Southeast Asia’s middle classes and the spectre of authoritarianism - New Mandala

 Southeast Asia’s middle classes and the spectre of authoritarianism - New Mandala
CLAUDIO SOPRANZETTI - 27 MAR, 2018

In 1848, Karl Marx opened his manifesto with an eloquent sentence: “A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of communism.” One hundred and seventy years later, Laos and Vietnam are among the fastest growing economies of twenty-first century capitalism and the Chinese Communist Party plans to abandon the post-Mao doctrine of putting its assembly above any individual leader. Communism, which once materialised so prominently in East Asia, is little more than a faded ghost, haunting no one. Yet another spectre has taken its place in Asia—the spectre of authoritarianism.

Whether in terms of China’s attempts to establish a life-long chairmanship, Philippine’s systematic dismissal of habeas corpus or—as my work Owners of the Map analyses—Thailand’s new forms of constitutional dictatorship, a new wind of authoritarianism is blowing over East Asia. Contrary to existing theories of the “end of history” or of “democratic transition” this wind does not waft against the wish of the middle classes, but rather with their support, and it is not a temporary breeze, destined to died out, but rather a stable wind, one that carries forward an alternative system of governance.

Much has been written on this trend as the result of geo-political, military, and economic push and pull between the patronage of the United States and that of China. These explanations, while important, miss a central element evident to anyone who spends time with office managers, business executives, and traditional elites in Thailand: the growing popularity of authoritarian ideology among local middle class, a popularity that finds its roots in the shifting local meaning of words like corruption, good governance, and rule of law.

During the last decade, the understanding of corruption among Thai middle classes underwent a radical transformation. Corruption today does no longer refer to someone misusing public office for private gain. The word’s semantic universe has expanded to include three major components. Firstly, a traditional understanding of corruption as taking advantage of your position to steal money or gain. Secondly, an idea of moral corruption, related to the intrinsic immoral nature of one’s personality. And, thirdly, a vision of electoral corruption that reframes any redistributive policy favouring the working masses as a form of vote-buying. Under these new meanings, elections themselves become a corrupt practice, one that favours populist leaders who, through policies, gain popular support without necessarily producing “good governance.”

The discourse of good governance itself has become central to Thai middle classes’ ideological flirtations with authoritarianism. This mantra entered the country after the 1997 economic crisis, pushed by the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions understood the concept as a technocratic category, one that mostly meant efficient and transparent governance. In Thailand, however, the concept was translated by conservative political ideologues as thammarat, the governance of Dhamma, transforming good governance into righteous governance, a governance that does not rely on electoral support but rather on alignment with the monarch, the thammaraja.

While these semantic shifts in ideological categories may take local forms, they do not occur in an international vacuum. Previous authoritarian phases in Thailand—particularly the period between 1945 and 1992—had been supported, both economically and ideologically, by the United States and its anti-communist rhetoric. Since the 2014 coup, the junta has been looking to China for similar patronage.

The alignment between the two governments has not just been the result of real politic and shifting international alliances but also rooted in parallel claims about the rule of law and corruption. In 2002, the 16th Chinese Communist Party Congress endorsed a new rhetoric of legalism, as a more efficient system to deal with equal and fair participation. Political scientist Pan Wei, in a famous article that took the shape of a political manifesto for legalism stated that “rule of law directly answers the most urgent need of Chinese society—curbing corruption in times of market economy. Electoral competition for government offices is not an effective way of curbing corruption; it could well lead to the concentration of power in the hands of elected leaders.”

While not as sophisticated as Professor Pan, and not with the same ability to govern as the Chinese Communist Party, the system emerging in Thailand since the 2014 coup looks quite similar: a legalistic system in which non-elected officers create and enforce the law, above and beyond the electoral will of their population. The Thai transition from a polity in which people make the rules through elected parliamentarians to one in which the rules are imposed from above for the people and parliament to follow, has been legitimised on a basic principle: the superiority of unelected “good people” over elected politicians in preventing corruption and establishing good governance.

