The King is (nearly) dead: long live the King? | New Mandala

The King is (nearly) dead: long live the King? | New Mandala
Llewellyn McCann, 16 JUN 2016

Llewellyn McCann explores what the royal succession will mean for Thai elite politics.

On 9 June 2016, Thailand celebrated the 70th anniversary of the accession to the throne by Bhumipol Adulyadej.  It was a celebration by both the ultra-monarchists and those who had to go through the motions. Conveniently scrubbed from royal history and public discourse (especially with the abuse of lèse majesté laws) is how he ascended the throne, almost certainly having accidentally killed his brother Ananda in 1946.

Almost all Thais have lived under Bhumipol’s reign, and benefitted from the transformation of the country from a poor developing agrarian society with 67 percent poverty in 1986 to a $390 billion economy with a poverty rate of only 11 percent in 2014, though one that is clearly underperforming since the 2014 coup d’etat.  Criticism of the monarch has grown, but during his reign, Thailand was transformed from a subsistence agrarian economy to a middle income.  Peasants have become the aspirational middle class, setting the stage for the country’s ongoing political conflict.

Missing from the paeans was Bhumipol, who was too ill to make a public appearance.  The media often speaks of the societal unease regarding his imminent passing.  But this is overstated.  The King has spent the last year living in Siriraj Hospital, and just underwent angioplasty surgery.  While not a serious procedure anymore, it is on an 88-year-old man who has spent almost all of the past five years confined to a hospital and has recently been treated for water on the brain and lung infections.

While the yellow shirted ultra-royalists prostrated themselves, most Thais went on with their lives with only cursory notice of the anniversary.  The reality is the monarchy means less to average Thais than it did in the past for three key reasons:

First, the King has largely been out of their lives for the past five years, if not more.

Second, while journalists often phrase it as the Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn “not enjoying the same levels of support for his father,” the reality is he commands almost no respect from society.  The moral authority and legitimacy of the monarchy will plummet, and as such, so will its importance in the lives of ordinary Thais.

Third, there is growing fatigue of the political upheavals done in his name, including coups in 2006 and 2014, and the rampant abuse of the lèse majesté law and Computer Crimes Act.  In the two years following the coup, 68 people have been charged with lèse majesté(Art. 112 of the Criminal Code).  If the monarchy is as revered as Thai ultra-royalists and the military say it is, then why must it be so vigorously defended by draconian laws?  A robust monarchy could handle criticism, whether in principle or satire.

So why is the King’s passing so important?  I outlined why here, and a year later the points largely stand.  There are, however, a few aspects that take into account events of the past year.

First and foremost, the succession is about Thai elite politics. The May 2014 coup was thrown, in large part, in order to control the succession.  Neither the military nor the ultra-monarchists could fathom the Pheu Thai under direct, or even indirect, control of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to be in power during the transition.  The political instability was simply their justification to seize power, which they show no sign of relinquishing, now in the third year of military rule.

We know there were rifts between the junta, led by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha, and the ultra-monarchists, led by Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda.  Under the 1924 Palace Law, which predates the establishment of the constitutional monarchy in 1932, the 63-year-old Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn should ascend the throne as the male heir. The ultra-monarchists cannot countenance the Crown Prince be-spoiling the institution of the monarchy.  Despite desperate attempts to clean up his image and make him appear more kingly, his reputation will be a hard one to whitewash.

Despite early and regular signals by Prem and the Privy Council that the Crown Prince is unfit to rule and a peril to the institution of the monarchy, Prem seems to have acquiesced to the reality that he will become the King and has made tepid endorsements. Very tepid in fact, such as showing up for the start of the 16 August 2015 Bike for Mom event led by the spandex-clad Crown Prince, and organized by the Royal Thai Army (RTA).  And the Crown Prince, for his part, has made efforts to patch up the relationship with Prem and the ultras to ensure his succession. In December 2014, he divorced his wife Princess Srirasmi  – whom royalist elites called a “bar girl” – and cut their son out of the line of succession.  At the same time allowed her parents, three brothers, and members of her extended family to be convicted of lese majeste and sentenced to three to five year prison terms.

Prem probably still views the Crown Prince as an existential threat to the wealth, power and privilege of the ultra-monarchists, but their ability to orchestrate Crown Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn’s ascension to the throne is limited.  Although the Privy Council does have constitutional prerogative to influence the succession, the only part of the 2007 constitution that is currently still in force, following the 22 May 2014 coup, is Chapter II, the section on the monarchy that was incorporated into Chapter I of the draft constitution released in April 2015 in toto.  Chapter I, Section 22 states clearly: “succession to the Throne shall be in accordance with the Palace Law on Succession, B.E. 2467.” In Section 23, if the King has appointed his successor, the Council of Ministers submits the name to the National Assembly for endorsement.  The appointed National Legislative Assembly (NLA) is dominated by military, serving and retired officers. It’s just hard to see them voting against Prayut and the junta on this issue.

It is still likely that Prem and the Privy Council will try to use their influence to at least delay the forwarding of the name to the NLA by calling for an “extended period of mourning” upon the Kings passing; that in itself would weaken Vajiralongkorn’s legitimacy.  But getting the NLA to support Sirindhorn’s ascension or at the least her regency over the Crown Prince’s infant son, born to his fourth wife, is looking increasingly unlikely.  Prem himself is less visible, which is no surprise at age 95.

