Myanma - The president and the proxy| New Mandala

Myanma - The president and the proxy| New Mandala
Chit Win,  11 NOVEMBER 2015

Barred from office, Aung San Suu Kyi claims she will act “above the president” if her party wins Myanmar’s elections and forms government. With victory imminent, Chit Win looks at how she just may pull it off.

Myanmar’s people have decided they want change.

The reds, the National League for Democracy (NLD) have repudiated the greens, the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in a historic election that was largely peaceful.

The USDP leadership, custodians of Myanmar’s political transformation since the introduction of a quasi-civilian government and new constitution in 2008, have publically conceded defeat. The government and the military have also declared their acceptance of the election results.

At a glance, it looks like a smooth transition for Myanmar and high hopes for democratic change under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi.

The problem is, it is not that simple.

The main complication is that, despite leading her party to what looks like a resounding victory, Aung San Suu Kyi is not going to be the next president of Myanmar. She is constitutionally barred from the office because of her two sons, who are not Myanmar citizens.

Last week she publicly declared that the next president of Myanmar would be an NLD member and she would direct him or her, should her party win the election and be able to form government. Since then there has been some speculation about who she might pick as her ‘notional president’ and exactly what this arrangement may entail.

So who will be the new president of Myanmar? And in what way can Aung San Suu Kyi influence a role that is constitutionally prohibited from being influenced?  Most importantly, will the country’s military obey this new president?

These are puzzles for the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi to solve as Myanmar enters its post-election phase.

But with the above questions in mind, we can already sketch out some likely scenarios and key challenges.

For Aung San Suu Kyi to get her way, the optimal choice would be a NLD member in his late 50s or 60s with a legislative background.

Myanmar’s constitution says the president has to be over 45 and acquainted with politics, the administration, economics and the military. Though it is not necessarily expected, based on the fact that only 13 per cent of election candidates were women, the new president will also most likely be male.

And while Aung San Suu Kyi may be thinking of a younger president in order to exert maximum influence, she may opt for someone older, in order to appeal to the Myanmar people and their innate respect for their elders.

Clearly then, a man in his late 50s or 60s would be a strong possibility.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s vision of a presidential proxy can also be fulfilled if she appoints an NLD member who comes from a bureaucratic background or is a member of the current legislature (which maintains power until March 2016).

Such a person would be ideal, because the military would have worked with him for the past three years and he would know how the system operates. Her vast international experience may also persuade her to choose someone who is internationally competent.  This reduces the possible candidate to a just handful of people.

There are two key challenges to all of this; one internal and the other external.

The external challenge is the need to secure the support of the military, in particular the 11-member National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) that overseas day-to-day political and security affairs. Six panel members are linked to the military, given it a lot of muscle. These include the vice-president (elected by the military), the military’s Commander-in-Chief, the deputy Commander-in-Chief and three Union Ministers appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and who are active military personnel.

Stiff resistance from the military through the NDSC is expected should the NLD appoint the wrong person. However, this challenge can be overcome by co-opting the military and by forming an inclusive government – something Aung San Suu Kyi has already hinted at.

The greater challenge comes from within her own party, and in particular the question of how Aung San Suu Kyi is going to influence the new president over their whole five year term. Will she micro-manage the president or allow a certain degree of independence?

There are two recent examples of a similar situation: India and Indonesia. Some experts are predicting that Aung San Suu Kyi will take the role of Sonia Gandhi in India, who as a party chairperson effectively ran the government while also maintaining good relations with the prime minister.

On the other hand Aung San Suu Kyi would not want to sour her relationship with her president, as is the case between President Joko Widodo and his party chief Megawati Sukarnoputri in Indonesia. Can she do it? It could come down to the individual she chooses. When people obtain power, they change, and so does their loyalties.

Institutionally, the situation is more complex than it looks. Her presence in the legislature will enhance the legislative role in Myanmar’s democratic consolidation. But, her mentor role over the president will undermine constitutional checks and balances, particularly if Aung San Suu Kyi assumes the role of the speaker of the legislature, as some have predicted she will.

The Constitutional Tribunal may also interfere with her role, and the military may not like it full stop. If she takes an executive post, then she will have to relinquish the party leadership. And with Aung San Suu Kyi as a de facto leader of the country, the new president will be in an awkward position, especially in the international arena.

It’s complicated, to say the least.  With a major victory in her sights, it’s imperative that Aung San Suu Kyi finds an institutionally acceptable way to overcome these potential pitfalls.

Legislative oversight provides a possible solution to her predicament.