It would be easy to dismiss these changes has temporary pushbacks. Yet, my work argues, something deeper is changing around Southeast Asia, something that we will not see or understand unless we stop working under preset theories of democratic transition and we engage ethnographically with the shifting landscapes of class alliances, everyday ideologies, and forms of governance. These transformations, in fact, are particularly resistant to quantitative analysis and questionnaires. Often they do not imply the emergence of new terminologies or ideological concepts but rather the re-signification of words like corruption, good governance or rule of law. It is only when we spend long stretch of time with people and participates to their lives that these new meanings emerge.

The risk of failing to see these transformations is a familiar one to people in the US: becoming aware of the emergence of a new political and social order when is too late to do anything about it.

This post first appeared at the University of California Press blog.

Thailand’s 2010 crackdowns: truth for justice | New Mandala

Kwanravee Wangudom - 20 Jun, 2017

On the 7^th anniversary of the 2010 government crackdown on the Red Shirts, People’s Information Center for the April-May 2010 Crackdowns (PIC) has released an English-language edition of its original 1,398-page long fact-finding report, available for free download.

Truth for Justice, the original fact-finding report of the PIC, was published in Thai in 2012, two years after the crackdown on the Red Shirts by the Abhisit Vejjajiva government, which resulted in over 90 deaths and 2,000 injuries. The report came out amidst growing criticisms towards the workings of the two major fact-finding bodies: the government-initiated Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand (TRCT), headed by Kanit Na Nakorn; and the controversial National Human Rights Commission, chaired by Amara Pongsapich.

The aim of the PIC original fact-finding report is to document what occurred in the crackdown. PIC believes that this is the first step to ending the deeply-entrenched culture of impunity in Thailand.

The English-language edition, consisting of six selected chapters from the original report, with added clarifications, is produced in the hope that it will stimulate a wider global discussion on truth, justice and reconciliation in the deeply-divided Thai society, and perhaps elsewhere.

To access the PIC original fact-finding report (in Thai), click here.

For the English-language edition, please follow this link.

Bombs, facts, and myths in southern Thailand | New Mandala

Bombs, facts, and myths in southern Thailand | New Mandala
Anders Engvall, 13 AUG, 2016 

Truth shouldn’t also be a casualty after Thailand’s 10-12 August bombings. 

It is no surprise that Thai authorities go out of their way to rule out Malay-Muslim separatists as potential perpetrators of the string of bombs in the upper south on 10-12 August. It is after all what they always do.

It is more surprising that several experts make similar claims based on myths about the southern Thai conflict, while disregarding equally important facts about recent events in the border provinces.

Fact: southern militants launched a sustained bombing campaign timed to the referendum.

The first 10 days of August saw 50 bomb attacks in the southern border provinces. To make it clear that the violence was related to the 7 August referendum, the insurgents also sprayed anti-constitution graffiti in 18 locations.

This might have helped to sway public opinion in the south against the constitution and contributing to voters in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat rejecting the draft referendum.

Source: Deep South Incident Database.

While southern militants were busy placing an average of five bombs a day, no other anti-government groups resorted to violence during this period. This should make the southern militants key suspects if the August 10-12 bombings in the upper south is indeed related to the passing of the junta backed constitution.

Myth: Southern militants don’t target tourists.

Contrary to common claims, the southern insurgents have a history of directly targeting tourists. High profile events include the bomb at Lee Garden hotel in Hat Yai killing several foreigners and injuring more than 400, an earlier bomb at Hat Yai airport, the bomb at the central shopping mall on Koh Samui in April last year, and numerous bombs against entertainment venues frequented by Malaysian tourists in the seedy border towns Sungai Kolok, Sadao and Betong.

Myth: Southern militants don’t act outside the southern border provinces.

In addition to the Koh Samui blast last year, two bombs in 2013 was linked to southern separatist groups. First the bombing in front ofRamkhamhaeng University in Bangkok in May and then a foiled car bomb at a the Phuket Town police station at the end of the year.

While it is true that the vast majority of the violence has been concentrated to the southern border provinces, the separatist groups do not lack capacity to carry out bombings in tourist areas in the upper south.

Southern Thailand was rocked by a total of 63 bombs during 1-13 August. Focusing only on the 13 explosives targeting the upper south during the latter part of the period, while disregarding the 50 events in the southernmost border provinces, clearly plays into the hands of Thai authorities.