The single most important reason that Prayut and the RTA are lining up behind the Crown Prince, is not the Constitution (for which they have proven to have no regard for), or their love of the King, in whose name they shamelessly cling to power.  It is about the protection of the military’s and ultra-monarchists’ long-term power, wealth and privilege.  Prayut and the RTA respect the Crown Princess and probably agree that she would serve their interests well.  The RTA made a huge show and diverted resources from their royal adoration budget, which increased by 20% following the coup to US$536 million in 2015, to celebrate her 6th Cycle.

Ultimately for the junta, it is ultimately about stability and political order.

Despite the draft constitution that has done everything it can to strip power away from political parties and elected politicians while empowering the military and non-elected elites including provisions for a non-elected prime minister and military oversight for the following five years, there is strong evidence that the Pheu Thai party will continue to be the predominant political party.  No credible and independent analysis of the draft constitution believes it to be workable charter that will lead to the return of civilian politics, free of military interference.  Indeed, most analysis believes that the charter will lead to years and years of prolonged political strife and deep and societal cleavages.  That the military will not even allow a public debate over the draft charter ahead of the planned 7 August referendum, is telling.

The junta’s claims that it has brought reconciliation or political stability is ludicrous.  Things are calm on the surface because of restrictions on the media and civil society.   According to ILaw, in the two years following the May 2014 coup d’état, 926 were summoned – errr “invited” – to report to the military for “discussions,” 527 have been arrested, 47 have been charged under the Sedition Law, and 167 civilians have been tried in military courts with no right of appeal.    The tempo of political persecutions has been increasing. In April 2016 alone, four people were summonsed to meet with the RTA, 10 were arrested for peaceful demonstrations, three people were arrested for lese majeste, and nine people were tried in military courts.  The military regime is brittle.

The junta believes that the Crown Prince can be managed.  Or to look at it another way, they truly fear what the Crown Prince is capable of should he be passed over;  and here we do not need to revisit the long history of business interests and other ties between Thaksin and the Crown Prince.  There is evidence that the Crown Prince was pressured to break those ties, but if the Crown Prince is passed over, he would have significant grievances with the ultra-monarchist elites.  More importantly, he would have a potential ally in Thaksin Shinawatra.  Though less public since Thaksin’s ouster, the two have met on at least one occasion, and both have a well-founded dislike of the ultra-monarchist elites and military.

There is only one way back for Thaksin, both physically, but also politically and financially: a royal pardon.  He needs the Crown Prince on the throne.  As King he could pardon Thaksin and there is absolutely nothing that the military and the ultra-royalist elites could do to prevent this.

Why would he do this? Simple, the crown prince enjoys little popular support and Thaksin’s endorsement would do much to bolster his legitimacy.  As much as Thaksin needs him, he needs Thaksin.  Moreover, as the RTA has proven disingenuous with their attempts at national reconciliation, the new King could possibly force just that in attempt to quickly broaden his legitimacy, and demonstrate his independence from his military handlers.

This is what causes the greatest fear in Prem and the ultras, and the military is obviously trying to prevent this alliance from happening.  That is why Prayut is working so hard to slavishly court the Crown Prince, ride behind him on his bicycle rides, and try to cut off any questions about the Crown Prince ascending the throne.  The RTA believes that the Crown Prince can be managed, and that they can convince him that pardoning Thaksin would usher in a new wave of political instability.

And if the Crown Prince, i.e. Thaksin’s get out of jail card is passed over, then the fugitive prime minister has no reason to hold back his Red Shirt supporters.  Since the 2014 coup, Thaksin has maintained a low profile and called on his supporters to work with the junta.  This is the real reason that there was less violence following the coup than predicted. Yes, the military has cracked down and systematically upended all human rights protections, but Thaksin also ordered the Red Shirts to stand down as he tried to negotiate a grand bargain for himself and his sister, Yingluck.  While we cannot fall into the military’s trap of thinking that Thaksin and the Red Shirts are one in the same, as they have different agendas and interests, he has clearly held them back in the past two years, trying to give the junta enough rope to hang themselves.

Finally, the military needs to win over the Crown Prince for the very fact that they are clearly planning to stage continued interventions in civilian politics.  They are trying to do this “legally.”  The draft charter, for example, gives the military several avenues to control democratic politics. It will be able to appoint the members of the 250 man senate, with six ex officio positions for the military chiefs, who in turn can appoint the prime minister.  The appointed upper house will have additional appointment and vetting powers, and will be able to check the independent law-making responsibilities of the elected lower house, including constitutional amendments.  The military will lead another unelected body, the National Reform Steering Assembly, responsible for the defining and vetting public policies, including the junta’s “roadmap” to democracy as well as a 20-year national development plan.  The draft charter gives the military sweeping powers in pursuit of law and order, without any accountability, undermining the rule of law.  As one thoughtful analysis recently put it:

The draft Thai charter adds far-reaching discretionary limitations on rights and liberties that fall outside the strict letter of the constitution, as long as any restrictive measures imposed accord with the rule of law. While a limitation of this kind would be exceptional in any context, it is doubly striking and problematic in Thailand, where the concept of the rule of law is imprecisely defined, subject to broad interpretation, and historically vulnerable to manipulation and abuse.

