whose political agency grew under the 1997 Constitution and the successive governments led or backed by Thaksin.

Most Thais recognise that, like it or not, the country’s present twilight era is likely to end soon. A struggle for power and wealth within Thailand’s conservative establishment may be imminent.

The nightmare scenario for Thailand would be outright violence between the country’s domestic factions, with ordinary people caught in the middle. The 17 August attack might provide a worrying portent of such violence.

However, despite sometimes contradictory and confusing statements from the Thai authorities, the circumstantial evidence that has emerged since the brutal and cowardly attack on the Erawan shrine suggests that it was more probably a manifestation of international terrorism than of domestic politics.

Under any government, Thailand, with its easy visa-free or visa-on-arrival access for many nationalities, its cosmopolitan environment, widespread corruption, pervasive organised crime, weak law-enforcement, patchy record of international cooperation on counter-terrorism, and plethora of sites popular with tourists, would be vulnerable to violent extremists from outside the country.

While in the past there doesn’t seem to have been a clear rationale for Islamist or other extremist groups to attack Thailand, Anthony Davies has argued quite persuasively that the Turkish nationalist-fascist group, the Grey Wolves,
may have perpetrated the bombing in retaliation for the Thai government’s forced repatriation of Uighur refugees to China.

If Thailand was a victim of international terrorism, this will pose serious challenges for the military government in Bangkok. To prevent future attacks, and to restore already sagging confidence in the country’s tourist sector, Thailand will need to improve its counter-terrorist capabilities, including in terms of intelligence collection and analysis. It will particularly need to intensify intelligence exchanges with the US, Australia, and other Western countries as well as Asian partners.

Indonesia’s acceptance of international support for its counter-terrorism effort following the 2002 Bali attack provides an example example of how such assistance can significantly bolster national capabilities. A bonus for Thailand and its international interlocutors would be expanded interaction on practical matters despite the tensions precipitated by Western governments’ reaction to the 2014 coup.

Overall, if the 17 August attack originated outside the country, there are grounds for an optimistic prognosis. With international assistance, the culprits may be tracked down. Enhanced counter-measures including tightened border controls and strengthened intelligence exchanges with regional and international partners could go a long way towards preventing similar attacks in future.

The outlook would be much grimmer if the attack was found to have domestic origins.

John Franklin is the nom de plume of a security analyst based in Southeast Asia. He has worked in the region since the 1980s.

Thai junta turning tragedy to farce | New Mandala

Thai junta turning tragedy to farce | New Mandala

LEE JONES, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

21 AUGUST 2015

A few ideas? General Prayuth talks to Thai journalists. Photo by Reuter/ Athit Perawongmetha.

In the aftermath of the Bangkok bombing, all we’ve seen is an investigation characterised by inconsistency and incompetency.

As sympathetic as everyone must be towards the Thai and other victims of this week’s bombing at Bangkok’s Erawan shrine, we must also recognise that the Thai authorities’ response is turning a tragedy into a farce.

The host of contradictory statements emanating from police and, especially, from the erratic and incompetent dictator, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, suggest severe internal disarray, making it unclear whether the perpetrators will ever be caught.

There have been at least three major sources of confusion. The first is the nature of perpetrator. Initially, they were supposedly Thai: Prayuth instantly linked the bombing to an ‘opposition’ (ie Red Shirt) group based in Thailand’s northeast. The regime’s spokesman quickly rowed back from this, saying they could be foreigners.

Following the release of extremely grainy CCTV footage showing a yellow-shirted figure leaving a backpack at the shrine, police quickly declared – on no apparent basis – they were seeking a ‘“Caucasian” or “Arab-looking” man’ (sic).

However, the advisor to the deputy prime minister for security later stated it was unclear whether the figure was even a man or a woman. The release of an identikit apparently confirms his sex, but certainly not his ethnicity. Police still admit he could have been a Thai in disguise.