At this point there is no conclusive evidence pointing to a single group behind recent bombs in the upper south. Thai authorities have mobilised the full force of their propaganda machinery to convince their citizens and the international community that southern separatist groups had nothing to do with the bombs targeting foreign tourists.

The role of analysts and researchers should be to question the official line and not to repeat baseless claims about the character of the southern insurgency.

Anders Engvall is a research fellow at Stockholm School of Economics and research advisor to the Deep South Incident Database at Deep South Watch in Pattani, Thailand. 

Thai blasts a wake up call for peace? | New Mandala

Thai blasts a wake up call for peace? | New Mandala
Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat, 14 AUG, 2016

Coordinated bombings, Thailand’s southern conflict and a stalled peace process.

If the recent coordinated attacks in Thailand’s Upper South, which claimed four lives and injured 36, were carried out by southern militants, the next important question is to what extent it would affect the Thai state’s policies towards the ongoing violent resistance in Thailand’s Malay Muslim-majority southernmost region.

While I agree with most independent analysts that these attacks are more likely to be linked to domestic groups rather than transnational terrorist networks such as the Islamic State, I am more convinced that the motive is related to the southern conflict rather than national politics. There are at least three reasons for this hypothesis – I stress that it remains a hypothesis.

First, while most of the southern militants’ operations remain to be in the southernmost provinces, it would be misleading to think that they have neither capacity nor interest in expanding their reach to other parts of the country. The insurgents, who consider themselves as juwae (a Patani Malay word for fighter), have previous records of carrying out violent attacks outside their traditional theatre of operation, which I noted in an article on New Mandala last year.

In December 2013, they made a failed bombing attempt in Phuket together with a series of successful bombings in Songkhla’s Sadao district injuring 27 people. In April last year, another car bomb went off in the underground car park of a major shopping mall in the southern resort island of Samui, wounding 10 people and damaging several vehicles.

During that time, the military government was quick to blame “the old powerful clique” and paid little attention to police investigation that pointed to the contrary. Two Malay Muslims were later prosecuted in connection to the Samui bombing. According to police, two pick-up trucks transformed into car bombs in Narathiwat and Songkhla during this year’s Ramadan were used in the Sumui operation.

As I was monitoring reactions from the Thai authorities following the recent bombings, I had a sense of déjà vu. General Prawit Wongsuwan, deputy prime minister and defense minister, hastily ruled out the possibility of southern militants’ involvement without waiting to see police investigation results.

While the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front, or BRN) has the strongest military capability, it should be noted that other groups have tried to gain attention by carrying out attacks outside the southernmost region. In a recent interview with this author, leaders of Patani United Liberation Organisation-MKP (PULO-MKP) admitted that the group was responsible for the bombing in Bangkok’s Ramkhamhaeng area on 26 May 2013, which injured seven people.

PULO-MKP was not involved in the 2013 peace dialogue under the Yingluck Shinawatra government and such attack was meant to display its military capacity. In May this year, Criminal Court sentenced four Malay Muslims men to 33 years and four months for their involvement in that bombing.

Second, the choice of targets is in line with the BRN’s strategies – areas of economic significance and “sinful” activities, that are also symbols of the security force. Most of the selected areas are major tourist attractions, such as Phuket, Hua Hin, Khao Lak and Krabi. Shopping malls, discount stores, and shops also represent hubs of economic activity.

In particular, three attacks in Phuket took place near Patong beach, which is popularly known to be a centre of nightlife activities. Two bombings in Hua Hin took place at a bar and massage house on a busy nightlife lane. Southern militants consider entertainment venues offering sex services, covertly or otherwise, as “sinful” and therefore they are a legitimate target of attacks.

Bombs were also left near places symbolising the power of the security forces, including a traffic police outpost, police’s traffic light control booth, a police station and office of marine police.

The bombings carried out by southern insurgents are often not meant to maximise casualties. It is also common for the BRN not to make any claims for its military operations.

It should be noted that while some Westerners were wounded in the recent bombings, the insurgents have not particularly targeted them. However, a small number of foreign tourists, mostly Malaysians, fell victim to previous bombings such as in Hat Yai and the Thai-Malaysian border town of Sungai Golok.

