Truth the latest victim in Bangkok blast | New Mandala

Truth the latest victim in Bangkok blast | New Mandala

Zachary Abuza, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

22 OCTOBER 2015

Somyot Pumpanmuang, speaks to reporters about the Bangkok blast investigation in front of a popular go-go bar “Suckers” . Photo: Royal Thai Police

Thai investigators have declared case closed in the Bangkok bombing; but it shouldn’t be.

On 28 September, Thailand’s chief of police Somyot Poompunmuang announced that the case of the 17 August bombing in central Bangkok that killed 20 and wounded more than 120 others had been “solved” despite the fact that 15 suspects remained at large and that they were ready to prosecute the only two suspects it had in custody.

The police then gave themselves some $84,000 in reward money. It was a most unconvincing conclusion to an investigation that had been riddled with incompetence, conflicting press statements, lack of follow through, and political meddling, in which the facts had to comport with the military junta’s worldview.

Despite rivalries between the police and army, Somyot was hand selected by the junta following their May 2014 coup d’etat and was trusted to do their bidding. He did not disappoint. Although the fact that the bombing took place only blocks away from the Royal Thai Police headquarters, the initial investigation and forensic evidence collection was remarkably shoddy.

The bombing confounded security analysts as it fit the modus operendi of no group. Groups that had the capabilities had no motive, and vice versa.  The lack of any claim of responsibility added to the confusion.

The military junta immediately denied that it was the work of international terroristsand tried to pin the attack on radical “Red Shirts.” But the attack was well beyond the technical capacity or interests of even the most rabid opponents of the military regime.

After 12 days of missteps, Thai police made their first arrest on 29 August, an ethnic Uighur carrying an obviously forged Turkish passport, who was found with a large cache of explosive materials in his apartment.  Three days later, the Thai army arrested a second suspect, also a Uighur carrying a Chinese passport, who had likely been handed over by Cambodian officials.  Authorities detained an ethnic Malay in Thailand’s Deep South days later in connection with the bombing.

The government issued 14 more warrants, but all remain at large, and no government – in particular the Turkish government, which has been highly critical of both China and Thailand – seems all that helpful. To date, no formal extradition requests have been received by the Turkish government, despite the fact that at least three of the top suspects were tracked there.

There were some really strong parts of the investigation, in particular on the financial side, where both police and anti-money laundering officials displayed professionalism.  Yet too many other aspects of the investigation were amateurishly handled or forced to comport to the junta’s conclusions to instill any sense of confidence in Thai law enforcement.

For example, Thai police completely dropped the ball when Malaysia detained three suspects, including two Malaysians and a Pakistani. Senior Thai police officials stated that there was actually no need to go and interview them, let alone begin extradition proceedings. Days later, it leaked out, the deputy police chief had traveled to Malaysia without the approval of his superiors, to at the very least follow up on theMalaysian investigation.

By early-September the role of Uighurs and radical Turkish nationalists was beyond doubt.  But it was not until 15 September that the government officially made the connection.  And even still, Thai authorities continued to insist that this was not an act of international terrorism, but instead an act of “vengeance” by human traffickers angered by Bangkok’s crackdown.

On 19 October the government announced that the two suspects would not be charged with terrorism, but instead with murder. Indictments are forthcoming.

Why is the junta so fixated on this?

First, there is palpable fear that if they call the bombing “terrorism,” it will impact the lucrative tourist industry, some 25 million visitors annually accounting for 10 per cent of GDP.  Since the May 2014 coup, the junta’s economic mismanagement has led to sharp downturns in economic growth, including tourism; they just can’t afford any further setbacks.

Second, in July 2015, Thailand once again received Tier 3 status, the lowest rating by the US Government in its annual Trafficking in Persons report. Thailand is under intense international pressure to stop the pervasive trafficking that goes on within its borders, which includes the complicity of very high ranking members of the security forces.  So their assertion that this was a human trafficking ring’s way of responding to the government’s crackdown has a diplomatic imperative.

Third, in July 2015, Thailand acquiesced to Beijing’s demand that it render some 109 Uighurs who had fled China and were en route to Turkey, which has been highly critical of China’s policies towards its Turkic minority.  Since the May 2014 coup, the junta has been widely ostracised by the West, and the United States has repeatedly called for the return to democratic rule.