As if all of these powers are not enough, the military is prepared to launch another coup d’etat.  This is what makes the monarchy so indispensable to the military: an extra legal seizure of power becomes legal with the King’s endorsement, just as Bhumipol did in 2014. Without that endorsement, it’s treason.  What if the new King doesn’t sign off on extra-legal actions or fails to endorse a constitution that all objective commentators view as destabilizing?

But it is also about the military’s own purview.  The new King will almost definitely appoint a new 18 person Privy Council, people loyal to him.  He will keep few if any of the current members (and many would refuse to serve under him). The Privy Council sits atop what Duncan McCargo refers to as the “network monarchy” and has vast power, whether through patronage ties through the judiciary, over the Crown Property Bureau that oversees $30-40 billion in assets, but also the military.

The Privy Council formally forwards the names of all flag officers to the King for endorsement. While the military has tried to put itself beyond accountability to civilian politicians under the new charter (budgets and promotions), it still has to account to the monarchy, via the Privy Council, and that is important for Thailand’s nearly 1,100 flag officers. The Crown Prince, who holds the rank of Air Chief Marshall, will promote a cadre of generals loyal to himself. Here the new King, should he chose, could thwart the power and the influence of the Eastern Tigers, who have dominated the Thai military politics and staged the 2006 and 2014 coups.  The new King could completely alter the seeding of protégés that Prayut has overseen to maintain his influence.

The generals have painted themselves into a corner and their legitimacy is quickly ebbing.  The economy continues at an anemic pace with both declining foreign direct investment and exports.  In 2015, foreign direct investment plummeted 78% due to the junta’s continued mismanagement and political risk.  Exports in April 2016 fell 8% from the previous year.  At the same time, income inequality is soaring, with the top 0.1% controlling 46.5% of total assets, making Thailand the sixth most unequal country in the world.  All of this has accelerated under the royalist-elite backed junta.  As Kevin Hewison so rightly pointed out, Thailand is beset by the “prodigious and pernicious influence of a social, political and economic system that is structured to maintain inequality.”  That will continue to fuel support for the Red Shirts and any politician that begins to address the grievances of rural Thais.  But even in the cities, it is increasingly hard to see sustained middle class support for Prayut, as their economic condition becomes even more precarious, and Thailand continues to lose out to regional competitors, such as Vietnam.

The military has backed its longterm fortunes to an unpopular Crown Prince.  Yet the military has legitimized its rule and power as the ultimate defender of the Monarchy.  Soon it will be defending something that few will care to defend.

This has forced the Thai military to increase its assault on democracy, human rights, accountability and oversight, and the rule of law.  New laws are being forwarded to control the internet and social media, while existing laws are being manipulated and abused.  That is not a sign of strength, but a sign of weakness.  This edifice is sure to crack even more, built on the crumbling foundation of the monarchy under Rama X.

Llewellyn McCann is a pseudonym. The author is a long-time watcher of Southeast Asian politics.

Donald Trump is Thailand’s friend | New Mandala

Donald Trump is Thailand’s friend
Tom Winson, 08 APR 2016

As the US stares down the barrel of a Trump presidency, there is a lot that Thailand can learn.

I hope Donald Trump is the next President of the United States. For Thailand’s sake.

Trump is a manipulative orator who wants Americans to feel angry. He doesn’t want them to think.

Trump wants to win power by persuading Americans that America’s complex problems are easy to fix.

Donald Trump is America’s Thaksin Shinawatra. Donald Trump is America’s Suthep Thaugsuban. If Trump is the next President of the United States, Americans will have won Thaksin and Suthep in a single package. Buy one, get one free.

Donald Trump is Sondhi Limthongkul, Buddha Issara, Jatuporn Prompan and Nattawut Saikua. Six extreme populists for the price of one.

Like his six Thai brothers, Donald Trump believes he has all the answers. But he can’t harm the United States as much as his Thai brothers have already harmed Thailand, or as much as they could harm Thailand in the future if Thais don’t protect themselves.

The United States is far from perfect. Think of renditions, water-boarding and Abu Ghraib, and of America’s own political cronyism. But Americans are better protected against their Trump. Thais have little protection against their Trumps.

What will happen when President Trump tries to censor the Internet, deport American-born children of illegal immigrants, close mosques, bar the entry of Muslims, impose the death penalty on murderers of police officers, or order the military to use torture?

President Trump will be challenged in the courts, especially the Supreme Court, the American equivalent of Thailand’s Constitutional Court. Americans will ask Supreme Court judges whether Trump’s actions breach the US Constitution.

Americans respect their constitution because it protects them from people like Trump. And they feel they own their constitution. They own it because their forefathers consulted widely and debated passionately before they put pen to paper.

Thailand’s first constitution was a gift from unhappy bureaucrats. Most of Thailand’s subsequent constitutions have been gifts from grumpy generals.

When Supreme Court judges are considering whether Trump’s actions are constitutional, they won’t have to force their way past mobs of pro-Trump or anti-Trump protesters screaming that they will cripple the judges, their families and the whole nation if the court doesn’t deliver a verdict they like. Most pro-Trump and anti-Trump Americans respect the law and the independence of the judiciary.