Third, improvised explosive devices (IED) found in these attacks have been used extensively by southern insurgents for the past 12 years. The type of bomb material is different from that of the deadly Erawan Bombing in August last year, which used a tightly‐controlled military explosive (TNT or C-4) killing 20 people and injuring 125.

It was later revealed that the Erawan bombing was triggered by the dissatisfaction with the Thai government’s forced repatriation of Muslim Uighurs to China. Some suspect the Red Shirts or other anti-military groups. Although there have previously been cases of disgruntled individuals who take matters into their own hands and resort to violence, their attempt to plant bombs were amateurish.

The Patani liberation movements are not totally out of Thai politics but rather stand on the periphery. The juwae did not miss the opportunity to express their rejection of the referendum and the draft charter. A few days before the poll, anti-constitution graffiti, such as “Constitution X” “Referendum X”, were sprayed in several locations in the Deep South.

“Vote No” was dominant in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, whereas the overwhelming majority of voters in other southern provinces voted to support the constitution and an additional question that would allow the military to have significant power in post-election politics.

The referendum result in the Deep South manifests deep resentment against the military/the Thai state as well as the rejection of the charter content, particularly the emphasis on the protection of Theravada Buddhism and the end of state subsidies for high school education. It was unclear to what extent the voters’ decision was influenced by the underground movements.

If the juwae were the perpetrators, these attacks might indicate a significant strategic shift. These bombings have received a great deal of national and international media coverage. Attacks of a similar scale in the Deep South would gain much less attention these days. This might be an incentive to shift their strategies.

If this hypothesis is true, this would be the biggest coordinated bombings to be staged outside their traditional theatre of violence in term of geographical coverage and casualty. It would post a serious security challenge with potentially huge economic implications for the Thai state.

These bombings took place amid the stalled peace dialogue between the military government and MARA Patani, an umbrella group comprising representatives of five liberation groups, including the Patani Islamic Liberation Front (BIPP), Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP), PULO-DSPP, PULO-MKP and some BRN members.

Despite the involvement of mid-level BRN members, its Dewan Pimpinan Parti (Party Leadership Council –DPP) has not formally joined MARA Patani. A senior BRN member told the author that the DPP is waiting to see if the military government is serious about the dialogue.

Talks have hit a snag since Party A (Thai Government) refused to endorse the Terms of Reference that the technical team had jointly drafted with Party B (MARA Patani/People with Different Opinions from the State).

Two major sticking points are that the government does not want the name of MARA Patani mentioned in the terms of reference and is unwilling to guarantee “protection from prosecution” for Party B.

Party A recently sent a totally new draft with the name MARA Patani removed and no mention of any safeguard against prosecution if Party B, which is only defined as “People with Different Opinions from the State”, travels to Thailand. MARA Patani has not responded.

The southern militants have spoken through violence for the past 12 years. The formalised peace dialogue only began in 2013 and has made little progress. The violence on the eve of the 84th birthday of Queen Sirikit and on National Mother’s Day clearly intends to express a strong symbolic challenge against the Thai state, of which the monarchy is placed at its apex.

Heavy-handed suppression and cooptation through social and economic incentives have failed to put an end to the violent resistance calling for self-determination. Intensifying crackdowns would only be counterproductive.

This might be a wake-up call for Bangkok to pay serious attention to the peace dialogue.

Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat is a PhD candidate at the Australian National University’s Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs. She formerly worked as an analyst for the International Crisis Group.

Two suspects in Thailand’s blasts | New Mandala

Two suspects in Thailand’s blasts | New Mandala
Zachary Abuza, 13 AUG, 2016

The latest bombings and arson attacks in Thailand are most likely to be the actions of Malay insurgents or radical Red Shirts, writes Zachary Abuza. 

Between 10 and 12 August, Thailand was rocked by a string of 14 IED attacks across eight provinces in its upper south.

Four people were killed and 33 wounded, including 10 Western tourists. Authorities defused two of the 14 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed at the tourist destination on 10 August, but never made this public until after the other bombings. Police also found one other suspicious object, but have not commented on whether it was an IED. To date no one or group has claimed responsibility.

