Thursday, September 25, 2014

Captain Nat and the wheels of Thai justice | New Mandala

Captain Nat and the wheels of Thai justice | New Mandala
In Tor Chor Dor Vol. 2, chapter 6 (“Crimes and Human Rights Abuses”), I described in considerable detail the case of a group of Border Patrol Police officers, dubbed the ‘BPP Gang’ by the media, which engaged in an organised campaign of abduction, extortion, torture and other serious abuses. Their arrests in January-February 2008 became a national event. Around 40 BPP officers were incriminated, including their so-called ‘leader’, Captain Nat Chonnithiwanit. The victims, of whom there may have been around 200 over a period of at least three years, were subjected to electric shocks, suffocated with plastic bags, severely beaten, and in some cases both mentally traumatised and physically maimed. They were mainly respectable, middle-class, law-abiding, fairly well-off Thai citizens, who would normally have expected protection from the police against this sort of criminal conduct.
The subsequent trials, sentences, appeals and commutations provide a fascinating glimpse at the workings of the Thai justice system. It is a very slow and fitful process. Many members of the gang have yet to be brought to trial, six years after they were initially charged with one or more offences. In Nat’s own case, several charges are yet to be heard by the courts, including those relating to the abduction and extortion of a wealthy Thai businesswoman, Pienjit Peungon, in Bangkok in January 2008; her courage and credibility prompted the arrest of Nat and the first batch of his colleagues.
On 24 July 2009, the Southern Bangkok Criminal Court sentenced Captain Nat and seven other former BPP men to three years and four months in jail for extorting money from a couple in Bangkok in January 2008. The court initially sentenced the eight to five years in jail but commuted the penalty by one third after they cooperated with the court during the trial.
On 8 December 2009, Nat and seven other BPP associates were convicted by the Taling Chan District Court in Bangkok in connection with a case involving a silver jewelry seller in Bangkok in February 2007. They were found guilty of assault with weapons, illegal detention, and extortion, and each sentenced to five years imprisonment. On 6 December 2011, however, the Appeal Court quashed the convictions of Nat and these seven other officers. It determined that ‘the evidence presented in the case lacked weight’.
The nullifying of the December 2009 convictions caused many blog pundits to scoff at the Thai justice system, particularly where police officers are involved. Some argued that Captain Nat and his associates would soon be walking free. However, such observations were premature. Since 2013, Nat has had a further 39 years imprisonment added to his July 2009 figure (amounting to 42 years and four months).
On 30 September 2013, Bangkok’s Criminal Court found Nat and nine others guilty of assaulting four police officers from Chiang Mai and forcing them to confess to drug crimes in October 2007. The Court gave each of the ten accused a 10-year jail term, but halved the term for Nat and two others for their ‘useful confessions’, while the rest received reduced jail terms of six years and eight months. The court also ordered them to pay 100,000 Baht compensation (plus 7.5 per cent annual interest) to each of their victims.
On 17 December 2013, the Criminal Court sentenced Nat to 22 years in prison for robbery and rape of a woman in Bangkok. Seven associates were sentenced to 12 years for ‘dishonestly performing their duties, armed robbery and illegal detention of a person’. Nat received the additional 10 years for raping the woman while she was being detained. Nat and two of the others were also sentenced to another five years each for extortion of four other victims.
On 27 February 2014, the Criminal Court sentenced Nat to seven years in prison, and four of his team to five years, for abuse of authority and assault. On 6-7 January 2007, they had taken a husband and wife to the HQ of the BPP’s 42nd Sub-Division and tortured them until they paid 200,000 Baht for their release.
It is possible that some of these sentences could be reduced on appeal, but it is also likely that Nat and some of the others will receive substantial sentences from further charges still to come to trial. Nat, who was 28 years old at the time of his arrest, remains cherubic-looking after more than six years in jail. But he will probably spend a large part of the rest of his life behind bars. Hopefully, anyway.
In another case described in Tor Chor Dor Vol. 2, a former BPP officer, Sub-Lieutenant Jittipong Sochai, who was arrested for drug offences on 12 December 2012, was found guilty and sentenced by the Criminal Court on 23 September 2014. Sub-Lieutenant Jittipong was one of five members of the Ouan police station in Nan Province who were arrested in Ayutthaya with more than one million methamphetamine tablets in their police car. Jittipong, then the deputy crime suppression chief at the Ouan station, was allegedly the ring-leader. He had previously served as a BPP officer in Chiang Mai, where he ‘had been involved with a major drug trafficking group’, precipitating his transfer to the Provincial Police in Nan. The Criminal Court initially sentenced Jittipong to death, but commuted the sentence to life imprisonment because of his ‘useful testimony’.
Professor Des Ball is the author of the two volume Tor Chor Dor: Thailand’s Border Patrol Police. In September 2014 he received an Order of Australia for his distinguished lifetime of service to defence and security studies. 

