Why I speak out against the Thai Monarchy | New Mandala

Why I speak out against the Thai Monarchy | New Mandala
Chatwadee Rose Amornpat, 12 OCTOBER 2015

I was brought up in a royalist family in Thailand. My roots are also intertwined with the monarchy.

My grandparents worked for the royals and my family back home is a staunch supporter of the yellow cause. We always watched the nightly royal news (more like propaganda to me now) every night at 8pm, just like the rest of the population.

We adored the royals and their ostentatious outfits and lavish caravans of cars. They all looked like gods, untouchable and to be feared.

I first became disenchanted with the Thai monarchy during my last two visits to Thailand and prior to my lese majeste charge.

While visiting what I once called home, I often walked the streets and mingled with the locals, eating noodle soup on the streets. I talked with the street vendors and found that they all have a very hard life to say the least.

I remember one vendor so clearly; an elderly man, in his late 60s having to get up at 4am every day in order to prepare for another long shift selling noodles to passers-by from dawn till dust in order to make ends meet.

He said he would be lucky, after expenses, to make around 500 baht (approx $US 15). He and his family of four lived in a slum area of Klong Toie. He had worked at his stand for about 15 years and little had changed for him in that time. In contrast, as we talked I noticed several expensive Mercedes Benz zooming by. Some even stopped to pick up am order “to go.”

On other occasions, I rode in a taxis across Bangkok.  Again, the drivers expressed their sense of hopelessness for the future; destined to driving the smoggy streets, simply not knowing what else to do.

One driver told me that after paying his taxi-rental fee, food and gasoline, and after driving some 10-hours, if he is lucky his take-home pay was about 500 baht; the same as the noodle vendor.

While visiting Thailand, I also talked to many manual labourers and found that life is also very hard for them and their families. Most of them get paid a minimum wage of 300 baht per day, while about 30 per cent earn between 150-200 baht working 10-hour shifts.  These are the under aged workers in restaurants, factories, and the sex industry and parlours.

Such is life for Thailand’s majority, which basically drives the nation’s economy; what is known to foreigners as Thailand’s cheap labour.

Owners of such establishments are all royalists following the footstep of King Bhumibol who promotes his ‘Sufficient Economy’ everywhere. And each evening when I was at home with my parents watching TV, there would be the so-called ‘promotional’ ads proclaiming the greatness of the royals every hour.

Since the military takeover of May 2014 the propaganda peddling has gotten worse. As The New York Times’ Thomas Fuller has reported, coup leader General Prayuth Chan is spending $US 540 million on a promotional campaign with the ever so subtle moniker ‘Worship, protect and uphold the monarchy’.

“The campaign includes television commercials, seminars in schools and prisons, singing contests and competitions to write novels and make short films praising the king,” writes Fuller.

This money could have been better used for the poor. The fact is, Thailand is still a very poor country after almost 70 years of rule by King Bhumibol. Meanwhile, the king’s Crown Property Bureau prospers exponentially every year and is worth at least $US 43 .8 billion dollars (with some experts claiming this estimate is too low).

It controls 15 per cent of the country’s GDP and owns businesses throughout Thailand and the world. But because Thai people are passive in nature, they don’t complain.

What disturbs me so much is the fact that according to Forbes magazine, the Thai king is considered the richest monarch in the world. Yet, he continues to receive a yearly royal budget from Thai taxpayers potentially worth some $US 500 million dollars without feeling guilt or shame. I don’t know how he can justify his Sufficient Economy when it comes to his own self-interest.

All the while, Thailand’s poor continue to pay the price of his long reign. When you count the cost, it’s enough to make anyone scream and shout, let alone speak out.

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat is based in London. She was charged with lese majeste by the Thai military junta in July 2014. 

A conversation with Chomsky | New Mandala

A conversation with Chomsky | New Mandala

PAVIN CHACHAVALPONGPUN, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

1 OCTOBER 2015

Pavin Chachavalpongpun (left) and Noam Chomsky. Photo supplied.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun discusses Thai politics, the monarchy, authoritarian rule and Thaksin with world-renowned public intellectual. 

Since the Thai coup of 22 May 2014, my life has been turned upside down.

The Thai junta summoned me twice for being critical of its intervention in politics. When I rejected the summons simply because I did not accept the legitimacy of the coup-makers, they issued a warrant for my arrest and revoked my passport. This forced me to apply for refugee status in Japan.

Throughout this tumultuous period, Professor Noam Chomsky – one of the world’s most renowned academics, political commentators and social-justice activists – offered his encouragement and support in the process of applying for my refugee status.

He helped appeal to the Japanese government to seriously consider my case, while at the same time condemning the Thai junta for its harassment against my basic human rights.