China has swooped into the void, with regular senior-leader engagements, increased military exchanges and exercises, and the potential of a US$1 billion submarine sale.  The returned Uighurs were shown hooded, bound, with guards on either side during their return to China – ostensibly to “prevent a hijacking.”

Since their return they have been detained without charge for “re-education.”  The junta cannot afford to alienate China due to the fact that it has no other allies.  If it labeled the attack as terrorism in response to Thai government policy, then they open the regime to challenges to its policies.

Finally, if this was indeed an act of international terrorism, then it would put pressure on the Thai government to divert resources away from internal security, which has been the sole priority of the military government since seizing power in May 2014.

The junta equates regime survival with national security and has diverted the vast majority of manpower and resources – which have been dramatically increased – towards opponents of the regime.  Why shift resources towards meaningful threats to Thailand or its economy, when they can be focused on more spurious Article 112 lese majeste investigations for defaming the monarchy.

Indeed, on 28 September, the police chief also linked the bombing to a radical Red Shirt, calling it “politically motivated,” offering only the most tenuous evidence. Yet, the Department of Special Investigations – a bureaucratic rival to the police that is part of the Ministry of Justice – completely dismissed such that finding.

And yet, there is no evidence that this was simply a human trafficking ring.  They were definitely part of a group that was moving Uighurs to Turkey, but this was not a criminal trafficking ring. Moreover, it defies all logic: if this was a for profit smuggling organisation, what would they stand to gain by targeting a lucrative sector of the Thai economy and bringing intense investigative scrutiny on their actions?

The two suspects are likely to stand trial in a military court, though for murder, not terrorism. And with 14 suspects still at large, there are many outstanding questions.

But as they point to conclusions that are inconvenient for the junta, it seems that the case is now closed.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College where he focuses on Southeast Asian politics and security issues.

Were the Grey Wolves behind Bangkok bombing? | New Mandala

Were the Grey Wolves behind Bangkok bombing? | New Mandala

MURAT YURTBILIR, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

2 SEPTEMBER 2015

‘Adem Karadag’ has been arrested in connection to the Bangkok bombing. But is he a member of the Grey Wolves? Photo: Royal Thai Police.

On 8 July 2015, the deportation of 109 Uighur refugees back to China by Thai authorities shifted mob attacks against Asian tourists in Turkey to protests at the Consulate General of Thailand in Istanbul and the Thai Embassy in Ankara.

After stoning the consulate, smashing the windows and wrenching the doors open, the mob poured consular documents and files onto the street.

Roughly two months later, on 28 August a man identified as Adem Karadag, with a fake Turkish passport, was arrested by Thai police in Nong Chok district of Bangkok, as a possible key suspect in the 17 August bombing at the Erawan shrine.

He was found with dozens of fake Turkish passports and explosives similar to the ones used in what is now Thailand’s most deadly peacetime attack.

The recent anti-Thai and anti-Chinese protests by the Grey Wolves and the arrest of an alleged Turkish citizen by Thai police has sparked arguments putting the group at the forefront of those possibly behind the deadly bombing that killed 20 and left more than one hundred injured.

For example Susan Cunningham’s piece in Forbes outlines long-time security analyst Anthony Davis’ argument for the strong probability of the Grey Wolves’ involvement in the Bangkok bombings. Lindsay Murdoch of Australia’s Fairfax media has also outlined the Grey Wolves past activities, including military operations in post-Soviet states with Turkic people. But before the blame is laid squarely at their feet, a few key points need to be considered.

First, the Grey Wolves, a group also known as the Idealist Hearts, was founded in February 1968 to break the hegemony of socialist groups in Turkish universities throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Formed by the leader of the Nationalist Action Party, Alparslan Turkes, the group’s raison d’etre was anti-communism.

The Nationalist Action Party has since then held firm de facto control of the Idealist Hearts, although the organisation is not a formal sub-branch of the party. Hearts members came to be known as the Grey Wolves because of their logo, which was originally derived from a Turkic myth.

The organisation soon spread all over Turkey, and until the 1980s, a fierce anti-left stance was combined with Pan-Turkic myths, racism and some Islamic discourses under a typical fascistic leadership cult and strict hierarchy.