Monday, September 22, 2014

Law and irony in Thailand | New Mandala

Law and irony in Thailand | New Mandala
22 SEPTEMBER 2014
There is irony in recent statements from General Prawit Wongsuwon, Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister. As reported in today’s Bangkok Post, General Prawit has said, “I want to stress that everything must be done according to the law.  Since the NCPO wants peace and reconciliation, I am afraid we can’t allow a politically-related (seminar) to be held”.
The irony, plain as day, is that General Prawit serves a military dictatorship that shredded Thailand’s hesitant and faltering democracy on 22 May 2014. That is four months ago today.
Since then, the team at New Mandala has been watching the situation with some sadness, from a distance. Army rule, whatever its supporters imply, brings no glory.
That General Prawit wants to lecture some of Thailand’s leading academics on the need for things to be done in accordance with “the law” would be laughable if it didn’t simply reveal the hollowness of the “coup culture” he has helped create. The law, in case General Prawit had failed to notice, comes from the barrel of his gun.
While we all hope that the coup-makers will eventually return Thailand to some semblance of democratic rule, in the meantime the military government should not expect their abuse of law and language to pass without comment.
Free-and-open academic discussion — like a free press, or effective judiciary, or non-political armed forces — is a key building block for the world’s more successful societies. The evidence for the advantages that such academic discussion offers is writ large in the resilience of those systems that embrace open debate.
While I doubt anybody is surprised by the ongoing campaign against free expression in Thailand, it remains a lamentable situation. Seeing scholars I greatly respect temporarily detained for their involvement in a recent academic seminar only heightens the sense that Thailand will not quickly recover from its self-inflicted wounds.
We are all the poorer when academics and their students are denied the opportunity to consider important topics such as “The Decline of Dictatorships in Foreign Countries”. There is no easy solution to Thailand’s multifaceted political woes but surely the answer won’t be found while even basic discussions of comparative politics are judged beyond the pale.