I had never met Chomsky prior to the coup in Thailand. Therefore, his sympathy towards my struggle was unexpected and much appreciated. So when I was invited to speak at the Thai Studies Program at Harvard University on 25 September, I dropped a note to Chomsky to see if he would be available to meet me. He said yes.

Our meeting took place on the same day at his office inside the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where we had a private conversation. As soon as I was invited to sit down, Chomsky fired off many hard-hitting questions. He was interested in three issues: the military, the monarchy, and Thaksin Shinawatra.

First, he asked if I could describe the performance of the current military government led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha. He was curious to know how the military government has been coping with both domestic and international pressure. At the same time, I was requested to give an update on the state of human rights inside Thailand.

Chomsky offered his view on authoritarian rule in today’s world and how it works against the tide of democratisation. He told me that any regime not supported by the people, in this century, should not last long. But in the Thai case, he admitted that there were factors contributory to the longevity of military rule. One of them is the monarchy.

He asked me to what extent the Thai monarchy has interfered in politics. I replied by referring to the shifting strategy of the monarchy and its involvement in politics.

The royal institution has broken its past modus operandi of pulling the strings behind the political scene, and is now playing politics in the open. This is particularly so after the 2006 coup, with the Queen attending the funeral of a yellow shirt and Princess Chulabhorn overtly supporting the anti-government protest led by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC).

Chomsky responded by asserting that royal political involvement explained why Thai politics has become muddled and complicated. The global trend shows that monarchies of the world are shrinking. Working against the tide of democracy would only accelerate that shrinking process.

But he was also surprised by the fact that the Thai public has become tolerable to political interference by both the monarchy and the military, particularly among the politically marginalised. This discussion led us to focus on the surge in cases involving lèse-majesté charges.

He told me that he remembered signing a petition many years ago calling for a reform of lèse-majesté law in Thailand. But he also said, his effort was futile. He believed that without an immediate reform of the law, the monarchy would find it even more difficult to coexist with democracy.

Chomsky seemed to also be very fascinated by the fact that former Prime Minister Thaksin has still commanded love and respect from a number of red shirts in Thailand. He was curious about Thaksin’s effective populist policy which seemed to have “hypnotised” Thais to continue to vote for his political proxies.

But Chomsky was also suspicious of Thaksin’s competitive political script, which was greatly different from that of the “network monarchy”. He raised the pertinent question of how Thaksin’s political idea could really shift Thailand’s political landscape toward more democratisation.

Chomsky also asked why Thaksin’s political opponents, be they opposition parties or enemies in the old establishment, had failed to initiate better and more commercialised policies designed to win the hearts and minds of Thai villagers. I could only say that they were not interested in empowering the people, as such empowerment could challenge their own powerful position in the political and economic spheres.

Chomsky posed some other questions on the negative aspects of Thaksin’s populism but at the same time came to understand the reason why his populist tactics functioned well in the country where marginalised people are still struggling to gain access to political and economic resources.

This brought us to the last topic of discussion, the Thai economy. Chomsky was inquisitive about the economic consequences of the coup, the changing domestic socio-economic conditions, and the implications on foreign investors in Thailand. Again, I could only provide him with a pessimistic outlook. Chomsky lamented that it was unfortunate for Thailand to have fallen into its own political trap.

Aside from his inquisitiveness about the Thai political crisis, Chomsky asked me about my future plans, now that I have become a refugee fleeing my own country. What would I do from now on?

I assured him that my status in Japan was guaranteed and that I was just waiting to witness changes during this transitional period in Thailand. Should I need any assistance from him, he said, he would be willing to help as much as he could.

I then asked him a final question; how would he like to see Thailand in the future? Chomsky quickly replied, “A democratic state without interventions from non-elected institutions.”

Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies and currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Walter H Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.

Royal power in Thai politics | Chatwadee Rose Amornpat / New Mandala

Royal power in Thai politics

 

CHATWADEE ROSE AMORNPAT, GUEST CONTRIBUTOR, 

22 SEPTEMBER 2015

A royalist holds aloft a picture of Thailand’s king. Photo: Reuters.

How the King can leave a lasting legacy for Thailand’s people.

Events since the May 2014 coup convince me that Thailand is now becoming more dictatorial, particularly when the political system is still under the auspices of King Bhumibol Adulyadej.

He and his advisers set the rules and the law. He appoints and approves people to all the nation’s important positions, filling them with cronies loyal to him. He does not seem to care what the international community thinks.

Thailand clearly needs to change its monarchical system.