If fanatics among them try to seize Washington’s airport or to sabotage an international summit, the government will tell the police to enforce the law. And the police will enforce the law and stop them. The law is supreme, not the mob or the police.

The Supreme Court judges will not care that President Trump has just won an election and that a majority of Americans believed him when he said he would make them happy and rich. The law is supreme, not the voters.

Nor will the judges find eminent figures cajoling them, twisting their arms or offering them rewards. The law is supreme, not the elite.

The judges will explain clearly why they have reached their verdict. They won’t say that they want to restore harmony. They will say why the law supports their findings. The law is supreme, not the judges.

Americans will accept the Supreme Court decisions because American judges are judges; they don’t want to be politicians or administrators. They want to be independent referees and, critically, they want to be perceived as independent referees. So, from the day they become a judge, they scrupulously avoid commenting publicly on politics. They are proud to be judges and stoutly defend the independence of the judiciary.

The courts are likely to find that President Trump’s enthusiasms breach the US Constitution. The Constitution and the courts will protect Americans from the worst of Trump.

Congress will also put a brake on President Trump. The US President can’t pass laws or secure his budget unless he respects the elected representatives of the people and the legislature as an institution.

When Congress and President Trump reach a deadlock, members of Congress won’t resign in a huff, or boycott an election, or be bullied into whistling for another Trump, or call for a military coup. Congress – not the street – is the venue for political debate. Elected MPs – not mobsters, mobs or soldiers – represent the people.

The states will also thwart some of President Trump’s enthusiasms. The United States has a federal system; power isn’t centralised.

And the American media will draw attention to Trump’s deceptions and give Trump’s opponents opportunities to challenge his ideas. If Trump tries to adjust their attitudes, all of America will laugh at him.

President Trump may adapt to these checks and balances that lie at the heart of American democracy. If he doesn’t, the checks and balances will chew him up and spit him out.

The United States will suffer under Trump. But the rule of law will limit the damage and protect ordinary Americans.

The United States doesn’t have the answers to all Thailand’s governance problems. Nor does any other country. But Thailand can learn a lot from the presidency of Donald Trump. Vote One Trump.

Tom Winson is a pen name. The author is a long-time observer of Thailand.

Thorns of the Thai rose | New Mandala

Camille Gazeau, 26 MAY, 2014

London, May 2014. It’s raining. I’m hiding underneath my umbrella, when I see her arriving. Chatwadee Rose Amornpat, wrapped in her Burbery coat, looks like a typical Londonner (she has been living in London for 11 years). This 34 year-old hairdresser, a little fashionable woman with pink eyes and crystalline voice, makes Thai monarchy shake and has now become Thai royalists’ “Number One Enemy.” For fighting for freedom of speech in Thailand, she was accused last April of lèse-majesté, under article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, by her own parents, in a so-called Democratic country. In her home country, she now faces a 100 year-prison sentence.

“Thailand is like North Korea”

Her crime ? She publicly defies the Thai royal family. To Rose, most problems in Thailand are related to the Thai monarchy.

In October 2013, the Yellow shirts started demonstrating again, against an amnesty bill that would have allowed former Prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra to come back to Thailand. After a few weeks of protests, Prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra withdrew this bill, but protesters continued to gather on the streets of Bangkok, whistling, singing and picnicking, to force Yingluck to eventually resign.

Rose started to be active again on social media, especially onFacebook. She used her real name and posted videos of her criticising the Thai royal family. The first victim of her attacks was princess Chulaporn, who openly supported the PDRC. The youngest daughter of the Royal couple became Rose’s target after she postedpictures of herself holding a Thai flag and giving her opinion on the political situation. According to Rose, she shouldn’t give her opinion. “ I attacked her a lot; I started talking to her directly.”

This amnesty bill, Rose disagrees with it. “Yingluck has made a huge mistake, and that is why now she has been dismissed by Court. Of course her brother Thaksin has made bad stuff, but, at least, I can criticize him without being put in jail ! I feel Thailand is like North Korea.”

Rose starts to sting

Besides her Facebook activities, Rose is connected with the Red Shirts around Europe ; they exchange information. Their goal is to let information flow through the security wall of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology and freely be spread around the country. They also send lists of names of ultra royalist activists to embassies, to prevent them from fleeing Thailand.

Slowly, step by step, her friends turned their back on her. Rose’s activities were becoming disturbing for them. “ I know they have been brainwashed. But I also know some of them are very aware of the situation, but they don’t care because they have a comfortable life, and they don’t want it to change.”

The number 1 enemy of the “Rubbish Collection Organisation“

Since the failed elections in last February, tensions have risen in Thailand, resulting to rights such as the freedom of speech having started to disappear. Obviously, Rose’s activities strongly irritated the Thai royalists. On their side is article 112 from the Thai Criminal Code that states “ Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment to 15 years.” This law is the hardest law in Thailand : no bail possible. Thai royalists have been using this article to get rid of their opponents. And Rose is one of them. She has been the number one enemy of Thai royalists, especially since she appears on top of the so-called “Rubbish Collection Organisation” list. A list which identifies all the Red Shirts who may be regarded as being guilty of lèse-majesté.