Rohingya and national identities in Burma | New Mandala

Rohingya and national identities in Burma | New Mandala
22 SEPTEMBER 2014
The most controversial aspect of the census recently held in Burma has been the denial of the large Muslim population in Arakan to identify themselves as Rohingya, the term of their choice. The government ban means as many as one million people remain uncounted in Arakan. That is scarcely surprising, as the Burmese government, Rakhine ultra-nationalists and seemingly a majority of the Burmese population have denied for years the existence of the Rohingya identity. According to them, the Rohingya ethnicity is an invention devised by immigrants from Bangladesh to take over the land in Arakan.
Few people have made more effort to deny the claims of ethnicity by the Rohingya than Derek Tonkin, former British ambassador to Thailand and editor of the website Network Myanmar. Mr. Tonkin has reached his conclusions after digging deeply in colonial British archives, where he has not found a single use of the term Rohingya. His command of the British colonial records is nothing less than impressive, but by relying almost solely on these sources he only offers a partial picture, from which I think he draws incorrect conclusions.
The debate on whether the Rohingya ethnicity should be regarded as one of the “national races” or not, assumes – implicitly or explicitly – as its framework of reference the definition to be found in the controversial Citizenship Law passed in 1982. According to this definition, only those ethnic groups which were already in Burma in 1823 qualify as “national races.”
Rather than attempting to defend Rohingya claims, I argue that the notion of “national races” itself, and thus the set of assumptions hitherto determining the terms of the debate, are fundamentally false and do not facilitate any understanding of the history and present social realities of Burma.
This notion has reduced the debate on Rohingya identity to a confrontation between three different historical narratives: what we might call “Rakhine history” and “Burmese History” on the one side (on this point both are basically indistinguishable, albeit there are important divergences in other aspects), as opposed to the “Rohingya history” on the other. As in many other nationalist histories all around the world, these narratives are loaded with myths and distortions. They are also mutually contradictory, making it impossible to find any common ground for all sides involved.
Competing historical narratives
Burmese and Rakhine nationalists often accuse the Rohingya of falsifying their history in order to advance their claims for ethnicity. It is true that Rohingya historians tend to minimize or ignore altogether the importance of the migration of laborers to Arakan from Bengal during colonial times; moreover, some have made claims that are historically incorrect: for instance, Rohingya historians often claim that some Muslim kings ruled Arakan in the 15th century.
Meanwhile, mirroring the distortions of “Rohingya history,” Rakhine historians tend to minimize, or to ignore altogether, the large numbers of Muslims living in Arakan before colonial times and to emphasize only the influx of Bengali laborers during colonial times. Now some Rakhine go so far as to claim that “illegal immigrants from Bangladesh” have arrived as recently as a few years ago and have continued arriving up to the first wave of sectarian violence in 2012, a highly dubious assertion for which there is no evidence.
On the Burmese side, we find assertions of a history of unity and continuity stretching back for hundreds of years and which was only broken by the traumatic colonial experience. Thus, in 2002, the military ruler, Senior General Than Shwe claimed that “thanks to the unity and farsightedness of our forefathers, our country has existed as a united and firm Union and not as separate small nations for over 2,000 years.”
This extraordinary kind of assertion only makes sense in the context of the state-building project to unify all the ethnic groups under the guardianship of the (Bamar-controlled) Tatmadaw(Burmese military).  This has been the ultimate goal for the Burmese state since Ne Win staged his coup d’état in 1962. It is in this context that, at least during the last two decades, the generals have been increasingly trying to present themselves as the heirs of the Burmese kings and their mission as that of restoring some sort of “natural Burmese order” which the British interrupted.
There is no doubt that the British colonization of Burma dealt a highly traumatic blow to every dimension of social order in Burma, from which it has yet to recover. The British dismantled completely all the political institutions and cultural structures that had more or less glued together the society of central Burma and replaced them with others that the Burmese often did not understand or refused because they had been imposed by force by foreign invaders.
But pre-colonial Burma was by no means an era of uniform political order and stability. In fact, the centuries between the first Burmese kingdom which managed to unify this territory, the Pagan dynasty (1057-1287), and the colonial times was a period in which central authority was only gradually asserted, at every point confronting many difficulties and including long periods of anarchy when petty states competed for power.
In any case, before the first Anglo-Burmese war, the domains of the Burmese kingdom were never coterminous with those of the present Burmese state: in large areas, particularly in the hills to the North and East, the grip of the Burmese kings was at best extremely weak.  And the Arakanese kingdom was only invaded in 1784, just forty years before it was taken by the British.
It is an anachronism to talk about borders, as we understand them now, in Southeast Asia before the arrival of the colonial powers. As the anthropologist Edmund R. Leachput it more than fifty years ago in his paper, “The Frontiers of ‘Burma’:” pre-colonial Burma was a “wide imprecisely defined frontier region lying between India and China” where “the indigenous political systems which existed prior to the phase of European political expansion were not separated from one another by frontiers in the modern sense and they were not sovereign Nation-States.”
Therefore, it makes little historical sense to classify any ethnic group as a “national race” on the basis that it already inhabited before the colonial period a territory demarcated after the beginning of the period.
Colonial conceptions of ethnicity
What the Burmese, Rakhine and Rohingya historical narratives have in common is an essentialist and racialist conception of ethnic identities as something primordial and fixed in time. Arguably, this is one of the most enduring and deleterious legacies of the British rule in Burma and lies at the heart of the now hegemonic and highly dangerous notion of “national races.”
When the British arrived in Burma, they found a land with a bewildering and confusing (for the external observer) variety of human groups, and where ethnic affiliations were enormously fluid. To make sense of that complex human landscape, they imposed a rigid grid of ethnic classification in which they conflated the mother tongue of the speakers with the category of “tribe” or “race.”
But, as the scholar Victor Lieberman has shown in his paper, “Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth-Century Burma,” ethnicity had virtually no bearing at all as a marker of political loyalty to the different kingdoms which ruled Central Burma during the 17th and 18th centuries. Ethnic distinctions were even more blurred in the “hill areas,” as Edmund R. Leach showed in his classic book Political Systems of Highland Burma. The distinction between Kachin and Shan categories was rather vague, and it was not uncommon for “Kachins” to turn Into “Shan” or vice versa depending on the social systems in which they decided to live, a phenomenon which, according to Leach, “cannot readily be fitted into any ethnographic scheme which, on linguistic grounds, places Kachins and Shans into different ‘racial’ categories.”