The misunderstood “constitutional monarchy”, as it is currently called, is often thought of in similar terms as systems like Japan and England. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The current Thai constitution states the King has the ultimate say – no matter which political party wins an election. All the relevant sections of each of the country’s constitutions clearly indicate that in Thailand the ultimate power lies with the king.

As such, it is unfortunate that the Thai King keeps a low profile and rarely speaks. The people do not know him or his mindset. And due to Article 112 of the criminal code, the notorious lese majeste law, people are not allowed to talk about or question him. Only praise and favourable comments are allowed.

With all the sovereign powers bestowed upon him under the constitution, one would believe that the King should be responsible for the welfare of the people. Once again, nothing could be further from the truth.

He is not held accountable for anything.

This is why I have to speak out against the regime and the Thai monarchy; even though I have been threatened by Thai royalist thugs constantly at home and at work, and through social media messages.

As the Thai King is known to have poor health, I wish that he would do one good deed for the Thai people before he dies, abolishing Article 112 from the Thai criminal code once and for all.

Further, he should order General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the current self-appointed prime minister, to set free all lese majeste prisoners and dismiss all pending cases. He should leave this legacy before he dies for the world to see that he does care for his people after all.

My family back home have disowned me and all my friends are too afraid to have anything to do with me, because I was charged with violating Article 112.

I hope that just someday soon and with the help of peace and democracy loving nations around the world, we will see a true democracy in Thailand.

If not, Thai people will continue to suffer for another generation to come.

Chatwadee Rose Amornpat is based in London. She was charged with lese majeste by the Thai military junta in July 2014. For previous New Mandala coverage of her situation see this post.

Succession and legitimacy: Vajiralongkorn and Tôn Duc Thang | New Mandala

Succession and legitimacy: Vajiralongkorn and Tôn Duc Thang | New Mandala

DAVID CAMROUX, 

4 MAY 2015
It may appear incongruous and, to some at least, offensive to compare the present Crown Prince (aged 62) and heir apparent to the Thai throne with the second president of North Vietnam and, after reunification, the first president of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. After all the putative ‘predecessor’ of the former, King Bhumibol (Rama IX), while ailing, still remains on the throne and is still the more than ceremonial head of state of the Thai kingdom. As for Tôn Duc Thang’s predecessor, Ho Chi Minh, he died in 1969 and Tôn himself passed away in 1980 at the age of 92. Yet a recent trip to neighbouring Vietnam has caused me to think again on political developments in the Southeast country with which I am at present most concerned, Thailand, and the parallels and divergences in the historical trajectories of these two Southeast Asian nations.

(Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn - Photo New Mandala)

During this holiday I visited the Tôn Duc Thang Museum in Ho Chi Minj City, as well as alighting from a cruise on the Mekong to visit the Tôn Duc Thang Exhibition House on My Hoa Hung Island.  The Museum has been correctly described by tourist guidebooks as one of the quietest places in the bustling city, formerly known as Saigon, while the Exhibition Hall was totally bereft of visitors. It seemed terribly unfair that such a true Vietnamese revolutionary should, despite some efforts by the Vietnamese propaganda machine, be so neglected by his compatriots. After all he was not only an authentically working class party cadre, but also came from southern Vietnam. He had not only spent fifteen years imprisoned by the French on the infamous Con Dao Island, but had presided over the reunification of his country, the culmination of a life of struggle and sacrifice. Surely if someone deserved elevation to the pantheon of Vietnamese heroes it was Ton. Alas, in life and in death, he had to live in the long shadow cast by his predecessor Ho Chi Minh.

(Tôn Duc Thang - Photo lichsuvietnam.edu.vn)

The same cruel fate would appear to await for Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn when he finally ascends the throne after the more than sixty year reign of his father, the world’s longest reigning monarch. In Bangkok in March 2010 during the violent repression of anti-government, pro-democracy demonstrators by the military that caused the death of 90 red shirt protestors, one of their supporters scrawled on a Bangkok overpass, in reference to King Bhumibol, “Where is daddy?” The question is does this really matter?

Ho Chi Minh was described by the French historian, Jean Lacouture, as a “Franciscan who had read Marx”. Certainly his personal modesty, moral integrity and an almost monk-like devotion to his vocation are portrayed in the ubiquitous images that adorn public buildings and hoardings throughout Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh, like King Bhumibol, in his personal behaviour seemed to epitomize the ideal of the Buddhist middle way: the rejection of personal gratification and vice in service of a greater public good. Indeed, King Bhumibol’s doctrine of the sufficiency economy, promulgated in reaction to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, could have been as easily drafted in Ho’s modest bungalow in Hanoi as in the Dusit Palace in Bangkok. Both Ho and King Bhumibol are portrayed as having a particular concern for the lowest of the low, the peasant farmer. Other parallels can be drawn: Ho is affectionately referred to as cu(uncle), the benevolent family patriarch who devotes himself to his family (the nation) while King Bhumibol is commonly referred to as the father of his people.  Yet, while Ho Chi Minh may have an altar devoted to him in several Buddhist temples in Vietnam, (such as that in Chau Doc, I visited), under a secular Communist regime he never acquired the revered status of a dhammaraja (the virtuous Buddhist ruler) associated with King Bhumibol.