Secondly, how many culprits were they? Police initially declared that yellow-t-shirt man was ‘not just the suspect: he is the bomber’. Now they say they are only ‘more than 50 per cent sure’.

They subsequently identified two others in the CCTV footage as his accomplices. They then backtracked, saying that subsequent footage proved their innocence since they reacted ‘girlishly’ to the blast – truly a deduction worthy of Sherlock Holmes. (The two terrified men later handed themselves into police and were swiftly cleared of involvement.)

Even before that, though, other police spokesmen were saying that at least 10 peoplewere involved in a ‘network’ – apparently pure guess work.

Third, were there any international linkages and motives? Initially it was implied that the supposed ‘network’ of 10 involved foreigners – though it took three days for Thai police to file the case with Interpol. However, international terrorists were then ruled out – apparently solely on the basis of discussions with allies’ intelligence agencies.

Prayuth again boldly declared this, while also dismissing any link to the recent deportation of 109 Uighurs to China (which might explain why Chinese tourists were apparently targeted). Yet, it was simultaneously reported that the police had been pursuing this as their main lead, with Special Branch having specific forewarning of a possible attack on Chinese tourists after 11 August.

Nonetheless, this was apparently scotched by Prayuth and his allies, who are stilltrying to refocus attention on internal oppositionists. Others in the police are suggesting an organised crime link – though why the Thai mafia should want to bomb the Erawan shrine is anyone’s guess.

Obviously, any attack of this sort, which catches security forces entirely unaware, creates confusion and panic, and a wide range of hypotheses must be investigated to narrow down an investigation. But the Thai response is particularly chaotic.

Yesterday, BBC reporter Jonathan Head found fragments of the bomb near the shrine and was unable even to hand them in to police – who instead subsequently criticised Head’s own knowledge of explosives.

Indeed, the haste with which the shrine has been swept and repaired may have seriously compromised the investigation. Prayuth and his allies have obviouslyprioritised the restoration of superficial calm and ‘happiness’ over apprehending the culprits.

This is all redolent of the 2006/7 New Year bombings in Bangkok.

Then, as now, the military ruler, Surayud Chulanont, instantly (and baselessly) blamed the Red Shirts. Then, as now, the sites were rapidly swept and repaired, undermining the investigation.

Then, as now, the regime seemed to be caught in complete internal disarray, with suspects ranging from Thaksin’s friends, to Thaksin’s enemies, to the police, to factions within the military regime itself.

Then, as now, Thailand’s Muslim separatists were instantly discounted as suspects – yet the best guess of Thai intelligence today is that the Pattani United Liberation Organisation was responsible (possibly with external assistance from Jemaah Islamiyah). This is consistent with the fact that no one ever claimed responsibility – a hallmark of separatist bombings in the South.

It also refutes the suggestion, repeated today, that the separatists have never struck outside the South and have never harmed tourists (10 foreigners were among the 38 injured).

Ultimately, no one was ever caught for the 2006 attacks. This could well be the outcome this time around.

The Thai police’s professionalism, competence, expertise, political independence and moral rectitude have not noticeably improved in the intervening nine years; they appear well out of their depth. Prayuth is even worse than Surayud: paranoid, bombastic, loose-mouthed, erratic, idiosyncratic and ignorant.

Having presided over a security disaster, he now has every incentive to direct investigators away from anything for which the military could also be blamed – notably the escalating Southern insurgency and the Uighur deportations.

Unsurprisingly, Prayuth immediately refused offers of external assistance – including help from the British government – as attempts to ‘intervene’ in Thailand. His brilliantsolution was instead to urge Thai police to watch the US crime drama Blue Bloods to get ‘tips, ideas and insights’.

Many Thais see all this as a national disgrace. They are right.

Lee Jones (@DrLeeJones) is Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Queen Mary, University of London. He is author, most recently, of Governing Borderless Threats: Non-Traditional Security and the Politics of State Transformation (CUP, 2012).