Reality check on Islam, Buddhism in Myanmar | New Mandala

Reality check on Islam, Buddhism in Myanmar | New Mandala

 

MELISSA CROUCH, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR

 – 17 NOVEMBER 2014

The West has been wondering what has gone wrong with Buddhism in Myanmar since 2012 and the violence primarily by Buddhists against Muslims. Yet I want to suggest that this is the wrong question, and that the West needs to take a look in the mirror. The West’s skewed view of Buddhism as a ‘peaceful’ religion, combined with the stereotypical view of Islam as inherently ‘violent’, are a core part of the problem.

Over the past month several reports and a barrage of media reports have surfaced in an attempt to explain the violence against Muslims in Myanmar. Yet implicitly such reports often promote the ‘real’ teachings of Buddhism as a ‘peaceful’ religion, and this adds to the Western stereotype of Islam as somehow ‘violent’.

Let me illustrate this by taking a different perspective to some of the issued raised byContesting Buddhist Narratives. This report prioritises understanding Buddhist fears and concerns, represented in the irrational ranting of the monk (and former convicted criminal) U Wirathu, who is mentioned or quoted from at least 25 times in the report. Yes, we need to understand all aspects of the conflict, but we have paid so little attention to Muslim communities in Myanmar, and this lack of information continues to fuel stereotypes about both Buddhism and Islam. This obscures Muslims’ concerns and fails to acknowledge that Muslims have serious fears too.

The basic premise of the report is that one key way forward is to use Buddhist narratives of non-violence. This is one option, but what about other alternatives, such as secularism? There is very clear precedent for this in Myanmar. General Aung San, the revered martyr and national independence hero, was a secularist. For example, in the drafting of the 1947 Constitution, he insisted that Burma should be a secular state. It was only after his assassination (when he died alongside his colleague and Muslim cabinet member, U Razak) that the provision in the draft constitution on religion was revised to give Buddhism a ‘special position’ (this was actually based on the Irish Constitution and its recognition of Catholicism). Things of course turned from bad to worse in 1961 when U Nu passed a constitutional amendment to make Buddhism the state religion, and the coup of 1962 followed soon after. Collective popular memory in Myanmar of General Aung San seems to have conveniently forgotten that he stood for secularism.

The strength of the report is its knowledge of Buddhism, yet it devotes just one paragraph to representing Muslim views. I understand the report does not claim to focus on understanding Muslims, but that’s precisely my point. Why do Buddhists who are promoting violence deserve our understanding, and Muslims who have suffered the consequences do not? This lack of focus on Muslims has led to many misunderstandings, not least the fact that the West equates Muslims in Myanmar with the term ‘Rohingya’. There is little appreciation of the diversity within the Muslim communities in Myanmar, nor is there any acknowledgement that most Muslims in Myanmar are probably not (or do not self-identify as) Rohingya. The concerns of Muslims in Rakhine State are acute and need to be addressed, but we can’t continue to ignore the fact that Muslim communities can be found right across Myanmar and that they have been severely affected by this violence.

The report also hints at the need to reform Islamic education, although it rightly acknowledges that efforts to promote tolerance in religious-based schools should take place in all religions. But let’s interrogate this view that somehow Islamic education institutions in Myanmar are partly blame (which is also what the Rakhine Commission Report indicated). Using Islamic education institutions as a convenient scapegoat indicates both an ignorance about these institutions, and a failure to remember the past. For example, prior to 1962 there were top schools run by Muslims (and there were also Muslim children who attended top Christian schools) and these institutions provided a broad education, alongside an Islamic education. When Ne Win took over in 1962, Islamic schools, like all other religious schools, were at risk of nationalisation. And many of these Islamic schools were nationalised. Some, however, that were able to convince Ne Win’s regime that they would only teach a narrow Islamic studies curriculum were allowed to continue to function as madrasas. So I think we need to keep past government policies in mind, before we go pointing the blame at Islamic education institutions.

The report does provide some interesting examples of how Buddhists are participating in inter-religious dialogue. But it fails to mention that some Muslims have been doing this for decades in Myanmar. There has been a very distinct movement in Myanmar for a very long time of Muslims who have bent over backwards to fit in, to tolerate Buddhism and its traditions, and to show that they belong to Myanmar too. These ‘Burmese Muslims’ have insisted on using Burmese language (rather than Arabic or Urdu) as the language of instruction in Islamic schools. These Burmese Muslims have insisted that their women should be free to wear Burmese dress if they choose (which is more revealing than traditional Islamic teachings allow). I am not saying Muslims should have to identify as ‘Burmese’ or compromise their religion in this way; of course if they chose to retain their Indian or Chinese or Shan identity alongside their Muslim identity, they should be allowed to too.

We need to put aside this preoccupation with proving that Buddhism is an inherently peaceful religion while remaining ambiguously silent on Islam. Western media and scholarship needs to intentionally work to dispel the assumptions that Islam is bad and Buddhism is good, that Islam is violent and Buddhism is non-violent, that a monk in a saffron robe is peaceful, but that a man with a beard and wearing a skull cap is violent. These dichotomies are false and contribute to the tensions.

It is time that the West takes a serious reality check on how it views Islam and Buddhism. While the violence and discrimination against Muslims is a reflection on Myanmar, the response of the West is a reflection of persistent stereotypes in the West about Islam and Buddhism.