But that is exactly what the British did. And the colonial officials held a set of views of ethnicity and race strongly influenced by the social Darwinist prejudices of the time, and they attributed to the different groups personal and innate characteristics: the Karen or Kachin were stereotyped as simple and honest people, included within the “martial races;” the Burmans were devious and childish, not to be trusted, and so on.
On the basis of these spurious classifications, they recruited people to their armies using ethnicity as criteria, and favored some groups over others. They also tended to employ Indians as civil servants, rather than Burmese, because they had more experience with the colonial bureaucratic system and thus were better trained. These policies reinforced, and in some cases generated, ethnic classifications which are still widely accepted in Burma, and animosities that survive to this day.
The anthropologist F. K. Lehman identified the problem more than fifty years ago in his study “Ethnic Categories in Burma and the Theory of Social Systems.” According to him, before the colonial period, “the Burmans had a reasonably correct tacit understanding of the nature of their relations with bordering peoples, tribal and non-tribal,” an understanding which was lost due “to the importation of very explicit European ideas about nations, societies and cultures.”
Lehman suggested that when people identify themselves as members of an ethnic group, they were merely “taking positions in culturally defined systems of intergroup relations,” and that those ethnic categories were “only very indirectly descriptive of the empirical characteristics of substantive groups of people.” Therefore, local or regional groups were “inherently likely to have recourse to more than one ethnic role system and more than one ‘identity’.”
As a consequence of the fluidity of these roles, Lehman Asserted that “we cannot reconstruct any demonstrable discrete ancestral group for some ‘ethnic category’ –no matter whether we define such a possible ancestral group as a discrete dialect group, or as a group with relatively sharp discontinuities from its neighbors.” But this kind of “discrete ancestral groups” is precisely what the notion of “national races” assumes as certain.
Arakan: “The Palestine of the Farther East”
In 1891, the Swiss Pali scholar and archeologist Emil Forchhammer wrote a small book about Arakan in which he described it as the “Palestine of the Farther East,” because, as he put it, Arakanese Buddhism was the inspiration of the Buddhism practiced in the rest of Burma. More than two hundred years later, the comparison has a different resonance: as in Palestine, Arakan is the land of a conflict with some religious undertones between two communities. As in Palestine, the conflict involves a clash of historical narratives. And, as in Palestine, one of the two communities has been stripped of its political rights.
Arakan is separated by a range of mountains from the rest of Burma, making it relatively isolated from the Irrawaddy delta and central Burma. For most of its history, Arakan’s relations with the kingdom of Bengal in the west were just as rich and close as with the Burmese kingdoms in the north, if not more so, thus creating a culture distinct from that of Burma.
As in the rest of Southeast Asia, there were not clear borders between Arakan and Bengal in pre-modern times, the areas of influence of both kingdoms overlapped and were constantly fluctuating. The historian G. E. Harvey wrote in his classic History of Burma that, throughout the Middle Ages, “when Bengal was in the ascendant, some kings sent tribute to Bengal and when the Arakanese were in the ascendant they received tribute from the Ganges delta, ‘The Twelve Towns of Bengal’.” At that time, the Bengali court provided a political model for the Arakanese kingdom, and from the 15th to the 17th century, it was common for the kings to use Muslim/Bengali designations and to issue coins with the kalima, the Muslim profession of faith.
Meanwhile, as Harvey points out, though the geographical isolation of Arakan from Burma “rendered her immune to attack on the east, the resultant peace did not give her unity, because her territory is a long thin strip of coast intersected by hill torrents.”
This fragmentation made the Arakanese kings more tolerant than the Burmese kings to the religious beliefs of the different communities under their rule. In his doctoral dissertationWhere Jambudipa and Islamdom Converged: Religious Change and the Emergence of Buddhist Communalism in Early Modem Arakan (Fifteenth to Nineteenth Centuries), Professor Michael Charney wrote: “In Arakan the royal center was not simply indifferent to promoting one particular religious identity over another, but rather was one of the chief barriers restricting the emergence of a Theravada Buddhist orthodoxy in the Arakan littoral.”
Arakanese kings did not try to establish a “Buddhism kingdom” or centralize the Sangha, as their Burmese counterparts did, but worked through local patron-client networks and tried to present themselves as the patrons of whatever religion was practiced at a local level, be it Buddhism, Islam or even Catholicism in some Portuguese communities in the coast. Charney argues that this prevented for centuries the creation of communal identities based on religious beliefs, Buddhist or Muslim; and that these did not emerge until the late 18th century, and even then only under external influences.
There were Muslims in Arakan as early as the Ninth century but it is likely that their presence was not very strong. It was in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the Arakanese and Portuguese communities settled in Southern Bengal (then under the authority of the Arakanese court) started to raid Bengal for slaves and transferring thousands of them to Arakan. The Arakanese kings settled most of these slaves in Northern Arakan, but took the well-educated in Mrauk-U to serve in the court as functionaries.
Before its conquest by the Burmese in 1784, there was already a substantial rural Muslim population in Arakan. “Perhaps up to three-quarters of Danra-waddy’s [northern Arakan, including Sittwe and Mrauk-U] population by the 1770s may have been Muslim,” asserts Charney. Meanwhile, “some Bengali Muslims in Mrauk-U participated in the development of an elite Muslim culture in the royal city, perhaps reflecting their privileged backgrounds in Banga [Southern Bengal].”
It is worth mentioning that the border along the Naf River between the British-controlled Bengal and Arakan did not have the same meaning for the British and the Burmese. If, as Leach pointed out, pre-colonial Burma was a “wide imprecisely defined frontier region lying between India and China,” Arakan was a “frontier region” between Burma and Bengal.
Whatever border there was between Arakan and Bengal, it disappeared completely after the first Anglo-Burmese war (1824-1826), when Arakan passed to British hands. At that time, Charles Paton, the sub-Commissioner of Arakan, estimated that, from a total population of 100,000 people, 60 percent were ‘Mughs’ (Rakhine), 30 percent were ‘Mussalman’ (Muslims) and 10 percent ‘Burmese’. It is clear that those were highly tentative figures, but at the same time it’s impossible to deny that there was a substantial Muslim population in Arakan before the arrival of the British.
It is also undeniable that there was migration of Muslims from Chittagong during colonial times, and that not all of the newcomers were seasonal laborers. This immigration was encouraged by the British, something that was resented by the Buddhist Rakhine population and contributed to reinforce the communal divisions between Muslims and Buddhists in the region. There is no need to repeat here the arguments demonstrating this, the reader can review the article published by Mr. Tonkin to find extensive evidence for that.