It seems unfair that Ton Duc Thang has been allowed to fade into obscurity despite sharing many of the character traits so vaunted in Ho Chi Minh. The same continuity in personal demeanour cannot be said to exist in the case of Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn in relation to his father. Going into detail to make the contrast more explicit would potentially incite prosecution under Thailand’s much abused lese majesté laws: suffice it to say that the thrice divorced future Rama X is almost the antithesis of the monogamous Rama IX. In the rumour mill that compensates for the lack of open discussion of the monarchy in Thailand, the eccentric playboy, to put it mildly, is often contrasted with the saintly father (and Prince Vajiralongkorn’s elder sister). However does this really matter?  After all the British monarchy, to take but one example, has survived for centuries despite having had at times some rather dubious characters on the throne. My argument is that indeed it does matter, for it is not the Thai monarchy itself that is problematical, but rather the particular role it plays – or rather has been orchestrated to play – in the construction of a sense of   Thai nationhood.

Once again a reference to the Vietnamese case is useful. Ton Duc Thang’s relegation to the status of a footnote of history is of little consequence for the Vietnamese nation. The State-orchestrated cult of Ho Chi Minh is that of the revolutionary leader who united his country across class, regional and ethnic divides to create a new modern Vietnam.  The lack of a spiritual successor is of little importance, for, in a sense Ho Chi Minh lives on in the egalitarian ideals of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, if not often in its practice. In contrast the cult built around King Bhumibol is designed to maintain a somewhat feudal social order in the interests of a Bangkok elite comprising the business community, the top Administration and the Military. This personalized cult, extended only to Princess Chakri Sirindhorn and, to a lesser extent, to Queen Sirikit, does not portray the king as a the head of a Thai democracy, even if this is his constitutional role. Parliaments and elected governments are to be kept weak. They will become even weaker under the present proposals of the civilianized military government resulting from the coup of May 2014.  Rather the monarchy is the first of the three pillars, the others being the sangha (the monkhood) and the nation, that officially defines Thai identity. Yet is the individual on the throne, not the institution of the monarchy per se, that is brought to the fore in this official portrayal.

What lessons can be drawn from this brief comparison? Thailand, like Vietnam, is constrained by its past. As we are constantly reminded Siam (today’s Thailand) was the only polity in Southeast Asia not, formally at least, to be colonized. In Thai school textbooks and in the popular imagination the perpetuation of Thai independence was the almost single-handed work of two great monarchs of the Chakri dynasty:  King Mongkut (Rama IV) and King Chulalongkorn (Rama V). The latter has been described by one Dutch scholar, Irene Stengs, as the ‘patron saint of the Thai middle class’. The modern Thai nation, in other words, is a product of the Thai monarchy, going back even further in history to the 13^th century. The ‘other side of the coin’ of the Thai kingdom’s ostensibly uninterrupted independence is that, unlike most neighbouring countries, it did not experience that cathartic seminal moment, when the struggle for independence against the colonizer brings together a founding national movement united across class barriers, and the sense of citizenship involving some form of social contract. The people of Thailand continue to be subjects before they are citizens.

In Vietnam the cult of Ho Chi Minh both maintains and legitimizes the nature of the modern one party nation-state. In Thailand respect for the monarchy, largely centred on the personality of King Bhumibol himself, could rapidly disappear once his son ascends to the throne. As a Thai colleague once suggested to me, Thais have become “Bhumibolists’ rather than fervent supporters of the monarchy as an enduring institution. In the inevitable succession it can be feared that social cohesion within Thailand itself would be severely challenged.  The reconciliation of kingdom and modern nation remains a work in progress, as the constant changing of the Thai constitution – with the twenty-first since 1932 now being drafted – demonstrates. If constitutions can be discarded like so many scraps of paper quid the future of a constitutional monarchy? If the legitimacy of an institution, such as the Thai monarchy is so centred on the purported extraordinary attributes of one individual, will it survive when a far lesser mortal succeeds the irreplaceable?

David Camroux is Associate Professor and Senior Researcher in the Centre for International Studies at Sciences Po in Paris and co-editor of the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs.

Feature image: Yellow shirt supporters at King Bhumibol’s birthday celebrations in December 2013, Bangkok Post 5.12.2013