During the late 1970s many Grey Wolves sympathisers were recruited for counter-guerrilla operations and used as hoods in the paramilitary actions of the Turkish “deep state” (a group of anti-democratic coalitions with strong influence in Turkish politics) against rising left wing activism in the country.

During this era, members of the group were also involved in several assassinations of left wing intellectuals and a few massacres against Turkey’s Alevite population who were the main base of the far left during that decade.

In the decade following the 1980 Turkish military coup, the suppression of the Turkish left by the military, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the consequent eradication of “the traditional other” of the Grey Wolves left the group in an ideological vacuum.

With this identity crisis a few sympathisers of the group became largely affiliated with the Turkish Mafia. Several members of the Hearts established connections with international crime, with some becoming hit men for international terrorist groups.

One frequenter of the Grey Wolves, Mehmet Ali Agca, who was convicted of assassinating a prominent left-wing Turkish journalist, was later caught at St Peter’s Square after attempting to assassinate Pope Jean Paul in May 1981.

In the 2000s the organisation turned into a nation-wide club where attendees were exposed to a blend of pan-Turkic, Islamist and anti-Kurdish racist ideas. Today the appeal of this ideological mixture is mostly attractive for Turkey’s least educated youth, and they gather in protests from time to time for pan-Turkic causes.

Despite the Grey Wolves possibly providing a large pool of followers to be used in petty crime, minor mafia activities and even human trafficking, I highly doubt their capacity and preparedness to conduct a bombing such as that at Bangkok’s Erawan shrine.

Simply put, the group has never participated in such a transnational mass bombing.

The person charged in Bangkok may be a sympathiser or a regular member/visitor of branches of this organisation in Turkey. He may also be a supporter of the pan-Turkic ideology of the Grey Wolves. Furthermore, the Grey Wolves might have been so agitated in their nationalist feelings for the Uighur cause to develop strong anti-Thai and anti-Chinese responses.

However, as an organisation the Idealist Hearts, or Grey Wolves, under strict control of the leadership of Turkey’s Nationalist Action Party, is unlikely to be the group behind the Bangkok bombings.

Dr M. Murat Yurtbilir is an associate lecturer in Turkish studies at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, The Australian National University. His research focuses on Turkish politics, history and foreign policy, and international politics in Central Asia. 

Thailand’s nightmare scenario | New Mandala

Thailand’s nightmare scenario | New Mandala

 

JOHN FRANKLIN, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

26 AUGUST 2015

A multi-faith ceremony commemorates the victims of the Bangkok blast. Photo: Ritchie B Tongo/EPA.

There will be grim consequences if the Bangkok blast proves to have its origin in domestic politics.  

Recent posts for New Mandala by Zachary Abuza and Lee Jones have accurately highlighted the obvious weaknesses in the Thai authorities’ investigation of the lethal bombing at the Erawan Shrine on 17 August.

Perhaps it should also be said, though, that few governments emerge from terrorist attacks looking good. Every terrorist attack represents an intelligence failure, and security agencies’ post-attack responses are often characterised by confusion and lack of coordination.

There has been much speculation about the identity of the terrorists who carried out the attack.

For Thailand’s military government and ordinary Thai people, the most worrying possibility is that the 17 August attack signalled a dramatic escalation of domestic political violence, whether the conflict in the Thailand’s far south, or the long-running fight for control of the national government. Many hundreds of Thais have lost their lives in these bitter conflicts since the 1970s.

In the south, ethnic-Malay insurgents routinely murder not only military and police personnel, but also schoolteachers, Buddhist monks and other civilians, and make frequent use of IEDs. On their part, the security forces have sometimes in the past, particularly under the Thaksin Shinawatra administration, reacted with excessive brutality to the insurgency.

However, although there have been signs of an expansion of the insurgents’ target-list to include tourist zones in the south, the southern conflict has until now been almost entirely contained within several provinces.

If southern terrorists were responsible for the 17 August attack – perhaps in retaliation for the military government’s hard-line towards peace negotiations – this would represent a serious expansion of an already vicious but contained conflict, with serious implications for international confidence in Thailand’s internal security.

Meanwhile, the central political conflict has seen large numbers of people from all sides lose their lives: students and left-wingers during the 1970s, students again in 1992, Red Shirts and soldiers in 2010, and Yellow Shirt protesters in 2013-14. However, the conflict has previously not involved any serious efforts to inflict large-scale casualties on civilians through terrorist attacks.