The point is that there was a migratory wave of Muslims from Bengal in colonial times that joined an already sizeable Muslim population made up of the descendants of the slaves taken by the Portuguese and the Arakanese during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Present-day Rohingya are the descendants of both waves of migration, which intermingled to such a degree that now it would be impossible to distinguish who descends from one or the other.
In any case, as Lehman pointed out, it would be impossible “to reconstruct any demonstrable discrete ancestral group” for the people who now have chosen to call themselves Rohingya, as it would be impossible for any other Burmese ethnic group. But that does not imply that the Rohingya ethnicity is not real now. In any case, the Rohingya identity was not “invented” recently out of the blue, as some claim; it had been “gestating,” so to speak, for at least three hundred years, and the term itself was not new.
The “R-word”
The first known record of a very similar word to Rohingya used to refer to the Muslim inhabitants of Arakan is to be found in an article about the languages spoken in the “Burma empire” published by the Scottish physician Francis Buchanan in 1799.  He wrote: “I shall now add three dialects, spoken in the Burma Empire, but evidently derived from the language of the Hindu nation. The first is that spoken by the Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves Rooinga, or natives of Arakan.”
It has been argued that Rooinga (or Rohingya) derives from Rohang, the word used in Bengal to refer to Arakan, and thus was just another way to say Arakanese. Michael Charney suggests tentatively that “Rohingya may be a term that had been used by both Hindu and Muslim Bengalis living in Rakhaing [Arakan] since the sixteenth century, either as resident traders in the capital or as war captives resettled in the Kaladan River Valley.” But he is careful to point out that in the past “Rohingya and Rakhaing [Rakhine] were not mutually exclusive ethnonyms. Rakhaing’s topography may have led to Rohingya and Rakhaing emerging as separate versions of the same term in different geographical contexts that came, in the eighteenth century to be associated closely with the predominant religious makeup of the local area concerned.”
The evidence available shows that the term Rohingya was not widely used to describe a distinct ethnic group until the twentieth century. I would argue that the explanation for this is as simple as that there was no reason for the Rohingya to distinguish themselves in such a manner until the rise in Burma of the Bamar and other ethno-nationalisms against British colonialism.
The beginnings of the Burmese nationalist movement were strongly Buddhist in character, and some of the first nationalist leaders were monks. Thus, Burmese nationalism acquired a religious hue from the beginning. On the other hand, the Burmese have always viewed Indians with suspicion, and particularly Muslims. At that time, the general public did not distinguish much between Burmese Muslims and Indian Muslims, so Burmese Muslims felt they needed to distance themselves from Indian Muslims throughout the country.
The tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in Arakan, which had been mounting during colonial times, came to a head in the Second World War. When the British retreated to India and the Japanese advanced in Arakan, the Rakhine Buddhists sided mostly with the Japanese and the Burmese Independence Army of Aung San, while the Muslims were armed by the British; but the conflict soon turned into a civil war between Muslims and Buddhists. When the war ended, the north was mainly Muslim, the south was mainly Buddhist, and the communal divisions reached a point of no return.
Anti-Rohingya discourses often recall the Mujahid insurgency that took place in Arakan during the fifties. As the goal of some of the insurgents was the annexation of northern Arakan by East Pakistan, Rohingya are accused of disloyalty to the Burmese State. But there was scarcely any popular support for the rebellion, and many of its victims were Rohingya. In fact, some Rohingya leaders demanded U Nu to provide them with weapons in several occasions, a demand which was never met.
Meanwhile in Rangoon, Rakhine nationalists were pushing for a separate Arakan State, while Rohingya politicians, wary of their Rakhine neighbors after the Second World War sectarian violence, demanded a separate region in the north for them ruled directly by Rangoon. And during the Parliamentary period (1948-1962) and the first years of Ne Win’s dictatorship, there were not only many Rohingya organizations, both in Arakan and Rangoon, but the government recognized Rohingya as a Burmese ethnic group, as documents compiled by Dr. Zarni show.
It was the government of Ne Win and its military successors who denied Rohingya their rights and began to persecute them, from the mid-seventies until now. And it can be argued that, paradoxically, nothing has done more to reinforce the Rohingya identity than the attempts to suppress it.
Burma and its national identities
There is no historical precedent for an independent political entity for Burma as it exists now, and the different groups that make up the complex ethnic tapestry of Burma were never under the authority of a single government before the arrival of the British. Like many other post-Colonial countries, Burma emerged from British rule as a country deeply divided along ethnic and sectarian lines.
The Bamar was in some ways an underprivileged group during the colonial era but, after turning the tables in the Second World War, since independence it has become the privileged group. As a result of these competing nationalisms and the repeated attempts of the Bamar majority to impose its centralized vision of a Nation-State, the Burmese state has failed to generate a supra-national identity powerful enough to include and transcend the several ethno-nationalisms that awoke during colonial times.
The Rohingya identity is not more “artificial” or “invented” than any other, but the story of its ethnogenesis does not fit easily in the all too narrow concept of “national races” as is currently understood in Burma: ethnic groups which were already fully formed as we know them now in pre-colonial times. Others would also fail the test, because the test itself stems from a misunderstanding of ethnicity and group formation, but it is the political context that has determined that the Rohingya, and the Rohingya alone, should fail it. Their mere existence as a people is a serious challenge to the weak mainstream historical narrative imposed by the military regime.
This, and the Rohingya’s cultural, religious and linguistic differences, has made them expedient scapegoats in the context of a failed process of nation-building. Nothing glues together a divided community more than a common threat, real or imagined, and nothing has united the Rakhine and the Bamar more than identifying the Rohingya as their common enemy. The consequence is a campaign of ethnic cleansing that has been going on for decades. In this situation, it would be very naïve to believe that they are suffering such persecution because they have choose to call themselves Rohingya, a claim for ethnicity that they have as much right to make as any other community in Burma, instead of accepting the designation “Bengalis” enforced by the Burmese regime.
If, as Mr. Derek Tonkin claims, the word Rohingya “is offensive to many Burmese,” that tells us more about those Burmese than about the Rohingya themselves. Burmese define themselves and what it means to be Burmese in the very act of exclusion. What is at stake in the way that the Burmese nation treats and identifies the Rohingya and other Muslim communities is not only the future of those communities, but also the kind of Burma that the Burmese want to build for themselves.
Carlos Sardiña Galache is a freelance journalist based in Bangkok. A longer version of this essay is available hereYou can visit his website here.