In addition, there were five separate suspicious fires — possibly arson attacks in Phang Nga, Krabi, Trang, Surat Thani and Nakorn Sri Thamarat that destroyed markets, a Tesco Lotus, and other buildings. Police are investigating whether these were straight up arsons or caused by incendiary IEDs, that are frequently seen in the south. All of these arsons occurred between 02:15 and 08:00 and intended to minimise casualties.

Many of the IEDs were “double tap”, going off in quick succession. And yet the casualty rate was relatively low. Four IEDs caused no casualties.

The IEDs were relatively small. Almost all were detonated by cell phones. While they are similar to IEDs found in Thailand’s Deep South, where an insurgency has been ongoing since 2004, that says nothing. There are only so many ways to make an IED, and the bomb-making plans are readily available online.

The five locales for the IEDs were tourist areas. But the size, design and placement of the devices was clearly not intended to maximise casualties. They were designed to send a message.

The question is from whom? There are plenty of suspects. There is no evidence that this was an external terrorist group, such as ISIS or even Uighur extremists responsible for the August 2015 Erawan Shrine bombing in Bangkok.

This was domestically orchestrated, which leaves two suspects: Malay insurgents or radical red shirts or other regime opponents. Both have their motives to discredit the military regime at this time.

Suspect one: Malay insurgentsThe insurgency is now in its 13th year, and has reached a stalemate. Peace talks with the military are going absolutely no where. The goal of the Thai army is clearly to degrade the insurgency and get violence to a low enough level that they can attribute it to criminality, and thus have no need to make any meaningful concessions at the negotiating table.

Violence in 2016 is clearly down, as it was in 2015. The average monthly death toll is currently just under 13, a third of what it was in 2009. Since the start of 2009, the monthly average number of casualties in the south has been 81. But since the May 2014 coup, it has fallen to 49.

It’s been years since the insurgents have been able to pull off large-scale coordinated attacks across multiple cities and provinces, and even when they have, its always been confined to the three-and-a-half provinces of the Deep South: Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani and parts of Songkhla. Out of area attacks such as Koh Samui in 2015 have been one-off attacks.

They do like to hit tourist venues, but they have been “out of area” while remaining “in area”. They hit tourist venues for Malaysians, such as Sungai Golok, Betong, Hat Yai, and Sadao, where there are few if any Westerners. These are all on the periphery of their claimed territory. And even attacks in these places have been quite limited. Insurgents are clearly aware that a major attack on a tourist venue would ultimately be counterproductive.

Technically the Malay insurgents have the capacity to do these attacks. Insurgents routinely use double tap IEDs, though in a more sophisticate away to target first responders. Insurgents, likewise, have never claimed responsibility for any attacks. The question is if they have the logistic ability to pull it off. While I have my doubts, it is worth noting that the extensive network of checkpoints in the Deep South could actually make out of area attacks easier to perpetrate.

I should note that much of the evidence regarding the bombings in Sadao, Betong, Hat Yai and Koh Samui suggest that these were carried out by hardline cells frustrated at either the pace and scope of the insurgency or the peace process itself.

The April 2015 Koh Samui bombing was clearly intended to send a signal, not kill people. The junta tried to false flag the attack on Red Shirts, and it was not until June 2015 that charges were actually filed against insurgents.

And with the peace talks stalled and the new charter that completely precludes any type of regional autonomy, there is plenty of reason to suspect some insurgents have decided that it is time to escalate the violence to get the junta’s attention. They have an incentive to remind the junta the costs to not negotiating.

The Deep South was one of only three regions that overwhelmingly rejected the charter in the referendum, in addition to the Red Shirt bastions in Issarn and the North. There is clearly antipathy for any continued military hold on power and their current policies towards the Malay region. Don’t forget that in the days before and of the referendum, there were 35 IEDs across the Deep South, a time of heightened security.

The junta blamed the fact that 60 per cent of the voters in the Deep South rejected the charter on the fact that they were “intimidated and pressured by the insurgency group.” The government was clueless that the charter gives no hope for devolution of power and autonomy, while pushing Buddhist nationalism on a community fighting for its identity.

If the attacks were perpetrated by the insurgents it would be both unprecedented and suggest a sharp shift in their strategy.