According to Rose, Dr. Rienthong Nan-Nah, the founder of this organisation, put pressure on her parents to make them file a complaint against Rose. They were publicly mocked, the name of her father’s company was all over the Internet. Her father warned her in March, asking her to stop “I told him it was my duty to tell the world what is happening in Thailand.”

“I’m doing it for the whole Thai people”

It is through Facebook that Rose found out about the complaint against her. She became a “star” in Thailand, her face was all over the media.

“When I found out about this, I was destroyed. I know they had to do it because their lives were threatened. Otherwise, they would have been killed, and the police wouldn’t have done anything.”

Since then, Rose refuses to talk to her father; she no longer stands him telling her to stop. “ I’m not doing it for myself ; I’m doing it for the whole Thai people.” She claims she wants Thai people to live like Europeans : “I want free care, social help, free school.”

For more than a month now, Rose and her family are regularly threatened by Dr. Rienthong, who asks British authorities to send Rose back to Thailand, where she could be judged. Thankfully being a British citizen for 6 years, Rose is protected by the United Kingdom.

Living in Europe opened her mind on Thailand

Born in Bangkok, Rose grew up in what could be seen as the perfect Thai family – a Yellow family. Her mother , Somjintan Amornpat, used to work for the Department of Civil Aviation (she was dismissed after the scandal), and her father, Surapong Amornpat, owns a design and packaging company. Her older brother is in the navy. Rose studied mass communication and got specialised in politics at Ramkhamhaeng University. Everything seemed perfect. In appearance only.

Military crackdown in 2010

The turning point in Rose’s life was in 2010, during the military crackdown on the Red Shirts (National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship – UDD). At that time, the UDD protested in Bangkok against the rule of Prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, demanding that he dissolve parliament and call an election. Within a month, around 90 people were killed and thousands injured. At that time, Rose was already living in England, and it’s on television that she saw soldiers shooting at people, at journalists, and at volunteering nurses in temples. Her mind started changing. She was advised to watch a BBC documentary “Thailand – Justice under fire”.

Rose was shocked by the shooting scenes and this is when she totally changed her opinion on the monarchy:

“The shooters using M-16 were attached to the King and Queen’s royal guards. Thus I feel the King and Queen knew full well of the massacre. Yet, they made no attempt to stop this hideous action by their soldiers shooting at unarmed Red Shirts. I started shaking, I had fever. I decided I needed to open my mind and I went on the Internet to find every website about Thai monarchy“ .

From that moment on, Rose searched through all the websites she could find, in Thai or in English, giving “evidence about the Thai monarchy stealing money from Thai people.” She also read about the scandals around the royal family. Unemployed at that moment, she spent her time reading censored books such as “The King Never Smiles” by Paul M. Handley. She found out about Bhumipol’s wealth “He’s richer than Queen Elizabeth !”

Rose would send her parents and friends all the links she could find. But her first opponent in Thailand was the ministry of Information and Communication; it would censor most of her links, so her relatives could not open them. Those who could go through the censorship, like her father, would tell her that she had been brainwashed by Thaksin:

“We always fight about politics. My father was mad at me a lot at this time. He supported the shut down of Don Mueng airport in Bangkok by the Yellow Shirts in 2008 by sending money. Also he deeply respects the King ; he has a huge picture of Rama IX on the wall. I asked him to throw it away.”

With her mother, it was a different story : “We never talk about politics, it’s useless. My mother is one of these civil servants, who are really proud to serve the King.”

Meanwhile, Rose became one of the numerous admins of aFacebook page with a title meaning “We used to love Thai royal family.” She realised she was not the only Thai citizen willing to discover the truth, and who was really affected by it. No surprise : Thai government tried to shut it down. Then, her family life kept her away from her computer for a while.

Rose wants the Royal family to be kicked out of Thailand : “I won’t stop until Thailand is full democracy”

With her eyes full of tears, Rose says “This fight made me lose everything, my friends, my family. I still love my dad. He is my best friend. I feel he had to do it.”

The violence of this betrayal from her home country is so strong that she will keep on fighting, no matter what happens. She is not afraid to show her real identity and reported the threats she encountered to Scotland Yard, to the International Criminal Court, to several embassies, to Amnesty International.

She wants to let the world know what is behind the beaches and white sand of Thailand :“I want the Royal family to be kicked out of Thailand. They are the real problem in my country. Thailand needs to be like France ; I want Thailand to be republican. I wish we could have a monarchy like in the United Kingdom, but it is impossible. They like their privileges too much.”

And to the people who threaten her, Rose answers:

“I want to tell people who try to shut me up that it’s not going to happen until Thailand is a full democracy, even if I have to die. At least if I die, the world will see the real face of these people. The pictures from 2010 are stuck in my mind.”

Camille Gazeau is a French journalist and photographer who worked in China and Thailand.

Playing cat and mouse with Thailand’s junta | New Mandala

Playing cat and mouse with Thailand’s junta | New Mandala
Nick Nostitz,  9 JUNE 2016 

Nick Nostitz captures the opening of the UDD Referendum Monitoring Center.

On June 5, 2016 the UDD brought itself back to the political map with their opening ceremony of their referendum monitoring center, which took place in their headquarters at the 5^th floor of the Imperial Lad Prao Department Store. In addition to the press conference with most UDD leaders in attendance, hundreds of their supporters in red shirts mingled there, among a strong presence of security forces, both in uniform and in plainclothes.