Thursday, September 18, 2014

Corruption scandal: Thai Junta failing its first test { New Mandala

Corruption scandal: Junta failing its first test | New Mandala
15 SEPTEMBER 2014

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Days after being sworn in, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha’s cabinet is already facing its first corruption scandal and seems to be failing the test. Although the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) has engaged in wasteful spending that resembles Thaksin’s notorious populist policies, this is the first time that the public has been confronted with hard evidence of suspected corruption.
Last week Panadda Diskul, the Prime Minister Office’s Minister and the Permanent-Secretary of the same office, showed the press a new set of 89 microphones for the cabinet’s meeting room. Fitted with state-of-the-art anti-intelligence technology, each unit cost 145,000 baht. “Now the Thai cabinet is using the same technology as the White House,” boasted Panadda. These microphones are only the first lot of the 192 units to be delivered shortly after. They are part of a larger 255-million-baht scheme for the renovation of Government House approved by the NCPO. Because the renovation is being carried out in haste, it was waived from the normal procurement process. The supplier was chosen without bidding. Suspicion arose when the public investigated and found that the same microphone was displayed on the supplier’s website for only 99,000 baht. The government would have been paying a premium of 7.7 million baht.
Anyone familiar with public procurement will agree that an agency may obtain a worse deal than a private purchaser would. Thus, although this time the price is slightly too high, that can be justified. However, how the involved parties responded only raised more suspicions. Soon after the exposure, the supplier changed the price on its website to 199,000 baht while the NCPO kept mum on this issue. Panadda Diskul, who is in charge of overseeing Government House, claimed that he knew nothing about the installation of electronic devices and that it had been decided by the Department of Public Works and Town Planning. The Director-General of the Department then explained that the procurement has not been finalized yet — the supplier had delivered microphones before price negotiations. Later this week, the Department and the supplier negotiated the price down to 95,000 baht each. But further investigation revealed more purchases of outdated technology at inflated prices.
The microphone scandal confirms that the NCPO has no wisp of sincerity to curb corruption and restore transparency. Its anti-corruption campaign is propaganda, or worse, a tool to suppress political opponents of the elite establishment. If the junta truly wishes to fight corruption, Prayuth has to learn three lessons. First, transparency must begin at home. If his condemnation of former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra is more than mere hypocrisy, Prayuth must also act against the corruption within his own regime. He must discipline his men. The government must not bypass any procedural safeguards. Second, only a timely and honest investigation will satisfy the public’s doubt. Panadda must stop urging the public to rely on his and General Prayuth’s personal integrity. Panadda’s great grandfather was the highly revered minister of the Siamese court and the brother of King Rama V. But his esteemed lineage and Prayuth’s reputation as an honored Army Commander are no guarantees of accountability. Thaksin once used this tactic and failed. Third, Thais are not that stupid. Lame explanations lead to more distrust. Modern technology and the spread of information make attempted cover-ups futile. These old tactics employed by civilian politicians can only damage the junta’s legitimacy.
This is the first scandal of Prayuth’s regime, but surely it will not be the last. The perfect combination of absolute power and an inactive anti-corruption agency ensures more abuse of power. The NCPO, which has become the cabinet, is relieved of liability by the Interim Charter, and the National Anti-Corruption Commission is notorious for its inefficacy and bias. Despite the public uproar, the Commission announced that no irregularities were found: case dismissed. Assessment of public opinion is difficult because of ongoing suppression. But this should be enough to wake coup supporters up to the cruel reality that only democracy can fight corruption. They should stop justifying military corruption as a smaller and more acceptable corruption, a reward for overthrowing the Shinawatra family. For 80 years, military corruption has never ended civilian corruption. Democracy is not perfect but at least it offers freedom of expression and checks-and-balances, both of which are necessary for the struggle to build a more transparent Thailand.
When a civilian government failed the transparency test, many Thais rallied and invited the military in. For the coup to materialize, they sacrificed economic growth, rights and liberties, the rule of law, and human lives. But when the supposed savior scores badly on the same test, what punishment should be imposed on the junta and its supporters?
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang is a constitutional law scholar in Thailand


SBY good for the ‘big picture’, bad for the little people | New Mandala

SBY good for the ‘big picture’, bad for the little people | New Mandala
18 SEPTEMBER 2014




Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 10-year rule leaves Indonesia with mixed fortunes and a controversial legacy, writes Marcus Mietzner.
On 20 October, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 10-year rule will come to an end.
Limited by the constitution to two terms, Yudhoyono will hand over power to his successor Joko Widodo (popularly called “Jokowi”) who was elected in July. This constitutes the fourth peaceful transfer of presidential power in Indonesia since the country embarked on its democratic transition in 1998. For a nation that had seen its first two presidents overthrown in a wave of bloodshed, this is a remarkable achievement.