Suspect two: radical Red ShirtsThere is also plenty of reason to suspect radical political opponents of the military regime. That the bombings occurred on the eve and day of the Queen’s birthday, a national holiday, seems designed to discredit the military, who have justified most everything they have done — as self serving as it usually is — in the name of defending the monarchy.

The military’s continued hold on power is, in their own words, necessary to maintain peace and security. Clearly the scope of bombings discredits them. It reiterates the concern that security forces are so focused on peaceful protestors and activists against the junta, that they have dropped the ball on thwarting bonafide security threats.

The location of the attacks is interesting for another reason. The upper south region voted in very high margins in the 7 August referendum for the draft charter that will perpetuate military rule indefinitely.

With the restrictions on campaigning against the referendum, including up to 10-year jail terms, restricting open discussion and coercing voters, the referendum was truly shambolic. And many radicals opposed to the military see no alternatives but extralegal means to challenge the military.

And that could explain the choice of targets. All the bombing locales were in tourist destinations. Yet, none of the bombs was really meant to kill a lot of people. Even the physical damage they did was limited, according to these photos. They were intended to do harm to the tourist economy.

The junta has convinced itself that its rule is legitimate following the referendum. That is something I would challenge, seeing that they only won 61 per cent of 55 per cent of the electorate who bothered to turn up — that is, only 34 per cent of possible votes. Most independent analysts see the charter as having done little to reconcile the country’s deep divisions.

But the junta remains very vulnerable in terms of their stewardship of the economy. Foreign direct investment plummeted last year and exports are anemic. The Wall Street Journal politely described the economy as “underperforming.”

Tourism accounts for 10 per cent of the economy and is a critical cash cow. Even among their core supporters, the junta’s economic management has been their achilles’ heel. The referendum has done little to convince the business community or international investors that it will be smooth sailing ahead.

So who did it?I really don’t know. I could argue it either way as both groups have a clear motive. Thai authorities claim that they have two people in custody, linked to the first two defused IEDs in Phuket. But they have provided no additional information as yet.

It is important that we brace for another politically motivated and incompetent investigation, as we happened following the Erawan Shrine bombing, when a shocking number of leads went un-investigated. To this day, there are far more questions about that devastating attack than answers.

The junta is likely to follow suit this time around. As a junta spokesman said, “This is not a terrorist attack. It is just local sabotage that is restricted to limited areas and provinces.”

But the attacks do discredit the regime whose legitimacy is far shakier than they care to admit.

The junta seemed awfully smug after the referendum. These attacks are a reminder of how divisive the military really is, and how far they really need to go to address the deep cleavages with both political opponents of the regime, and ethnic Malay.

And while I am not sure who perpetrated the attacks, I am certain of one thing: the junta will likely double down in its divisive and self-serving policies, rather than address legitimate and core grievances of large sectors of society.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College where he focuses on Southeast Asian politics and security.

Decades of dominance and a junta’s demise | New Mandala

Decades of dominance and a junta’s demise | New Mandala
Dr James L Taylor, 11 AUG, 2016

Thailand’s referendum has installed the military junta for the long haul. But could it also be their undoing? 

The result is out; it is back to 1978.

No surprises. Now the junta can gloat over its inevitable, foregone conquest and lecture the Western world about minding its own business, which they were quick to do after the win.

As one Thai person told me: “Well, maybe Thais now have the democracy they deserve!”

The suppression of free speech and critical debate around the referendum are well known, even begrudgingly among normally ‘yellow’ influenced Bangkok-based journalists.

It was clear that Thais were not given the details about the draft constitution, except those parts deemed suitable for public propaganda, and critiques of the draft were forbidden. Massive more-unpalatable sections of the translated version were left out.

If those sycophantic voters for the military’s constitution had no idea of the implication of their “yes” vote, in the not-too-distant-future they may soon think twice .

But the masses were never given the truth and many people continued to believe in the military-elite’s feel-good iron-fist nationalism. It all reminds me a little of a less tame version of Brexit.

That aside, more seriously, information from regional sources such as the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) indicates that the numbers were stacked at some crucial ballot centres, there were many more ballots that actual registered voters.