It was almost like in the old days – a market selling Red Shirt trinkets – coffee mugs with images of Thaksin and Yingluck, amulets minted to raise funds, freshly printed T-Shirts with the motto of their monitoring center: Do Not Cancel, Do Not Cheat, Do Not Be Embarrassed About Burma (in context of the high voter turnout in the Burmese elections). After the press conference, the UDD leaders and their supporters danced and sang songs in their recently opened coffee shop/library.

 

UDD leader Dr Weng Tojirakan insisted that their center is not aimed at disrupting the referendum, but to get as high a voter turnout as possible, saying also that boycotting the referendum, as proposed by some critics of the referendum, would only serve the government’s aim of passing the constitution, and would be against the law. He said that while the backbone of the monitoring center will be the UDD members and hierarchies it is open to all citizens of Thailand to volunteer, which is why the UDD leaders decided to wear black colored T-Shirts at the press conference – “Red is already in our hearts – we do not want to discriminate against anyone”.

He added that the UDD’s ideology is to create a democratic system, but they have to create new strategies, so that people will not get killed or jailed. “We have to walk delicately and carefully, one wrong step can get us imprisoned”, he warned.

Nick Nostitz is a photo-journalist and long-time contributor to New Mandala. All the photographs in this article are credited to him.

The future of the EU-ASEAN relationship | New Mandala

The future of the EU-ASEAN relationship | New Mandala
Carlo Filippini, 23 MAY 2016

The EU and ASEAN share some relevant aspects but at the same time important differences; both are born out of international (to counter threats from bordering communist powers) and internal (to avert new almost brotherly conflicts) security needs and grow mainly as economic entities: the EU because of the French veto to the European Defence Community in August 1954, the ASEAN because the “domino” theory did not actualize due to the Sino-Soviet conflict at the end of the 1960s and the 1979 war between China and Vietnam.

As far as ASEAN is concerned in the recent years, after decades of inactivity, a few important projects have been agreed on and (almost) carried out: the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) signed in 1992, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Charter, a sort of basic law or bill of rights, both signed in 2007; future targets are listed in ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together, November 2015. In the same years important international agreements have been implemented: just to mention one, the Chiang Mai Initiative (2000), later strengthened as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (2010), in order to reduce the likelihood of a new 1997 Asian currency and economic crisis.

ASEAN and EU with 620 and 510 million people respectively are the third and the fourth largest entities by population (2015) and the seventh and the first by GDP with USD 2.6 and 18.5 trillion (2014) respectively.

The two groups are quite inhomogeneous as far as ethnic groups, language, religion, history, and values are concerned; the member states are very diverse: in the EU we have Malta with 0.4 and Germany with 82 million people, or Bulgaria and Luxembourg with a GDP per capita five times higher, and in the ASEAN Cambodia and Singapore with a GDP per capita fifty times bigger.

The EU is ASEAN’s second largest trading partner: EUR 180 billion in goods and 70 billion in services were traded in 2014; in the previous twenty years the trade grew on average by 7% annually, with a structural EU deficit. The EU is the biggest provider of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into ASEAN with EUR 23.9 billion, some 22% of the total; at the end of 2013 it held FDI stocks of EUR 156 billion, 60% of which were concentrated in Singapore. About ten million people travel between the two regions each year for tourism, study, business, and otherwise; exchange of scholars and students is rapidly increasing as is the cooperation between research centres.

The ASEAN and EU’s deepest differences concern private-public and interpersonal relations and the importance of laws and written agreements versus long-term informal commitments and familiarity; the wide-spread Confucianism favours harmony even to the prejudice of justice and prefers hierarchical relations to equalitarian ones. This philosophy has been carried by the Overseas Chinese, sometimes the majority (as in Singapore), sometimes a small minority (as in Indonesia), but always in control of the local economies. In Europe there is a union among states, in Asia an association among nations: this is not simply a choice of words.

ASEAN-EU relations have been quite soft up to the end of the last millennium, particularly because Europe deemed irrelevant the whole of Asia. The old colonial powers usually kept strong links with their former colonies pursuing domestic interests, often at the expenses of other EU member states. In 1996 the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was set up by the then EU-15 and ASEAN-7 plus China, Japan, and (South) Korea; the Asian countries took the initiative wishing to counterbalance the USA hegemony. While the EU never became a real alternative to the USA, ASEM (enlarged to more than 50 countries) is now a very important forum to discuss, and try to solve, global problems and, even more, an occasion to hold informal meetings between conflicting states.

In 2006 a deep crisis explodes: Myanmar, still under the military junta, ought to act as chair of ASEAN; the EU threatens to break all relations if this happens. The solution looks very “harmonious”: under pressure Myanmar renounces to the chair (kept by Thailand for a second year) but reserves the right to ask for it in a successive year at her choice.

In that same year the EU identifies South-East Asia as an area of strategic interest and begins negotiations to sign a FTA. After years of useless meetings it gives up the idea and negotiates bilateral FTAs with individual ASEAN member states; these agreements have different new names to stress their quite wider contents: not just tariffs on goods only but rules on services, investments, competition, property rights, and so on. A joke says that FTAs signed by ASEAN are ten-page long plus a set of appendixes a thousand-page long, detailing exceptions asked by every member state but Singapore.