With Yudhoyono set to leave office, it is not surprising that heated debates about his legacy have emerged. Has Yudhoyono created a politically stable and economically prosperous democracy that is now the envy of an increasingly unsettled international community? Or has he missed the opportunity to take Indonesia to the next level, presiding over institutional stagnation rather than pushing for further reform? As is so often the case, the answer is not clear-cut, with Yudhoyono’s report card featuring both significant achievements and failures.
To begin with, there is no doubt that Yudhoyono’s presidency has been a period of unprecedented stability. Yudhoyono served longer than any of his democratic predecessors, and the length of his rule exceeded that of Indonesia’s first experiment with democracy between 1950 and 1957. During his rule, the level of communal violence declined, the 30-year civil war in Aceh was ended, and there were few intra-elite conflicts that would have threatened the stability of the country’s political and civil order.
Economically, Indonesia’s achievements under Yudhoyono’s rule look impressive as well. The economy grew at an average rate of around five per cent for a decade, per capita income tripled in that period, and the country joined the exclusive club of one-trillion-dollar economies.
In international affairs, Yudhoyono put Indonesia back on the map of regional and global powers. Indonesia’s leadership of ASEAN was undisputed under Yudhoyono’s rule, and the country was admitted to the G20, giving it a permanent and very visible role on the world stage.
But behind the façade of these successes, many of Indonesia’s structural problems have remained unaddressed. Indeed, the price Yudhoyono had to pay for maintaining overall stability was political stasis – he stayed away from launching potentially risky reforms that could have alienated one of his many coalition partners. As a result, Yudhoyono entrenched the status quo and neglected urgently needed initiatives for change.
One of the areas Indonesia has made little progress in is that of high-level political corruption. Pay-to-play arrangements, favouritism and collusion continue to drive the decision-making process in the political, economic and legal spheres. Yudhoyono’s own Democratic Party has been a particular focal point of such practices. Last week, yet another of the party’s senior executives – the Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Jero Wacik – was indicted for corrupting close to a million dollars from his department. The party’s chairman and treasurer had already been arrested over other cases.
Critically, Indonesia has also witnessed the erosion of religious minority rights under Yudhoyono’s rule. Reluctant to Islamic parties in his coalition, Yudhoyono allowed conservative Muslim groups to push for a new religious orthodoxy that eschewed liberal and moderate thought. Subsequently, radical militias began to attack members of the Ahmadi sect, Shiites and non-Muslim groups. Given this record, Yudhoyono’s critics were outraged when he was presented with an international religious tolerance award in 2013.
Similarly, international praise for Indonesia’s strong economic statistics has masked the fact that many ordinary citizens have not benefitted from the country’s economic growth. Much of Indonesia’s growth is fuelled by the capital-intensive commodities sector, which has produced large company profits but few additional jobs. Consequently, more than 60 per cent of Indonesians remain trapped in the informal sector, and 43 per cent continue to live on less than two dollars a day.
Critics have also pointed out that Yudhoyono failed to develop Indonesia’s infrastructure, leaving behind an out-of-date system of roads, ports and electricity networks. Under his government, Indonesia spent less than four per cent of its GDP on infrastructure development – half of what long-time ruler Suharto invested in the 1990s, and well below China’s average annual investment of around nine per cent. It’s no surprise Yudyohono’s successor Jokowi has identified the reform of Indonesia’s antiquated infrastructure as one of his main challenges.
A key reason for Yudhoyono’s failure to raise sufficient funds for infrastructure development was the maintenance of wasteful energy subsidies under his rule. In 2014, Indonesia spent US$ 33 billion on energy subsidies (fuel and electricity), which constituted 21 per cent of total government expenditure. These subsidies mostly benefit the middle class, and have long been criticised as nonsensical by economists. While aware of their irrationality, Yudhoyono feared that reducing the subsidies would lower his popularity, and he therefore decided to leave them in place.
Thus, Yudhoyono leaves behind a legacy that appears imposing at the macro-level but is problematic in many of the detailed policy fields that determine Indonesia’s overall direction. Given the importance of this complex legacy, this year’s Indonesia Update conference, to be held on 19 and 20 September at The Australian National University, will assess the Yudhoyono years.
The conference brings together distinguished scholars and practitioners to evaluate Yudhoyono’s legacy in the fields of politics, the economy, foreign affairs, the environment, gender relations, and others. It will be the first major attempt of a systematic examination of Yudhoyono’s rule and the challenges facing the incoming Jokowi government.
Whatever the final judgment on Yudhoyono will be, it is clear that he has been a key figure of contemporary Indonesian history, and he will continue to draw controversial assessments in the years to come.
Dr Marcus Mietzner is an associate professor in the Department of Political and Social Change at the Australian National University’s College of Asia and the Pacific.
Details for the 2014 Indonesia Update are available at http://bit.ly/2014IndoUpdate