But while the military regime led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha has imposed superficial calm since the armed forces took power through their May 2014 coup, tensions have grown beneath the surface.

These tensions reflect not only a sense of disenfranchisement among the majority of the population whose political agency grew under the 1997 Constitution and the successive governments led or backed by Thaksin.

Most Thais recognise that, like it or not, the country’s present twilight era is likely to end soon. A struggle for power and wealth within Thailand’s conservative establishment may be imminent.

The nightmare scenario for Thailand would be outright violence between the country’s domestic factions, with ordinary people caught in the middle. The 17 August attack might provide a worrying portent of such violence.

However, despite sometimes contradictory and confusing statements from the Thai authorities, the circumstantial evidence that has emerged since the brutal and cowardly attack on the Erawan shrine suggests that it was more probably a manifestation of international terrorism than of domestic politics.

Under any government, Thailand, with its easy visa-free or visa-on-arrival access for many nationalities, its cosmopolitan environment, widespread corruption, pervasive organised crime, weak law-enforcement, patchy record of international cooperation on counter-terrorism, and plethora of sites popular with tourists, would be vulnerable to violent extremists from outside the country.

While in the past there doesn’t seem to have been a clear rationale for Islamist or other extremist groups to attack Thailand, Anthony Davies has argued quite persuasively that the Turkish nationalist-fascist group, the Grey Wolves,
may have perpetrated the bombing in retaliation for the Thai government’s forced repatriation of Uighur refugees to China.

If Thailand was a victim of international terrorism, this will pose serious challenges for the military government in Bangkok. To prevent future attacks, and to restore already sagging confidence in the country’s tourist sector, Thailand will need to improve its counter-terrorist capabilities, including in terms of intelligence collection and analysis. It will particularly need to intensify intelligence exchanges with the US, Australia, and other Western countries as well as Asian partners.

Indonesia’s acceptance of international support for its counter-terrorism effort following the 2002 Bali attack provides an example example of how such assistance can significantly bolster national capabilities. A bonus for Thailand and its international interlocutors would be expanded interaction on practical matters despite the tensions precipitated by Western governments’ reaction to the 2014 coup.

Overall, if the 17 August attack originated outside the country, there are grounds for an optimistic prognosis. With international assistance, the culprits may be tracked down. Enhanced counter-measures including tightened border controls and strengthened intelligence exchanges with regional and international partners could go a long way towards preventing similar attacks in future.

The outlook would be much grimmer if the attack was found to have domestic origins.

John Franklin is the nom de plume of a security analyst based in Southeast Asia. He has worked in the region since the 1980s.

Politics and security in Thailand | New Mandala

Politics and security in Thailand | New Mandala

ZACHARY ABUZA, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

19 AUGUST 2015

Experts investigate the Erawan shrine at the site of a deadly blast in central Bangkok.

Editor’s note: look at a table by Zachary Abuza examining potential culprits for the Bangkok blast and the likelihood they committed the attack.  

In the wake of the Bangkok blasts, politics and the junta’s self interests should not trump a proper investigation. 

It is still too early to attribute the bombings in Bangkok to any group and to date no one has claimed responsibility.

There are plenty of suspects: radical red shirts seeking to discredit the military regime by crippling the economy; southern Thai insurgents, in particular younger more radical members frustrated at the pace and scope of the insurgency now in its 12th year, but no closer to achieving its goals, who have been inching out of the deep south since December 2013; or international terrorist groups which have always seen Bangkok as a very appealing target.

Each has motives and reasons to eschew such violence. The attack fits no group’s MO, so nothing can be ruled out right now.

But what is needed more than anything is for the investigation to take its course without political interference. At first the security forces pledged to not rule any suspects or groups out.

And yet, one cannot forget the junta’s recent handling of the April 2015 bombing on the resort island of Koh Samui: within hours senior junta leaders attributed the attack to radical Red Shirts, despite the preponderance of evidence to the contrary.

The bomb design was identical to those most commonly used in the south, the vehicle was from Yala, apparently stolen in an insurgent operation, and the attack mirrored the March 2013 bombing of the Lee Gardens hotel: detonated in a remote car park to cause few casualties but sending a clear signal.