In one Bangkok district, for instance, there were 298 people coming to vote on the day and 335 ballots. There were no witnesses allowed at the ballot stations when the counting was carried out. (For a good summary see Prachatai).

It was reported (unofficially) that there were many more ballots that actual registered voters. In one Bangkok district for instance there were 298 people coming to vote on the day but 335 ballots counted. There were no witnesses allowed at the ballot stations when the counting was carried out.

It also appears that the kingdom was clearly divided along ancient divisions, with “Lanchang” (and the Northeast Region generally), Lanna (North) and Pattani, voting “no”, while the mid-southern (the PDRC stronghold) and central region voting “yes”.

But all may be not lost, despite the prospect of decades of dominant and repressive military rule ahead, and little chance of being able to amend the constitution – with the charter enshrining military ineffective coalition “governments”, unelected prime ministers, appointed senates, and so on.

At least this is the view of some red shirt leaders, such as exiled founder of the Organisation of Free Thai Network, Jakrapob Penkair (7 August 2016). He noted that the result was inevitable, “knowing the nature” of the amaat regime. But, he also outlined a few reasons for some optimism among all the gloom saying that the consequence of the new constitution will show to the world the true nature of the military-royal alliance and power.

The result will also encourage the pro-democracy (red) activists to reconcile as they have split into two primary factions over the past decade or so: the electoral faction and the revolutionary faction. While the electoral faction wanted elections quickly, the so-called revolutionary side ridiculed them (“revolutionary” in the sense of rhetoric not action).

Both sides he noted now need each other to establish a unified ideology and action, so as to bring power to the democracy movement. He said that the revolutionary faction did not understand the constraints that the previous elected governments were under, in the gaze of the amaat regime. These elected governments since 2005 had to work on the surface within the established legal framework. They had no real power to make lasting progressive changes being blocked at every turn.

Jakrapob noted that the situation now will enable a unified and systematic approach to bringing about democracy, liberty and rights in the coming decades.  But do not hold your breath — it will be a long-term project.

Meanwhile, the evidence has been mounting about massive military corruption since the last coup, despite attempts to silence critics. The military junta takes a page from boxing, where the best form of defence is attack.

In regard to the politicised notion of getting rid of “kong” (cheating) or corruption, Jakrapob said let the military regime continue with their propaganda until the “san phra phum” eventually falls (literally “spirit house”, but an illusion to monarchy).

When we reach that time the truth will shock the nation from trivial matters such as which subordinates under “higher ups” are selling the soil of Parliament House at 300 Baht per square metre(a budget was allocated to build a new Parliament House), to bigger matters — including who owns the PTT Public Company Limited? Who benefits? Who is the real owner of Temasek Holdings?

Who is behind stopping the construction of the Kra Isthmus Canal (an economic opportunity always stopped)? And who is behind extensive real estate interests, taking land from the people which makes it hard to undertake effective land reform?

These are the people who are actually cheating the nation and yet no one dares to challenge this. Therefore, it is good that the military’s constitution puts “kong” in the charter, so that one day we can use this to expose the nation’s real cheats.

This is similar to the great Ayutthaya poet Sri Prat who said that the owner of the sword will eventually kill themselves with their own weapon. This time we are defeated in the game, but not in the battle with the regime (rabob).

But now that Thailand has now slipped back in time one thing is clear — this generation and possibly the next will have to continue the struggle for democracy.

Dr James L Taylor is Adjunct Associate Professor, Anthropology & Development Studies, University of Adelaide.

A vicious cycle of coups and constitutions | New Mandala

A vicious cycle of coups and constitutions | New Mandala

David Camroux, 06 AUG, 2016

Thailand has been searching for an appropriate form of government for more than 80 years. It’s unlikely to find one this Sunday when the country votes on a contentious new constitution.

At first glance, there may be something unique in the Thai military junta seeking to have its action and program legitimised through approval by referendum of a somewhat undemocratic constitution. Yet, in other ways — from a long-, medium- and short-term perspective — this is in continuity with the political trajectory of modern Thailand since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932.

Thailand’s second military coup in 1932 succeeded where the first of 1912 failed because the military leader, Phibun Songram, allied himself with a Western-educated liberal (and republican?), Pribi Banamyong, to found a political party, the People’s Party, giving a democratic veneer to his play for power.