Melissa Crouch is a Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore

Big agenda for ethnic groups in Myanmar | New Mandala

Big agenda for ethnic groups in Myanmar | New Mandala

 

YAW BAWM MANGSHANG, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

14 NOVEMBER 2014

After enduring decades of brutal military dictatorship, the people of multi-ethnic Myanmar finally got their chance to try democracy. In November 2010, the people of Myanmar voted for the first time in twenty years. While the election was an important step toward peace, Myanmar’s military maintains a tight hold on political power, making progress difficult. The international community has supported the democratic transition, but has focused too narrowly on governmental reforms and economic development, while the demands of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities are marginalized. The fact remains that disenfranchising ethnic minorities will prolong armed conflict and possibly derail the democratization process. Thus, for Myanmar’s democracy to succeed, the international community must actively promote ethnic minorities.

The ethnic dimension of Myanmar is extremely complex, but the major anti-government players consist of seven groups, each possessing armed rebel forces. Among these dominant groups, the Kachin Independence Organization is yet to sign a ceasefire agreement with the government, and is a member of the United Nationalities Federal Council, the political alliance of ethnic rebel groups. While each ethnic group is distinct from the others, most find common ground in their mutual resistance to centralized rule. The political demands of Myanmar’s ethnic groups revolve around this issue of autonomy and the internal sovereignty they were promised by the Panglong Agreement of 1947, a treaty unifying Burma with several neighboring territories also under British control. The Panglong Agreement was signed in order to more effectively push for independence, but only under the condition of retaining autonomy. Without this agreement, minorities argue, there would be no unification in the first place and minority regions of Myanmar might today be separate and independent states.

The 2010 election renewed ethnic minorities’ hopes for negotiating adequate decentralization, but the winning party—the Union Solidarity and Development Party—is tacitly supported by the military and is dominated by former generals. This new, nominally civilian government led by President Thein Sein, also a former general, hasinitiated several widely praised (yet ineffective) reforms. The so-called civilian government has become a darling of the West, as evidenced by the lifting of most economic sanctions. In 2013, Myanmar’s military was invited as an observer to Cobra Gold, a major, regional military exercise led by the United States.

The warming relationship between the West and Myanmar’s government is based on the promise of reforms, but those reforms have not empowered the country’s ethnic minorities or granted them any meaningful autonomy — both essential conditions for ending armed conflict. However, the government’s actions demonstrate a reluctance to change.

President Thein Sein touted national reconciliation and reform after coming to power in 2011, and his government has engaged with Myanmar’s rebel ethnic groups in over a dozen peace talks. However, the May 2014 attacks and numerous battles against the Kachin Independence Army, the displacement of over 100,000 refugees, and continued military buildup in ethnic areas make ethnic groups and Myanmar analysts alike question the sincerity of the peace negotiations.

The unwillingness of the government to share power with ethnic minorities is reflected in the 2008 constitution. When the constitution was drafted, most armed ethnic groups participated and presented their demands to be incorporated, but ultimately none were included. Now, rebel, ethnic groups and the government are at an impasse. The government insists rebel groups first lay down their arms, then convert to political parties and participate in elections under the framework of the constitution. But rebel groups, such as the Kachin Independence Organization, want political negotiation and constitutional reform before agreeing to a ceasefire. Many Myanmar observers see the current constitution as the mechanism preserving the military’s political power instead of more appropriately devolving power to ethnic groups.

Additionally, the government has wrongly blamed poverty as the driver of insurgency and has pursued economic development ahead of political negotiation, further rankling Myanmar’s ethnic groups. Economic development may benefit government officials, but it will not solve the conflict unless the demands of ethnic minorities are properly addressed.

Unfortunately, Myanmar’s lucrative business in natural resources blinds the international community to ethnic minorities’ grievances. To bolster peace in Myanmar, the international community must step back from rapid economic development and refocus on political negotiation. Otherwise, civil war will continue and the military will remain a powerful actor in Myanmar politics for years to come.

International influence is crucial for democracy to succeed in Myanmar and there are several actions that can facilitate the peace process.

First, the international community should acknowledge rebel groups as legitimate political entities representing their respective ethnic groups. Without explicit support from the international community, rebel groups have no leverage to enter political negotiation.

Second, the international community should not prematurely encourage foreign investment in Myanmar. Instead, investment, engagement with the military (which is blocking the democratic reform), and debt relief should be used as incentive for tangible political reform.

Third, the Myanmar government should be pressured to implement the peaceprocess in good faith, to cease military buildup in ethnic areas and, to stop ongoing military campaigns which could derail the nationwide ceasefire negotiation process.

Fourth, the international community should offer mediation for this delicate stage of the peace process and provide minority groups an assurance of security for participation in political talks.

Fifth, the international community should recognize the importance of providing autonomy to ethnic groups and should pressure the government to implement federalism accordingly.

Sixth, the Myanmar government should be pressured to allow humanitarian aid to be distributed to internally displaced people in Kachin State.

Additionally, the international community should urge the government to amend the 2008 constitution, which both prevents Aung San Suu Kyi from running for president in 2015 and enshrines military power in Myanmar politics.

These steps are vital to foster Myanmar’s fledgling democracy, but above all, the international community must not turn away from the people of Myanmar. Without support the conflict will continue, and if the international community does not stand up for Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, who will?

Yaw Bawm Mangshang is co-founder of the Nau Shawng Education Network (NSEN) with a goal of cultivating democratic culture through civic education and higher education opportunities for young people. NSEN is based in Myitkyina, Myanmar, where Yaw Bawm worked as director until mid-2012. With a Fulbright Scholarship, he is currently studying for a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy at the Fletcher School, Tufts University. He can be reached atwunpawng@gmail.com or mangshang.bawm@tufts.edu.