And yet the police commander from the Deep South was quickly over-ruled by the national police chief and the junta. Investigations into Red Shirt connections have gone no where, with one arrest and quick release of a Red Shirt activist for a cryptic comment on FaceBook.

Quietly, so as for the junta to not lose face, there have been a number of arrests of southern insurgents in connection to the Samui attacks.

That is not to say that insurgents were behind the two bombings in Bangkok. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that it was international-based terrorism or a hybrid.

But the investigation must follow the evidence, not the political dictates of a junta hell bent on vilifying their political rivals. And sadly, the junta seems to be pursuing another Cheyney-esque attempt to find evidence to fit their pre-existing political world-view. The police chief Somyot Poompanmoung has already suggested Red Shirts were behind at least the second attack.

Let us be clear: this was a massive intelligence failure on the part of Thai security forces that have richly rewarded themselves since the coup. Indeed, between the 2006 and 2014 coups, military expenditures increased nearly fourfold.

Spending increased sharply in 2015 following the coup, which is set to rise by 7 percent more in the 2016 budget, some $6.3 billion. Police and other security force expenditure has likewise increased as the regime has prioritised security since the May 2014 coup d’etat.

At the same time, the military government has expanded their legal and investigative powers, in particular in the cyber and telecommunications fields.

Despite all of these increases and new powers, the junta’s obsession with neutralising their domestic political rivals has blinded them to other serious threats to national security. Their biases and aversion to facts give pause that the hope that the investigation will be conducted honestly and transparently.

It’s a reminder once again of the dangers posed by autocratic regimes that equate their own survival with national survival. That always leaves a country, its people and economy, more vulnerable.

With the international community watching, there is finally some hope that the regime will do what’s best for the country, not their consolidation of power.

Zachary Abuza is a principal at Southeast Asia Analysis specialising in regional politics and security issues. He has authored numerous books including Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand(2008) and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia (2003).

Look at a table by Zachary Abuza examining potential culprits for the Bangkok blast and the likelihood they committed the attack.   

Who is behind the Bangkok blast? | New Mandala

Who is behind the Bangkok blast? | New Mandala

JAMES GIGGACHER, 

18 AUGUST 2015

Debris from the blast in Bangkok. Photo by AP.

In the wake of a devastating bomb attack in Bangkok overnight, which has already claimed more than 20 lives, many questions remain, including who is behind the atrocity and what their motivations are.

To get a clearer picture of who might be responsible, New Mandala spoke to security and Thailand expert Dr John Blaxland from the Australian National University.

These are Blaxland’s responses.

_________

In the absence of any clear declaration claiming ownership, there are three broad possibilities for who is responsible for the bomb blast in Bangkok overnight: the military, Red Shirt supporters, or insurgents from Thailand’s Deep South.

At the same time, there are other rumours circulating in Bangkok claiming that it is Uighurs or people linked to their cause who are behind the incident.

In terms of the military, this is not a very plausible scenario, but nonetheless it is important to address it.

Some would say that the motivation for the military, or a military proxy, carrying out such an atrocity is to justify their ongoing military rule after Thailand’s May 2014 coup and into 2017, when elections are next most likely to take place.

This latest act of terror would seem to cement support for their ongoing rule and tight control of the state.

However, Thailand’s military leaders are currently focused on developing the country’s economy and tourism, and an attack at such an important tourist site would not assist them in this.

An attack on the Erawan shrine also can be seen as inauspicious for the military government, reinforcing the implausibility of the military as the instigators. Reducing the auspiciousness of the Prayuth government is something they would seek to avoid. In addition, their grip on power remains quite strong.

There is no compelling reason why they would feel a need to fabricate an additional and artificial security crisis. For these reasons I don’t think the military is behind it.

Another possibility is that it is a member of, or a supporter of, the Red Shirt political faction, the group which supports former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his sister Yingluck.

They have been marginalised and frustrated by the military government’s success so far in containing political unrest and bringing about legislative changes inimical to the Red Shirts’ interests.

This incident could be seen as an attempt to undermine the military government’s sense of control or to add pressure to return to elections and civilian rule.