Presently the EU has signed (even if not yet ratified) FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, is negotiating with the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar and has signed a special agreement with Indonesia (2009); Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are part of the European Everything but arms (EBA) initiative granting duty- and quota-free access to all goods.

The future of their economic partnership will depend on the policies ASEAN and EU implement in order to win the present, complex, and serious challenges they are facing; in the EU: immigrants, fiscal constraints to growth, banking union; in the ASEAN: economic dualism, middle income trap, rigidity of the non-intervention principle and relations with China (in particular, disputes in the South China Sea).

To the EU it is very relevant that ASEAN might conclude its economic integration process fully and rapidly, eliminate non-tariff barriers and FDI restrictions, liberalize financial markets, harmonize and make more predictable customs procedures. These problems are not simple but can be solved.

The king still never smiles | New Mandala

The king still never smiles | New Mandala
Nicholas Farrelly, 9 MAY 2016

First published at Mekong Review, a quarterly literary journal based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Thailand’s King Bhumibol Adulyadej took the Chakri throne in June 1946. His remarkable 70-year reign is now the longest in Thai history, straddling multiple generations and a period of immense economic, political and technological change. As time marches on, the proportion of the Thai population that has known any other monarch has vanished. Where others have faded, King Bhumibol has survived.

In the decade since Paul Handley’s The King Never Smiles: A biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej was published, Thai society has lost its democratic facade. There have been two military coups, dozens of violent clashes in Bangkok, and hundreds of people have been locked up after finding themselves on the wrong side of callous political determinations. Others have been forced to seek sanctuary abroad. This chapter in King Bhumibol’s long reign has seen a miserable confrontation between duelling elites and the stark polarisation of political opinion in the provinces.

At the street level, this conflict has usually been painted in hues of ‘red’ and ‘yellow’, but anyone who watches closely knows it is more complicated than that. The reality can prove brutally disheartening. Like in many drawn-out political battles, much of the aggression is reserved for perceived traitors and deviants. Nonetheless, while the ‘yellows’ continue to exalt in the reflected glory of Bhumibol’s charismatic eminence, there are some courageous voices in the ‘red’ corner that ask penetrating questions of the royals and this noteworthy reign. These still have Handley to thank for presenting a considered rebuke to the painstakingly manicured mythology of a royal household above politics, supposedly disconnected from petty financial or personal concerns.

Handley invested many years disentangling the offcial narrative from the facts. His book is critical, yes, but also ultimately empathetic in its portrayal of a king whose ascension came at a moment of unspeakable personal, dynastic and national tragedy. Handley suggests that King Bhumibol never fully recovered from the death of his brother, King Ananda Mahidol, and the shock of his own elevation to the throne. This dark shadow, like much else in Handley’s book, is not supposed to be discussed in Thailand. Since the publication of The King Never Smiles, the country’s draconian and vindictive lèse majesté law has become the preferred weapon for battering the vulnerable and the brave. It has been used with increasing enthusiasm by weak governments, including today’s militocracy, looking to buttress their royalist credentials. In practice, the law is used to stamp out dissent and punish opponents. It is ludicrously difficult to mount any effective defence to a lèse majesté charge, and the accused often end up seeking a reduction in punishment with a guilty plea.

Handley’s book has been caught up in these proceedings. Joe Gordon, a Thai American, spent thirteen months in jail for translating portions of the text. A full Thai language translation has been available, online, for years, but it is dangerous to ‘like’ or ‘share’ it. In the recent past, before the relative anarchy offered by the online realm, it was possible to maintain a single version of the royal truth. Today’s multiplicity of perspectives and narratives makes that impossible.

In response, there has been a massive investment made in fortifying the story of King Bhumibol as Thailand’s exemplary centre, a semi-divine presence bestowing prosperity and security on the common people. In 2012, for example, the palace supported the publication of the epic King Bhumibol: A life’s work, which offers a favourable interpretation of his role in the country’s development. This lavish rejoinder is not without merit, but should, in all circumstances, be read alongside The King Never Smiles. The problem is that Handley’s work is still deemed far too explosive to be openly available inside Thailand. Following a pattern established in the final year of Thaksin Shinawatra’s prime ministership, subsequent Thai governments have kept up the fiction that the book poses a credible threat to national security. Over time, this directive has been extended to other writers, websites and publications.

Yet the official Thai retort to Handley’s exertion has failed. Handley’s work still motivates some good analysis of the royal family across its economic, political and cultural dimensions. We now know much more about the holdings of the Crown Property Bureau, thanks in large part to the impressive sleuthing of Porphant Ouyyanont. Regarding politics, a rising generation of Thai scholars has grappled with a re-militarised and contentious landscape, with notable contributions by writers like Aim Sinpeng, Prajak Kongkirati and Pitch Pongsawat. Then there is the story of the king as a cultural icon. Perhaps the most incisive analysis of this issue is by the impressive young German scholar, Serhat Ünaldi. Other durable writers like Kevin Hewison, Duncan McCargo, Nick Nostitz, and Andrew MacGregor Marshall, have also made an impact.