With an overwhelming majority in the legislature, it is likely that the NLD’s proposed laws will go through parliament unopposed. Therefore, one possible solution is to make the executive more accountable to the legislature and let the president freely take charge of government.

There are a number of legislative tools for executive oversight and they can effectively control the government. Myanmar’s current legislature is very much familiar with this arrangement; the new legislature will just need to fine tune it.

Rather than overseeing the president and their day-to-day business, Aung San Suu Kyi should control the executive through the legislature, setting an example of how the executive can be tamed by the people’s representatives.

As someone who has finally tamed Myanmar’s military masters, it should be a cinch.

Chit Win is a PhD student at the Australian National University’s Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, and currently a visiting scholar at Indiana University.

This article forms part of New Mandala’s ‘Myanmar and the vote‘ series.

Myanma's Elections just the beginning

Nicholas Farrelly, 11 NOVEMBER 2015 

This column was published by The Myanmar Times on Monday, 9 November 2015

The cold hard reality is that Sunday was just the beginning of the next round of political competition. Once the votes are in, the heavy business of negotiation and repositioning will rumble forward.

This will be hard for many people to accept. Surely, the election will allocate power based on the people’s will? If only it was so straightforward.

The first task for those holding high political ambitions will be to tell the story about what the election result means. It is no surprise that during the campaign this already began, with all sides seeking to claim a premature mandate based on scenarios that serve their purposes.

For Daw Aung San Suu Kyi the claim that she can run the government even if she is barred from taking the presidency is one such pre-emptive move. The obvious constitutional obstacles require a certain amount of fancy footwork.

On the other side, we have her opponents suggesting that the National League for Democracy needs broad support among other forces to make a credible administration. The suggestion is that even a strong showing at the polls cannot guarantee power for a prospective government.

What these currently unreconciled positons mean is that even if yesterday’s vote offers a clear result, the horse-trading and jockeying for position will last for a while.

I fear that there is much potential for miscalculation in this process, as nobody has been forced, in recent times, to find the comfortable middle ground.

While the votes won from the people will count for a lot, in the final calculations they will be just one part of the broader story. The excruciating grind of ceasefire negotiations shows just how hard such politics can be.

What really matters is the stranglehold on key legislative and executive functions enjoyed by the military.

In practice, this power flows from the National Defence and Security Council, at least half of whom will still have an armed forces background in 2016. Ministerial responsibility in defence, internal security and border affairs will also be retained by the Tatmadaw.

Civilianisation will only be possible within quite strict limits and that will be hard for some NLD boosters to accept. Coming up with a government that balances all of the different powerful interests seems prudent. It is less clear whether it will be possible so soon after the election campaign.

Next there is the challenge of getting those elected to serve in Nay Pyi Taw to accept such day-to-day compromises. Will the ones who miss out on power be prepared to politely applaud the victors? If the winner presumes to take all the spoils for themselves all residual goodwill among runners-up could quickly fade.

One of the advantages of politics since 2012 is that the NLD has been prepared to play second fiddle to the Union Solidarity and Development Party. That has not been easy. It is a credit to the NLD hardliners that they have generally tolerated their impotence. Their savviest operators appreciate that it has offered a much-needed opportunity to learn the ropes in Nay Pyi Taw without taking on too much of a burden.

The weight of the burden changes, though, as soon as the serious negotiations begin. These negotiations will determine who becomes President, who takes the roles of Speaker in the Amyotha Hluttaw and the Pyithu Hluttaw, and who fills out the cabinet.

There will also be parallel negotiations around a large number of other senior legislative, bureaucratic and judicial appointments, at both local and national levels. Unwinding the legacy of military rule is taking time, and it remains an erratic process.

What we sometimes forget is that the topsy-turvy character of political re-alignment actually helps to build resilience and create opportunities for mutual understanding.

This is apparent in the NLD’s resolve to get involved with Naypyitaw politics. It is also part of the story of the military’s ongoing retreat from direct political management.

On both sides old positions have been watered down, while new chances to get to know each other have emerged. This can get lost in the heightened emotions of an election campaign but it will be a crucial factor as soon as the votes are fully counted.

What it all means is that from today onward there will be no point in expecting everything to flow smoothly. Not only is that unrealistic, but it may not even provide an outcome in the best interests of the Myanmar people.

The fact that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has sat at the same table as Thura U Shwe Mann and U Khin Aung Myint on so many occasions over these recent years needs our attention. She will have to draw on all that experience of dealing with military men if politics in the months ahead is going to work in her favour.

Nicholas Farrelly is director of the Myanmar Research Centre at the Australian National University, a Fellow at the ANU Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs and co-founder of New Mandala.