It must be remembered that the Erawan shrine, at the heart of the fashionable Rachaprasong shopping district, is also the scene of the May 2010 Red Shirt barricade, which after prolonged demonstrations and protests lead to violence that saw many hundreds injured and at least 90 killed, from the military and both sides of politics. It has great significance for the Red Shirts.

Striking at the heart of downtown Bangkok would be a blow to the nation’s elite, those who have often opposed the Red Shirts and their political aspirations. It would also be a powerful reminder of the power and support of the Red Shirts’ nominal leader, Thaksin.

The third possibility is that it is insurgents from Thailand’s Deep South, who have been waging a separatist campaign there for many years.

The modus operandi of this blast fits with their methods in that it is an improvised explosive device delivered by a motorbike and placed at the foot of a shrine. Thais who live in the Deep South are very familiar with such blasts as they are an all too common occurrence.

However, I think it is unlikely that the bomb came from this group. In all their long years fighting the state, they have avoided making attacks in Bangkok their priority.  In fact, they tend to avoid attacking cities in general. They’ve attacked Hat Yai, but have deliberately avoided attacking so far north or a city as large as Bangkok.

In addition, the insurgents from the Deep South have worked very hard to distance themselves from the global war on terror and the violent extremism of other groups, so as to avoid being entangled in operations that would see them suffer under the heavy hand of the US.

It would make no sense for them to change this approach now, and for that reason I don’t think this latest tragedy is the actions of insurgents.

That’s why on the balance of things, with no one claiming ownership of the attack, I think it would be most likely to have been instigated by a supporter of the Red Shirts.

Outside of these three possible groups, there are rumours that Uighurs or people supportive of their movement are behind the attack.The Uighurs have opposed the Chinese state for many years, sometimes resorting to violence, and only last month Thailand sent back over 100 Uighur asylum seekers to China.

Once again, I don’t think this is plausible, but it goes to show that amid the chaos and confusion it is hard to know exactly what has happened and why.

Whoever is responsible for this terrible tragedy, such violence has no place in any society, and should be abhorred.

Initial thoughts on Bangkok bombing | New Mandala

Initial thoughts on Bangkok bombing | New Mandala

 

NICHOLAS FARRELLY, 

18 AUGUST 2015

Looking at the lists of dead and injured, the human toll of last night’s bombing at the Erawan Shrine in Bangkok is clear. It is a distressing situation: seemingly designed to sow maximum havoc in the heart of the city.

In different ways, many New Mandala readers will have been touched by these events. Our condolences to the families of the dead and our sympathy for all those who were injured. It is a heart-breaking scene.

At times of such confusion, there are no immediate answers to questions about who, what and why. Investigators are no doubt mobilising all available resources to ascertain what has happened. The authorities will move quickly to get answers.

In the meantime there will be speculation about everything.

First of all, no matter who is involved, for a short period this attack will draw more attention to Thailand’s long-running war in the southernmost provinces. That conflict continues to fester, receiving only sporadic mention in the international media. Even many Thais have long since disengaged from what must feel like an unending series of violent incidents. One of the latest is the killing of a Thai Ranger at his own wedding. Until we know otherwise, there will be speculation that the conflict from those provinces has spread.

Second, there will also, no doubt, be concern about the prospect that more globally-focused terrorist forces are involved. In 2012 Bangkok was the scene of such a plot. There has long been insinuation about the safe haven that some Islamists have found in Thailand. Many people still remember the arrest of Jemaah Islamiya operational commander, Hambali. Thailand is, of course, embroiled in all manner of contentious international situations, including the recent repatriation of Chinese Muslims. Given the broader international context, there will certainly be discussion of how Thailand fits into the battle between Islamists and their opponents.

Third, the attack will draw renewed focus to Thailand’s own messy politics. Given all of the ill-will between different factions in Thai society there will be the need to eliminate the possibility of their involvement. Previously Thai political conflict has bounced along without mass casualty attacks of the type that are familiar elsewhere in the world. Most of the deaths in the battle between reds and yellows have been shootings. If that has changed then Thailand faces a range of new problems.

Today everyone is scratching their heads wondering who is involved and what this violence will mean. The military regime that has been in-charge since May 2014 faces its biggest test. People in Thailand and beyond will be demanding justice.

Nicholas Farrelly is the co-founder of New Mandala and a Fellow at the Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University