Wednesday, September 3, 2014

Young Rohingya Woman Chases Dream of Peace and Justice in Burma | The Irrawaddy

Young Rohingya Woman Chases Dream of Peace and Justice in Burma | The Irrawaddy


RANGOON — Wai Wai Nu is a diminutive 27-year-old with pro-democracy activism in her genes and a quarter of her young life spent behind bars.

Activist Wai Wai Nu at her office in Rangoon. (Photo: Thin Lei Win / Thomson Reuters Foundation)

The former political prisoner is now working to end the persecution faced by her people, the stateless Rohingya Muslims in western Burma.
The mistreatment she and her family have suffered is just one example among many of abuse aimed at the Rohingya, a minority of around 1.33 million living mainly in Arakan State. Most are denied citizenship despite having lived in Burma for generations.
Wai Wai is one of Burma’s brave, articulate and clear-sighted women working on countering the extremist views that tend to dominate the dialogue over religious intolerance and communal violence.
Whether the discussion is about the Rohingya or women’s right to marry men of their choice, firebrand Buddhist monks and nationalists have successfully stoked Buddhist-Muslim tensions.
“Right now, the Buddhists are becoming more afraid of the Muslims and vice versa. Everybody feels insecure,” she told Thomson Reuters Foundation in her sparsely-furnished office at the top of a six-story building in Burma’s main city, Rangoon.
“There is little contact, trust or relationship between the communities at the moment so it’s easy for an agent provocateur to incite riots and hatred.”
Wai Wai’s ambitions are long-term: peaceful co-existence of different groups in Burma, especially in her home state Arakan, also known as Rakhine, and an end to injustice.
“We would like Rakhine State to be a fair, developed and prosperous state for everyone, regardless of their race or religion,” she said.
Her organization, Women Peace Network Arakan, conducts training to promote better understanding between the communities. She is also one of the few advocating for the rights of Rohingya women, who suffer multiple layers of discrimination.
Election to Imprisonment
Wai Wai was 18 and studying law when she was arrested in 2005. Her crime was to be the daughter of Kyaw Min, a Rohingya who was elected as member of Parliament in the 1990 elections, the results of which were ignored by Burma’s military rulers.
A former state education official in Buthidaung in northern Arakan State, Kyaw Min was also a member of the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament, a group of MP-elects from the 1990 vote led by Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.
The family had moved to Rangoon in the early 1990s after Kyaw Min faced repeated harassment from the authorities.
More than a decade later, the whole family was rounded up—Kyaw Min first, the rest two months later—and charged under state security and immigration laws. Activists say the junta wanted to silence Kyaw Min’s championing of labor rights.
“Ever since I was young, I wanted understand law to make sense of the injustices that were occurring in the country,” Wai Wai recalled.
“When we were jailed, my mother said, ‘Well now is the opportunity to do so in a real, practical way,’ so I guess I was lucky,” she added, laughing.
The trial was held behind closed doors, without their lawyer, and the judge refused to listen to them, she said. Kyaw Min was sentenced to 47 years, and the rest of the family—the wife, two daughters and a son—got 17 years each.
“We were shocked into silence. My father was already 60.”
“I remember turning to the judge and saying, ‘Thank you for the sentence. Our grandmother lived a very long life so we will be ok.’ I also told my dad not to feel bad,” she said.
“I only burst into tears when I got back to my cell,” she added, losing her composure for the first time and wiping tears from her eyes.
The Prison Years
Wai Wai spent seven years in Insein Prison, notorious for its harsh regime and squalid conditions.
She found the mental anguish of imprisonment the most difficult thing to deal with, and kept herself busy. One way was to talk to other female prisoners. Most were arrested for prostitution, running small-scale gambling businesses or drugs.
“They were very young. Some were even younger than me,” Wai Wai said.
“They had to do these jobs because there is no other choice. Is it their fault they don’t have opportunities?”
Hearing their stories turned her into a feminist and made her want to help marginalized women, she said. “I couldn’t wallow in self-pity after meeting them. Insein Prison was my university about life.”
Still, the privations of prison life left long-lasting scars on the family. Her father’s health deteriorated and her sister contracted liver disease that almost killed her.
All the family members were released in January 2012, together with hundreds of other political prisoners, under the new government of President Thein Sein, which took power in 2011 and embarked on a series of political and economic reforms.
Conditions for the Rohingya in Arakan State, however, have only got worse.
Being Stateless
Kyaw Min won the 1990 elections as a Rohingya politician. The term has always been debated but it was not the political lighting rod that it is now, made worse after religious clashes in June and October 2012 left 140,000 people homeless, mostly Rohingya.
The government and ordinary Burmese use the term Bengalis, implying they are illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh.
“The Rohingya used to lead dignified, respectful lives. They were not always stateless. My parents, grandparents and great-grandparents were citizens,” Wai Wai said.
A citizenship law enacted in 1982 back-paddled history, took away the Rohingya’s citizenship, and imposed restrictions on travel, education and jobs, she said.
“Not having this little ID card affects the whole community. It allows the violation of basic human rights and takes away people’s dignity and mental well-being,” Wai Wai said.
On Sept. 15, the world’s first forum on statelessness will open at The Hague, focusing on the estimated 10 million stateless people worldwide. Wai Wai hopes it will raise the issue of Rohingya.
“How is it that our fathers were in the government service and able to run in and win elections but that is no longer possible during our time?” she asked.
She blames the negative perception towards the Rohingya—which stereotypes the group as polygamous and criminal—on decades-old propaganda by the military.
The United Nations has said the Rohingya are “virtually friendless” amongst Burma’s other ethnic and religious communities. Even human rights activists, including Aung San Suu Kyi, have failed to speak up on the Rohingya’s behalf.
“We too sacrificed many things for the same cause—democracy—and we too are working towards a better future for our country,” Wai Wai said.
“So it really hurts when human rights advocates say Rohingya shouldn’t have rights.
“But then, our history has been erased by the junta so it’s not their fault. It’s the system’s fault,” she added.


Monday, September 1, 2014

Australian mining activist blacklisted in Malaysia | Asian Correspondent

Australian mining activist blacklisted in Malaysia | Asian Correspondent
  Sep 01, 2014 
An Australian mining activist who had joined Malaysians to rally against Lynas Corp. has been banned from entering Malaysia.
Sydney-based supporters for Natalie Lowrey said she was detained by customs official upon arrival in  Malaysia.
Lowrey is reportedly on the blacklist of the police headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and her deportation back to Australia has been scheduled shortly. She is expected to fly to Sydney at the early hours of Tuesday from Bali.
Supporters decry the arrest saying she is refused entry because she is “an observer on the criminalisation of environmental defenders against Australian rare earth miner, Lynas.”
Australian Greens Senator Lee Rhiannon and Natalie Lowlrey at the Lynas headquarter in Sydney after her release from detention in June. (Photo: Supplied)
Lowrey and 15 Malaysians were arrested at a protest in June for pressing the Malaysian government to shutdown operations of the Lynas Advanced Material Plant (LAMP) in Kuantan.
She was detained for six days, then released without charge and  without notification of being unable to return to the country. The other Malaysians are being tried under the Malaysia’s Penal Code.
“Their charges against the 15 peaceful Malaysian citizens arrested with me on June 22 must be dropped including the Gag order that was part of their bail conditions. I was released with no charge so why are they facing a trial, which if convicted, may include jail time?” Lowrey said.
Stop Lynas Campaign said concerned citizens across Malaysia are appealing to the international community to apply pressure on the Malaysian government and Lynas about the lack of transparency of waste management at the LAMP. Supporters also blast the police intimidation tactics against environmental defenders, including members of the grass roots movement Himpunan Hijau.
 “The Malaysian government must allow the full enjoyment of environmental and human rights, including the right to defend rights and ensure that corporations operating within it’s country respect the rights of nature, people, and rights defenders.”continued Lowrey.
Local Kuantan resident Seet Ping and secretary of the grassroots movement Himpunan Hijau (Green Assembly) said LAMP poses serious threat of toxic and radioactive wastes in their neighbourhood. He added, the firm’s facilities were “quietly built in our backyards without us knowing about it, and day by day the toxic radioactive wastes are piling up in open storage ponds in the plant which is situated in a low lying swampy area exposed to yearly extreme monsoon weathers.”
The campaign group said thousands of Malaysians have mobilised against Lynas over the past three years. “We have collected 1.2 million physical signatures within 36 days in a petition calling for the Lynas Advanced Materials Plant to be shut down. We want Lynas to pack up, clean up and get out of Malaysia.”
 Lowrey said “The neoliberal model of ‘development” is destroying the environment and pitting communities and eco-defenders against powerful corporations and colluding police and governments all around the world.”
Lynas has been contacted by Asian Correspondent for comments.