However, within this duumvirate the contradiction between two sources of legitimate rule remained unresolved: one was new, namely representative democracy through the ballot box, and the other linked to the ancien regime, that of the rule of virtuous men. Seen within the longue durée the last 84 years can be described as the search for an appropriate mode of governance for the Thai nation.

This situation is not unusual. After all, it was only some 80 or so years after the French Revolution with the founding of the Third Republic that a return to absolute monarchical rule became unthinkable.

What, nevertheless, as explained by Chai-Anan Samudavanija, is unique in the Thai case is that 1932 was first in the vicious circles of coups, interim constitutions, permanent (sic) constitutions, elections, protests leading to further coups. The last coup of May 2014 was the sixth in this series.

The draft constitution proposed for approval in the referendum on 7 August will be the 21st or 22nd since 1932 — something of a world record. However when constitutions, with an average shelf-life of approximately four years, are treated as disposable nappies, is it any wonder that the notion itself of a constitutional order and the rule of law in Thailand becomes problematic, a situation exacerbated by the politicisation of independent referring bodies such as the Supreme Court.

The referendum of 7 August is an attempt to show that this time, this constitution is really permanent. Alas, unlike the People’s Constitution of 1997 (the most transparent and progressive) which was the result of public debate and the fruit of a largely representative Constituent Assembly, this second draft has not been the subject of debate. Nor, more importantly, is there a sense of ‘ownership’ even, it would appear, among those in Bangkok such as in the Democrat Party, who supported the military coup of 2014.

If this is the case why is the military even bothering to organise the referendum?

Here we enter a number of mid-term considerations. In organising the referendum, the military regime is attempting to draw from the lessons learned from the 2006 coup that overthrew Thaksin Shinawatra.

From the military perspective in 2006 they failed to consolidate and legitimise their control, for within a year after the promulgation of yet another constitution Thaksin’s party under another name, and with his sister Yingluck as Prime Minister, was back in government.

This time around General Prayuth Chan-ocha is taking no chances.

Included in the draft provisions are that for the first five years, the present governing National Council for Peace and Order selects nearly all members of the upper house including six seats reserved for the security forces and that a non-lower house member can become Prime Minister. Furthermore, future military intervention will be legalised in advance.

Moreover, as Allen Hicken has explained, introducing multi-member constituencies will mean it will be very difficult for one political party to have a majority of seats in the lower house. As Jim Glassman has shown, from the royalist-nationalist perspective one of the “evils” of the 1997 Constitution was that it led, for the first time in Thai history, to a party, Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai having a majority in parliament in its own right.

The new draft will mean a return to the status quo ante (the quiet before the war) of weak coalition governments allowing the public service with their military and business compradors the maximum political space.

Finally, from a short-term perspective, the referendum can be seen as an exercise in political theatre to bide Thailand over as it enters a period of potential turmoil with an impending royal succession.

The royalist-nationalist establishment is in a bind of its own making. Having elevated the monarchy to the position as the keystone of the Thai nation it now must cope with the unthinkable: the Crown Prince, as recent images emanating from Munich attest, appears manifestly unfit to take on the mantle of the dhammaraja to be bequeathed by his father, King Bhumibol.

To conclude, it is questionable whether Thai voters will effectively disenfranchise themselves, given that the draft constitution will mean the creation of a largely appointed parliament and legal prerogatives for the military to continually intervene in Thai political life.

Even if a constitutional draft – that is not only opposed by the two main political parties, Pheu Thai and the Democrats, but on which no political debate has been allowed – receives majority support among those Thais who bother to vote, it is doubtful whether this will provide the Thai military junta and part of the royal-nationalist elite with the democratic unction it seeks.

On the contrary, the referendum will not be a celebration of national unity but one that glosses over the regional, class and ideological divisions within the kingdom.

These I suspect will come to the fore with the death of King Bhumibol and once the painful moment of the royal succession comes, as it inevitably must.

David Camroux is a resident Senior Associate at the Centre for International Studies, Sciences Po in Paris and, from 1 September, Professorial Fellow at the Vietnam National University, Hanoi.