It is MacGregor Marshall who has kept up the most consistent criticism of the political and economic meddling of the royal family. His A Kingdom in Crisis: Thailand’s Struggle for Democracy in the Twenty-First Century draws on a wide range of source material, including Wikileaks cables, to eviscerate royalist mythology. His account of recent Thai political conflict argues that the succession remains unresolved. MacGregor Marshall insists there is deep unease among the country’s power brokers over Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn’s prospective elevation to the throne. From this perspective, the 2006 and 2014 coups make sense as preparation for handling a crisis right at the apex of Thai society.

To read the rest of the essay click here.

Nicholas Farrelly is co-founder of New Mandala. 

Thai junta to get its report card | New Mandala

Thai junta to get its report card | New Mandala
Paul Sanderson, 10 MAY 2016

Many have promised to bring Thailand together, but only succeeded in uniting people against them. The increasingly-isolated Thai junta could soon get the measure of their own popularity, Paul Sanderson writes.

Uniting the country is so often the catch-cry of those who would do anything but. In Thailand, a succession of prime ministers both elected and not have pledged to bring the country together as more than a decade of bitter division has seethed and occasionally flared into violence.

Former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s administration gave probably the most obvious example of this when their ill-advised attempt to introduce a bill at 3am giving a sweeping amnesty to the country’s greatest political troublemakers, including her fugitive brother, only succeeded in uniting the country against them. Many of those aligned ideologically with the ruling party, and even several government MPs, joined the chorus of condemnation.

History, as is its wont, is in danger of repeating itself. The military regime, known officially as the National Council for Peace and Order, will mark its second anniversary on May 22. It has held power almost as long as Yingluck had before the Pheu Thaiparty’s tactical blunder.

The junta is embarking on a referendum as it finds itself increasingly isolated: Fewer and fewer voices speak out in support of Prayut Chan-o-cha’s regime and the draft charter it almost dictated to chief constitution writer Meechai Ruchupan.

Even those who were anti-Yingluck in 2013 have condemned the NCPO’s transparent plan to cling on to power for a further five years after the slated 2017 election, should it go ahead. Former PM Abhisit Vejjajiva, who was on the streets for some of the Bangkok Shutdown protests, spoke out against the draft constitution, saying it “distorts” democracy and “weakens people’s power”.

The regime is not quite at the point of uniting the country against it, but the August 7 referendum and the crackdown on dissent will seriously test its support.

The Election Commission has expressed confidence of a turnout of 80 per cent,telling Reuters about 51 million people were eligible to cast a vote. This would be significantly higher than the 57 per cent who turned out for the comparable 2007 referendum on a military-led charter, although commissioner Somchai Srisuthiyakorn would not say why. (Somchai, it is worth noting, is a controversial figure himself.)

It would also be a higher turnout than most general elections of the past 20 years, which have hovered between 60 and 70 per cent – the outliers being the 2007 post-coup poll when 85 per cent went to the polls as the ousted Thaksin Shinawatra and his opponents rallied support, and the 2014 pre-coup ballot, when about 47 per cent  of eligible voters showed up amid protests, cancellations and after a shooting designed to scare people away.

The suggestion that 40 million people could vote on  August 7 may be based on optimistic interpretations of polling. A Suan Dusit poll in mid-April found 85 per cent of respondents thought the constitution was important to the country’s future. But they may as well have asked whether they thought the record-breaking summer was hot: of course it’s important.

A closer look at the results, from a polling agency that has produced headlines favourable to the regime, reveals two-thirds were not impressed by the draft constitution. Curiously, 73 per cent said they might have “other things to do” on the day of the election. More than half said politics served only vested interests and thought the referendum was a waste of money.

The Election Commission made another public foray at the end of April, issuing a list of dos and don’ts for those keen on campaigning. The don’ts are problematic, with activists and political figures questioning the vagueness of phrases such as “false information”, “incite the public politically” and “incites unrest”.

The commission’s guide came after the junta, more worryingly, declared that expressing too strong an opinion in the lead-up to the referendum could bring about a 10-year jail term. Other penalties include a potential 10-year ban from politics and hefty fines. There have already been arrests.

This being a country where smiles are shallow and cynicism runs deep, there is always another theory or three. One goes that the referendum is being set up to fail: Gen Prayut’s terse replies when pressed on what would happen in that event suggest there is a contingency plan they want to keep guarded. Another goes that the smattering of protests will be used to justify calling the referendum off altogether: the roadmap to elections has already been pushed out two years and the military sank its first draft, so there is precedent. Other speculation quickly turns into sad stories of the death of kings.

There is a mindset that the military wasted the 2006 coup and returned the country to democracy too quickly. No chances are being taken this time. This is not a new observation, but with the referendum coming into focus it is worth asking just how long the status quo will be tolerated.

Chulalongkorn University’s Thitinan Pongsudhirak raised all these points in April, with a forecast of long-term military rule and a road ahead that will “most likely be marked by more turmoil”.

The junta is determined to be around in some capacity until at least 2022. The referendum is not likely to alter its grand plans, but it will provide some indication of how much of the country is united behind them, and how much against.

Paul Sanderson is a pen name. The author is an independent writer and consultant based in and around Southeast Asia.

This article is published as a collaboration between New Mandala and Policy Forum, Asia and the Pacific’s platform for analysis and discussion on public policy.